

THE PARTICIPATION OF UGANDA IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS; A CASE
STUDY OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM).

BY

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Abstract

This study focuses on the role of Uganda in peacekeeping missions around Africa. Uganda has for years since its independence tried to help fellow African countries achieve peace despite the insecurities and civil wars it has experienced and this has been through helping the countries fighting off rebel groups, providing food and health aid. This study focuses on how Uganda under the current government, National Resistance Movement, has managed to bring peace to its neighbour Somalia under the slogan of 'African solutions for African Problems. Uganda's spirit of Pan-Africanism has motivated the country to give a ray of hope to the war torn country Somalia. Since Uganda under the AMISOM deployed to Somalia, there has been a great improvement in the peace and security status of the country. A sample of 35 people was used which included army personnel and academicians. Literature review was also utilized to compare different case studies similar to the one Somalia had. The study concluded that Uganda plays a big role in peacekeeping in Africa which brings peace to the region hence all African countries should follow suit in standing up for a safer Africa.

Declaration

I SheritaBusingye hereby declare that this research is my own work except where sources have been acknowledged. I also declare that this work has never been submitted as a requirement for any degree at any university.

Signed:

Student.....Date.....

Supervisor.....Date.....

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Dedication.

This book is dedicated to my lovely daughter Crystal ShaniKabahumaKaheru.

List of Abbreviations

AMISOM.....African Union Mission In Africa

AU.....African Union

DRC.....Democratic Republic Of Congo

ECOMOG.....Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group.

EU..... Union

ICUIslamic Courts Union

IGADInter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGASOM.....Inter-Governmental Authority on Development In Somalia.

LRA.....Lords Resistance Army

OAUOrganization of African Unity

NGO.....Non-Governmental Organisation

NRM.....National Resistance Movement

RTF.....Regional Task Force

SALWSmall Arms and Light Weapons

SNASomali National Army

TCC.....Troop Contributing Countries

TFG.....Transitional Federal Government

USC.....United Somali Congress

UK.....United Kingdom.

UN.....United Nations.

UNSOA.....And United Nations Support Office ForAmisom

US.....United States.

UPDFUgandan People’s Defense Force

WHO.....World Health Organisation.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this research was to examine Uganda's participation and reasons for intervening in the Somalia civil war, the contributions Uganda made towards the civil war in Somalia under AMISOM and the challenges and successes of the mission. This chapter gives the background to the study, the statement of the problem and purpose of the study. Research questions and objectives that were used to guide this study are also included in this chapter. These are followed by study limitations and delimitations and assumptions which determined the scope of the research study.

Marco (2014) stated that many African countries have been involved in peacekeeping missions within and outside Africa. Wars of independence and civil conflict filled the power vacuum left by the post-World War II withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa. Almost 40% of all UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) have occurred in Africa.

The continent currently hosts nearly half of all active UN peacekeeping missions and the UN missions created in the last 10 years, 60 percent have been in Africa, (Paterson, 2008). Uganda under the leadership of the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) has served as a peacekeeping mission in countries including Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Congo, Kenya, and South Sudan. Currently, Uganda is in Somalia under the

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. AMISOM's actual birth can be traced to January 2007 when the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council voted to assume the mandate and responsibility from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for a peacekeeping mission in Africa. Moving the mandate from IGAD to the AU was a result of needing greater African military involvement in the operation, (Ishahilidza 2012). The mission was to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and strategic infrastructures (the port and airport) in Mogadishu from the insurgents who had strengthened their position as Ethiopian forces withdrew and to provide support for humanitarian assistance for the Somali population, (Cilliers 2010). Additionally, AMISOM was mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and create necessary conditions for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia, (Cilliers 2010). Fisher, (2007) observed that since February 2007, over 5,000 Ugandan soldiers had been sent to Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Uganda remains both the largest contributor of troops and the major African coordinator of the operation. The Ugandan government has explained the Ugandan intervention in terms of regional responsibility, African solidarity and domestic interests.

Following the unsuccessful interventions by the UN in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), many Western countries exhibited fatigue and reduced their involvement in peace initiatives on the continent. Indeed, these countries have been accused of abandoning Africa to its own fate (Adebayo, 2008). The so-called “Africa fatigue” by the Western countries, both motivated and necessitated the continent’s leaders to step-up and devise ‘African solutions to African problems’. It is in this context that the African Union (AU) has mandated a range of peacekeeping missions, among them, AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to respond to the complex conflicts that have engulfed the continent, (Ndwimana2013). This research therefore is an analysis of Uganda’s contribution to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Uganda’s peace keeping history.

The Ugandan government has served as part of a peacekeeping and peacemaking mission in several countries depending on its own resources and also under the UN and AU. Marco (2014) remarked that Uganda’s peace operations are driven by several political imperatives. The Ugandan government has deployed significant peacekeepers within Africa, reflecting a commitment on the part of the leadership to address some of the continent’s security concerns. Furthermore, these missions have all been AU-authorized and not UN led indicating a preference for African led initiatives. Since coming to power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) was engaged in

combat in northern Uganda until 2006 and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) until 2003, (Marco, 2013). Some of the other missions include the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) created in 1993 to avoid the Rwanda war from spilling over into Uganda. The United Nations active involvement in Rwanda started in 1993, when Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of military observers along the common border to prevent the military use of the area by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Security Council in June 1993 established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the border to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda. Marco, (2014) noted that Uganda also sent troops backed by the U.S Special Forces to lead the hunt for fugitive war lord Joseph Kony in Central African Republic. In the same way the Ugandan police also deployed in Liberia in 2005 by providing troops headed by the Deputy Force Commander Brigadier Ivan Koreta to the UN Mission in Liberia. On 7 August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standing Mediation Committee established a military observer group (ECOMOG), to help resolve an armed internal conflict which had broken out in Liberia the previous year. Liberian civil war was an internal conflict in Liberia from 1989 until 1997, (Marco, 2014). Uganda has also helped in the mediation process between the Democratic Republic of Congo government (DRC) in Kinshasa and M23 rebels and when the second phase of the second civil war started, Uganda volunteered to deploy its troops. Also recently Uganda deployed in South Sudan using its own resources with the reason of its deployment being to protect its own security and economic interests since South Sudan is the largest market beyond its own borders.

Almost every tomato, potato, bean and egg that is consumed in South Sudan comes from Uganda (Schlindwein 2014). Currently Uganda is in Somalia under AMISOM as part of a peacekeeping mission since March 2007 to assist in the peacekeeping and peace building in the war torn Somalia.

1.1.2 History of the Somalia war

Roth (2004) stated that Somalia's political situation is an ideal example of the hardships and disunity that many African nations have encountered in the post-colonialist era. Since its independence in 1960, Somalia has encountered political, economic, and cultural instability. Along with the majority of African nations, colonialism has had a dramatic effect on Somalia. Although the reign of colonial powers in Somalia ended more than fifty years ago, it still continues to greatly affect the country. Since 1991 Somalia has undergone many changes in its political structure boundaries drawn in colonial times, even if unchanged after independence, still create enormous problems of national unity, especially in Africa. Since the collapse of SiyadBarre's regime several areas of Somalia have created their own governments due to the lack of a centralized national government. Somaliland, Puntland, and the recently declared Southwestern Somalia have established relatively stable governments.

Farah I, Abdirashid& Jeremy, (2002) observed thatSomalia is located in the Horn of Africa bordering the Gulf of Eden and the Indian Ocean. Its population, estimated to be

between 9 and 12 million people, shares a common language (Somali), religion (Sunni Muslim), and the same ethnic origin (the Somali tribe). The majority of the population estimated at 65% adheres to a primarily pastoral nomadic tradition.

Roth (2004) observed that the lack of a centralized state has been a boon for Somaliland and Puntland, as the absence of the corruption and repression that characterized the previous government has facilitated local economic activity. The contrasts between the troubled central and southern regions and the relatively peaceful and stable north are dramatic. In Somaliland and Puntland, the presence of few regulations, nominal taxation, and negligible price controls has encouraged the establishment of many new businesses; but the stability in these areas is indeed relative, and entrepreneurs remain vulnerable to theft and violence. This risk is much greater in the unstable southern and central portions of the country, in which domination by clan militias, banditry, and looting make the free movement of people, goods, and services nearly impossible

Farah, Hussein & Lind, (2001) observed that the country is currently embroiled in civil war which broke out in early 1991 after the former Somali president Mohammed SiadBarre was ousted by armed Somali rebel groups. Somalia saw the launch of a new interim Constitution, the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament and the swearing in of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on September 10, 2012. These political and security developments are considered as milestones in the stabilization of the country and have created hope that herald the

beginning of a broader political process that will involve and embrace all the Somali population. For the first time in a generation, a possible safe, secure and prosperous Somalia, at peace with itself and its neighbours, seems more likely than a distant dream (Nduwimana, 2013).

The nature of the Somali crisis and the international context within which it is occurring has been constantly changing. It has mutated from a civil war in the 1980s, through state collapse, clan factionalism and warlordism in the 1990s. The collapse of the Somali state was the consequence of a combination of internal and external factors. Externally, there were the legacies of European colonialism that divided the Somali people into five states, the impact of Cold War politics in shoring up a predatory state, and the cumulative effect of wars with neighbouring states, most damagingly the 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia. Internally, there were contradictions between a centralized state authority, and a fractious kinship system and the Somali pastoral culture in which power is diffused (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

Dersso,(2009) observes that it has been many years since the eruption of this conflict following the demise of the government of Siad Barre. During his term, the conflict fluctuated in terms of its intensity, the nature of actors involved as well as its dimensions and dynamics. Currently, the conflict is raging on between the militarily weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and their supporters on the one hand and Al Shaabab and other fundamentalist groups on the other. Other groups that contributed

to this conflict were Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA). This conflict is not a sudden and inexplicable eruption. Rather, the conflict is a result of the interplay of multiple historical, social and political processes that have shaped the political and socio-economic structure of Somalia (Dersso, 2009). The Somali civil war has multiple and complex causes including political, economic, cultural and psychological. Various external and internal actors have played different roles during the various stages of the conflict. The root causes of the Somali conflict is due to the competition for resources and power, a repressive state and the colonial legacy, politicised clan identity, the availability of weapons, the large numbers of unemployed youth, and certain aspects of the Somali culture that sanction the use of violence (Afyare & Abdullahi, n.d)

Bradbury (2010) noted that by 1988–90 the Somali Armed Forces began engaging various armed rebel groups, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the northeast, the Somali National Movement in the northwest, and the United Somali Congress in the south. The clan-based armed opposition groups eventually managed to overthrow the government in 1991. Various factions began competing for influence in the power vacuum that followed, which precipitated an aborted UN peacekeeping attempt in the mid-1990s. Fartaag, (2013) wrote that, in 2000, the Transitional National Government was established, followed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. In 2006, the TFG, assisted by Ethiopian troops, seized most of the south from the newly formed Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU subsequently splintered into more radical groups,

notably Al-Shabaab, which has since been fighting the Somali government and the AU-mandated AMISOM intervention force for control of the country. Nduwimana (2013) remarked that AMISOM is a peace-enforcement mission that by October 2013 had troops drawn from Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Djibouti. To date, AMISOM has had significant, albeit limited, achievements in addressing insecurity in Somalia. Thus far, AMISOM has effectively evicted the militant and insurgent Al-Shabaab, credited with most of the insecurity in Somalia, from most major urban centers in southern Somalia, including the capital city Mogadishu. In March 2005, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) accepted to shoulder responsibility for fielding a peacekeeping mission in Somalia on behalf of the African Union (AU) and in support of the peace process in the country. In March 2006 the IGAD efforts of deploying a peacekeeping mission in Somalia were considered to have failed, a confirmation that was made by the then Kenya's foreign affairs minister. Throughout 2006, IGAD members continued pursuing solutions to these problems until the African Union (AU) assumed direct responsibility for the peacekeeping mission and fielded the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in January 2007 (Ishahilidza, 2012).

1.1.3 Uganda under AMISOM

Uganda currently has over 5,000 soldiers and officers from the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) serving with the AMISOM mission, along with troops from Burundi and Djibouti. Erickson, (2013), says that Uganda has allowed itself to become one of the most influential regional actors in Somalia's civil war. As the largest troop contributor to the African

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Uganda has several stakes in the political and military process. Fisher (2007) noted that the government of Uganda has explained the Ugandan intervention in terms of regional responsibility, African solidarity and domestic interests. The Ugandan government remains the largest contingent in AMISOM with 6,223 troops based in Sector 1 which comprises of Banadir (Mogadishu), Middle and Lower Shabelle regions until now. Uganda has deployed 12 battle groups into the Mission area. The deployed Battle Group 12 joined their Burundian counterparts in Baidoa (Marco, 2014). However, up-to-date Somalia is still not a war free zone and the country is still undergoing war and internal conflict despite of all the support Uganda and other countries has offered under the UN and other voluntary missions from other countries. The security situation inside Somalia remains unstable and dangerous, Piracy and other criminal activities are still ongoing, deaths of Somali nationals and the displacement of more people due to conflicts still exists in Somalia.

Fisher, (2007) wrote that President Museveni's decision to intervene in Somalia is an example of the government's multi-pronged 'image management' strategy in which the President has involved Uganda in numerous foreign and domestic activities to ensure that donors perceive his government differently vis-à-vis their interests: as an economic success story, a guarantor of regional stability and an ally in the global war on terror. Additionally, Fisher (2007) states that by combining actions such as the sending of troops to Somalia with the skilful engagement of Western media organisations and donor officials and the use of public relations firms, the regime has been able to convince its

development partners to see it primarily as a useful regional ally worthy of support rather than as a corrupt, semi-authoritarian ‘success story gone wrong’ worthy of censure. Mwesigwa (2011) commented that there are perceptions that the Uganda People’s Defence force uses Uganda’s conflict to sustain its political influence and privileges.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The current drivers of the Ugandan government interest in the Somalia conflict are not well understood. Eriksson (2013) asserts that there are signs of an improved security situation in the Somalia conflict. Most notably, the external military intervention by AMISOM to which Uganda is a member has reduced the threat from armed opposition at least.

However, while Al Shabaab, Somalia’s main Jihadist group, has suffered severe military losses it is by no means defeated. It is assumed that the government of Uganda’s decision to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 2007 as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had as much to do with Uganda's relationship with its donors than it has with maintaining regional stability and this had to do with the benefits gained from this relationship for example the source of income to the Ugandan troops in form of wages. Over a long period of the civil war, neighbouring countries and the international community have developed interests in the political trajectory of the

country. Understanding and harmonizing interests of all these parties is crucial to deflect negative forces from affecting the peace building agenda. Therefore, this study aims to examine the role and interest of Uganda in intervening in Somalia and the impact of the intervention in peacekeeping and security in the region.

1.3 Purpose of the study.

The aim of this research was to examine Uganda's participation in peacekeeping missions and the motivating factor for the intervention in the Somali conflict and also find out the progress and challenges of the mission and how the intervention has helped in the promotion of peace and security in the region.

1.4 Significance of the study

The study hopes to provoke researchers' attention on issues regarding peacekeeping missions in Africa and their relevance. Through this research, the readers will gain deeper insights in Uganda's peacekeeping mission in Somalia and the impact of the intervention on peace and security in the region. In addition, the study will help understand the successes and challenges faced by AMISOM and help evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by the Ugandan Mission in Somalia. Furthermore, the study will also make a contribution to the theory and practice of peacekeeping mission in Africa.

1.5 Research objectives

The objectives of the study were to:

1. Examine the factors that led to Uganda's intervention in the Somalia crisis through the AMISOM;
2. Identify the objectives of the AMISOM in peacekeeping mission and regional stability;
3. Assess the successes and contributions of the Ugandan government's participation while in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia
4. Assess the challenges of the Ugandan government's peacekeeping participation in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

1.6 Research Questions

The study sought to answer the following questions;

1. What reasons motivated Uganda to intervene in the crisis on Somalia?
2. What are the objectives of AMISOM in peacekeeping mission and regional stability?
3. What are the successes of the Ugandan government's participation in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia?
4. What are the challenges of the Ugandan government's participation in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia?

1.7 Delimitation of the study

This study focuses on Uganda as a peace keeping mission in Somalia. Uganda has been involved in several other peace keeping missions in Africa but this study only focused on the Somalia mission. Likewise, several countries have pledged and deployed troops to Somalia but this study concentrated only on Uganda's involvement due to the availability of time and resources.

1.8 Limitations of the study

One of the major difficulties the researcher faced was the acquiring information from government personnel since they considered the data as classified information and that most of them were not available. This was managed by the researcher asking some of the respondents to refer her to fellow respondents and help in making appointments for interviews.

Another limitation was not being able to travel to Somalia and get direct information from the Somalis themselves and this was reduced by using the desk research for the information that cannot be gotten directly from those based in Somalia and interviewing 4 Somali citizens staying in Uganda.

1.9 Assumptions

This research was based on the following assumptions:

That Uganda's involvement is not merely based on the spirit of Pan-Africanism but also on trying to safe guard its security within its boundaries.

What Uganda is gaining from the war for example; the mission is a source of income for the Ugandan troops hence justifying its involvement.

President Museveni's decision to intervene in Somalia is an example of the government's multi-pronged 'image management' strategy in which the President has involved Uganda in numerous foreign and domestic activities to ensure that donors perceive his government positively.

1.10 Definition of terms

Peacekeeping. Carvalho (2010) describes peacekeeping as the use of military, police and civilian personnel to protect civilians ensure environmental sustainability, and protecting human rights.

Mission. A special organized assignment or operation assigned to a group of people.

Intervention. The act of engaging or interposing in ones affairs to improve a situation in an environment or country.

Conflict. A disagreement or misunderstanding between one or more parties.

1.11 Conclusion

The chapter shows the history of how Uganda has played a role in promoting peace in Africa and through this different missions were highlighted showing Uganda's continuous engagement in fighting for African peace. The chapter highlights AMISOM as a mission and its obligations in Somalia. Also presented in the section is objectives and problem statement of the research which guides the researcher through the findings of Uganda's continuous involvement the Somali civil war. The chapter also showed the delimitations and limitations that guided this research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of the related literature on the subject of peacekeeping missions as presented by various researchers and scholars. The researcher drew materials from books and journal articles, which are closely related to the theme and the objectives of the study. The relevant concepts that have been used in the analysis; peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, challenges and complex mission, are described and the relationship between them established. The chapter begins with the literature from different scholars on peacekeeping plus challenges and achievements faced during these missions

2.1 Conceptualizing peacekeeping.

Definition of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping refers to activities that tend to create conditions that favour lasting peace. Peacekeeping refers to the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundations of sustainable peace (James, 1990). This involves the protection of civilians, environmental sustainability, ensuring, promotion and protecting human rights. It is one of the most effective tools available to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping is the imposition of neutral and lightly armed

interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory those forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved, (Diehl 1994: 13). Fortna & Howard, (2008) suggested that the term peacekeeping generally refers to the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security.

Caplan (2001) argues that peacekeeping refers to the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states. Most peacekeeping operations are undertaken with the authorization of, and are often led by, the United Nations (UN) but regional organizations may also conduct peacekeeping operations, and in some cases single states have undertaken such operations as well. Peacekeeping forces are normally deployed with the consent of the parties to a conflict and in support of a ceasefire or other agreed upon peace measures. Peacekeeping forces are therefore usually unarmed or only lightly armed and use the minimum of force necessary and then only exceptionally. Peace enforcement refers to the use of military assets to enforce a peace against the will of the parties to a conflict when, for instance, a ceasefire has failed. Peace enforcement often exceeds the capacity of peacekeeping forces and is thus better executed by more heavily armed force.

Bellamy, (2009) argues that problem solving and critical approaches to peace operations can be distinguished along three lines; their purpose, their understanding of the social world and their position on the relationship between theory and practice. Whilst there has been an explosion of literature on the strength, weaknesses and experience of peacekeepers and peace operation, there have been very little reflections that peace operations fulfill within it. He further quotes that the challenge to 'think anew' about peace operations raises fundamental epistemological and ontological issues. Robert Cox, (1981) argued that knowledge is never politically neutral; 'it is always for someone and for some purpose'. All theories have a perspective. Knowledge can thus serve two distinct purposes, it can act as a guide to help solve problems that arise within a particular perspective, or it can reflect upon the process of theorizing itself and enquire into how it relates to other perspectives.

James. (1990) stated that peace operations maintain and are informed by a particular understanding of international peace and security that is ostensibly compatible with the capitalist global political economy. Global capitalism creates peripheral regions of the global economy where the state and economic development collapse into anarchy and competition between warlords, who use violence to serve their economic interests, (Pugh 2003).

Cox & Duffield, (2001) argue that peace support operations serve a narrow, problem solving purpose to doctor the dysfunctions of the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism. Two dynamics in world politics might be exploited to mobilize a counter hegemonic transformation in global governance. First, a radical change in the global trade system and its problematic institutions will create opportunities to emancipate the weak from economic hegemony. Second, future network wars are likely to require increasingly subtle and flexible teams, similar to disaster relief experts, to supply preventive action, economic aid and civilian protection. This might only be achieved by releasing peace support operations from the state-centric control system, and making them answerable to more transparent, more democratic and accountable multinational institutions.

UN definition of peacekeeping.

Toyama (2013) noted that peacekeeping, as defined by the United Nations, refers to ways to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace. UN peacekeepers, soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries, monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. All operations must include the resolution of

conflicts through the use of force to be considered valid under the charter of the United Nations.

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has grown immensely since the end of the cold war, and a plethora of studies have examined the prospect of peacekeeping with respect to its failures and successes. These upsurges suggest that the nature of conflicts have changed from regional to internal conflicts occurring within the borders of states, thereby making peace effort to be achieved with difficulties. The UN peacekeeping interventions were sometimes deemed successful in some cases such as El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Mozambique and failures in others such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia. However, if one considers the civil war interventions, the interesting question is not only why the UN succeeded or failed but also what factor accounts for the successes or failures in Africa.

Structure of the United Nations peacekeeping teams as of 2013.

Toyama (2013) noted that according to the United Nations Security Council, peacekeeping forces are contributed by member states on a voluntary basis. Under the United Nations as of 31 December 2013, the total size of the peacekeeping force is 98,200 police, troops, and military experts. European nations contribute nearly 6,000 units to this total. Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are among the largest individual

contributors with around 8,000 units each. African nations contributed nearly half the total, almost 44,000 units. Peacekeeping troops are not ever heavily armed. They are there to assist the process of peace. Every peacekeeping mission is authorized by the Security Council.

History of peacekeeping and how it evolved.

Dawson (2004), commented that since the end of the Cold War (1948-1989), international organizations have repeatedly engaged in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking to help solve international and intra-national problems. Although conflict resolution is a regular feature of the international landscape, these operations achieved mixed results and others had less impressive cases. Peacekeeping is a temporary solution but it helps the state take on its responsibility to protect civilians by supporting security sector reform and rule of law development. The nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be strengthened as argued by Hammarskjöld where by providing security and support, peacekeepers play an enabling role for national and international actors to implement long-term peacebuilding measures in areas such as police, rule of law, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

Oxfam policy compendium (2012), noted that the UN peacekeeping missions have shifted from traditional peacekeeping towards multidimensional missions whose tasks include anything from supporting elections to protecting civilians. Peacekeeping missions can only function with the necessary troop's equipment, resources and training. It is also the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.

Bellamy (2009) stated that one of the earliest attempts to think conceptually about peace operations began by identifying the roles that peacekeepers ought fulfill before moving on to show how they might fulfill those roles more effectively . He further argued that although it is important to understand what peacekeepers actually do and to think instrumentally about how they might do it better, this should not constitute the limit of theoretical engagement with peace operations as it has tended to do in the past. It may well be the case, for example, that by maintaining and reproducing a particular type of world order, UN member states are partly responsible for creating the problems they are trying to resolve.

The principal purpose of peacekeeping missions is to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long term conflict resolution efforts by the parties themselves. Traditional peacekeeping tends to take place in the period of a

conflict between a ceasefire and a political settlement. It aims to facilitate conflict resolution by creating a degree of confidence between belligerents that opens up a space for political dialogue, (Bellamy, 2004).

It is stated that certain non-mandated/unofficial activities conducted by peacekeepers (such as providing support to local community initiatives) are often crucially important to the local population. Such activities have not been included in dominant accounts of what peacekeepers do, and stamens calls for a reconfiguring of our 'common sense' in order to appreciate their political role and potential (Bellamy, 2004).

United Nations peacekeeping missions

Boutros BoutrosGhali (1992) described *Peace-keeping as* the deployment of United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. He further expressed himself at the UN summit meeting about peacekeeping that peacekeeping is about;

- *To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;*
- *Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflicts,*

- *Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;*
- *To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war*

African Union Mandate

Ndiwimana (2013) stated that the United Nations Security Council states that AMISOM's original mandate included supporting the TFG and its institutions in their efforts at stabilising the country and advancing the process of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance, and creating conditions that were conducive to long-term stability, reconstruction and development in Somalia.

In order to fulfil these objectives, AMISOM was given the overarching tasks of:

1. Supporting dialogue and reconciliation, working with key stakeholders,
2. Providing, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions and their key infrastructure in order to enable them to carry out their functions,
3. Assisting in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan, particularly the re-establishment and training of Somali security forces,

4. Providing, within their capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts,
5. Monitoring, in areas of deployment, the security situation
6. Facilitating, as may be required and within their capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons
7. Protecting its own personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence.

Ishahilidza (2012) Stated that the AU was mandated with the primary responsibility for establishing and operationalizing the continent's peace and security structure. The ruling Constitutive Act of the organization affirmed the application of the right to intervention. This in principle implied that all member states had agreed to give up some of their sovereign powers to enable the AU act as the ultimate guarantor and protector of the rights and well-being of the African people. Consequently, the Peace and Security Council was established as a legal institution of the AU through the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council in 2002. According to the Indicative Work Program of the Peace and Security Council, the AU would endeavor to be present on the ground where there was a need for a peace operation. Whether as a stand-alone AU operation or in partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the UN and others, the AU indicated its commitment to being active in post-conflict reconstruction. This actually meant that the African Standby Force needed to become operational sooner rather than later to ensure that there was the required enforcement capacity to

consolidate peace agreements and intervene when and where necessary, (Ndiwimana 2013).

In the AU policy brief written in 2010, it was noted that the AMISOM mandate is not achievable because, contrary to the requirements set out by the Brahimi Panel, the force lacked the means and resources to do the job properly. The prevailing AMISOM mandate, besides being weak, was also not achievable because of the lack of substantive political support from within the region and internationally. Since Western disengagement in the mid-1990s the AU had assumed much greater leadership and involvement on the continent. In addition to leading on the peace process and attempting to find African solutions to African problems, Africa had been called upon to ‘spill blood’, while the international community, particularly the West, simply donates money.

Marco (2014) stated that peacekeeping reflects Uganda’s broader international relations in dealing with the UN and other bodies. It is based on a pragmatic strategy driven by national interests underscored by Pan-Africanism. Although Uganda has consistently contributed peacekeepers to UN missions, the numbers are far lower than neighboring states and other countries with similar defense capabilities and budgets. However, Uganda has been at the forefront of developing AU peacekeeping capabilities and contributes large numbers of troops to AMISOM and the RTF, reflecting a commitment

on the part of the leadership to implement African-led initiatives. This trend is likely to continue with Uganda seeing mainly AU peace operations as serving its regional priorities and security concerns, but also as an invaluable bargaining chip with international donors. This is partly explained by the ethos of the Ugandan leadership, which has typically been distrustful of UN missions and the UN in general. AU peace operations on the other hand are seen as part of a Pan-African project where African states can make decisions about their own continent without being dictated to from outside. In practical terms, the AU serves Uganda's interests far better than the UN given the influence Kampala can wield within the continental body.

2.2 Role of peacekeeping in Africa

Reasons that motivate countries to venture into peacekeeping.

Gounden, Pillay & Mbugua, (2010) argued that the time was ripe for Africa to usher in peace and prosperity by identifying and implementing African solutions to African problems. 'African solutions to African conflicts' meant that Africans should not only design their agendas for peace and security, they should also own the processes for creating such agendas and their implementation. Only through analysis and evaluation, understanding and development of an 'African identity' can African solutions to African conflicts emerge. But this did not mean that Africans are blind to experiences and lessons from other continents. On the contrary, 'interdependence' is an African principle that emphasizes relationships and connection. It suggested that even when we look to

ourselves for solutions and make progress in resolving conflicts, our collaboration with others outside the continent can strengthen our interventions and solutions.

Despite what Africa has gone through since gaining its independence, there is a lot of improvement. Africa was regarded as a state full of confusion and conflict due to the regular wars that took place but as of today there are very few countries that are still undergoing these conflicts and this is due to the fact that Africa has learnt to deal with their own issues to a greater extent. Africa is often viewed as a continent wracked by wars, full of hopeless cases where peace can be tenuous, full of unsolved rivalries and tensions, (Furley & Oliver, 2006).

African Union (AU), is responsible for defence and security in Africa. It is also part of the broader African security architecture, conceptually consisting of standby multidisciplinary contingents, including civilian and military components in their countries of origin, ready to rapidly deploy as a preventative force where needed, (Kobbie, 2009). However, (Furley & May 2006), stated that today most of the peacekeepers have departed and most of the interventionists have withdrawn from those conflicts in which they took part. Africa is now facing fewer war situations than it did as many of its wars are ending.

Ishahilidza (2012) noted that there is no threshold or standards other than UN guidelines to guide for peacekeeping missions in the emerging conflict environment on the continent. Peacekeeping in Africa has been mainly a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) strategy which, except in a few cases, has inspired Africanism in its design, approach and implementation. The trend of the developed world to consign the African affairs to the bottom of the ranking order gives credence for the establishment of Peacekeeping architecture for Africa with associated retinue of policies, strategies and resource capital.

Carvalho, (2010) stated that the nature of peace operations in Africa has changed dramatically over the past decade in the sense that such operations now involve a range of actors, ranging from the UN, the AU, and the European Union (EU) to regional organizations like ECOWAS, as well as a plethora of states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many operations are partnerships that involve multilevel coordination among and between the actors involved. While participation in these operations has increased, the scope and aims of these operations have also widened. The AU placed a very high premium on coordinating and integrating peacekeeping efforts as an intrinsic part of its peace and security architecture. In current AU peacekeeping operations, actors are involved simultaneously in different operations, and in very different tasks within the same operation.

Peacekeeping under the African mission in Somalia.

Ishahilidza, (2012) stated that AMISOM had an initial authorized strength of 8,000 and was mandated to protect transitional government personnel and institutions, conduct military enforcement operations against antigovernment actors, principally al-Shabaab, and facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil military operations. In early 2009, AMISOM protected key members of the TFG and a number of strategic locations in the city from armed opposition until the last Ethiopian troops withdrew from Mogadishu.

Fisher, (2011) observed that the Ugandan and Burundian troops who made up the AU force became the principal barrier preventing the TFG from being overrun by al-Shabaab fighters and AMISOM itself came under increased attack following the Ethiopian withdrawal. During 2009 and 2010, battles raged across the city but they resulted only in stalemate: neither AMISOM nor Al-Shabaab could decisively defeat the other. Probably in an attempt to weaken Uganda's resolve, al-Shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala in July 2010. Instead of pulling out, Uganda responded by deploying additional troops to Mogadishu.

Faced with a growing enemy, al-Shabaab launched a major offensive against the TFG and AMISOM during Ramadan of 2010 but the insurgents were repelled and sustained heavy losses. AMISOM then went on the offensive and engaged in many months of bloody street fighting across Mogadishu in order to expand its areas of control. The result was the withdrawal of al-Shabaab's core fighters from the centre of the city in

early August 2011, although fighting continued in the suburbs and outskirts for another nine months, (Ishahilidza, (2012)

Bellamy, (2007) wrote that one way around the problem of peacekeeping is to classify peace operations in general terms according to their perceived role and objectives. One approach is to define types of peace operations according to their characteristics (size, mandate, functions). Additionally, Bellamy, (2010), the identification of different types of operation should be according to their role in global politics points to two key points that need to be borne in mind when thinking about peace operations. First, there is no agreement in international society about what peace operations are for. Some states, agencies and individuals argue that peace operations should build global peace by constructing liberal democratic politics and societies, while others insist that peace operations should only be concerned with facilitating conflict resolution between states. If we take this point seriously, it means that, second, there are no common criteria by which to evaluate the success or failure of peace operations because such judgments are framed by actors' beliefs about the appropriate role for peace operations in global politics.

Thomas, (2011) argued that any attempt to establish a basis for interventionary action premised on a universal formula of human rights, even if this could be achieved in theory, it cannot be translated into state practice for three reasons: state sovereignty, heterogeneity within the system, and the hierarchical nature of the system. This may not

be how the world *ought* to be, but this is how the world *is*. The heart may dictate that moral judgment must play a significant role in the relations between states, but the head says otherwise. It can be argued, and demonstrated, that most of the time intervention do more harm than good. If states act out of moral considerations other than those flowing from the morality of sovereign statehood itself, the floodgates will be opened for intervention motivated by particularistic interpretations of human rights.

2.3 State interventions and peace initiatives

International interventions have been of great use in ending conflict and bringing peace to so many war torn countries. These interventions come with the good and bad in the sense that mostly some actually do help in the peacekeeping missions and bring conflicts to an end. However, some of these divert from their mandates and carry out activities, like rape, robbery, mistreatment of civilians, man slaughter, and these don't tally with their responsibilities.

According to Bradbury & Healy (2010) some of these International mediators have brought to these debates their own models of state and society relations, which are premised on the creation of a state that has a monopoly on legitimate force and is responsible for service provision. The state building approach to resolving the Somali crisis reflects an external analysis of the problem and fails to get to grips with the problematic nature of a Somali state

Ahmed & Green, (1999) observed that the multitude of agencies with contrasting mandates, structures, procedures, operations and capacities to operate in Somalia complicated the coordination of the intervention in an already complex disaster. Many Non-Governmental Organizations, (NGO) were in the theatre primarily to curry favour with the media, in an effort to mobilise name recognition and funds. Doubtless they were concerned with saving lives but also with bolstering their budgets via increased government and UN agencies transfers and public donations. The high profile media coverage of the crisis also created other problems, which undoubtedly affected the quality and delivery of humanitarian assistance

The Brahimi Report (2000) focused upon how the UN Secretariat's staff working on peacekeeping might better manage personnel in the field to produce more effective results. To promote better management of peace operations the report made four major recommendations:

- The military component of a peace operation should be robust enough to defend itself effectively and protect civilians under its care;
- There should be greater consultation between the Security Council and troop contributing countries;
- The Security Council should not authorize a mission until it has the means to accomplish its goals;
- The planning and management of peace operations should be reorganized to improve coordination and personnel should be recruited on the basis of expertise.

Uganda's involvement into the Somali crisis.

Kasaijja(2013) stated that since 2011, when the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) started to extend its military operations beyond Mogadishu, the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) have done most of the heavy fighting against Al Shabaab and its sympathizers. Uganda also played a mediating role in the extension of the life of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for a further year after its term ended in August 2011. The agreement between the President of the TFG and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) of Somalia (also known as The Kampala Accord) was negotiated in Uganda in June 2011, and President Museveni became one of the guarantors of its implementation. In September 2012, at the end of the transition period, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected President of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) under a new constitution, the first President of Somalia to possess a full mandate, (Kasaijja, 2013).

Marco (2014) noted that in the last 10 years Ugandan contributions to UN peacekeeping have mainly been in the form of staff officers, police, prison officers and civilian experts, deployed on missions since 2005. A good number of Ugandans deployed in UN peacekeeping operations are police. Uganda Hosted the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe (RSCE) and a training hub also at Entebbe providing logistics support but also peacekeeping training courses to peacekeeping missions and related offices in the region. Ugandan peace operations are driven by several political imperatives. For

example, addressing African security concerns, especially perceived threats to Uganda, is an important motivation for contributing forces to peace operations, Uganda also sees peace operations as key foreign policy tools when engaging with international actors and other African states.

As noted by Fisher, (2007), Kampala has frequently justified its involvement in Somalia with reference to African solidarity and the responsibilities of African states to help resolve African conflicts. In a March 2011 interview, for example, Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa made clear that, ‘We are in Somalia because of our Pan-African policy, we believe that it is not right for Africans to sit and watch as an African state becomes a failed state. We think African states have to play the role to bring stability to the continent’, (Daily Monitor 23/03/11). The expression of such sentiments by the president Museveni’s regime has certainly not been confined to public discourse on the AMISOM operation alone and, indeed its intervention in Somalia has simply been one of the more recent examples of Uganda attempting to involve itself in regional peacekeeping initiatives.

McGregar, (2014) wrote that Uganda has also attempted to present itself as one of the foremost authorities on resolving political crises in the African continent. During the 2000s, for example, Museveni chaired the Regional Initiative on resolving Burundi’s civil war and though both South Africa and Tanzania have more often been cited by

commentators as responsible for the success of this process, the Burundian leader had also expressed thanks to Uganda for the role it had played (New Vision 28/05/09). However, less edifying had been the failed attempts by Kampala to provide ‘Ugandan solutions to African problems’ in response to the 2008 electoral violence in Kenya and the ongoing 2011 crisis in Libya.

Fisher, (2008) noted that the Ugandan regime’s main support base had always been the UPDF and, indeed, most senior members of the government, including the President, were current or former members of this institution, maintaining its loyalty had become increasingly dependent upon the regime providing patronage resources to troops or, at least, opportunities for soldiers to augment their salaries. Interventions in Liberia and Somalia, therefore, had been a useful means for the regime to keep a potentially volatile domestic constituency both occupied and financially satisfied. UPDF soldiers serving in AMISOM, for example, earn a great deal more than their counterparts who remain in Uganda, courtesy of AMISOM’s Western funders (Parliament of Uganda (Hansard) 08/02/07).

Peacekeeping; An international perspective

The aim of this research was to find out whether sometimes deployment is necessary. Carvalho, (ed) 2010) argued that deployment of AU troops in Somalia gives rise to some important questions. Is there in fact a peace to keep in the country? Or is the AU trying

to find a peace to keep? It is important for the emerging peace and security architecture of the AU, of which the ASF is part, to realize that in the quest for peace in Africa, political processes, peacekeeping missions, and the process of grassroots social reconciliation are intertwined and reinforce each other. The deployment of troops should therefore not be made to supplant an effective political process. Deployment without an enduring political process involving all actors of the conflict not only erodes consent for the mission, it also endangers the forces. Hence a question to Uganda's involvement in this mission justifying its actual motivation and if this is what Somalia really needs.

Sengupta (2014) indicated that soldiers face different risks: terrorist groups, transnational criminal gangs and hateful ethnic militias. Western countries are loath to send troops to countries where they have no immediate interests, and the United Nations has had trouble finding enough recruits. States that not least, the peacekeepers' mandates are increasingly involved with protecting civilians and not as was the case 20 years ago, keeping warring armies at bay. At the same time, peacekeeping has become increasingly expensive.

4.4 Challenges and failures of peacekeeping missions

Short falls of the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Pugh, (2004), argued that the limits of the current forms of peacekeeping and humanitarianism lie in the inherent contradictions of a capitalist hegemony trying to

keep the lid on instability. Peace support operations and humanitarianism deal with the manifestations of that instability, marking the extent to which the system fails to benefit large parts of the world. The issue reflects a concern about the abuse of people by state and sub-state elites, and many war-torn societies have benefited from relief aid and military protection but they pay a price for that assistance in their dependency on the wealthy parts of the world and their subjection to the demands of an economic globalization that may benefit the minority of entrepreneurs but undermines the self-sufficiency of the majority.

Pugh, (2004) conceived peacekeeping as a deliberate ploy of serving the hegemony interest of an existing international system. These ideologies emanate from a particular global system that is entirely bourgeoisie or status quo bar, which seeks to resolve conflicts that are anathema to its interest in crisis-prone zones. Peacekeeping is designed to cope with living in an ‘anarchical society’, but such peacekeeping operations are not deployed or executed for the sake of maintaining peace in the affected conflict zones of the world, but meant to protect the ideological interest of a specific order within the international system whose goal is to resolve conflict under the dictate of the existing status quo in the world.

Ogunrotifa (2011) noted that the balance sheet on UN peacekeeping effort suggests that, while the UN has served an effective role in legitimizing enforcement coalitions for interstate, armed collective security, the United Nations has proved to be a very

ineffective peacekeeper in the many intrastate, civil conflicts that emerged in the Post–Cold War world as evidenced in Rwanda and DRC case. The challenges faced by the AU missions range from the lack of capacity and political will, to perennial financial and logistical constraints on effective peacekeeping operations. These challenges have made the AU heavily dependent on the international community to undertake its peacekeeping operations (Carvalho, 2010).

Garima&Gippner, (2013) stated that in the realist framework, peacekeeping enables governments of contributing states to increase their international clout or to subsidize the maintenance of armed forces, as Pugh (2004) argues, since peacekeeping emerged historically with the diplomatic intent to check dispute escalation caused by imperial powers within the realist/neorealist framework, the focus of interest in peacekeeping missions is not on crisis and operational performance. The crisis is often made subservient to domestic considerations, foreign policy agendas, and power distribution among elites. According to the neo-realist view, states use international institutions such as the UN framework as arenas for competition and establish norms to reflect power and interest, and thus justify participation in peacekeeping missions under the UN framework.

Othieno&Samasuwo (2008) noted that despite some notable successes, UNPKOs in Africa have been faced with massive challenges. While some of the operations on the continent simply failed to protect civilians from genocide or sustain peace, others have

tended to drag on for years seemingly with no end in sight. The problem of open-ended peacekeeping mandates have in recent years led to calls by major donor countries for the closure or scrapping of some of the older missions on financial grounds or as a way of reducing the peacekeeping budget. This is similar to the Uganda's mission in Somalia. The civil war has dragged on and the budget that the AU set up in the first place is no longer sustaining the troops, which is leading to the dragging of the mission.

African regional organizations, on the other hand, seem more willing to undertake stabilization operations, especially when they have been involved in brokering a ceasefire, and feel obliged to build on that momentum. Although the AU and some of the RECs are capable of deploying military forces that can achieve limited stabilization mandates, they generally lack the staying power and multidimensional capability of the UN necessary to transition from a security focused stabilization mission to a complex peacebuilding mission. These African missions are also dependent on financial support from the West, and the countries providing this support are generally eager to transfer these mandates to the UN so that the UN's assessed contribution system can kick in and take over the financial burden, (Carvalho al et, (ed) 2010).

Additionally, Carvalho, (2010) noted that the AU remains dependent on voluntary contributions to finance its peace operations. This is problematic, because such dependency on external resources denies the AU the freedom to take independent decisions on strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it

may wish to undertake. The availability of funding determines the number of troops, the nature of their equipment and support, the duration of the mission and various other aspects of the mission.

AU peacekeeping efforts suffer what can be referred to as a ‘consistency shortfall’ in terms of capacity and political will. Firstly, the institutional and legal reforms for peacekeeping purposes have not been consistent with the capacity to launch and sustain successful peace support operations. Consequently African led peacekeeping efforts have recorded capacity shortfalls, particularly in terms of logistics and finance. When African countries have deployed peacekeeping missions, they have always looked to the international community for logistical and financial support to sustain operations. Where international support has not been forthcoming, missions have shown crucial deficiencies in transportation, logistics, and equipment for operations. The second strand of inconsistency is that the political will of members of African organizations has not been consistent with the collectively proclaimed resolve to tackle insecurity on the continent. Political will is what African states need to sustain troop contributions and to collectively sustain peacekeeping operations. This is the one of the things that can make African efforts ultimately gain the description as ‘African-led’. As yet, African countries have remained sluggish in contributing troops to AU-led peacekeeping operations, (Carvalho (ed) 2010).

Most war torn countries have resisted peacekeeping mission due to unpleasant circumstances like army rape, language barrier and cultural difference and some peacekeeping missions are imposed on community. However, Deanna (2001) states that while community consent is indispensable for peacekeeping personnel to fulfill the tasks necessary for continued recovery, it is also essential that the community is in the first place consulted prior to the commencement of operations and subsequently shares in the planning and implementation of projects. In this way, actual community needs are addressed, instead of a model being imposed on to a population.

Logistical and language challenges in peacekeeping missions especially in Africa.

Ammunition differences and the different trainings have been found to be an obstacle to peacekeeping in war torn areas. Just like the case of AMISOM, the fact that the mission deploys troops from several countries, these come with different training and different knowledge of the equipment to be used. Feldman, (2008) observed that African nations possess an array of armaments, from Second World War vintage rifles to modern jet fighters. Countries of origin of these weapons are diverse, including, the United States, Germany, North and South Korea, Iran and China. The continent also has several home grown weapons makers, mostly manufacturing small arms but some capable of more complex items such as missiles.

Aboagye, Cilliers&Boshoff, (2010) noted that this wide array of equipment can create numerous problems for a joint force. First,a senior commander from one nation may be unfamiliar with the capabilities of theequipment from another, a problem amplified when that other nation's forces are putunder his command. Not knowing ranges of artillery pieces, speeds of armoredcavalries, or lift capabilities of aircrafts could be disastrous during combat.Second, communication becomes difficult when various transmitters and receivers,of different vintages and from a variety of manufacturers, are pressed into service. Thiscan easily lead to orders not being properly communicated to troops, and battlefielddassessments not being relayed to commanders. Third, sharing of ammunition as well as spare parts for broken armaments canpresent challenges.

The issue of language barriers has also led greatly to the failure of the some of Africa's peacekeeping missions. Africa has so many languages hence when troops travel to different countries under a mission, they tend to find difficulty in communication. Feldman, (2008) observed that there are inherent difficulties in attempting to create a cohesive force from widely disparate populations. Should a nation's military choose only soldiers who speak the same language, numerous others will be disenfranchised, which can lead to internal dissent. On the other hand, it can be costly in both money and time to train and fully integrate a military force of different linguistic backgrounds. Language thus serves as both a barrier to communication among the nations who volunteer for peacekeeping missions, as well as to soldiers from various ethnic groups within each nation.

Boutros Ghali (1992) observed that Not all Governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service abroad. While some equipment is provided by troop-contributing countries, a great deal has to come from the United Nations, including equipment to fill gaps in under-equipped national units. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. Orders must be placed with manufacturers, which create a number of difficulties. A pre-positioned stock of basic peace-keeping equipment should be established, so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc., would be immediately available at the start of an operation. Alternatively, Governments should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment, specified by the Secretary-General, on stand-by for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required.

Challenges of the peacekeeping missions in Somalia

Nduwimana (2013) stated that since the civil strife in 1991, numerous peace initiatives have been made in attempts to stabilize Somalia. These initiatives faced various challenges and their success was limited. However, with the advent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, the security landscape has changed significantly and the foundations for restoring peace in the country have progressively improved. Indeed, AMISOM led credence to the notion, envisaged by the architects of the Africa Union (AU) in 2002, that ‘Africa should solve African Problems’. Despite this success, the fact remains that authorities in Somalia still have some way to go before they can secure and restore sustainable peace in the country. Murithi (2009) suggested

that between reactive and proactive interventionism, there is need to argue whether this interventionism had been predicated on a coherent AU policy towards crisis situations, or whether it can be best described as reactive interventionism.

Peacekeeping endeavors are by their very nature costly affairs. Peacekeeping mission also face a challenge of funds. As indicated in chapter one there are several missions spread all over Africa. Somali is not the only country that needs help hence the African Union is stretched in terms of funds and since the country has been under turmoil for quite some time, its resources are also limited hence little support to the troops. Feldman, (2008) pointed out that Africa is large and transportation expenses can deplete funds, leaving little to support operations once troops arrive. Troops often move by air when the roads are inadequate, which is frequently the case. Inadequate African transportation for AU operations forces the AU to turn to outside sources. Outside funds come with restrictions and caveats. In other words, the AU will have to address and meet the glaring financial realities of the high costs of peacekeeping missions if it would like the ASF to play any significant peacekeeping role in African conflict resolution and peacekeeping requirements. Some observers even contend that from a funding perspective, the only viable peacekeeping operations in Africa are UN (funded) peacekeeping operations

Discipline among soldiers on the mission has also proved to be an obstacle to peacekeeping. Some of the troop members tend to divert from the mission and go against their mandate. Feldman, (2008) wrote that the human rights records of some of the militaries that constitute the AU forces are abysmal. In 2005, the world Court placed a ten billion dollar judgment against Uganda for its intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Upon examining the evidence, the court found that during Uganda's five-year occupation of eastern portions of the DRC, they tortured and killed civilians. Accusations of rape and sexual exploitation, including of young children, were leveled against African forces in UN peacekeeping operations. The spread of HIV/AIDS into areas where it previously was not present can sometimes be linked to the movement of peacekeeping forces. With such behavior it is impossible to win the hearts and minds of the local people, the very ones the AU forces were sent to protect. This could result in less intelligence from the locals about the AU's adversaries, less willingness to assist AU forces when they are in need, and perhaps even the locals joining the AU's adversaries to drive these "foreign occupiers from our country".

Internal conflicts were also a problem to the peacekeeping mission. AMISOM's mandate made it crucial that the mission work closely and effectively with the authorities in Somalia. It is an established element of counterinsurgency doctrine that the efforts of external forces are highly unlikely to succeed without a legitimate and effective local partner. The TFG government was perceived by many Somalis as both illegitimate and being foisted upon them by Ethiopia and other external powers and

ineffective inasmuch as it provided neither any form of public services to its citizens nor undertook any major attempts at reconciliation between the conflicting factions. The TFG's security forces also proved to be largely ineffective against al-Shabaab and regularly committed abuses against the local population. The combination of local hostility towards Ethiopian troops and the TFG's weaknesses provided ample fodder for al-Shabaab to successfully recruit considerable numbers of fighters to its cause, both in Mogadishu and beyond. AMISOM was caught in the middle inasmuch as its mandate called for it to work with and support the TFG (Ishahilidza, 2012).

Lack of exit strategy.

Another challenge the mission is facing is lack of a follow up plan for the exit strategy. Just like any mission, there should be a start and end point or a plan on how whole the mission should function. This is different in the case of AMISOM in Somalia. Countries like Uganda are still benefiting from this war because there is no set strategy of when and how the civil conflict will end. AMISOM biggest challenge is figuring out how to leave the scene. Ishahilidza, (2012) in his paper noted that there are not clear demarcations or beacons to guide the exit strategy.

Conventionally, a major component in any operation is the timelines and activities of the operation guiding it to eventual withdrawal and closure by way of scaling down of the military forces and entire mission in general. Operations cannot be undertaken

indefinitely especially in an international environment. AMISOM does not have a timeline nor does it define the stage at which the mandate will be handed over to the local actors or any other agency. In effect, this may be a cause of discontent on the part of local players as the mission may turn into an occupation force and elicit counteraction and counterforce from the local agents, (Nduwimana, 2013).

Bradbury & Healy, (2010) says the conflict has not solely been over the state, a political arrangement of which a growing percentage of the population has no memory. Instead, it has involved numerous armed groups fighting over resources, territory and commercial monopolies that have little care for states, borders or sovereignty. International diplomacy is therefore handicapped by a state-centric approach to conflict and mediation.

2.5 Conclusion

Othieno&Samasuwo, (2008) argued that while the catastrophes of Somalia and Rwanda severely undercut the UN's credibility in Africa in the early 1990s, there is growing international acceptance that UN operations are legitimate and therefore have a significant role to play in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The UN not only has the moral high ground or impartiality that other organizations may not necessarily have, but also has certain clear comparative advantages in setting global security standards, humanitarian assistance and development.

According to Bradbury & Healy, (2010) primacy has been given to regional and international interests, leaving Somalis without protection and without a voice in international affairs. Somalia's lack of international personality and loss of international legal representation has resulted in a systematic denial of rights and the abusive exploitation of territory, such as fishing and dumping toxic waste. Piracy may be a response to this, but not an answer. The stabilization of Somalia will require the acquiescence and cooperation of its neighbours, but it should not be hostage to them (kasaijja, 2010).

Uganda has used the leverage of its participation in regional peacekeeping missions to get away with criticism from the UN in the past. In August 2010, the United Nations published a report mapping the most serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed in the DRC in 1993–2003. The report alleged that countries in the Great Lakes Region, including Uganda, committed human rights violations during the successive DRC conflicts. Uganda reacted, inter alia, by stating that report was a sinister tactic to undermine Uganda's resolve to continue contributing to and participating in various regional and international peacekeeping missions, such as AMISOM, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the United Nations-African Union hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sam Kuteesa, observed that the publication of the report "may lead us to remove our troops from the chaotic country [Somalia]".³⁶⁰ In the end, the report was not discussed

at the UN and only remains on the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodological approach adopted in this study. The chapter endeavors to give a detailed account of the research design and methods used. The population and the sample are described and the sample size is explained and justified. The study solicited information from key informants, army, ministries and the civilians who have ideas or have been involved AMISOM. The data collection was done in the month of March and April 2015. In this chapter, methods of data collection tools are defined and explanation of how they were developed and administered, survey, data collected and knowledge gained were described and summarized.

3.1 Research Design

Qualitative methodology

The researcher used the qualitative research design in exploring Uganda's role in peacekeeping in the context of regional peace and security. This research was grounded in qualitative approaches in which the study was interested in inductive processes and established a deeper understanding of reasons for Uganda's role in the mission. The researcher used qualitative design where interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with different stakeholders. This was done to gain deeper insights into the

reasons, roles and mandate of Uganda's involvement in Somalia. Interviews were carried out with the participants of the AMISOM deployed officers, army commanders and Uganda AMISOM spokes personnel in Somalia.

The researcher also used a case study approach that focused on peacekeeping missions in which Uganda participated within several countries. A case study approach is the intensive investigation into specific aspects of an individual, social unit, community or country in effort to gain deeper insights about the same conditions. Different cases studies were adopted to help compare and contrast different scenarios, experiences and outcomes from the different peacekeeping missions Uganda has been involved in. These included Uganda's involvement in peacekeeping in Liberia, Congo, Rwanda and South Sudan. Golby, (1993), states that case studies also generate data which stand the test of internal validity. Case study protocols are sets of rules and procedures that are applied to the investigation with a view to increasing the reliability of the findings. Analyzing different case studies gave the researcher more information which helped in the basic outcome of the research results.

3.2 Phenomenological Approach

Lester, (1990) says phenomenology is concerned with the study of experience from the perspective of the individual. The goal of qualitative phenomenological research is to describe a "lived experience" of a phenomenon. The researcher used this technique to

gather information from soldiers and expatriates who had been to Somalia on the mission hence have had lived experiences in the conflict. These were either soldiers who were engaged in the real battle or leaders like commanders or brigadiers that were heading these troops.

The researcher also interviewed citizens that were affected by the al-Shabaab attack on Ugandan soil. This approach was chosen because some of the soldiers being questioned had been traumatized while fighting in Somalia and the civilians who had lost a friend or relative in the boom attacks in Uganda. So using this approach helped the researcher analyze the situation and condition of the respondents while interviewing them by observing the pattern of their answers and their attitude. This helped the researcher to choose the right questions to ask in order to get answers and also gain as much information as she could without agitating the respondent.

This was considered essential because it allowed respondents to describe their perceptions thoughts and understanding. This principle claims that in order to collect rich phenomenological data one needs to suspend all preconceptions and biases concerning the investigated issues. This research study adopted a holistic approach that allowed the researcher to be involved with the participants by being a listener as they gave their

experiences, knowledge, perceptions and in the end rich data was acquired which helped the research results.

3.3 Population

The population of the study comprised of Ugandan citizens and Somali citizens living in Uganda. Uganda has about 37million people and is surrounded by Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda and Ethiopia. Somalia has about a population of 10 million people and is surrounded by Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Indian Ocean. Both Uganda and Somali are East African country almost neighbouring each other which has made people migrating from one country to another easy. This explains the flux of Somali nationals who have migrated to Uganda looking for security due to the civil home in their home countries. The researcher concentrated on the UPDF soldiers and civilians both Ugandans and Somalis who have either physically participated civil war, been affected by it or have knowledge about it.

Sample size

The researcher interviewed 35 people. These were selected according to offices they work in like ministry of defence and finance hence they poses information concerning the troops since the ministries are in charge of deployment and donor aid respectively. Also the army personnel selected was based on the Somali experience. The civilians

selected were based on how the war has affected them especially those that had been affected both physically and emotionally by the Al-Shabaab attacks. These were categorized according to their fields which included; Ugandan army officers that had directly been to Somalia and were in charge of the troops, (3 Army commander's, 1 Brigadiers, 2 colonels', 3 lieutenants, 4 ex-soldiers who retired and 4men and women current soldiers waiting for deployment, 1 UPDF spokes personnel in Somalia), ministries like defense since they are responsible for recruiting the soldiers and also since they handle the AMISOM mandate (1 form the public information office, and 2 from the office of the directorate of foreign liaison and military protocol) and ministry of finance since they are in charge of the resources and welfare of the troops (2 officers front the Office of the Accountant General). Additionally, the researcher collected views from the public especially civil servants and civilians (2 academicians, 5 civilians that have been affected by the Al-Shabaab attacks and 5 that have lost relatives).

The table below shows the breakdown of the respondents interviewed.

Target group	Methodology	Sample seize
Face to face interviews. - UPDF officers,(3 Army commander's, 1 Brigadiers,	In-depth interviews	16

2 colonels', 3 lieutenants) - 2 academicians, -4 ex soldiers (1 injured and 3 retired) - 1 AMISOM spokes personnel		
ministry defence(1 from the public information office, and 2 from the permanent secretary office)	In-depth interviews	3
ministry of finance(2 officers front the Office of the Accountant General)	In-depth interviews	2
Civilians(5 civilians that have been affected by the Al-Shabaab attacks and 5 that have lost relatives)	In-depth interviews	10
2 men and 2 women (both back from and those waiting	In-depth interviews	4

for deployment)		
Total respondents		35

Table 1: Break down of sample size

3.4. Purposive Sampling

The purposive sampling technique is a type of non-probability sampling that is most effective when one needs to study a certain cultural domain with knowledgeable experts within. Purposive sampling is a method used when the researcher intends to target a particular group of people and not everyone in the population. It is used when the desired population for study is difficult to locate or to access.

Castillo (2009) noted that purposive sampling can be used for situations where the researcher needs to reach a targeted sample quickly. In light of the fact that the time for field work was limited to three weeks the researcher therefore, employed the purposive sampling method because it is quick and saved on time. This technique was used basing on the qualities the informant possessed. In the context of the present study the researcher's target was not to work with everyone but rather particular people that possessed information regarding the UPDF, AMISOM and Uganda's peacekeeping missions. Also targeted were the civilians who were affected by the war and also work

with government ministries that posse's information about the mission or those that have been affected by the war through the Al-shabbab attacks in Uganda. The researcher talked to informants who were willing and had the right information needed after doing a survey of the knowledge they possessed on the topic.

3.4.1 Snowballing.

Handcock, (2011) describes snowballing as method where a few identified members of a rare population are asked to identify other members of the population, those identified are asked to identify others for the purpose of obtaining information. The researcher used this technique where she asked respondents to refer her to other people who fit the study requirements to help get information required. This technique used to collect data because of the difficulty in acquiring this data due to the sensitivity of the subject and the political connectivity. Also most of the key informants where in offices that are hard to access so after getting a few of them the researcher requested for referrals to those she could not access. So in this case the researcher used the UPDF army generals like colonels and lieutenants to identify their fellow soldiers and refer her to them for further interviews. In the same way a Lieutenant Colonel of the UPDF referred the researcher to the academicians specifically a Professor who have published several books about the mission.

3.5 In-depth interviews

The researcher employed in-depth interview in this study because of its main advantage of being adaptable to the imperatives found during field work. Face to face interviews were carried out because this technique allowed free exchange of ideas and in-depth of what the respondent meant with their information. This gave the researcher an advantage of being flexible and offered her the chance to probe more information plus allow new ideas to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewees would say.

3.6 Secondary data

The researcher also carried out literature review of materials like books, journals, book reviews, reports and organizational records through a desk top research to supplement the field research. This was due to the fact that distance was a challenge considering the researcher's institute was in a different country from where she was collecting her data from and the time given to carry out the field research was limited hence resorting to literature review.

3.7. Data Analysis Procedures

3.7.1 Text Analysis

Patton, (2002), describes text analysis as a qualitative data reduction and sense making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings. This technique helped in deducing meaning of the information written from a variety of written material. The researcher was able to identify key issues emerging from the data collected.

3.7.2 Transcribing / coding

This is the use of code names to disguise the actual names of the respondents. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, there was use of code names while analyzing and describing information to void revealing the respondents details. Coding is the process of defining what data is about, (Charmaz, 1995). Some of the key informants did not feel comfortable to give information for the fear of being quoted. This was dealt with by assuring the respondents about the coding technique where actual names would not be used but rather code names were to identify information. This technique also helped in analyzing and categorizing data while organizing collected information and because there was a lot of data from the interviews, the researcher organised data through classifying data. Data classification was based on the information given. Data was put in themes and categories, for example key informants who had firsthand data, personnel experiences, thoughts and perceptions, and common characteristics.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

This research took into consideration the feelings and careful treatment of human respondents or informants especially those that had been directly involved in this battle. The researcher created a consent guide for the research participants in order to agree on how the research would be carried out. The same consent guide was translated in the local language (luganda) to help those that did not understand English to get the meaning and reason for being interviewed. Also during the research the researcher took kin interest in the wording used to avoid writing the wrong statements since the research involves vital political issues. Interviews were conducted in ways that did not put the informants at risk for example asking the informants to disclose government information that could puts the mission at risk such as the next attack plan for Al-Shabaab or tactics to be used during the mission.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This study sought to assess the role of Uganda in peace keeping mission in Somalia. The chapter presents data collected on the Ugandan mission to Somalia. The chapter presents data on the reasons that motivated Uganda to intervene plus the successes and challenges faced by AMISOM and help evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by the Ugandan mission in Somalia. The chapter further discusses the success and challenges of peacekeeping in Somalia and how this has impacted on the regional peace.

4.1 Data Presentation

4.1.1 Uganda's motivating factors for peacekeeping in Africa

Intervention guided by the UPDF Act law.

Respondents from the permanent secretary's office in the ministry of defence quoted the Uganda foreign policy act by saying, Ugandan military deployment and activities, including peacekeeping, are enshrined in the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) Act of 2005 article 39. The President of Uganda as Commander in Chief, in collaboration with the military High Command and Defense Forces Council, determines UPDF peacekeeping deployments. The Parliament is supposed to regulate and oversee

UPDF activity as stipulated in the constitution and the Defense White Paper of 2004. In practice parliament has limited oversight of and accountability for UPDF deployments and tends to accept the decisions of the UPDF high command on military matters. The President, security advisers, and UPDF high command are the key decision-makers for peace operations although approval from parliament is sought hence this gave the president courage to go for several war interventions in Africa because he had the powers to do so.

A ministry of defence respondent in the public information office said that the main reason why the government of Uganda got involved in this peacekeeping mission was due to the spirit of Panafricanism. As long ago as 1994, for example, the regime sent nearly 800 troops to join the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia and remained committed militarily long after many other African forces had abandoned the mission. The respondents noted that the president of Uganda is acting on the card of Panafricanism where they quoted him generally saying ‘African problems for African’. They expressed that the president of Uganda is motivated by the fact that Africans can take care of their problems without soliciting for help that usually comes with strings attached that interferes with Africa’s independence.

Support from other concerned actors.

The inclusion of other country’s armies creates checks and balances approach for every country involved in this mission. Eng. Capt Innocent noted that Uganda encouragement

to join in this cause, apart from bringing peace to Africa, is motivated by the assistance UPDF gets from different countries in all the other battles that Uganda has been involved in. Uganda has been joined by other 6 countries namely Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Serra Leone and Ethiopia. Uganda being the first to deploy had a challenge in terms of troop numbers that were insufficient but when other troops from different countries joined, the mission was strong and this has contributed to its successes because more troops means more man power, more ammunitions and more tactics so far and this gave Uganda courage to know they were not in it alone hence motivation to keep fighting for peace and making Africa a peaceful continent.

The need to affirmatively view Uganda as a supportive and strong country.

Also discovered through this research, as reason for Uganda involvement in these missions is the enthusiasm of the current president of Uganda, president Museveni, wanting his presence felt in the world. As professor explained, President Museveni has been in power for almost 26 years and his popularity is waning also the Ugandan government does not have a very good reputation despite all the good it is doing to secure a peaceful Africa. Like most African countries, Uganda has been viewed as corrupt, semi-authoritarian regime with officials that embezzle funds, stay in power for too long through the press, but by constantly engaging in these positive causes, this has helped the country to be seen with a different and positive view and also the country's

military strength felt worldwide and helping president Museveni build a good reputation that wins him favours to the donor community.

The researcher noted that a desire to be acknowledged as a regional leader by other African states has also played a role in the development of this initiative, a UPDF Private expressed that himself. Museveni has high ambitions for Uganda and believes that he should be seen by his African colleagues as much of a regional statesman as Mandela, Nyerere or Annan. Involvement in regional peacekeeping, therefore, has been a means for him to achieve this status.

In addition to this, the respondent from the ministry of defence public information office noted that with these constant military engagements to help fellow African countries fight for peace, the Ugandan government is motivated to keep involved in this cause because the Ugandan army's reputation is felt worldwide and this is a way of securing the peace back at home by letting the world know of the military strength the country poses.

A Lieutenant Colonel noted that the government of Uganda's success battles and peace talks motivates the country to keep fighting for peace in Africa. In the mid-2000s, for example, Uganda was a major player in the discussions leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the twenty year Sudanese civil war. Similarly, in the later 2000s, Uganda was heavily involved in the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, an inter-

governmental panel comprising of delegations from Congo, Rwanda and Uganda whose main purpose was to achieve lasting peace and security in the Great Lakes region through restoring diplomatic relations between Kinshasa, Kigali and Kampala, strengthening regional security mechanisms and eliminating negative forces for example rebel groups, who posed a threat to regional peace was successful. Also the colonel said that the success the army has achieved in the struggles it has been involved in like Liberia, Rwanda, South Sudan and the DRC and significant experience in battles and insurgency warfare gained in the protracted civil wars they experienced in those countries have demonstrated more resilience to the asymmetric warfare hence giving courage to the Ugandan government to help other countries.

The threat to Uganda's security within its borders.

A Colonel commented by saying Ugandan national security has often been threatened by regional instability. In Congo, Sudan, Rwanda or terrorism in Somalia all these countries' insecurities and wars have threatened Uganda's peace. Though Kampala's foreign policy has sometimes aggravated the dangers posed to it by foreign rebels and terrorists they nevertheless remain genuine threats as the July 2009 bombings in Kampala demonstrated. Arguably, therefore, the regime has engaged with these peace processes so frequently as a means to promote its own national interests and better guarantee the security of its citizens. Since 9/11, Uganda has continued to align its own foreign policy with the anti-terror priorities of its Western donors. Thus in 2003 it became one of only five African states to give its full support to the US-led War on Iraq

with Ugandan Foreign Minister James Waphakabulo asserting that ‘the potential link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction poses a very serious threat to international peace and security’ and that Uganda would be ‘ready to assist in any way possible’ during the operation (*IOL News* 23/03)

4.1.2 Uganda’s motivating factors for peacekeeping in Somalia.

Spirit of Pan-Africanism.

A Lieutenant Colonel commented that following the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) directive and UNSCR 1744 (2007), Uganda deployed under AMISOM in March 2007, Uganda was motivated by the spirit of Pan Africanism and the need to address the instability in the region resulting from the state collapse in Somalia, orchestrated by militant youth wing Al Shabaab of Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Also, Uganda intervened because Somalia had become a breeding ground for terrorism and a source of arms which were proliferating in the East African region. The situation was a source of weapons to terrorists like Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and armed warriors like karamajong among others.

As a member of UN, a Brigadier noted that, *‘Uganda felt that we can contribute in helping our brothers in Somalia to have peace. The regional influx of refugees especially in Kampala compelled UPDF to contribute to this noble cause’. Uganda might not have been the strongest country militarily but compared to other African countries it had more strength and will to engage its troop. Both the willingness and the*

obligation encouraged the Ugandan government to deploy its troops into Somalia for a peace cause’.

Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa made it clear that, ‘We are in Somalia because of our Pan-African policy, we believe that it is not right for Africans to sit and watch as an African state becomes a failed state, we think African states have to play the role to bring stability to the continent’. (Daily Monitor 23/03/11). Yet again just like Uganda’s reasons for deploying its army in Africa was the same reason that motivated the country to get involved in the Somalia affairs. The UN had not fully succeeded so it encouraged the AU to step in and Uganda being an AU member plus its readiness motivated the deployment.

Al-Shabaab threat and insecurities caused in the East African countries.

The UPDF *spokesman*, a Lieutenant Colonel noted that the threat of terrorism that was spreading in the region also motivated Uganda’s deployment into Somalia. Al-Shabaab had established cells in East Africa that needed to be tackled as faster as possible. The reason UPDF had to do this from the source was that the two decades of failed Somalia state had provided a fertile ground for both local and foreign based Al-Qaeda groups to propagate their terror. So Uganda’s arrangement was to go and attack from the base and disorganize the Al-Shabaab strong bases from their roots and this would automatically weaken those that are being set up in East Africa that were growing strong causing a threat to Uganda and all east African countries.

A Colonel also remarked that among other reasons, Uganda has many motivating factors for its involvement in the Somalia conflict. It was noted that, 'UPDF deployment in Somalia is also legitimized as part of the "Global War on Terror" with Uganda positioning itself as a frontline state against Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Deployments to the UN-AU RTF against the LRA have also been legitimized as a security threat against a terrorist outfit, although the LRA had been pushed out of Uganda since 2006. Other regional security concerns are also an incentive for peacekeeping such as helping to curb the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the region, which has affected Uganda directly, especially in Karamoja. The influx of refugees from regional conflict hot spots such as DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and elsewhere is a further motivating factor to effectively deal with regional conflict issues.

Donor support towards the mission and directly to Uganda.

Key informants from the ministry of finance in the accountant general noted that Uganda's motivation also came from the attractive package the government was and is still receiving from the AU and other donors like the US and France particularly the troops wages of about \$1200 a soldier. The Ugandan Soldiers both deployed and back at home were and are still being paid an attractive salary that helps them and their families have a sustainable leaving. Now soldiers are able to have a sound alternative source of income to help them develop themselves, their families and the country through taxes.

AMISOM has therefore helped the soldiers to supplement their meager incomes back home.

A UPDF Private who is a soldier waiting for deployment said this motivated the government of Uganda and the soldiers themselves to continue with the fights and also attracted other civilians to join the army hence a bigger deployment for UPDF which helped in achieving its mission faster. Also discovered was that the ruling NRM party does not want thousands of soldiers hanging around in barracks with time on their hands and to add on that, there is no work for them outside the army therefore deployment was one way to keep the army engaged and trained.

Another factor that motivated Uganda to get involved in this civil strife was the fact that countries like the US, UK, France, EU and UN have provided significant financial and political support to AMISOM, but also to Uganda directly, such as fully funding training centers, non-combat equipment and various other support activities, observed by a Brigadier. He further noted that AMISOM's most important external partners were the United States, which provided considerable amounts of equipment, training and logistical support to the contingents from Uganda and Burundi, the UK and France, also provided various bilateral support packages, the United Nations, which from 2009 established an unprecedented mechanism (UNSOA) to provide AMISOM with logistical support via its base in Mombasa, the European Union (EU), which from 2011 began to

pay the allowances for AMISOM's uniformed personnel and conducted a training programme based out of Uganda through its African Peace Facility and also Algeria that helped air lift Ugandan troops into Somalia.

Adjustment of the mandate with more realistic objectives

Change in mandate was another motivating factor. AMISOM initially carried a weak mandate which was not in tune with realities on the ground in Somalia, either in terms of the mission's size or its scope. A Colonel noted that the mandate focused on peacekeeping yet considering what was on the ground more of that was needed. The AMISOM troops were faced with attacks and they had to fight back which wasn't originally the plan. By late 2010, after al-Shabaab had also proved to be a problem outside of Somalia, AMISOM was authorised an increase in size from 8,000 to 12,000 troops. This increase sent an important signal that there was a renewed commitment to AMISOM and provided the mission with both new momentum and increased manpower. Building on these positive developments and the need to help Somalia bring an end to the transitional period later in the year, the AMISOM's mandate was increased to 17,700 troops and broadened to include a more offensive stance, using all necessary manpower they could get so the adjustment of the mandate to fit the situation can be given as a motivator.

A doctor who served under the UPDF in Somalia observed that Somalis being tired of war was a motivating factor in its self. Majority of the Somalis were fed up of the continuous bloodshed which did not show any sign of ending. Despite of resistance towards the AMISOM invasion by the civilians who were thinking its interests were not good in the first place, later on realized that AMISOM was on their side and was the best chance they had at getting a peaceful nation and held them gain access to social services, reduction of famine and return to gradual normalcy. Most of them joined the cause and welcomed the UPDF by fighting alongside them or providing logistical support like shelter, hideouts and tricks or roadmaps to help them capture Al-shabaab. This motivated then UPDF to keep fighting since they had the local support.

4.2 Success of Uganda under the AMISOM in Somalia.

The capture of Al-Shabaab main and strong bases

The primary prerequisite of securing Somalia remains the defeat and elimination of the threat of al-Shabaab. A turning point for AMISOM was in August 2011 when African troops together with TFG forces pushed al-Shaabab out of the capital Mogadishu. One of the army colonels who was involved in this mission said, *‘Uganda being the highest contributor of troops I think it is safe to say we are highly effective. We have uprooted Al-shabaaab from most of their bases including Mogadishu their strongest.*

A Colonel noted that equivalent to the most achievements of AMISOM and one that gives the mission its strength is the capture of Kismayo. The participation of UPDF and Kenyan forces in Marine security along the Somali coast, together with provision of security to other international marine forces has helped curtail the insecurity and illegal businesses at the Kismayo port by pirates, hence stability in Somali waters currently stable and allowing free movement of goods into and outside Somalia boosting the economy of the country. AMISOM has gained critical leverage because this has denied al-Shabaab access to the main seaport that had been their major source of income hence weakening them. UPDF alongside Ethiopian forces helped to edge out Al-shaabab from all those bases, and thus Humanitarian relief ably reached the most starving and dying people in the country.

One of the former deployed soldiers said, ‘Uganda has proved what President Musveni has always said, African problems for African solutions. Our continued presence in there was peace outcome to Somalia, the peace that the western super power countries failed to achieve but Africa has achieved. UPDF along with other countries involved in AMISOM can sort their problems. Uganda’s continued presence has uprooted Al-shabaab thereby denying terrorists a safe environment which has widely contributed to better security in the horn of Africa. Terror cells in Uganda have been decimated, and Al-shabaab cannot now dare infiltrate our security and cause mayhem. Regionally, Al-shabaab has been weakened thanks to UPDF resilience in Somalia.’

Worth to note as a success as commented by a respondent is the degrading Al-shaabab capability and reducing further support to extremist groups in Mombasa Kenya and ADF in Uganda and this led to reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that cause organized crime in the region.

Operation name	Town liberated	Troop responsible
Operation safe Haven	Mogadishu City	UPDF
Operation Free Shabelle	Shabelle region.(Jowhar and Afgooye)	UPDF
Operation Eagle 2014	QORYOOLEY	
Operation Indian Ocean	BARAWE, GOLWEYNE&JEERO, KURUTUNWAREY	UPDF

Table 2:showing liberated towns free from Al-Shabaab illustrated by a Colonel

UPDF discipline can also be attributed to factors that strengthened and achieved the mission's agenda so says one of the respondents. The UPDF has strict rules and regulations that are followed by all soldiers. The Ugandan troops are trained to adhere to

plans orders given to them by their commanders and this helped the mission to run smoothly. This discipline has attracted other civilians to join the army and also in Somalia, the UPDF discipline attracted the Somali citizens which led to cooperation and working together with troops.

'In recognition of the risks of fighting among an urban population, the UPDF reviewed its engagement strategy and re-prioritized its interventions paying more attention to Somali cultural ties to attract the support of the population', said a Colonel. Some of these measures were not set in the AMISOM mandate but the troop's heads and commander found it necessary to adopt such measures hence leading to the mission's strength. Regular meetings with community leaders, outpatient clinics for treating civilians, and the provision of clean drinking water have been purposefully used by AMISOM to build and maintain the support of the population and political leaders during the most intensive periods of the military campaign.

A key UPDF informant who is an ex-soldier due to injuries got during the mission, noted that, 'Uganda being the first country to step foot in Somalia and by being dominant, voicing concerns and actually being at the forefront of participating in the mission shows the commitment and pan-Africanism spirit that is why other countries in the region joined hand and it's credible because it focuses on AMISOM mandate hence this can be viewed as a success story for the mission'. Also Somali citizens have started

to appreciate the presence of AMISOM because it has empowered them to start doing things like business and leadership on their own boosting the economic sector.

The AMISOM has also been successful due external motivating factors like the Somali Diaspora who make a major contribution to the Somali economy and livelihoods through remittances, humanitarian assistance and participation in recovery and reconstruction efforts. Without this support, the economy of the country would have collapsed long ago. The Somali Diaspora is the major investor in the country and provided 80% of the start-up capital for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Private sector investments contribute to economic recovery and improving livelihoods. This has helped the mission succeed in a way that people have not totally lost hope in life but they still have others activities to keep them going and these activities further reduce on the missions burden like food aid since some people are still earning and making a living hence motivating the troops to keep supporting.

4.3 Challenges both in Somalia and back at home in Uganda

Challenges faced by the Ugandan troops under AMISOM in Somalia.

A retired UPDF soldier noted that Ugandans being the first country to deploy under the AMISOM mission was a disadvantage in its self. Most of the activities and raids carried out in the start were based on a trial and error scenario and this led to loss of a great number of troops before other countries joined. Other countries were lagging to join due

to issues that affected them. For example countries like Nigeria had internal conflicts back at home and also according to their economy the AMISOM pay was too little compared to missions they had previously been engaged in by the UN, Tanzania was acting on their foreign policy of no interference, the reason why troops from Sierra Leone were withdrawn was the inability to rotate in fresh soldiers and was due to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leon and the surrounding region.

Personnel from the Ministry of Finance in the accountant general's office noted that through managing donor perceptions, the Ugandan regime has chosen to subvert the structural logic of aid dependence where donors impose political and economic conditionalities upon aid recipients based on their own interpretations of the recipient's character and actions. This has affected Uganda's policies because decisions cannot be made without consulting the donor community and if the country does rebel, they stand chances of losing all the support. This has been demonstrated in the recent case of the Ugandan current president taking up the countries values by going against the gay behaviour which has cost the country some of the donor support.

Weakness of the mandate and the conflicts within the missions personnel's structure.

IshahilidzaAmadi noted in his book that the then prevailing AMISOM mandate, besides being weak, was also not achievable because of the lack of substantive political support

from within the region and internationally, says one of the respondents. The mandate was focused on peacekeeping mission and a policy of no firing. The UPDF soldiers were constantly being fired and bombed and it was hard for them to stay still without firing back. Also the mission focused on peacekeeping by providing security but was neglecting the most urgent need of food aid that was critically needed in Somalia by the affected citizens and this brought about clashes between the on ground commanders and the personnel in charge of drafting the mission's propaganda. However, even after the mission's mandate was adjusted, there are still low force levels. (AMISOM and SNA) are still insufficient to hold liberated areas whilst continuing with offensive operations.

Equally important to note is that AMISOM mandate is renewed every year and is subject to political dynamics, financial and other factors out of control of the AU and the Somali government. Despite the fact that the change and renewal of the mandate had great implications to the mission, it also had some challenges that came with the changes. For example there were a lot of negotiations that took place between African decision-makers, Somali government and their non-African partners. The outcome of these negotiations had complex motives and interests that had consequences on the autonomy of the mission. Also, when contingents were yearly rotated, there were implications for performance as personnel leave just after they have been trained and have gathered sufficient knowledge on the terrain and on Al-shabaab operations and tactics. With also

came internal conflicts between the decision makers and this set the mission backwards delaying its success noted one professor.

A professor furthermore noted that the coordination and coherence of the mission also had several dimensions. The first was the geographical separation of some of the key mission components. AMISOM's strategic planning and political work was based out of Addis Ababa, its head of mission and mission analysis unit was headquartered in Nairobi, while the military units and operational command were in Mogadishu. The fact that AMISOM's head of mission was based in Nairobi until the end of 2012 not only sent an unhelpful political signal to both locals in Somalia but to the enemies and the troops involved too.

Secondly the fact that the various international training mechanisms for the TFG's security forces were also spread around Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti, among other places, did not ease this problem. Such a disparate mission set up was hardly conducive to internal coherence and effective coordination, especially for operational and tactical issues. This further posed as a threat due to the fact these separations brought about different trainings from different countries and different components of the army had received different types of training, mostly abroad, and there were poor levels of training for non-commissioned officers were troops came from. The Militia Integration was hard to accomplish and the disadvantage was felt when troops met and all had different

tactics of accomplishing the mission also the commanders in charge did not have better ideas to deal with this problem themselves.

A retired UPDF soldier stated that AMISOM its self-had internal challenges that hindered their success. Troops came from five different countries namely Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Estimates of the number of different languages spoken on the continent, not including numerous dialects, range as high as 2,000 or more, while some languages, such as Swahili, are spoken by millions, others may be spoken by only a handful. Military commanders found themselves not only having difficulty communicating with their counterparts from other nations, but also even with their own troops, as many individual African nations have numerous languages spoken within their borders. This hindrance posed as a threat to the mission because orders were not clearly understood and these led to mistakes like falling directly into ambushes hence loss of lives.

Challenges faced directly by the deployed troops

One of the prominent challenges is fatigue from UPDF soldiers being deployed into Somalia. A Colonel noted that AMISOM does not have a timeline nor does it define the stage at which the mandate will be handed over to the local actors or any other agency. The unending conflict has exhausted the troops plus their families at home are complaining of the ongoing conflict that seems to not having an end to it or the soldiers

being killed in the battle and hence putting pressure on the soldiers to withdraw or lose morale and enthusiasm to fight. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the few skilled and specialized police trainers like all other police officers, are deployed on a rotational basis and so have to leave at the end of their mission cycle. This negatively affects both the internal and external training cells in AMISOM because the new troops have to start afresh in learning new tactics and equipment which is also wastage of time and resources.

The Chief Political Commissar of the UPDF said that the key challenge especially in regards to the military component of AMISOM noted by that affected the mission from the start was the insufficient numbers of troops necessary to guarantee the stabilization of areas liberated from al-Shabaab and to continue with military offensive to root out all insurgency in the country and was also too low to stabilize the whole of Somalia given its size and the asymmetric nature of threats posed by al-Shabaab. Many countries refused to deploy due to challenges in their countries these were the likes of Tanzanian, Nigeria, South Africa and others. By the time Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Kenya joined the UPDF troops a lot of killings and captures had been done by the Al-shabaab militants and this weakened the mission which resulted into it taking long to be accomplished.

Another challenge that was and is still faced by the Ugandan troops is the failure to recognize the Al- Shabaab militants. A Colonel the Ugandan spokesperson in Somalia

said, 'al-Shabaab is a difficult enemy because they often look like civilians and because they have become expert in the use of non-conventional weapons such as improvised explosive devices. They also disguise themselves as government soldiers a method used to devastating effect when two suicide bombers attacked the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu in September 2009, killing more than 20 people. In the same way they attacked civilians in Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya using the same tactics. They dress like civilians and carry underneath their clothing suicide vests which kill a lot of civilians at the point of explosion'. December 26, 2014 eight Al-Shabaab militants, dressed in Somali uniforms, launched an attack on an AMISOM base near Mogadishu International Airport, which is also home to a United Nations office and several embassies. All militants were killed and five AMISOM peacekeepers and one foreign contractor was killed. This has been a challenge to the mission because such attacks are hard to be identified least control.

Violation of the Rule of Law by AMISOM.

In September 2014 Human Rights Watch published a report accusing a few soldiers within the Ugandan and Burundian contingents of AMISOM of sexual misconduct on two of the mission's bases in Mogadishu. The African Union issued an official statement denying the allegations, which it characterized as isolated cases largely involving a single rogue soldier. It also pledged to investigate the charges, and indicated that a

number of internal mechanisms had been instituted to prevent, mitigate and discipline any transgressions. UPDF spokesman, a Lieutenant Colonel noted that the AMISOM mandate in its Human Rights and Civilian Protection section condemns all attacks against civilians in Somalia and calls for the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, or abuses committed against civilians, including women and children. It strongly condemns reports of grave violations against children hence these accusations going public de-campained the reputation of the mission. This caused a change in attitude of the locals towards UPDF presence and the Somali citizens started having doubt and resistance to help the troops which put the mission on a setback hence delaying its success.

With the above accusations some of the Somali citizen started accommodating Al-shabaab as means of protection or getting back at the UPDF soldiers. This was a disadvantage to the mission because the Somalis' cooperation was very important to the mission and the fact that the citizens were harboring the enemy put the troops at risk because the Al-shabaab was using the civilians to carry out their deadly missions like planting bombs and accepting bribes to carry out suicides with promises of their families being looked after. This was a challenge to the UPDF because these civilians could not be identified.

Somalia's political composition and laws.

The political power in Somalia can be characterized as local, fragmented, violent, heterogenic and based on hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions controlled by clans or militias, in which different socio-political orders interact. This fluidity of structure, with access to resources and power being an important source of clan conflicts, has been an enduring challenge for peace negotiations. A retired UPDF army officer noted that the mission found it hard to break through the clan circles which all citizens believed in. the conflicts within the tribes alone were a threat to the mission. Even after managing to penetrate this clan system by convincing their heads to join the cause after providing security, food aid and medical aid needed, the mission was still faced with challenges like language and cultural differences. Communication problems were also a hindrance to the mission. AMISOM was hampered by a lack of Somali speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population and the National Security Force.

Financial and logistical challenges within the mission.

From the ministry of finance in the accountant's office, the programs officer noted that just like any other mission, UPDF was faced by financial burdens even after all its success, the mission is still lacking financially. The lack of sustainable funding equally posed a serious challenge for the Ugandan army in terms of continuity of its operations, the provision of the required capabilities and logistical support. While there are several co-existing support models including the UN Trust Fund, the EU African Peace Facility,

direct donor support and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), AMISOM was a heavy burden for the AU. To its credit, UNSOA and the support from the EU made a big difference, but it is still far from meeting most of the needs of the mission. For example, the necessary additional deployment of troops to areas where they are most needed has been hampered by the lack of resources to airlift and sustain the troops in the mission. To date Algeria has tried to support the mission by airlifting the troops but this is from Uganda to Somalia hence local transport is still a challenge.

Current men and women soldiers who have returned from the mission said that there are also a number of challenges faced by the UPDF soldiers, commented one of the army personnel with experience from this war. 'During the mission we faced logistical challenges like cars to transport troops, modern fighting machines like tanks in the beginning of the deployment. Al- Shabaab at this time had better equipment some acquired from Al-qaeda and better geographical locations so this was to our disadvantage and this costs us a lot of troops. Other factors were environmental factors, wide open flatlands, hot area, semi-arid which the troops were not used to compared to the weather back in Uganda, accidents due to bad roads that couldn't accommodate the type of cars being used, ambushes, Mogadishu mortar attack, roadside bomb, suicide car bomb that killed many'.

Also a Lieutenant Colonel noted that the forces also lacked modern weaponry with many ostensibly Somali National Army weapons belonging to warlords, clans, and individuals. Major problems were also with recruitment for senior commanders from one nation who were unfamiliar with the capabilities of the equipment from another, a problem amplified when that other nation's forces were put under his command. Not knowing ranges of artillery pieces, speeds of armored cavalries, or lift capabilities of aircrafts were disastrous during combat leading lots of defeat, expressed the returned soldiers.

According to the International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya, At the operational level, AMISOM experienced its own lack of trust with the TFG's security forces, which were disorganized, poorly equipped, poorly motivated, and often unruly. Instead of being a reliable local partner in the fight against Al-Shabaab, members of the TFG's security forces engaged in a variety of unhelpful activities including leading AMISOM troops into ambushes, selling their ammunition and weapons on the local market, and passing operational information to AMISOM's opponents. There were regular defections and an unwillingness to engage in risky operations, the major TFG troops and police were also associated with illegal roadblocks and looting.

A professor published information stating that another challenge that can be linked to the delay and challenge that the mission has faced is the fact that the Ethiopian troops did not fully coordinate the details of their departure with the AMISOM. This also meant

that in early 2009, Al-Shabaab forces were quickly able to occupy most of the former Ethiopia National Defence Force (ENDF) positions in the city, many of which were very close to UPDF positions hence giving them easy access to attack the troops.

The concentration of the humanitarian aid in and around Mogadishu further limited the operation's impact. Weather conditions, terrain and infrastructure affected the manoeuvre of humanitarian and Force convoys and were vulnerable to ambushes and IEDs due to lack of good transportation system and security issues, the humanitarian aid was located in the main town of Mogadishu and its surroundings drawing people from rural areas to urban centers where relief camps had been established. This posed as a threat in a way that during the citizens' movement most of them were killed but worse still the majority that made it the safe camps set up by the mission were too many to be accommodate and the Food and medical aid was not so sufficient to accommodate the flux of people that had migrated. This conflict caused a lot of social services breakdown in Somalia. Virtually no hospital, no school, name it, was functional. Humanitarian assistance could not reach the deeper parts of the country, especially where Al-shabaab had presence noted one Brigadier.

Finally civilians in Uganda who have been affected by this war noted that the challenge still facing the mission is, despite of all the support got from all the different countries, the mission is still ongoing and so is the conflict. The Al-shabbab have resorted to attacking civilians outside of Somalia as means of getting back at the armies sent to fight

them. This has been demonstrated by the influx of threatening messages sent by their heads through the social medial which has spread fear to many African countries. This has been followed by lots of killing especially in countries like Kenya and Uganda for example the June 2011 bomb on the Ugandan citizens watching soccer and the west gate mall shooting in 2013. One Somali citizen living in Uganda noted this loss of lives has created fear in east Africa and has caused the local citizens to resent the mission and beg for withdrawal of all troops.

4.4 Contributions of AMSIOM to peace and security

A Lieutenant Colonel noted that there are several contributions made by UPDF that can be sited as success of this missions and these includes things like providing security to the former and current governments including prime minister, President, Parliament, Members of Parliament, training of Somali national army (SNA), police, and intelligence, creating a conducive environment for regular elections of Members of parliaments, President as of next year 2016 and other local governments, providing security to Humanitarian agencies, including UN, WHO, and other NGOs, to faithfully and successfully carry out their work and opening up of the Aden Abdulle International airport and sea ports to engage in day to day trade.

It would be a good measure to say that the mission was and is successful. This can be seen in ways like, Uganda's intervention has somewhat stabilised the security situation in Somalia. The Somalia government has been able to expand its area of control and certainly there are very few pockets which are still controlled by Al-shaabab. The Federal Government of Somalia is now able to extend its authority practically to the whole of south-central Somalia. Additionally the UPDF has continued to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts and a significant amount of support to Ugandan army has been provided by private companies. "Bancroft Global Development, headquartered on Washington's Embassy Row, employs about 40 South African and European trainers who work with [AMISOM's] Ugandan and Burundian troops.

A Lieutenant Colonel also noted that the International Image of Uganda as a country has greatly improved. Uganda and UPDF were always seen as "bad neighbor" before the AMISOM mission in cases of conflicts in Rwanda, Congo, CAR and South Sudan adventures of the past. So internationally this was an opportunity for Uganda to mend its face in front of the international community and most especially the neighbors. This also proved and showed that UPDF can also ably work in UN or AU assigned missions and successfully execute their mandate.

Further to note as a contribution of the mission is ability to facilitate the stability that can enable a stable FGS to join East African Community (EAC) hence expansion of regional

market which is boosting the Somali economy which in the wrong run brings in revenue that will help into reconstructing of the destroyed infrastructure. Also to note is effort the mission put in the establishing of capable SNSF that can reduce piracy threat on Indian Ocean that affect regional and international trade as noted by Colonel.

A Private noted that some of the soldiers that were physically engaged in this war say the attitude of the Somali people would be described as happy because trade is booming, towns are being rebuilt, refugees are coming back home, and just last year (2014) for the first time Maj. Gen. Geofrey Muhessi of UPDF who is the deputy force commander walked 2km in Mogadishu without a bullet proof vest and no harm came to him. He was the first senior army officer to do that, he greeted people and played soccer with the kids. This is a clear indication and hope for a greater and safer Somalia.

4.5 Conclusion

Therefore in conclusion, the researcher through the analysis of data noted that the AMISOM mission has indeed vindicated UPDF in this MISSION. Everyone leader globally, is talking about the contribution of UPDF in Somalia even when the mission is not yet over. Right now, if UPDF pulls out of Somalia, everyone will follow, including the UN, AU and other partner troop contributing countries (TCC). Also the mission is still functioning in order to prevent spread of the strife to other countries in the region.

Drawing close to the end of the mission, AMISOM is still facing a few challenges whilst still deployed in Somalia, these are manifested in the continuous death of both the troops and civilians in Somalia and in countries where the troops originate from. This has caused a big hunch in the mission and a lot of revisions in the objectives of the mission are being made to stop these. However the mission still has one year to complete its mandate as they plan their pull out from Somalia. They are using all their manpower to leave Somalia a safe and secure country.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Summary

This study has sought to describe the role of Uganda in Somalia under AMISOM as a model for effective peacekeeping. The Uganda's People Defence Force (UPDF) has been engaged in so many different battles in Africa with a purpose of bringing peace to the continent. Some of these countries include Liberia, Congo and Rwanda. Uganda further went out of Africa to countries like Iraq with the same agenda of fighting for peace. These battles have not only strengthened the army but rather their success has motivated the government of Uganda to keep going for the same cause when they can be of help. This study concentrated on one country Somalia which Uganda has been helping to consolidate peace and security and establish the rule of law. Uganda served in Somalia under the umbrella of AMISOM a body which is under the African union specifically responsible for bringing peace and security to Somalia. The government of Ugandan sent its army, Uganda's People Defence Force (UPDF), to help Somalia gain its peace after years of struggle and having no hope for a peaceful country. Uganda has been engaged in this battle since 2007 when it first deployed its first troops until today Ugandan is still in Somalia trying to stabilise the situation after concurring most of the enemy bases. The UPDF is currently working on an exist plan which they hope to execute next year 2016 after the Somalia elections. By then the Ugandan army would have set protective measures for the peace they have built in this country. These have

been achieved; training a strong army that can keep, maintain and help in building sustainable peace that will strengthen the TFG and created a strong democratic government and help build strong security structures and infrastructures that can keep the economy strong. The research was carried out through interviews with key informants, army personnel's general citizens and the civil society. With results from this research Uganda's role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was discovered, the strength, achievement and challenges faced while carrying out these missions was also revealed.

5.1 Conclusion

The critical theory link to the research findings.

The findings are linked to the critical theory where, Ogunrotifa (2011) states that the theory views peacekeeping as a counter-insurgency operation, funded technically as a means of achieving political and military dominance and interest, this research found it empirical to use this theory to compare the findings in a way that however much Uganda's reasons for intervening are just and mainly towards a better Somalia, The National Resistance movement also has its personal interest of joining this peace fight whereby as discovered it is also a way of the securing the boundaries of Uganda and to make a statement about the strength of the security system the country has hence guarding its self from any threats.

Successes attributed to the intervention of AMISOM

The findings of this research have concluded that indeed Uganda has played a big role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. The findings show that Uganda has successfully brought peace to Somalia by capturing most of the enemy that is causing havoc. This can be seen in the way the UPDF has managed to secure Mogadishu, Kismayo port and the surrounding towns, the towns once invaded and captured by the terrorist group Al-shabbab. Cease fire operation that was introduced in 2007 up-to-date is still working. There is less loss of life today in Somalia, food aid is almost available to those in need, medical aid has also reached to those in need especially those that were affected physically to the battle thanks to the organised mission of AMISOM.

The fact that finally Somalia is going to have elections in 2016 can be attributed to the work done by AMISOM troops by convincing the Somali citizens and leaders that the only way to a peaceful country is through elections and also building sufficient secure space for a political peace process. In conclusion that shows how successful the mission is putting an end to the long conflict.

Uganda's achievements throughout the mission

The government of Uganda through this mission has gained quite a number of advantages these include the UPDF army experience gained throughout this battle. The troops have gained knowledge about tactics, equipment / machinery, discipline in terms of following orders, how to operate in war torn areas and so many more. These experiences have motivated them to be vigilant and enthusiastic about their careers. Furthermore, Uganda's image has been reverted from a corrupt country to a pan-africanist country that is willing to help fellow Africans achieve peace and also president Museveni and the UPDF have played critical roles, not only in terms of their military capabilities but their diplomatic capabilities to try to navigate, negotiate and mediate concerns in the region.

Contributing factors to the success of the mission and the motivating factors to its missions.

This research has also identified several major themes that helped to drive success for the AMISOM mission despite serious challenges faced in its early years. Also the determination of troop contributors and their funding partners, effective mechanisms to fully engage troop and police contributors in planning and decision-making, working with unlimited funds and support from the start, working with a tenacious enemy in a difficult environment but the mission went on and would be described as successful.

The research recognizes the support received from the UN, US, EU, France and fellow countries like Burundi, Kenya Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sierra Leone which strengthened the mission on several different levels. This included enabling the deployment of new troops, providing training and increasing the capability of the troops, the planning of operations, medical aid, financial aid, food aid, transportation, machineries and many other kinds of support.

It can hardly be ignored that the mission had challenges and some are still being dealt with but however, according to these findings AMISOM can be considered as having achieved some peacekeeping success, in that it has contributed to the stabilisation of Somalia. The mission seems to have delivered on its mandate, i.e. contributing essential support to the TFG and its institutions. In its role as a peacekeeping mission, AMISOM has significantly contributed in bringing Somalia to where it is today and it will continue to be of importance to the future of Somalia.

5.2Recommendations

- The research recommends that the Ugandan government keep engaging in these missions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding especially to their neighbouring countries or Africa at large

- The government of Uganda should always have timelines for such missions to avoid unavoidable challenges that crop up due to long stay in the intervention which in a long run start rubbing off onto the country and its citizens negatively.
- The research recommends that the AU strengthens its mandate to encourage all African countries to get involved in helping each other when need arises.
- The AU should solicit help from the UN to help in strengthening this cause with all the logistical support needed to avoid such scenarios spreading over to neighbouring countries which would make the peace and security situation in Africa a nightmare.
- Also the African Union should reaffirm the importance of the re-establishment, training, equipping and retention of Somali security forces, which is vital for the long term stability and security of Somalia, expressing support for the ongoing European Union Training Mission and other capacity-building programmes, and emphasizing the importance of increased coordinated, timely and sustained support from the international community.
- Boutros Ghali(1992) stated that the most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes hence African countries deploying for peacekeeping should use this strategy.
- The international community should use the incentive of international recognition and extensive support for the Somalia regime to ensure that the peace that it has so far achieved should be improved and maintained.

- The international community should make sure that Al-Shabaab respects the territorial integrity of its neighbors; these include Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia.
- Somali leaders should encourage the spirit of reconciliation and negotiations and focus on development rather than dwell on the past. The past experience should only strengthen the Somali citizens and act as a learnt lesson to avoid conflict in future.
- Africans should not wait for disputes to go further but rather capture them from their early stages and this can be done with negotiations and reconciliation methods that dissolves conflicts, disagreements and misunderstandings.

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
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Success or Peacekeeping in Regress? Ministry.

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Introduction Letter



Appendix 2: Consent form (English)

Date /...../.....

Correspondent

Researcher

My name is SheritaBusingye, a student undertaking masters in Peace Leadership and Governance at Africa University Zimbabwe. My research is about the Role of Uganda in Peacekeeping missions in Africa, a case study of Uganda under AMISOM. I am kindly requesting for your response to my interview questions. You were picked basing on the knowledge you posses on this topic. Your response will be greatly appreciated.

If you accept to be interviewed, it will take about 30 minutes of your time. This research is strictly for academic purposes and your responses are discreet. Your name will not be mentioned in this study unless you request for it to be. Answering my research question is not mandatory, you are allowed to withdraw your participation if your wish too without any repercussions.

Before signing to agreeing to be part of this research please ask any questions about anything you haven't understood. If you agree, please sign blow affirming that you understand and agree to these terms and conditions.

.....

Correspondent

.....

signature .

For any problem concerning this letter or the questioned being asked by the researcher, or the behavior of the researcher, or if you want to talk to one else apart from the researcher, please call Africa University Ethics Committee on (020) 60075 or 60026 or 1156, or write to aurec@africau.edu.

SheritaBusingye

Appendix 3: Interview guide for key informants

GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR KEY INFORMANTS

A. What is the mandate of the AMISOM in Somalia?

1. How did you interpret the AMISOM mandate?
2. What were the objectives of the mandate?
3. Where you following the mandate objectives during the war?
4. Where the AMISOM mandate objectives viable?
5. Where the AMISOM mandate objective achievable?

B. What are the reasons that motivated Uganda to intervene this mission?

1. In your opinion why did Uganda go to this war?
2. Why do you think Uganda is still intervening in this mission?
3. Is Uganda involved for only Somalia's interest or also personal interest?
4. What do you think Uganda is gaining from this war?

C. How effective is Uganda's participation in this mission?

1. In your opinion how successful has the mission so far been?
2. Is Uganda's participation bringing peace to the Somali region?
3. Has Uganda achieved its goals for intervening in this war?
4. Do you think the war is worth fighting in?

D. What are the challenges on both the Ugandan soldiers and Uganda as a country?

1. According to your observance what challenges have the Ugandan soldiers faced while at war in Somalia?
2. During the war what were the challenging factors that made this war last up-to-date?
3. Do you think the war is affecting Ugandans back at home?
4. According to your observations are the soldiers still enthusiastic to fight this war?

E. How far does Uganda's intervention contribute to peace and stability in Somalia?

1. Is Uganda's intervention bringing stability to this country?
2. If yes how is it doing this, what are the changes that are visible in Somalia?
3. In your view do you see a stable and peaceful Somalia in the near future?
4. Why do you think Somali is still unstable after years of struggle?

F. In your view, what is the implication of Uganda's continued presence in Somalia on regional stability and the credibility of AMISOM peacekeeping agenda?

1. Please give me your opinion how you think this intervention will bring stability I Somalia and Africa at large?
2. Do think this war reflects well on AMISOM since it has taken long to end?

3. In your opinion do you think AMISOM is a credible mission? Is the mission worth investing in?
4. Does the missions' success encourage donor support any more basing on its successes?
5. Do you think this mission places Africa on record for fighting its wars successfully?

G. What is the attitude of the Somali citizens towards the AMISOM troops?

1. According to your experience are the Somali citizens welcoming the rescue troops with open arms?
2. In your observation are the Somali co-operating with the troops to end this war?
3. Have the Somali citizens been of great help to help stop the war or a=have they been an obstacle?

Appendix 4: Interview guide face to face interviews

FACE TO FACE INTERVIEW

A. Would you please tell me about the objectives of the AMISOM as a peacekeeping mission?

1. What do you think the objectives for AMISOM to succeed in this war?
2. Do you have any idea what the objectives of this mission were?

B. Kindly tell me about your experience in the AMISOM?

1. While in Somalia what was your experience like?
2. What were ups and downs that you faced while fighting this war?
3. Would you still go back and complete the peace process?
4. What were your memorable moments while at war?
5. Did you feel it was worth fighting for this mission?

C. In your opinion what do you think about Uganda's intervention in the Somalia crisis through the AMSIOM?

1. In your opinion do think Uganda should continue this fight on Somalia's behalf?
2. Do you think Uganda's intervention is justified?
3. Do you think Uganda should continue with the intervention till the war is over and Somalia is peaceful again?

D. What were your challenges and successes while participating in the AMISOM?

1. What were the most challenging moments while engaged in this mission?
2. What were the challenges on your plans to achieve this success?
3. Do all the plans go as planned during the struggle, if not what goes / went wrong?
4. What were your personal challenges as an individual during this crisis?

E. Is Uganda's presence making a difference towards the stability of the region?

1. Do you think Uganda is making a difference in Somali during this mission?
2. What is your opinion about the al-shaaba attack in Uganda?
3. How do you think this war has impacted on the peace of all countries that have intervened?

4. Has Uganda made an impact towards the stability of Africa at large?

F. In what ways has Uganda's intervention strengthened the peace and security in the region?

1. In your opinion do you think Uganda has been exemplary to all African countries to fight for peace on the continent?
2. Do you think Uganda's intervention has made an impact or has sent a message to all peace spoilers in the world?

Appendix 5: Consent form (Luganda)

Consent form (Luganda)

Enaku/...../.....

Gwebabuuza

Abuuza

AmanyagangempitibwaSheritaBusingye, Omuyiziwa masters in Peace Leadership and Governance ku Africa University eh Zimbabwe.Nonyelezakunsongaza Uganda okwegaatamubyokuyambaensi Somalia okukumaeddelyabo. Nsababuyambimukudamuebibuuzukulupapulaluno. Ensongayokunonyelezakunozirinti; Kulywaki Uganda yegaata mu musoongaza Somalia wansiwa AMISON, gyawuloobankulakulanaki Uganda gyeleseewomukikwattekyino, enoenagatamuelessewookukulakulana ne ddembemuseno? Walondeedwaokuddamuebibuzobinokubangaensongaenoogimanyikokatono ate nengelielikintokinobwekikukosedwako. Amagezikugagyakuyambaokudamuebibuzobingiebnayambaenseno.

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Erinyalyoomubuzi/omuyizzi.