

THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVATORY OF CODE OF ETHICS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS (OCEP) IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN THE REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC OF CONGO (DRC): A CASE STUDY OF KINSHASA CITY.

BY

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to determine the role of the Observatory of Code of Ethics for Public Official (OCEP) in the fight against corruption in the Republic Democratic of Congo (DRC): a case study of the city of Kinshasa. The study sought to establish the extent to which OCEP helps to curb corruption in Kinshasa city. The sample size for questionnaire respondents was 40 ordinary community member from a cross-section of the Kinshasa population respectively to ensure diversity. Respondents were drawn from civil society, key OCEP officials, political analysts, and the civic groups, academic and media. The research design adopted for this study was qualitative research design, because it fitted the type of research being carried out to ensure methodological triangulation for the purposes of enhancing reliability and validity of findings. Questionnaires and interviews were used as research instruments. The documentary review method was used to provide information on how the OCEP can better execute its mandate in the institution in the city of Kinshasa. The study showed that the OCEP as an anti-corruption has its successes and challenges. Relevant comparisons were made with other institutions sharing to common aspect on the fight against corruption. This study recommended that the OCEP should increase public awareness and trust in its implementation through public officials. It is also necessary for the OCEP to implement governance reforms by taking concrete action against all forms of corruption by prosecuting culprits of corruption. The study recommended increase of salaries and development of personnel skills in order to prevent corruption. This research can be built into further research. A comparative analysis of Kinshasa with other similar cities that have been successful in reducing political corruption may lead to more effective solutions for the OCEP policy. Thus, more research is needed into them and brings to the face issues in the public eye that can help government to take action plans to curb corruption.

It is hoped that this research will bring about an understanding and appreciation of the OCEP policy as the implementation plan is being executed through the participation of Kinshasa citizens at all levels.

Key words: Corruption, Code of Ethics, Public official, transparency, accountability

DECLARATION

I, Sakisa Ndinga Sacky, do hereby declare that herein, is my original work except where sources have been acknowledged. The work has never been submitted, nor will it ever be submitted, to another University in the awarding of a degree.

STUDENT

Signed DATE

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my authority as a university supervisor.

SUPERVISOR

Signed DATE.....

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To all I sincerely say thank you!

DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my lost beloved father Munguna Ndinga Leon who was always encouraged and advising me the importance of studying, to my wonderful mother Mukumbi Sakisa Yvette for her unconditional love and support throughout my studies. God bless you all.

To all the people who fight the scourge of corruption and believe in change, always remember development depends on you!

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC: Anti-Corruption Commission

AU: Africa Union

BKMS: Business Keep Monitoring System

DCEC: Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EU: European Union

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

ICVS: International Crime Victim Survey

IMF: the International Monetary Fund

IPLG: Institute of Peace Leadership and Governance

KACC: Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission

NGOs: Non-Government Organization

OCEP: Observatory of Code of Ethics for Public Officials

PCB: Prevention of Corruption Bureau

UN: United Nations

UNCAC: United Nations Convention Against Corruption

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SAHRIT: Survey of Traditional Leadership in Southern Africa

TI: Transparency International

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

The mineral wealth of the country has largely been exploited as a source of personal wealth by a few individuals, since independence in 1960 (Economic Index Freedom, 2015). The culture of corruption has penetrated through the political and civil service bureaucratic structures of the country, including the legislature, the judiciary, the media and also independent professionals to corruption, the situation is the Congo's vast natural resources have continually attracted violent internal conflicts and intervention from abroad. The government has shown its ineffectiveness in protecting its citizens.

Political and administrative corruption is still on the increase and has challenged government and officials to find solutions to reduce it. There is hope in many countries is to have anti-corruption commissions in the hope that they will enhance the openness, transparency and accountability of public administration and increase the degree of interest and involvement of citizens in politics. The Observatory of Code of Ethic for Public Official is a positive channel for enhancing trust in government.

Since independence in 1960, DRC has been marked by conflicts, economic mismanagement, weak governance, and widespread corruption. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation (2014), in 1996 Laurent Kabila overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko after 32 years of authoritarian and rule. From 1997 the country plunged into a five-year

civil war with regional dimensions between government forces supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe against rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. The war claimed an estimated three million lives, fuelling what is often considered one of the regions greatest humanitarian catastrophes in recent years (British Broadcast Corporation).

After Kabila Laurent was assassinated in 2001 and his son Joseph Kabila assumed power and resumed peace negotiations with various rebel groups and national stakeholders, leading to the creation of a transitional government and a formal end of the war in 2003. Joseph Kabila subsequently won the first multi-party elections in 2006, which despite a number of procedural flaws, raised hopes of restoring peace and stability and expanding the democratic space in this conflict-torn country. These hopes were dashed by the flawed 2011 elections, in which Joseph Kabila was re-elected despite massive irregularities denounced by both local commentators and the international community (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014, Freedom House 2012).

According to Nelson (2013) most of the country's violence and instability was driven by both economic and political factors. The conflict was fuelled by the country's vast mineral wealth, including gold, copper, cobalt, and diamonds. The rebel groups took advantage of the political instability to plunder these natural resources. Revenue from the various mines provided funding for rebels groups and other officials in the conflict.

The Mobutu era created a system in which power and corruption were synonymous, and its legacy was difficult to overcome. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2012, the DRC was ranked 160 out of 176 of the most corrupt countries in the world. According to the report by Transparency International published on 3 December 2014, the DRC now occupies position 154 out of 174 countries, making it one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption is endemic at all levels of society and government efforts against corruption have been inadequate. Insufficient salaries, which are often not paid on time, fuel petty corruption among civil servants, who include but not limited to police officers and soldiers. Administrative disruptions designed to solicit bribes, are considered as part of everyday life by the Congolese people. Little progress has been made to combat corruption, although some local- level initiatives have reported success.

Institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability are weak or non-existent at all levels of the Congolese government. The 2006 Constitution and the Code of Ethics for Public Officials require the head of state, government officials, and civil servants to submit assets declarations to the constitutional court. However, public access to the statements is not stipulated. Owing to the weakness of the judicial system, prosecution for corruption, particularly of government officials, is not frequent therefore it does not act as a credible deterrent, though dismissals sometimes occur. The independent press generally is not blocked from investigating corruption in the public sector or criticizing government policies. In view of the above background, the researcher evaluated the role of the

Observatory of Code of Ethics of Public Officials in its fight against corruption in DRC with focus on Kinshasa city.

1.1 Statement of the problem

The DRC, which is one of the biggest country in Africa, has shown incapacity to develop due to the mismanagement of the country's resources. Several institutions have been created to fight corruption and the latest of these is an anti-corruption commission called the Observatory of Code of Ethics for Public Officials.

The 2014 international Anti-corruption day also comes at a time when the 2014 corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2014) result shows that DRC still remains at the bottom as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. The Transparency International annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2014, reveals that DRC is ranking number 156 out of 175 studied at this years.

According to the Afrimap Report (2009) the main function of the Observatory of Codes of Ethics for Public Officials (OCEP) is to raise awareness against corruption, and to ensure that all the national institutions involved in the fight against corruption have adequate operating capacity to investigate corrupt activities. This research therefore sought to investigate the impact of the OCEP in the fight against corruption.

1.2 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study was to examine the role of the Observatory of Code of Ethics of Public Officials in support of the DRC's quest to eradicate corruption. As stated by Ban Ki-Mon, Secretary General of the United-Nations "neither peace, nor development or human rights can flourish in an atmosphere of corruption" (Madson, 2003). The study also makes recommendations on how best the OCEP can tackle the problem of corruption in Kinshasa.

1.3 Significance of the Study

Corruption is considered as one of the greatest obstacles to growth and development of any country. Corruption delays and disrupts proper distribution of resources, damages the legitimacy of the government and weakens their structures as well as their performance, reducing productivity, marginalizing the poor and creating social unrest, (Kaled Anup,2000).

There are different studies about anti-corruption commissions, but in DRC there has been very few studies regarding this topic. This is so, in spite of there being lots of resources which can be dedicated towards more research on this topic. International institutions such as Transparency International and some NGOs have worked on publishing yearly reports on corruption. The importance of the study is to contribute to the exploration of the multiple facets of corruption through the Observatory of Code of Ethics for Public

Officials (OCEP) in terms of their success and challenges in a bid to create climate without corruption in DRC.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study were to:

- 1) Explore public's perceptions on corruption in government administration in Kinshasa city;
- 2) Examine the functions of the OCEP as an anti-corruption strategy;
- 3) Identify and evaluate the challenges associated with the implementations of the OCEP and;
- 4) Propose mechanisms to curb corruption amongst government officials in Kinshasa.

1.5 Research questions

The study is guided by the following questions:

- 1) How the public is perceiving corruption in public administration?
- 2) What is the role of the OCEP in government administration and as an anti-corruption mechanism?
- 3) What challenges are associated with the implementation of OCEP in Kinshasa city?
- 4) What can be done to enhance the effectiveness of OCEP and curb corruption in Kinshasa city?

1.6 Assumptions

The study was based on the following assumptions:

The higher the level corruption is in government, the more it will affect negatively on the advancement of human development in DRC.

For the growth of investment to occur there is need to strength anti- corruption institutions.

Transparency within a country highly opposes corruption. Where countries` officials are transparent the result will be low levels of corruption and lack of transparency may create high levels of corruption.

1.7 Delimitation of the study

This study was delineated to the Observation of Code of Ethics for Public Officials in DRC in the city of Kinshasa, because Kinshasa is the administrative capital of DRC. This particular area provided the researcher with a rich source of data needed for the study. In addition, the researcher chose to delineate the study to Kinshasa to make it manageable. All interviews were conducted within Kinshasa, and all questionnaires were distributed to selected participants in Kinshasa. Most government departments and NGOs involved in the fight against corruption are headquartered in Kinshasa.

1.8 Definition of terms

Corruption-Harris (2003) defines corruption as the use of public position for private advantage and the subversion of the political process for the personal ends. Most descriptions of corruption would typically include solicited or extorted bribery of public officials, contract or jobs and borderline practices such as inflated facilitation payments made by foreign companies to officials or misuse of public funds by officials.

Code of Ethics-Investopedia (2013) defines the Code of Ethics as a guide of principles designed to help professionals conduct business honestly and with integrity.

Public official-Oxford University (2013) defines Public Official as an individual in a position of official authority that is offered by a state.

Transparency-define as a principle, public officials, civil servants, managers and directors of companies and organisations which have a duty to act visibly, predictably and understandably to promote participation and accountability.

Accountability-define as a means ensuring that officials in public, private and voluntary sector organisations are answerable for their actions and that there is consequences, it is a force beyond our control. And when there aren't consequences to our actions we tend to behave differently.

1.9 Limitation of the study

This study looked at available information with major sectors and reviewed available literature, concentrating on Kinshasa due the highly representations of different public administration. The information acquired from participants was confidential although some participants viewed it as an investigation into government resource management hence they may not have given honest opinions. However, other participants were willing to share information with the researcher.

1.10 Structure of the study

This research is comprised of five chapters. Chapter one considered the introduction, statement of the problem, significance of the study, research objectives, assumptions and questions. Chapter two considered the review of related literature on different Anti-corruption commissions and their implementations. Chapter three is about the research methodology where research design, sample, methods and data analysis methods are explained. In chapter four, the research analyses and interprets the findings. Subsequently, chapter five discusses the findings and draws some conclusions and recommendations based on the researcher`s opinion.

1.11 Summary

This chapter introduced the research study as a whole by giving the background of the study, and explained the motivation for carrying out such a study. The researcher put forward the statement of the study, the objectives, and the main research questions and

justified the importance of the study. Finally the researcher pointed out the delimitations of the study, the major constraints that constitute the limitations, and defined the major terms. Thus, the next chapter focused on the literature review.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a critical look at the existing literature on the phenomenon under study and presents an overview of the major issues and explanations of anti-corruption institutions.

The Anti-corruption Commission assumes firstly the simplification of rules and procedures, so as to curb the scope of corruption. Secondly, it brings stronger transparency to the entire political system and to ensure effective punishment (Vital, 2001). Because Anti-corruption Commission information is often conveyed from one country to another through ratifications and implementations, it is important to ascertain the functionality of Anti-corruption commission on a global scale. To address this aim, the second chapter provides a critical look at the accessible information on the phenomenon and presents an over view of the different variables and examples of different anti-corruption commissions like the Observatory of Code of Ethics for Public Officers (OCEP).

2.1 Forms of Corruption

Muthomi (2006) argued that corruption manifests itself in one or more of various forms, such as; bribery, extortion, fraud, embezzlement and other forms of malfeasance by public or corporate officials. He maintained that though universal in its existence, the pervasiveness of corruption varies across nations and organizations. Corruption occurs in

different forms, in different types of organizations and at different levels. This section presents some of the forms of corruption mentioned as follows:

2.1.1.1 Grand and Petty Corruption

According to Transparency International (TI, 2007), grand corruption is corruption that pervades the highest levels of a national government, leading to a broad erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule of law and economic stability. Petty corruption can involve the exchange of very small amounts of money, the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment or the employment of friends and relatives in minor positions (TI).

2.1.1.2 Extortion

Ades and Di Tella (1997) observed that whereas bribery involves the use of payments, where the public official threatens to use state power to induce the payment of a bribe. Low-level extortion includes activities such as the payment of “speed money” to ensure timely consideration and decision-making of minor matters by officials.

2.1.1.3 Favouritism

Monica (2004) observed that generally, favouritism involve abuses of discretion. Such abuses, is where public sector jobs are illegally channelled to the interests of someone

linked to an official through membership of a family, political party, tribe, religious or to the benefit of the decision-makers own interests

2.1.1.4 Active and Passive Corruption

Rose-Ackerman (1999) argued that in discussions of transactional offences such as bribery, active bribery usually refers to the offering or paying of the bribe, while "passive bribery" refers to the receiving of the bribe.

2.1.1.5 Bribery

Simis (1982) argued that bribery is where an illegal payment is made to a government official in return for some type of official access. It can be initiated by a person who seeks or solicits bribes or by a person who offers and then pays bribes.

2.1.1.6 Embezzlement and Fraud

As noted by Ferrero and Brosio (1997), in the context of corruption; embezzlement involve the taking or conversion of money, or to appropriate public funds by an individual who is not entitled to them but, by virtue of his or her position or employment, has access to them. Fraud refers to the imaginative schemes orchestrated by officials to appropriate public funds. This may include listing ghost workers to pad payrolls.

2.0.1 Interest and motivation

Despite multiple efforts, corruption in public administration has reached critical levels and has become one of the major threats to development. Because corrupt practices mostly occur under conspiracy, the ways of fighting corruption become even more difficult. Tabish (2011) giving the pivotal functionality of Anti-corruption commission plays on curbing corruption, posit that it is important to establish whether or not their implementations is warranted.

One study has showed that to curb and control corruption it is by getting citizens involved in Anti-corruption activism through education awareness. (Peter 2010). A great deal of research has focused on the institutional frameworks to curb corruption. The current research examines how the anti-corruption commission was implemented in different spheres of the government administration through the OCEP. This area has been surprisingly neglected until recently, as the majority of the literature on Anti-corruption as focused on the effect of corruption and media reports containing misleading information.

A World Bank publication identified two different categories of anti-corruption institutions on the basis of their functions and the branch of government to which they were accountable (Udombana, 2000). The first category was the universal model of anti-corruption agency which combines investigative, preventative and communicative

functions. The second category was described as the investigative model and was characterized by a small and centralized investigative commission.

To appreciate the anti-corruption institutions and their functionality, this research looked in detail, and identified different institutions that have been involved in combating corruption.

2.0.2 Country profile

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a former Belgium colony which gained independence on the 30 June 1960, with Joseph Kasavubu as a president and Patrice Lumumba as the prime minister. Since 2001, the country has been recovering from several conflicts that broke out in the 1990s. The economic and social collapse has dramatically reduced national output and governance revenue, increased external debt, and resulted in deaths of more than 5 million people from violence and disease, (Cutting Through Complexity, 2002). Joseph Kabila and his party won the presidential and legislative elections held in November 2011; however these elections raised concerns about the transparency of the electoral process.

Transparency governance is a prerequisite for justice in a country, so reducing the level of corruption must be the main point. Its objective is to strengthen governance and

transparency in the administration offices in order to improve the business climate. According to Transparency International's Perceptions Index, the DRC is one of the most corrupt countries in southern Africa and it is ranked at the position 162 out of 180 countries in the world, (BBC).

The DRC remains a fragile country with great need in terms of reconstruction, economic growth, and governance. The security situation is improving but remains tense, particularly in the eastern and north Katanga provinces. Peace building and economic recovery efforts are being carried out in a challenging social context.

The issue of corruption was not neglected in the past, it has been on the political agenda for many years. Since then the government's anti-corruption legal framework is trying to be strong. Although not perceived as equally extensive as other countries in Africa, corruption does continue to be a significant problem in the DRC. Furthermore, with the nominations of the "geological scandal" because of the diverse resources especially in the mining sector have been raised whether the country is able to manage its resource revenues in respect of good governance principles and avoid the infamous "resource curse". In view of the above point the researcher would like to explore if the OCEP is facing the same challenges in the management of corruption in DRC.

2.1 Theoretical framework

The study was informed by the theory of corruption called “the modernization theory” which was conceptualized by Huntington in 1968, one of the theorist of modernization cited by Adefulu (2007) the author observed that: “the process of economic and political development in modernizing societies tends to breed inequality, political instability and corruption which may be defined simply in terms of the use of public powers to achieve private goals”.

Modernization theorists explained that: “the causes, scale and incidence of corruption and corrupt practices in pre-colonial African states in terms of the logic of patrimonialism, neo patrimonialism, and patro-clientelism and the main proposition common to all these theories of cooption centers on the view that extractive corruption in African (and elsewhere in developing countries) is one of the unconstructive consequences of grafting modern political structure and processes on indigenous socio political structures which function on the basis of old values and obligation.

In spite of the presumed benefits of mixed government as reported by the author (Adefulu, 2007) the incidence of corruption in Africa is seen as an outcome of the behavior of public officials which deviates from the accepted norms, and which also signifies the absence of effective political institutionalization that makes it difficult for these officials to divorce their public roles from private ones, thus prompting them to subordinate their institutional roles to exogenous demands.

The author posit that one best way to look at corruption is when individuals act negates the moral principle that guides their official obligations. Corruption thus cannot be devoiced from breaching of ethnical rules that bind the conduct of official duties. Every official position either in private or public is guided by ethics and these ethics are there to regulate official conduct. This theory helped the researcher to examine the role of the Observatory of Code of Ethics for Public officials against corruption in the DRC.

2.2 Understanding of corruption

Tax evasion gives a concern picture in Africa, as it remains a fundamental barrier to effective governance and to building trust between the government and citizens. A survey on citizen experience and perceptions of corruption when dealing with tax and custom official in several African countries demonstrate that corruption in tax administration takes different forms, from bribery to patronage. Tax in the administration plays a key role in ensuring that the right amount of tax is collected at the right time and at a minimal cost, while minimizing the trouble to both the government and tax-payers (USAID 2013).

According to Transparency International (2003) the majority of African countries are perceived as very corrupt by citizens. The Global Corruption Barometer (2013) showed the percentage of citizens reporting paying a bribe to officials in tax administration and customs in African countries was assessed as being much higher than the global average. Business people pay bribes in their encounter with tax administration in African countries. Investors reported having to give gifts when meeting with tax officials in sub-Saharan

African countries and the percentage is even higher in the rest part of Africa (World Bank, IFC, 2013).

Kabera and Child (2008) provide some evidence of the main forms of corruption involving tax and custom officials. This includes, first, bribery which consists of holding back a competitor's business activities, or illegal payments to tax officials to reduce taxation. Illegal payments are often made through cash or gifts. Secondly, revenue fraud, this is a process which under values or under-declares goods using fraudulent invoices by customs officials. They also may be involved in smuggling allowing illegal goods to be commercialized without taxes being paid. Third, embezzlement, this was a procedure whereby tax officials may illegally appropriate or divert funds they have been entrusted with for personal enrichment or other activities. Fourth, extortion is when officials take advantage of the lack of knowledge of taxpayers regarding tax laws. They can use their power and threat in order to extort illicit payment from tax-payers. Fifth, patronage or nepotism, this practice means that a person in a position of power is expected to use that influence to help certain persons close to him without really looking at their attributions.

In view of different forms and people's perceptions of corruption the researcher intends to look at the OCEP and assesses if such knowledge exists and if so what are the intervention measures that the institution can put in place to warned officials of such risks of corruption and what might be the way forward for such violations.

2.3 Anti-corruption commissions and their functions

2.3.1 United Nations Convention Against Corruption

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is an agreement that took effect on December 13, 2005 and has the objective; firstly to promote and strengthen measures to properly prevent and combat corruption more effectively. Secondly, to facilitate, promote and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention and fight against corruption, including recovery of assets, and thirdly to promote accountability, integrity, and good management of public affairs and public property. The UNCAC emphasises on the existence of specialized corruption bodies, which have independence within the country's institutional and legal framework. As a whistle-blower the UNCAC establishes measures and systems to facilitate reporting of corruption to appropriate authorities, declaration of interests for preventing conflict of interest, in preventing corruption and allowing and facilitation of freedom of information.

2.3.2 Africa Union Convention Against Corruption

The Assembly of the African Union (AU) in Maputo adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the African Union the convention on the prevention and fight against corruption, in Mozambique on July 11, 2003, and entered into force on August 5, 2006. The objectives of the Convention are as follows; firstly to promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each Member State, the establishment of the necessary mechanisms to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offenses in the public and private

sectors. Second, to promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation between state parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and report violations in Africa. Third to coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between the states parties for the purpose of preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corruption in the continent.

2.3.3 Southern African Development Community Convention Against Corruption

The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SPAC); SADC (2011), was signed by 14 Heads of State and Government of SADC in Malawi on August 14, 2001. Apart from Madagascar which joined SADC in August 2005, the purpose of the SPAC according to Article 3 is first, to support and strengthen the development by each signatory member state. To institute the necessary mechanisms to prevent, detect and punish, and eradicate corruption in the public and private sector, The second objective is to promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among states parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures, and the third objective is to promote the coordination of policies and national laws of the Member States relating to the prevention, suppression, detection and eradication of corruption in the private and public sectors.

According to Heymans and Lipietz (1999) corruption is a threat to development because it undermines efficiency, distorts public spending, discourages investment and growth, as undermines the quality of governance and has reputational consequences. According to

Sithole and Kunaka (2001) the SADC Protocol against corruption recognises as a problem. According to Matsheza and Kunaka (2000) the SPAC is the most notable expression of the regional political will to prevent and fight corruption. The protocol itself, in its preamble recognizes the importance of the demonstrated political will by SADC leaders to give effect to Anti-corruption strategies. However, there is complexity in implementing of the anti-corruption policy, for example, the political will to investigate any person or institution suspected of being involved in corruption.

According to Mattes and Bratton (2001), the SPAC had to use different sources for its analysis and for its investigation on corruption in 2000 for signatory member countries. The SPAC included the effectiveness of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), the corruption index of Transparency International, and the Afro Barometer.

The Survey of Traditional Leadership in South Africa conducted a survey and discovered that over half of respondents reported that they experienced corruption in their local communities all the time. Half of the respondents did not experience corruption at the community level. On the other hand the Afro barometer found that serious corruption was experience in the region. South Africans were the most concerned about the issue. 10% of respondents believed that corruption was an important issue that the government should address. According to Camerer (2001) approximately 62% of Zimbabweans believed that almost the majority of their public officials were involved in corruption. This was far higher than perceptions of public officials in South Africa who were at 48%, Zambia 46%

and Malawi 40%. The SPAC survey concluded that citizens perceived parliamentarians to be less corrupt than government officials and local government officials (governors) were believed to be less corrupt than directors of companies. There were negative views towards public officials. (Gastrow, 2001). In view of the above the researcher was interested to know if the OCEP as the official mechanism to curb corruption had to conduct such survey to know what the population within Kinshasa thought about corruption.

2.3.4 The European Union Anti-corruption

According to the EU Anti-Corruption Report (2014) two Euro barometer surveys were held in preparation of the report on the Anti- corruption in the EU which was the first of a special Euro barometer and the second was focused on Flash survey. Both barometers measured the general perceptions of the prevalence of corruption. According to the Public procurement in Europe (2011) responses confirmed a positive perception and low experience of bribery in the case of Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. Respondents in these countries rarely indicated that they had been expected to pay a bribe (less than 1 % of cases) and the number of people who thought that corruption was widespread were 20%, 29%, 42% and 44% respectively. These were significantly below the EU average. In the case of the United Kingdom, only 5 persons out of 1115 were expected to pay a bribe (less than 1 %), showing the best result in whole of Europe. Nevertheless, the perception data showed that 64 % of UK respondents thought corruption

was widespread in EU countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia and France, while more than half of the respondents thought corruption was a widespread phenomenon.

The actual number of people having had to pay a bribe was low (around 2 %). These countries also appeared among the best performers on the Transparency International Index. Austria shared similar results with this group with the exception of a somewhat higher number of respondents (5 %) who reported to have been expected to pay a bribe.

In some countries a relatively higher number of people indicated that they had personal experience with bribery, but with a clear concentration on a limited number of sectors, including Hungary (13 %), Slovakia (14 %) and Poland (15 %). In these countries, one sector, namely healthcare, provided the bulk of instances of bribery. There was evidence that the structural problem in healthcare provided incentives to pay a bribe for medical staff. In all the countries mentioned, the responses showed that healthcare was referred to by the highest number of individuals, while all other institutions or sectors (e.g. police, customs, politicians, public prosecutors' services, etc.) were named by less than 1 % of respondents. Corruption in a broader sense was perceived as widespread in these countries (82 % in Poland, 89 % in Hungary and 90 % in Slovakia).

In other countries, including Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Italy, bribery seemed rare but corruption in a broader sense was a serious concern. A relatively low number of respondents claimed that they were asked or expected to pay a bribe in the last 12 months. While personal experience of bribery was apparently rare (1-3 %), the perception was so heavily influenced by political scandals and the financial and economic crisis that was reflected in the respondents' negative impression about the corruption situation overall (90%, 91%, 95% and 97 % respectively) (Com, 2012).

Countries lagging behind in the scores concerning both perceptions and actual experience of corruption, included Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. In these countries, between 6 % and 29 % of respondents indicated that they were asked or expected to pay a bribe in the past 12 months, while 84 % up to 99 % thought that corruption was widespread in their country. Croatia and the Czech Republic appeared to make a somewhat more positive impression with slightly higher scores than the rest of the countries from the same group (Public Procurement in Europe, 2011).

At the European level, more than 4 out of 10 companies considered corruption to be a problem for doing business, and this was true for patronage and nepotism too. When asked whether corruption was a problem for doing business, 50 % of the construction sector and 33 % of the telecoms/IT companies felt it was a problem to a serious extent. The smaller

the company, the more often corruption and nepotism appeared as a problem for doing business. Corruption was most likely to be considered a problem when doing business by companies in the Czech Republic (71 %), Portugal (68 %), Greece and Slovakia (both 66 %) (Euro Barometer 2013)

According to Transparency International (2011) analysis of each country revealed large kind of problems related to corruption and corruption control mechanisms. Some common characteristics were recorded either in the EU or in groups of Member States. The country studied showed that public procurement was particularly prone to corruption in the Member States, because of deficient controls and risk management. A risk assessment of corruption included both good practice and was negative in public procurement. In view of the above, the researcher would like to know if the OCEP is an effective institution to curb corruption in Kinshasa city (DRC).

2.4 Implementation and challenges of AAC's in various countries.

Different countries place emphasis on fighting against corruption, few examples illustrated efforts and challenges faced on the fight against corruption.

2.4.1 The Botswana, Corruption and Economic Crime

Botswana has the commission called a Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) whose mandate includes the investigation of alleged or suspected offences, the conduct of any person that maybe connected with corruption, the examination of the practices and procedures of public bodies with a view to eliminating those that may be conducive to corrupt practices; the education of the public about the evils of corruption' and the promotion of public support against corruption (Global Programmer Against Corruption, 2004). The DCEC was set up in the Office of the President and started functioning in September 1994 when the country became an important financial centre, with the second highest GDP per capita in Africa.

The DCEC Annual Reports from 1995 to 1998 demonstrated a growth in results, activities and staffing. It has been estimated that one benefit of DCEC was to increase Government income from the recovery of taxes not paid and associated fines and seizures to an amount that exceeded the DCEC budget. In addition, several individuals were investigated under Section 34 of the Act for the possession of assets and 66 prosecutions began of which 31 were completed and 21 resulted in convictions. In 1998, 79 arrests were made and 39 prosecutions began, of which 29 were completed and 14 proceeded to guilty verdicts (World Bank, 1997). The Director raised a number of concerns, challenging critics of DCEC, and claimed that the media was badly informed concerning the development of the institution, because in the report the DCEC was accused of linking its success to choosing specific target groups for investigations and not the so called "big fish" (high

officials) . In view of what happened in Botswana, the researcher would like to know the implementation of OCEP in the role of punishing officials in government administration who were accused of being corrupt and what kind of mechanisms the commission can put in place in such situations.

2.4.2 Australia form of Anti-corruption

The Australian form of anti-corruption has had numerous royal commissions and special inquiries over the past decade that have investigated allegations of corruption in political lobbying, policing, land and building development, financial investment, and foreign bribery. Knowing that corruption is a challenge for developed as well as for developing nations, Australia has found the need to become more vigilant by establishing permanent commissions to investigate corruption. The electoral laws punish political bribery, activity that obstructs an election, and deceptive political advertising. Political parties must declare their source of funding and donations (Larmour P & Wolanin N, 2001).

An independent Australian national Audit Office, headed by the Auditor-general, conducts regular financial audits of government agencies to ensure strict compliance with the financial management laws. The auditor-general is guided by the Auditor-General Act of 1997 to be an independent officer of the parliament. The Auditor several reports regularly to the public Accounts committee of Parliament. A number of such commissions have been established in Australia at the national level, the Australian commission for

Law Enforcement Integrity, in the state of New South Wales; the Corruption and Crime Commission, and in Victoria, the Office of Police Integrity. (Jago Dodson, 2013). The role of these commissions differ, as their titles suggest. Some look only at police activity, while others can investigate all public officials, including politicians and some focus only on corruption while others look more broadly at misconduct in government.

According to the Australian Crime Commission (2013), the Australian commissions differ and have different roles: The first is an operational function that includes underground monitoring, analysing criminal intelligence and investigating allegations of corruption and misconduct, either on referral basis on the government or on complaints from members of the public. Secondly, their role is to prevent corruption by undertaking a risk assessment of agency systems, providing advice to agencies, instruction and research and publishing honesty guidelines. Thirdly, their role is public education, by conducting public consciousness programme that emphasize the harmful effects of corruption that enlist public support to report corruption and that change attitudes in support of ethical behaviour. Success observed by these commissions is the special investigation powers they have as given by the statute. These powers are necessary to penetrate the web of secrecy and wiliness that can prevent the detection of corruption. These permanent commissions have been effective in detecting and curbing corruption in government.

2.4.3 Tanzania form of Anti-corruption

In Tanzania the fight against corruption in public service, has been done by different commissions created to fight against corruption. Benjamin Mkapa first became President in 1995, and the parliament enacted an Act No. 13 known as the Leadership Code of Ethics. This law was designed to curb improper conduct of public leaders in the high echelons of government. The commission carried out an assessment study of the areas where corruption was rampant in different spheres of the government such as education, police, lands, health, and revenue authorities. Individuals who took part in corrupt practices were the cause of corruption. The Leadership Code of Ethics made several recommendations on how corruption could be fought. Unfortunately according to Ngunwa (2005) the report was submitted to president Mkapa at the time when he left office in 2000 and the Commission's recommendations were never implemented.

After President Mkapa left office, parliament enacted the Public Procurement Act. Mr Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, Tanzanian fourth president assumed office in 2005. Several measures have been taken to combat corruption in Tanzania's public service. The nature of corruption in Tanzania's public service has also been confirmed by the Exchequer and Auditor General. Ngunwa (2005) said that over 250 public employees have between 2005 and 2008, been arrested for different corruption offences such as financial and sexual corruption.

Following the significant improvement in the freedom of press, the print media, especially privately-owned newspapers have done a great job in flushing out corruption practices through investigative reporting. Through non-governmental, the print and electronic media and community-based organizations, there have been progressive moves to curb corruption in Tanzania's public service. On the other hand, the government has not been courage enough to deal with corrupt senior public service officials. In most cases, corrupt of senior government officials have only been forced to resign without being arrested, despite evidence of charges.

The other aspect was that despite putting in place institutions such as the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) as well as policy frameworks such as the Leadership and Ethics Codes, enforcement is still very weak. The institution was poorly equipped to deal effectively with corruption. Finally, salaries for public employees are very low in view of commodity price index as well as inflation. (Marno, 2008).

2.4.4 The Kenya form of Anti-corruption

The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) is a public body established by the Anti- Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, of 2003. The Act is the main agency with a statutory mandate to spearhead the fight against corruption in Kenya (Watshanga, 2008).

Under section 7 of the Act of KACC mandate it has the following functions:

To investigate corrupt conduct and activities; recommend for prosecution persons suspected of corruption; prevent the occurrence of corrupt practices; advise public

institutions on how to eliminate corruption; educate the public on the dangers of corruption; enlist and foster public support in fighting corruption and economic crime; bring civil cases in court for recovery of public property, or for forfeiture of unexplained assets, (Ibid).

The KACC receives oral and written complaints from members of the public and other institutions such as civil society organizations and public bodies. It also extracts relevant cases from media reports, audit and Parliamentary reports, and generally from other investigative and administrative agencies.

The Commission has recently launched an anonymous reporting system popularly referred to as the 'Business Keeper Monitoring System (BKMS) whistle blower reporting system'. This is an internationally recognized web-based reporting system which is used successfully worldwide by criminal investigation authorities and large enterprises to fight corruption. (Ibid) It is a uniquely encrypted system that guarantees a completely secure and anonymous mode of reporting. The most outstanding feature of the system is that, unlike the previous modes of anonymous letters and telephone conversations, it enables the investigating agency to maintain continuous contact with the reporter for follow-up enquiries while at the same time guaranteeing that the identity of the reporter remains anonymous to the investigator.

The Commission intends to become more accessible to members of the public through the establishment of: Toll free phones to facilitate reporting by the public; regional offices at the provincial level, mobile report centres were used in the interim before regional offices were established; and liaison channels with other agencies including the police, revenue bodies, professional associations, to facilitate reports, (Ibid).

The Commission also developed outreach programme to increase sensitization amongst the public on the dangers of corruption and to advise on reporting procedures. There are also some interactive radio and television programme for public participation and discussion. Under the Act, KACC has the power to investigate corruption and economic crime and, after completion of the investigation, to make a report on the results to the Attorney General. KACC may in the report recommend that any person be charged with corruption or economic crime. In the period January–March 2008, for instance, the Commission sent to the Attorney General 33 completed investigation files, out of which 26 were recommended for prosecution. Under section 3 of the Act, the Chief Justice is empowered to appoint special Magistrates to ensure speedy trials of corruption offences and economic crimes. (Watshanga, 2008). Kenya citizens further confirm widespread experience of bribery, with the probability of bribery demand estimated at 29.5% by the Eastern Africa Bribery Index 2012. Such issues encouraged the researcher to investigate on the OCEP as a mechanism to curb corruption in Kinshasa (DRC).

The four countries have had different experiences with corruption and institutional mechanisms to curb corruption. Australia had different commissions in place and permanent commissions showed effectiveness in detecting and curbing corruption in governance and policing. On the other hand, the anti-corruption commissions in Kenya and Tanzania have noticed difficulties under the repression of endemic corruption for decades, while Botswana has invested in good governance and integrity right from independence, with corruption mismanagement becoming a late issue in recent times. The response to corruption was immediate, decisive and home-grown, unlike in Kenya and Tanzania where the move to curb corruption was considered to have an international perception in order to meet donor's conditions for aid. In view of the above situation within the respectful countries the researcher tried to understand if the same situation was in DRC-Kinshasa through the institution of the Official of Code of Ethics for Public Officials (OCEP).

2.5 Autonomy of Commissions

The Commonwealth Framework makes the requirement of automaticity a prerequisite to the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions. Paragraph 21 of the Framework provides that, “autonomic anti-corruption agencies such as transparency International, and anti-corruption commissions can be effective if they were legitimately free from being influenced by the executive branch of government and where there was a strong judiciary in place”. Both models were organizationally accountable to the executive arm of

government. The third category, the parliamentary model includes commissions that report to legislative committees and are independent of the executive arm of government.

The fourth category is called the multi-agency model and it involves a collaborative effort by multiple agencies to reduce corruption. Each model, depending on other administrative dynamics would experience degrees of independence. The initiatives and measures taken for this purpose is that lessons can be drawn from these experiences to inform future actions. According to Udombana (2000), “the first and perhaps the greatest challenge to the fight against corruption in Africa was how to secure the autonomic system of institutions charged with the implementation of the various anti-corruption laws. In view of the above the researcher would like to explore if the OCEP is facing the same challenges associated with its implementation.

2.6 Legal and institutional mechanisms against corruption in DRC

According to Matti (2010) addressing corruption and governance challenges is a precondition to prevent the DRC from descending back into the conflict. Legal and institutional mechanisms in place to ensure accountability are still fragile within the country, as well as the limited capacity to respond to its governance challenges. Different forms of corruption such as patronage, embezzlement to site a few, have undermined the establishment of good governance and rent-seeking elites generally lack the incentives and political will to build strong institutions to curb corruption.

In the area of an institutional framework to curb corruption, DRC has set up some few commissions. At the national level, anti-corruption policies have also focused on establishing an adequate institutional framework against corruption, through the establishment and strengthening of a number of anti-corruption bodies and committees such as Fraud and Money Laundering Commission, Parliament's Economics and Finance Commission, Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission, and the Observatory du Code of Ethics for Public Officials (OCEP).

In September 2001, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed to poor governance in the DRC and denounced corruption in the government structures. As the government was keen to negotiate a loan from the IMF, it decided to act. The President, in a speech to the nation, acknowledged the generalized nature of corruption in the DRC and the weakness of the institutions responsible for fighting it. In October 2001, after the publication of the results of an audit that documented the catastrophic mismanagement of state enterprises, President Joseph Kabila suspended 90 percent of the managing directors. However, none of these directors were ever prosecuted. In the same year, the Auditor General (Cour des Comptes) started preparing comprehensive auditing reports on public administration which were not made public, (Kanyamihigo, 2005).

Fraud and Money Laundering Commission, in August 2002, the Anti-Corruption, Fraud and Money Laundering Commission were set up. Before it was disbanded seven months later to give way to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, a national anti-corruption strategy was drafted and put through consultation with various national stakeholders and donors. However, the strategy was never implemented. The Commission found itself pitted against other similar initiatives in the Ministries of Finance and Planning, (Pope 2005).

In June 2004, responding to criticisms of lack of action against rampant corruption in government, President Joseph Kabila wrote a letter to his four Vice-Presidents, in which he said, among other thing, the reports of international organizations, editorials in the newspapers, complaints from churches, reports from all sectors of the population attest to the persistence, if not the resurgence, of corruption and the misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds in all sectors of the national life. The leaders of the people cannot be indifferent to this state of affairs. (Observatory of Ethic and Anti-corruption 2003)

2.6.1 The Parliament Economic and Finance Commission

At Kabila's request, at the end of 2004 the Parliament's Economics and Finance Commission carried out an investigation into the management of state enterprises between 1 January 2002 and 31 March 2004. Using its own findings and those of the audits undertaken by the Auditor General, the General Financial Inspectorate and another two government bodies, the commission uncovered and detailed cases of corruption and fraud in all the enterprises, which also involved the ministers in charge of overseeing them. The boards and the management committees of the enterprises concerned, as well as a number of ministers, were suspended from their duties. However, no prosecution took place and, contrary to what parliament and public opinion had requested, the parliamentary commission was not allowed to continue its investigations in other state enterprises. In accordance with the resolutions of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the National Assembly of the DRC dated 24 April 2004, another special parliamentary commission was set up to investigate the validity of the financial and economic conventions signed during the 1996–7 and 1998–2003 wars by both the rebels and the central government of the DRC, (Kodi, 2007).

Working on a shoestring budget and facing all kinds of difficulties including death threats and the refusal to collaborate by some of the foreign countries whose companies were involved in the plunder of the DRC, the commission, led by Christophe Lutundula Apala, finalized its report in June 2005 and submitted it to the Speaker of the National Assembly.

The Commission reported that many of the contracts were illegal or that their terms were against the interests of the Congo. It recommended that the contracts be either rescinded or renegotiated to agree better terms for the Congo. It further requested that no contracts be signed with mining companies for the rest of the transition period. The report also recommended the prosecution of a number of top Congolese officials and foreign companies involved in the signing of these contracts.

Since the Congolese political establishment and the donor community brought a great deal of pressure to bear on the National Assembly, the report was never discussed by parliament. It was, in fact, feared that such could upset the delicate transition period, (Assemblée National 2005). Is it the same way that the OCEP is facing? Such a question needs further investigation by the researcher.

2.6.2 The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission

According to Kodi (2007) the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, was created in 2003 but after the national Assembly and the Senate passed a law defining its powers, organization and functioning. The main objective were to raise consciousness of the ethical issues and the fight against corruption; to increase the capacity of national institutions to encourage integrity; to ensure that all national institutions involved in the fight against corruption have sufficient operating capacity; to investigate violations of ethical values and corrupt activities; and to promote transparency in the political parties.

The CELC faced major resource and logistical problems that the international community sought to help. As with other transition bodies, its Board was composed of representatives of all signatories to the Peace Agreement, which resulted in full enrolment, difficult decision-making processes and lack of a common vision and coherent strategy (Kodi, M., 2007).

The work of the CELC was further disadvantaged by weak leadership, insufficient technical expertise and lack of independence. Paralyzed by these various challenges, the CELC was not carried over into the new constitution (Freedom House, 2010). Is it the same challenges that the OCEP is facing to implement successfully its role to curb corruption in Kinshasa city?

The researcher has noticed that most research conducted has methodology which seeks to identify the effectiveness of Anti-corruption commission and seek to implement it from a national and international sphere. Therefore, the assumption is made that the implementation of Anti-corruption is a matter of government management. It may consequently be advantageous to investigate the role of Anti-corruption using different research tools, such as; questionnaires, interview and group discussion on the methodology to enrich a deep research. However, more studies have used these tools as

the methodology, and those that have, had to miss other findings. Therefore, further investigation will be helpful to better understand the role of Anti-corruption commission.

2.7 Summary

There is no traditional theory that justifies corruption as a good principle of inter-personal relationship. Corruption is one of the evils deep which trait durable development and destroys civilian customs. This review of literature examined the implementation of different Anti-corruption commissions. The chapter synthesized the various actions, initiatives and commitments taken by states, international community and different institutional framework in the fight against corruption. In helping the understanding the differing viewpoints presented in this chapter, the study employed the theory by George at al (1985) was also showed that the issue of corruption need a direct system of capturing the evil early enough. The anti-corruption commission have to work together with the government and other institutional to better curb corruption.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents research methods used in collecting data for this study. The methods which were used are discussed in this chapter including the research design, population, sample selection method of data collection, analyses and ethical issues that were pertinent to this research are raised as well as the challenges and limitations of the study.

3.1 Research design

The research design adopted for this study was qualitative, because it fitted the type of research being carried out to ensure methodological triangulation for the purposes of enhancing reliability and validity of findings. McLeod (2005) notes that, the primary goal of qualitative research is to develop an understanding of how the world is constructed. It may be argued that people already have an understanding of the world based on their norms and values. However, such knowledge is far from being coherent and consistent. The essence of qualitative research design was employed to explore and examine to role of the Observatory of Code of Ethics for public officials plays in the fight against corruption.

In order to answer this question, qualitative research methods were suitable for analysing the view points of the selected general public and interpret the meaning they attach on their understanding of the OCEP in promoting the code of ethics for public officials.

Therefore, the perceptions and experiences of individuals in relation to the impact of the OCEP was used to validate whether the OCEP fight against corruption and promote good ethics for public officials.

3.2 Study population

Robson (1993) defines the term population as the body of individuals being researched or all the individuals of interest to the researcher. The study was carried out in Kinshasa, the largest city and capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a population of 9.5 million. Kinshasa is the third largest city on the African continent, equal in size to Johannesburg. The city's inhabitants are popularly known as Kinois. Kinshasa is divided into four districts which are further divided into 24 municipalities. The sample drawn from the population of this study comprised of the officials primarily from the Observatory of Codes of Ethics for Public Office, civil society groups, academics, political analysts and media practitioners members in five different municipalities located in the north, east, west and centre of Kinshasa. The selected areas were all headquarters on different targeted groups chosen by the researcher. The above cited officials were chosen because they are directly linked to the whole discourse of corruption and they had worked in the area for at least a year. The researcher conducted the research with respondents aged 18 years and above because they were considered mature and could participate in the democratic process of the research.

3.2.1 Sample Size

The sample size comprised 40 participants in 4 municipalities of Kinshasa city and 10 keys informants from the officials from the OCEP, official from the civil society groups, academic, political analyst, and official from the media sector.

3.2.1.1 Interview

The key informant interviews the sample was 6 respondents from officials of the OCEP and 1 respondent from each of the groups were to be interviewed. However, the researcher managed to interview a total of 8 respondents. 4 officials from the OCEP, 1 official from the civil society groups, 1 academic, 1 political analyst, 1 official from the media sector. Interviews were the main method of data collection, and involved approximately 30 to 45 minutes of conversation with each informant. All interviews were semi-structured, and included a core set of questions that constituted the main research focus, with open and closed questions, and also the possibility of raising other non-prepared questions during the interview. The interviews were disadvantaged by many of the respondents' general suspicion about questions concerning their activities. Discrimination and injustice dominate people's lives, and interviewees are often hesitant to answer questions from strangers, especially concerning the issue of corruption. For years, they have been victims of state harassment and are resistant to expressing their real views on the subject. The table below shows the key informants interviewed

3.2.1.2 Questionnaires

The sample size for questionnaire respondents was 50 ordinary community members from a cross-section of the Kinshasa population respectively to ensure diversity. The number was 20 questionnaires to respondents from 18-30 years of age, 14 respondents from 30-40 years of age, 10 respondents from 40-50 years of age and 6 respondents from 50 years and above. However, the researcher managed to distribute 45 questionnaires to the community members and from the age group of 18-30 years 18 questionnaires were distributed, 30-40 years 14 questionnaires were distributed, 40-50 years 10 questionnaires were distributed and from 50 and above 3 questionnaires were distributed, whose 38 answers were returned and collected by the researcher, from the age group of 18-30 years 17 answers, 30-40 years 11 answers, 40-50 years 7 answers, 50 and above 2 answers collected. Table below shows the number of questionnaires distributed to the community members.

Table 1: Number of questionnaires distributed to the community members

Response Attributes	Frequency	18-30 years	30-40 years	40-50 years	50 and above	percentages
Ordinary community members	50	20	14	10	6	100%
Distribution	45	18	14	10	3	87.5%

Answers	38	17	11	7	2	70%
Not responded	7	1	3	3	1	17.5%
Total members answers	45	18	14	10	3	100%

3.2.2 Sampling techniques

The purposive sampling technique was chosen because it sought to identify people who because of their experience or contacts, have special insights into the research question. In this study the researcher purposely targeted 50 respondents from civic groups, academics, and media sector, key officials from the observatory of codes of ethics for public officials, political analytics and informants from the civil society were selected for this study because they had an in-depth knowledge of corruption and the OCEP and by limiting the sample selection to individuals who met these criteria.

The researcher used non- probability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher based on the people who were able to focus on the central issue of OCEP and willingness to participate. In purposive sampling, there is an element of subjectivity since the research forms a view to

the characteristics of respondents. It may not be possible to extend the research findings to a different research population in the same way as natural science research. Despite these shortcomings, purposive sampling remained the most suitable for this study.

The researcher also had to use snowballing technique which entails the use of one respondent to refer the researcher to other persons who have similar or relevant information needed by the researcher. According to Patton (1990), snowball sampling is designed to identify people with particular knowledge, skills, or characteristics that are needed as part of the continuing research process. Therefore, snowballing was used by the researcher to establish a relationship with informants comprised of members from various NGOs with specific range of skills that were very useful for the researcher to identify other aspect of the OCEP, the researcher was referred to different NGOs such as, l'Observatoire Anti-corruption (OAC) (observatory Anti-corruption), Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (CCFD-Terre Solidaire). The researcher had to do this because the limited time and limited resources could not allow him to work with a large sample.

3.2.2.1 Characteristic of sample




Figure 1: Distribution of sample according to sex

The figure 1 shows the sex of the respondents in which the male's response constitutes the number of 18 whose percentages was 64.3% of the respondents while the other number of 10 whose 35.7% percent were female's respondents. The figure shows that women were remarkably involved the participation of the study. It also shows that gender balance and women leadership are matters of deep concern in the development of the Kinshasa as a city.




Figure 2: Distribution of sample according to age

The figure 2: shows the responses with the age between 40 to 50 years old constitute thirty seven (37%) while indicated those who are between the ages of 18-30 years represent twenty-eight (28%). The response between 30 to 40 years old representing twenty two percent (22%). Represented by the group of 50 years old and above, which represent thirteen percent (13%). The age of the respondents were important in this study to show that maturity and trust could be taken in consideration by the researcher without any spirit of doubt.




Figure 3: Distribution of sample according to social status

The figure 4.3: represent the marital status of the respondents, it shows that sixty-two (62%) of respondents are married, twenty-seven (27%) percent are single, eight percent (8%) are divorced and three (3%) percent are widowed. The study established that the higher number of participants on the study where married people and this gave a value on the responses given by the respondents.

The researcher used also the internet access latest published journals and articles during the data gathering process. Further, the role of the OCEP as an Anti-corruption commission has generated a lot debate since several people continue to share divergent views about the stated subject.

3.3 Data collection methods

The researcher used these sources to collect data: interviews guides, questionnaires and documents. Some documents from different organisations were also taken to augment the data obtained from the available documents such as the statistical data. Powell (1996) argues that differences in the variety of information sources exist from which to gather the researcher evaluation data. In a major programme evaluation, the researcher needed more than one source. Therefore, by implementing different methods of data collection the researcher intended to increase the authenticity of data gathered, since the different methods complement each other. The researcher sent appointment letters to the people who were interviewed to seek their consent before the interview. An interview guide was used which contained questions that were phrased and asked the respondents in the same manner. The researcher also included a consent form the respondents to assure them of privacy and confidentiality. In addition, the researcher reviewed newspaper sources, journals and other written documents.

3.1.1 Interviews

The researcher gathered data through semi-structured interviews which were conducted in one month. As an attempt to understand the discourse on the Observation of Code of Ethics for Public Officials, interviews were the best method of collecting data. Interviews were used to capture people's views through information collected by talking with and listening to people. Breifs (1997) argues that semi-structured interviews include an outline

of topics or issues to be covered, but the interviewer is free to vary the order of the questions and the language.

For a researcher whose intention was to investigate and understand the role of OCEP, using semi-structured interviews seemed to be a good option to comprehend the expressions, opinions and attitudes of individual experiences of various respondents. All the interviews were conducted in a conversational form, in what has been referred to as the interactive–relational approach. Chirban (1996) points out the interaction and relationship between interviewee and interviewee is very important. His opinion is that by developing an interactive and relational stance, it is possible to access information that would not emerge through formal and structured questioning alone. In the interactive-relational approach the interviewer establishes a relationship with the interviewee and this facilitates the giving out of information in a free and relaxing manner. Interviews provided the opportunity to obtain and produce data through dialogue. The limitation of this type of interview is that the interviewer employs effective listening skills and it can consume a lot of time.

3.1.2 Questionnaires

According to Oppenheim (1992), a questionnaire is an instrument for collecting and recording qualitative and quantitative information about a particular issue of interest. A

list of questions are made, but should also include clear instructions and spaces for answers.

In an attempt to focus on the specific answers on the OCEP, the researcher used a simple questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to reflect the opinion, and concerns of those officials who were under study. Mixtures of open-ended and closed questions were used. While open-ended questions allowed the participants to elaborate on their views, closed questions provided precise views to the subject of study. The use of both open-ended and closed questions was intentionally put in place to maximize the outcome of this research method.

The limitation of questionnaire is that there were no ways to tell how truthful the respondents were and also as the respondents were reading differently the questionnaires accordingly to their own understanding and interpretations. Questions were asked about corruption in governance, being aware about any situations when government officials was involved in corruption, their knowledge about the OCEP, the reason it's was formed, their view on the execution of the OCEP to curb corruption, challenges that the OCEP was and continue to face in it operation based on this information, question was asked about how best the challenges hindering OCEP in its work can be addressed to allow the OCEP curbing corruption in Kinshasa city.

3.1.3 Documents analysis

The researcher consider document as a vital data collection for this research because political magazines provides latest primary data on the OCEP issues. This within the context that the OCEP become a point of view in the issue of corruption in DRC and abroad as an important factor to curb corruption in bringing a sustainable peace and development. The researcher collected material from secondary sources such as journal and the internet. These sources of evidence were used to augment and complement information from other sources. The researcher sought to investigate whether the progress of the OCEP as reflected in the interviews and response from the questionnaires.

3.4 Data Collection Procedures

This part of the study involved three processes namely data editing, coding and tabulation. Data editing involved cross checking filled interview schedules to ensure that all answers given by respondents were correct. Interview appointments were also made and the stages of preparation were followed, including preparation of the interview guide and seeking appointment with interviewees. From the 17th to the 21st of March 2015 the researcher conducted interviews with different relevant participants from the officials primarily from the Observatory of Codes of Ethics for Public Office, civil society groups, academics, political analysts and media practitioners.

The questionnaires were delivered to the respondents who were given a week to respond. Details of respondents were obtained and used to get hold of the respondents after they finished completing the questionnaires. The researcher ensured that he collect every bit of information as part of the data process to make sure all relevant information was included in the study. The researcher distributed 35 questionnaires to individuals selected from five different municipalities located in the north, east, west and centre of Kinshasa. The questionnaires were distributed on the 25th of March 2015 and the answers were received through e-mail and DHL office in Zimbabwe.

3.5 Field work experience

The collection of data began in the month of March 2015. No major challenges were faced during collection of data because the researcher started building connections with the institution earlier before starting the research. However, minor challenges were faced during interviews with the officials of the OCEP. In order to gain access to them the researcher was recommended by the Minister of Defence whom the researcher shares good relations. In addition, the researcher had to introduce himself as a student from Africa University at the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance that easily allowed him on the basis that he was a student conducting a research for an academic purposed.

3.6 Data Analysis

The researcher analysed the data through Microsoft Excel programme and this involved usage of percentages and diagrams to describe the data. The analysis was based on the research questions. Qualitative data was analysed using themes and categorises in line with research questions. During the interviews the data collected was written down in notebooks as raw field notes from key informant interviews. These field notes were further expanded into sentences at the end of every day's field-work to add more meaning to them.

3.7 Permission to carry out the study

Permission for the researcher to effectively carry out the study was obtained from the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance (IPLG), and the Africa University Research Ethics committee.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

According to Berg (2009), research ethics is an area of growing significance that cannot be ignored. All researcher presents ethical and moral dilemmas which must be identified and addresses before the research is carried out in order to protect all participants from potential harm.

The researcher assured research participants of the followings:

1. do not harm and benefit society

The researcher assured them that no harm was going to be done to them during the data collection process. Privacy was respected all the times.

2. Justice and fairness

All results and findings presented were actual facts stated in the interviews. Every participant's experiences and perceptions were portrayed as they were shared in the interviews. No false information was included in this research study.

3. Anonymity

Confidentiality of the respondents, the researcher explained to them that their responses would remain confidential since the issue of corruption is highly debatable and politically sensible in DRC. As part of ensuring anonymity, their names were to remain anonymous, no names were used to refer to contributions made by participants in this study.

4. Free will

The researcher always obtained informed consent before carrying out an interview. The procedure of consent where a review of what the participant had consented to was used. All participant was ensured that the option to withdraw from the researcher at any time without penalty or repercussions.

5. Referencing

The researcher cited every material that was used in writing this research such books, newspaper articles, journals and the internet respecting the academic requirements of Africa University.

3.9 Summary

This chapter covered the research methodology including the research design, data collection methods, permission to carry out the study and ethical consideration. The chapter illustrated the justifications for the choices of the methods chosen. The research design was qualitative in nature with emphasis on thematic analysis to capture an in-depth view relating to the topic. Quantitative data, was collected through the questionnaire.

CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter considers the presentation of research findings obtained from data collected on the role of the role Observatory of Code of Ethics for Pubic Officials (OCEP) in the fight against corruption, particularly in Kinshasa, the capital city of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This chapter presents the study findings based on forty respondents. In this chapter, an attempt is made to see the results of this study reflected the reality of the daily life experiences in Kinshasa and efforts to curb corruption by the OCEP as an institution whose primary mandate is to fight corruption.

The researcher employed transcription of the interviews, re reading the field notes in order to get an understanding of the whole transcripts. The interpretation of data was done using Microsoft Excel. Themes, categories and meanings were also developed into units and dovetailed into broader themes and categories. Thematic and content analysis was employed to induce different meaning as they emanated from the transcripts. Due to time limitation, the researcher was unable to collect all the questionnaires pertaining to the study. Out of the 50 questionnaires that were sent, 38 were returned.

4.1 Presentation and Analysis of Data

Understanding of corruption in government




Figure 3: Understanding about corruption in public administration

The figure 3 shows difference responses given by respondents on their understanding about corruption in government. It has shown that 32 % said that corruption is the misuse of public funds, 68 percent agreed that it's a payment bribe activities. The researcher observed that the perception about corruption in government from respondents lead to different results. The researcher agreed with 70% of respondents who talk about payment of bribes, because the practice of giving bribes to overcome unjust regulations has been generally accepted by a strong majority of respondents and so Kinshasa is regarded as a city that still suffers from rampant corruption in government.

The findings showed that respondents from the academic perceived corruption in government as being associated with misuse of public funds by officials they said that:

“The most important aspect is the lack of a sense national consciousness in several public officials of the State. The first dimension is that they provide for their own needs, the other dimension is that they sacrifice the altruistic dimension of their desired social economic develop for the city. From that moment, when people want to serve their own needs first, seeking to put aside the general collective interest of the community we see the rise of corrupt practices”(Academic respondent 26 March 2015)

Another respondent from a media house said:

“We notice different forms of corruption and this happens when there is manipulation in the rendering of services to customers. This is through fraud through use of parallel false receipts to those used for generating services revenue, use of influence to write off those who are indebted to the State of their obligations. In other cases, accountants are guilty of holding on to money deposited in the city account for personal use. Because corruption is prominent, the public administration of the city is rendered ineffective.”(Key official OCEP interview 21 March 2015)

The findings showed that political analysts had noticed that public funds were mostly benefiting individuals than the entire city; embezzlement was to be been on the grand scale. This concerns city staff salary and donor funded projects.

One political analyst said *“Often many officials are not worried about taking Treasury money, and they do this in imitation of others who already steal from Treasury. This is another basis for corruption”*. (Political analyst respondent 25 March 2015)

Respondents from the civil societies said that petty corruption was a widespread among government departments such as the Passport office, the Company Registry Licensing board was illustrated as the departments where paying a bribe was considered to be a must. The payment of salaries to non-existent workers typically called “ghost workers” was a common practice in the public service. In the tax of customs department, undercharging of taxes, duties and false declarations of imports and exports in return for bribes were said to be widespread activities in Kinshasa city.

The level of corruption

Respondent of the OCEP, said that corruption is no longer a problem caused by human only but it has now become a full institution.

He said that; *"Corruption has become a way of life, almost a system of government management unit in Kinshasa, so there is widespread practice of corruption in the city"* (Key official OCEP interview 22 March 2015)

Respondent from civil society said that; *"corruption in Kinshasa is increasing years and years people have to bribe police officials so that they will do their business in a transport or in the street...my regret is to see not so far in a street buildings raising here and there all over the city and this making headline that those infrastructures are the fruits of misuse of government officials"*. (Key respondent civil society interview 23 March 2015)

Respondent from academic said that; *"I am really not comfortable with the state of corruption here in Kinshasa and the worse part of it is that people have voted for these guys (officials) to be in those positions and unfortunately corruption started from the people to whom ourselves have put in that position"*. (Academic respondent 30 March 2015)

One political analyst said that: *"the point of corruption is that it's make good governance bad and bad governance worse. How this happened it's when government incentivise, as person or a society as an all. The problem with aid which the meaning of*

giving someone or an institution aid of money without recourse, this people or the officials of this institution can use that money for a none productivity activity and there will not be any penalty, this person cannot lose their office and don't end up in jail and because of that, in economic we cannot have rent seeking (corruption) without a rent, unfortunately aid provide that rent to Kinshasa city and that have facilitate the expansion of corruption and have facilitate officials to steal.”(Key respondent civil society interview 24 March 2015)

Knowledge about the OCEP




Figure 4: knowledge of the OCEP

The figure 4 is showing the respondents' answers on the knowledge of the OCEP. 11% of respondents have only heard about OCEP, while 89% of respondents have answer positively that they knew the OCEP and further going by giving reasons.

Political analysts said that the OCEP was an institution which supported the building of public awareness and transparency in the administration of decision making. Similarly, respondents from civil society viewed the OCEP as an institution which has strong code

of ethics, was in place and strong punitive measures were available, but this was left to strengthen state control over public administration in Kinshasa city. Civil society respondents saw the OCEP to be the institution to audit and control political authority and the people working in the city administration by contributing the establishment of good governance in the city.

The researcher observed that the role of the OCEP as an anti-corruption mechanism derived from the responses has indicated a positive view on the role of the OCEP compared to its relevance.

Awareness on the work of OCEP




Figure 5: The work of the OCEP

Figure 5 shows the respondents' responses on being aware of the work of the OCEP, 18% said NO, meaning that they are not aware of any activity executed by the OCEP, 82% of the respondents said YES, meaning they are aware of how the OCEP it's executing is

work. The researcher agreed with the view that the majority of the people are aware of the work of the OCEP

Respondents from the civic groups said that the OCEP's mission is primarily the promotion of ethical values and ethical principles and to fight against corruption within the administration. He believes that for the OCEP to fight against corruption they need to do so in a systematic way and if they do not have the logistical support that includes all the company's components then this fight will not be effective.

One respondent from civil society indicated that: *“there were unwillingness to report their workmates or officials involved in corrupt activities because in their view, the OCEP was not guarantee confidentiality and this has leads to fears of victimization. Therefore the OCEP still weak in the execution of its work and should improve both in overall performance and in gaining people’s confidence by hold guilty people accused to be corrupt to account.”*(Civil society respondent 30 March 2015)

Duties of the OCEP

Respondent from civil society said: *“Since 2004 the OCEP had taken provisions of some protocol agreements with the Republic of South Africa and the office of the United Nations against corruption. From this level the OCEP has had to organize national forums that led to the production of material on the national strategy on the fight against corruption in the DRC, but up to now this paper is still awaiting its adoption by the government then it can be transmitted to the levels of parliament for enactment”.* (Key respondent civil society interview 23 March 2015)

The OCEP has a legal mandate of preventing corruption in DRC under the Act. It was therefore given the function of taking a lead in the fight against corruption. One respondent from the OCEP said that:

“The OCEP has fought for the wellbeing of public officials by assuring that they were well remunerated, and this could at least avoid officials to be tempted on corrupt activities...”(respondent from OCEP 21 March 2015)

To take necessary measures for the prevention of corruption in public and private bodies, including, in particular, measures for. One civic group respondent said that:

“on the 15th April 2013 the minister of public functions had to openly and publicly threaten to stop any public official who will be included in a corrupt activity this demonstrates that the OCEP has the will to eliminate corrupt practices of any such form”(Civic group respondent 01 April 2015)

Examining the practices and procedures of public bodies and private bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and secure the revision of methods of work or procedures which in the opinion of the Bureau may be prone or conducive to corrupt practices; one political analyst respondent said that:

“Certain perceptions of some taxes were moving towards the bank than the place of giving it directly into the hands of agents such as the payment of thumbnail, money was payment directly to the bank to avoid fraudulent conversion”.(Political analyst respondent 28 March 2015)

Advising the public bodies and private bodies on the ways and means of preventing corrupt practices, and on changes in methods of work or procedures of such public and private bodies compatible with the effective performance of their duties, which the Bureau

considers necessary to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of corrupt practices. One respondent from the OCEP said that:

“Under the impulse of the head of state of the national forum on the fight against corruption , there was an establishment of a college in Kinshasa in 2010 by the OCEP on the strategy to fight against corruption administrative corruption in government ethics and commitment of members of the Kinshasa government in 2014”(key official OCEP interview 24 March 2015)

Achievement of the OCEP

Respondent from academic claim that: from the starting of its creation the OCEP carried out a number of activities in a rather ad hoc manner, without prior strategic thinking or adequate analysis and understanding of the phenomenon of corruption in Kinshasa city. The United Nation Development Program (UNDP) , who were the main partner of the OCEP, tried to get the Commission off the ground but soon realised that the members of the OCEP`s executive organ were not capable of developing a unified vision to the implementation of its mandate, nor could they agree on the Commission`s plans and priorities.

Respondent from media practitioner said that: a workshop was organised by the international bar associations (IBAs) in partnership with the OCEP which was held in Kinshasa on 21 January 2011, focusing on corruption. The IBA legal specialist was working with the Kinshasa Bar to build capacities and to strengthen the legal education

programme. The workshop was on the role of lawyers with regard to transparency and the fight against corruption focused on the role that lawyers play in international corruption. Over 200 lawyers attended the event and following its success. (Media practitioner respondent 29 March 2015)

One respondent from the OCEP said that *“measures have already begun to be taken against members of the judiciary found to be corrupt as well as against actors in government ministries. There have been 434 cases at ministry level, where officials were accused of corruption and other of complicity in such corrupt practices as stealing government furniture or the sale of state property. There has also been an operation called Operation Zero Tolerance in which both officials and members of the public who instigated corruption were tracked down and either warned or arrested and charged. However, the measures are not yet sufficient enough and need to be expanded”*. (key respondent OCEP interview 23 March 2015)

Challenges of OCEP

The findings showed that insufficient financial controls, poor investigation, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and a general lack of transparency and accountability were repeatedly cited as reasons for the alarming level of corruption. In addition, a lack of political will to fight corruption and socio-cultural norms that tend to glorify the corrupt and encourage politicians and public servants to challenge objectivity and fairness in favour of loyalty to family members, kinship and friends were also frequently mentioned as reasons for the high level of corruption.

A respondent from civic group claimed that:

“Some officials were having a hand in financial positions which resulted in the mismanagement and lack of sustainable income to realize from the enterprises under their charge, also 45 offenders were not prosecuted by the justice system when they were found to be corrupt. Consequently, there were a lack of enforcement of the OCEP measures to curb corruption. Thus, officials continued to encourage the general community to engage in corruption and sometimes to take the law into their own hands resulting in instant mass justice.”(Civic group respondent 29 March 2015)

Media house respondent claimed that; politicians, or highly placed officials called “big fish” and other influential employees were disrupting the functioning of the OCEP by intimidating or victimizing those who wanted to expose those who were involved in corruption activities. Thus, despite enormous reform efforts during the past decade by the OCEP. One respondents from the media house said:


“Kinshasa’s public service still seems to be in a deplorable city: salaries were too low for a large proportion of civil servants, the half-hearted investigation and punishment of offences remains ineffective as a deterrent, and reporting systems were still in need of reform to make it easier to report offences and to guarantee their anonymity and security.”(Media practitioner respondent 27 march 2015)

Findings from political analyst respondents revealed that multiple commissions were put in place in the country to curb corruption but this has so far failed to substantially reduce this evil. There have been attempts to curb corruption by state-established bodies like OCEP, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Parliament Economic and Finance Commission. However, civil society respondents noticed that the success of the OCEP in curbing corruption and corrupt practice has been slow due to political patronage, nepotism and a weak legal system among other constraints.

According to Transparency International, the country is regarded as the most corrupt state on the African continent. However, the researcher noticed that the views of respondents suggested that the OCEP increase in official's salaries, are considered insufficient to guarantee a decent living without the need to resort to extortion.

Strategy to fight corruption

Figure 6 OCEP effort to fight corruption can be addressed



The figure 6 shows the responses of the respondents .32% of respondents said that public awareness about corruption will help, 32% of respondents said that they should be implementation of sanctions, while 36% of respondents said yet corruption was still at the highest level. They emphasis in punishment of corrupt officials.

Having reviewed on the causes and manifestations of corruption, solutions were given.

The researcher gave the opportunity to respondents to suggest their own solutions to the problems identified in the implementation of the OCEP to curb corruption.

Findings from academic respondents suggested that severe punishment must be meted out according to the code of ethics without any fear and prejudice, through the judicial system and internal disciplinary measures. In the same way one Political analyst said;

“The best solution is that there must be a government strategy of tough sanctions, to track corrupt officials and their facilitators at all levels. The perpetrators must sanctioned and not just token sanctions. For instance, it is ineffective, to deprive a corrupt official of three months’ salary when he has facilitated the diversion of \$450 000 of public funds. These kinds of sanctions only mean that they are offering him a holiday during the three months to go where he wants to spend the embezzled money from.” (Key respondent academic interview 21 March 2015)

Civic group respondents proposed a mixture of collaboration with the judicial which included a direct prosecution of corrupt officials. One respondent from the civic groups said:

“The corrupt people in the government should be identified and removed from their offices and continued by arguing that the OCEP should give knowledge to the general public about the organization in order to fight corruption effectively.”(Key respondent civic group interview 22 March 2015)

Findings from the civil society respondents revealed a steady increase in the number of people expressing support for building public awareness and transparency in the administrative decision making. Similarly, political analysts argued that strong punitive

measures were top of the list as popular measures, along with strengthening state control over public administration and increasing public employees' salaries. However, the political analyst expressed a high demand for punitive measures and increased control over public administration. It can be deduced that people are more aware of instances requiring punitive action. One respondents said that:

“There is need to apply the law when it necessary, corruption must be punished and sanctioned in accordance with the law. However, noted that unfortunately the political law of the strongest continues to be in force in Kinshasa. This is because even the audits are useless, because even auditors themselves are corrupt”.

He continued by saying that “even in some cases when auditors present their report the courts ensure that nothing is done by way of taking corrective measures. There are people that were referred to the court but they were eventually released under the pretext that there was insufficient evidence” ... (Civil society respondent 25 March 2015)

Views from members of OCEP (interview from the 17th to the 21st of March 2015)

From different perspective members of the OCEP gave their duties as well as for the institutions itself, as promoting transparent and participatory policy making process through OCEP by establishing network mechanisms of governance and anti-corruption from the existing relevant organisations and networks. Organising workshop when people came together and reflected on anti-corruption matters and the outcome will be the OCEP strategy on anti-corruption.

Conduct of civic education to enhance citizen's understanding of and involvement in governance and anti-corruption issues, public hearings or consultations with citizens at the grassroots level on a specific issues of public interest, and the summation of the various views expressed by the citizenry.

They also said that they conduct audits and analysis of the existing institutional and legal framework relating to governance and the fight against corruption in the DRC.

On the causes of corruption OCEP officials interviewed claim rated low salaries in the public service as the major cause of corruption. Therefore, the Congolese government is opposed to the fight against corruption, with government paying out low salaries that are inadequate to sustain average families. High ranking officials indicated that they resort to corruption as a means of increasing their salaries and enhancing their lifestyles.

An interviewee from the OCEP said when people cite the problem of poor wages, they ignore the fact that state agents would be paid better if they mobilized enough ways to raise revenue for the state. Instead, they prefer not to channel money to the right coffers, opting to take it for personal use. Officials from the OCEP estimate that \$15 to \$20 billion per year is lost from the public treasury of Kinshasa because of corruption.

In response to a question about their understanding of corruption, the majority of respondents chose cases which involved high-level public officials, followed closely by cases with strong political interest where big local and foreign businesses were involved.

On the achievements of OCEP officials indicated achievement of OCEP as fighting against corruption. They has been repeal of public officials by a presidential decree from 2009-2011 through investigations conducted by a joint committee of OCEP members and the ministry of justice.

On the question about challenges in the implementation of the OCEP officials cited that many offenders were not prosecuted by the justice system when they were founded to be corrupt it's also argue that in the environment targeted to any kind of control, inspectorate was marginalized and deprived of the necessary resources to play their role fully. For more institution it's difficult for the OCEP inspectors to have an easy access on their operational budget, in the case were the audits were carried out, the inspector's recommendations were ignored or was protected by the immunities of certain officials such as parliamentary and this, still serve as a shield against the fight of corruption. On the other hand officials claim that the Congolese strategic plan to fight against corruption are not well implemented for lack of funds to be budgeted by the Congolese State. Consequently, the enforcement of the OCEP measures to curb corruption is limited and continued to encourage the general populace to engage in corruption.

Officials claimed that the use of a code of ethics would to strengthen the OCEP as an Anti-corruption that mechanism must be prioritized by taking courageous measures knowing that there was complicity of public officials members which make investing in corruption being difficult phases has to be taking by firstly raising awareness of moral and respect of

public property and the last phase should be punishment of officials involved in corrupt practice. Others believed that the general code of conduct was a result of a state which is protecting the actions of corruption by erasing jurisdictional cases which showed corrupt cases. Thus there is need to appeal to the conscience of judges.

4.3 Interpretations of Findings

The OCEP operates independently without government intervention in its investigation and prosecution work, and has received strong political support from the Minister of Public Affairs, as evidenced by consistent budgetary support, open access to government information and data, the creation of seven regional anti-corruption commissions, and the establishment of ethics and code staff in government office that works closely with the OCEP.

The Commission has a clearly defined approach to combating corruption nationwide, which is consistent with the national draft anti-corruption strategy. This approach includes prevention as well as ethics, and anti-corruption education, and investigation and prosecution. Prevention and ethics education are currently the two major instruments used to combat corruption both at the commission and national level. The rationale behind this has to do with cost effectiveness and an immediate need to change the mind-set of the general public towards fighting corruption.

As shown in this research, OCEP has been gradually improving the effectiveness of its operations by carefully addressing the flaws detected in its system, and that it has the potential to become a credible Anti-corruption Commission given the solid foundation it has been laid for its anti-corruption activities. However, while it has a clear vision regarding how to address a range of anti-corruption issues, it still faces a critical challenge concerning the implementation of key activities.

This is due to the Commission personnel's lack of expertise in how to carry out its main anti-corruption functions, which consist of prevention, investigation, prosecution, and ethics and anti-corruption education. At this stage, it is essential that the OCEP enhances its staff capabilities through long-term training. In this regard, international actors and practitioners who seek to assist the OCEP should focus on building the capacity of OCEP personnel to design and implement its main anti-corruption functions. Such support should include technical assistance aimed at boosting anti-corruption functions and measures related to the design and implementation of effective, sustainable anti-corruption strategies and activities.

On a much broader perspective, at the risk of being accused of becoming a litigious society, the reporting and prosecution of corruption and economic crimes can be quite healthy and illustrative that people are more prepared to solve their problems by legal, rather than violent means. The public, judiciary, anti-corruption agencies and civil society organizations have an integral role to play and lend credence to public perception that the rule of law does apply when all accused persons are reprimanded and prosecuted.

4.4 Relevance of the theoretical framework to the findings

The theories used in the analysis were in accordance with the study. The analysis was based on the theory of corruption called “the modernization theory” which was conceptualized by Huntington in 1968, one of the theorist of modernization cited by Adefulu (2007) the author observed that: “the process of economic and political development in modernizing societies tends to breed inequality, political instability and corruption which may be defined simply in terms of the use of public powers to achieve private goals”.

The governance context emphasized that Kinshasa has weak accountability, and monitoring arrangements. In short, the OCEP architecture is ad hoc, poorly planned and inadequately executed. For Anti-corruption Commissions (ACCs), this means that they may be adversely affected contextually. In Kinshasa, the OCEP operating environment is characterized by different organizations with overlapping roles and responsibilities, ambiguities in inter-institutional relationships and a governmental infrastructure and culture is highly underdeveloped in terms of its policies and practices to prevent, detect and/or deter corrupt practices in all areas and at all levels of the public administration system. Several senior politicians and officials who have been censured or sanctioned for corruption, for example, by Parliament, have not really been called to account or prosecuted. Instead they have been rewarded with lateral transfers to the Movement or elsewhere in Government. Administrative sanctions, dismissals and prosecutions appear to be rare and poorly publicized throughout the Executive.

The poor governance arrangements are both the cause and consequence of governments which from the various interviews undertaken by the research team with donors, media and civil society on their general perceptions on levels and patterns of corruption, would appear not to have integrated the roles and work of the Anti-Corruption Commissions into any general anti-corruption strategy or wider poverty reduction, democratization or administrative reform programs.

4.5 Summary

This chapter has presented and the main findings of the study whose goal was to investigate the role of the OCEP in the fight against corruption in DRC using a case study of Kinshasa city. The study used qualitative data. The main objective of this was to present data in a way that was easy to understand and interpret the results suggested that all respondents, both those who perceive the fighting to curb corruption by the OCEP being low rate in Kinshasa city as well as those who perceive higher rate in the implication on the fight against corruption by the OCEP. Evidence showed that the effectiveness of the OCEP combatting corruption should be high priority in the capital city of DRC. The research evidence also indicated that if the emergence of corruption at a grand or petty scale is to be reduced, a variety of economic, transparency and accountability need to be effectively undertaken. However, the respect of rule of law must apply equally to all in terms of whoever transgressing the law and is brought to court. The urgency of effectively

implementing administration as well as transparency and accountability reforms is perceived to be much greater than the rest of remedies available for combatting corruption.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes and concludes the whole study in relation to the objectives that were set by the researcher. The chapter also provides recommendations based on what emerged from the findings in relation on how best the OCEP can tackle the problem of corruption in Kinshasa city.

5.0.1 Key findings

The following are the key findings of the research:

Respondents from civil societies and political analysts in the study said that they believed corruption to be rampant in Kinshasa, compared to those from those from the OCEP who thought that corruption is not rampant and that there is transparency in public administration.

Respondents from the OCEP cited the incidence of corruption regarding controversial licensing, and other noted petty corruption has common practice in Kinshasa and other respondents cited the incidence of corruption involving high-level government officials and strong political groups of large-scale corruption.

Respondents from academic and media house cited awareness campaigns on corruption and its effect on the development of the city, civil society oversight in the administration of the city and punitive measures for an effectively combating corruption.

5.1 Summary of the findings

This study sought to investigate the role of the OCEP in the fight against corruption in Kinshasa city. Envisaged an effort has been directed towards the OCEP in the new democratic dispensation that allowed the DRC to put in place an institution that mark a new era for the Congolese administration function, a prosperous future which will help to curb corruption which is one of the factors responsible for the poverty of the Congolese. The study also examined the functions and strategy of the OCEP, identified and evaluated key challenges associated with implementation of the OCEP and proposed subsequent mechanisms that can be used to curb corruption among public officials in Kinshasa.

The study therefore, revealed that people perceived corruption as still rampant in daily life of Kinshasa administration and the practice of giving bribes to overcome unjust relations has been generally accepted by a strong majority of respondents. Thus, the implication of an Anti-corruption commission was more in agreement with the wish of respondents, in the administration and the judiciary to provide a comprehensive management of the public administration in Kinshasa city.

Apart from limited participation, the study also enumerated some indicators in the function and strategic process of the OCEP. A major finding is that a high number of

respondents indicated that the OCEP is viewed as the institution which has in place a strong code of ethics to punish officials involve in corruption activities and to strengthen the state control over public administration in Kinshasa city. It was shown that the OCEP has been improving gradually the effectiveness of its operations by carefully addressing awareness to officials in the Kinshasa administration, and that to give a solid foundation on it implementation to become credible on it activities as an anti-corruption commission.

Furthermore, it was also shown that the independence and effectiveness of the OCEP is a function to encourage, personal integrity and independence of its leadership. Although, there are obvious weaknesses institutions are built around individuals, yet there is little doubt that great institutions are built by good leaders, who are able to develop effective team work based on effectiveness and integrity.

5.2 Conclusions

5.2.2 Understanding the implementation of the OCEP

For the OCEP to fight against corruption in Kinshasa city there is need for the improvement of the understanding of the notion of corruption by the people. To explore the effectiveness of the OCEP as a strategy in the fight against corruption activities will now not concentrated on prosecution, but intensify efforts of preventing corruption in Kinshasa city.

The OCEP will improve awareness on the evils of corruption through cooperation program line up with civil society. To promote, disseminate and popularize the code of ethics for public officials and monitor its implementation. To ensure the adequate implementation of the code and recommend to the relevant authorities appropriate to prevent and punish those who violate the provisions of the Code.

The solution lies in the political will of government officials to implement the OCEP legislation and enforce laws by incarcerating violators for significant periods to deter such crimes. With political leaders who are committed to reforming government and prosecuting violators, it is possible that corruption in Kinshasa might actually start to recede. Control of political corruption will not inherently result in reduced poverty but will eventually address the forms of corruption currently experienced in Kinshasa. However it is likely to take years to undo the effects of political corruption in Kinshasa's economy and social welfare. However, a significant implementation of the OCEP by reducing corruption would be a positive step to be engaged in the fight.

5.2.3 Evaluation of the implementation of the OCEP

The implementation of the OCEP has thus failed to some extent to moderate corruption in political administration in Kinshasa if the perception of corruption can be used as a measure of its extent. Transparency International's 2014 perceptions Index shows that

corruption is perceived to be increasing in DRC. However, this may be as a result of increased awareness of political corruption due to the rise in effort to combat it.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study;

People's perception of corruption: Respondents from civil societies claim that abuse of office is implanted in the Kinshasa social habit, embezzlement of public funds by government workers and the need for the public to pay bribes before they can access a range of government services are the daily reality of Kinshasa life.

Examination of the function of OCEP as an anti-corruption strategy; Respondents from civic groups consider that politicians benefit from corruption, and they are not hiding through the fact that there is the OCEP which function is known to punish such act.

Identification and evaluation of the challenges associated to the implementation of the OCEP; the researcher noted that political analysts' claim that officials are having a hand in financial position which resulted of mismanagement and lack of sustainable income to realized plan settings in the administration.

Mechanism proposed to curb corruption in Kinshasa government administration; respondents from the media houses said hindered the fight against corruption were the

habit of solving problems through corrupt practices and corruption prevalent in law enforcement agencies. The absence of will in political leadership moved to last position.

The researcher generated the following recommendations:

- Public awareness and trust should be increased through public. Education on the mission of the Anti-corruption commissions and an adequate effective and enforceable laws on corruption will increase public confidence and trust and prove to the public that the OCEP are not an ineffectual commission. Since public confidence and trust is a key factor to the success of the commission. Such a high expectation has the potential to create an appreciable gap between expectations and achievements between the public and Anti-corruption commissions.
- At the highest levels, the government needs to show its political will to fight corruption and its commitment to implement governance reforms by taking concrete actions against all form of corruption. These actions will send a clear message of zero tolerance to and will also communicate a message of the non-existence of the components of impunity to the rule of law and justice by the government justice wing this will create an environment where some integrity systems for all institutions are available so that people do not see the anti-corruption institution as merely alone policeman, but a collaborator in effecting a

larger public good. This must then become policy and must be disseminated to all and rigorously implemented.

- there need to apply administrative options by the employer or administrative tribunals as a necessary alternative to criminal law in restraining abuse of official discretion is a positive move. This need arises through the referrals or recommendations by integrity committees. Therefore, the guidelines for applying administrative options need to be developed promptly so that the OCEP objective is achieved in record time.
- It is also recommended that, there is need for financial and material resources capacity to support the OCEP institution to develop within Kinshasa community and citizen participation in the fight against corruption. This will lead to an increase in the number of personnel with new investigations and prosecutions skills that emphasize financial and asset tracking and procurement analysis. An increase will also be recorded towards the number of personnel with enhanced skills in corruption prevention with emphasis a research skills, monitoring and evaluation.
- It's recommended that public officials have to provide information, explanations to internal and external actors of the society for their performance in the execution of their functions, in this sense one can say that public administration is not an

irresponsible activity. Increase of the accessibility of the information held by public administration authorities. First of all, to enable the public to access all the information related to the public interest that is held by public administration authorities, the volume of the yet undisclosed information and the reasons for not disclosing it will be established, the information shortages experienced by the public will be identified and the acceptable manner and form of obtaining it will be determined.

- Enhanced transparency in public administration can create far-reaching social effects when it is combined with improved quality of administrative service. Centralised publishing of information on public administration activities. Information on the implementation of the Government Programme provisions and the performance of assigned functions by public administration authorities will be published in a centralised fashion and in line with a uniform policy for information provision to the public.

The OCEP has come in as an effective tool in the fight against corruption as its provisions do not allow for an occurrence of a corrupt practices. As a corruption is seen to have taken a different and integrated approach which is more effective. The relevant laws are also being reviewed and amended in order to be in conformity with the dynamic nature of the crime of corruption.

5.3.5 Further research

This research can be built into further research. A comparative analysis of Kinshasa with other similar cities that have been successful in reducing political corruption may lead to more effective solutions for the OCEP policy. Thus, more research is needed into them and brings to the face issues in the public eye that can help government to take action plans to curb corruption.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Questionnaires

TOPIC: THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVATORY OF CODE OF ETHICS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN THE DRC: A CASE STUDY OF KINSHASA CITY.

SECTION A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Age of the respondent: 18-30[] 30-40 [] 40-50 [] and above []

2. Sex of the respondent: Female [] Male []

3. Marital status: single [] married [] divorce [] widowed []

4. What is your occupation:

SECTION B: ISSUES ABOUT THE OCEP

1. What is your understanding about corruption in government?

2. Can you describe the level of corruption today in Kinshasa?

3. Do you know the institution by the name observatory of code of ethics for public official?

Yes ☐ No ☐ (tick the correct answer)

4. If yes, do you know the reason or reasons why it was formed? (explain the main reasons)

You can use an extra sheet if you need more space).

- 5 Are you aware of the way OCEP is expected to execute its work?

Yes ☐ No ☐ (tick the correct answer)

6. If yes, briefly describe how OCEP has executed its duty since you got to know of it.

7. In your own view, how successful has been OCEP in performing its duty?

8. What are the challenge(s) OCEP has faced and or is still facing in its operation?

9. In your opinion, how best the challenges hindering OCEP in its work can be addressed?

Appendix 2: Questionnaires in French

SECTION A: RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS

Veuillez cocher dans la grille qui correspond a votre personne.

1. L'âge de la personne interrogée: 18-30 [] 30-40 [] 40-50 [] et au-dessus []
2. Sexe du répondant: Femme [] Homme []
3. Situation de famille: célibataire [] marié [] divorce [] veuve []
4. Niveau d'études: primaire [] secondaire [] institution supérieure []
5. Quelle est votre profession: _____

1. SECTION B:

1. Que connaissez vous a propos de la corruption dans le government?

2. Connaissez-vous l'institution nommée l'observatoire du code d'éthique pour le fonctionnaire public ?

Oui [] Non [] (cocher la bonne réponse)

3. Si oui, savez-vous la raison ou les raisons pour lesquelles cella a été formé?
(Expliquer les principales raisons)

(Vous pouvez utiliser une feuille supplémentaire si vous avez besoin de plus d'espace).

4. Êtes-vous conscient de la façon l'OCEP est en mesure d'exécuter son travail?

Oui [] Non [] (cocher la bonne réponse)

5. Si oui, décrivez brièvement comment OCEP a exécuté son devoir puisque vous avez à le savoir

6. Selon votre propre point de vue, quelle sont les succès que l'OCEP a pu démontrer dans l'exercice de son devoir?

7. Quels sont le défi (s) que l'OCEP a déjà pu faire face ou a toujours eu à faire face dans son fonctionnement?

8. A votre avis, quelle sont les défis qui entravent le bon déroulement l'OCEP pour mieux lutter contre la corruption ?

Appendix 3: interview guide

The information will be used for this study only and no name of respondents is required

Specify -----

Gender: Male Female

Age: -----

1. For how long have you been working with OCEP?
2. What is your position or title of work at OCEP?
3. Briefly, explain your duties as a member of OCEP?
4. Have you been enjoying your work ever since you became a member of OCEP?
 - b. If not, why?
5. Can you tell me the achievements OCEP has made in its fight against corruption by government officials?
 - b. If any, what can account for such an achievement or achievements?
6. In your view, are there any challenges you have faced or OCEP has experienced during an effort to combat or reduce corruption by public officials?
 - b. If yes, give a brief outline of the challenges
 - c. How have such challenges or problems solved?
 - d. Did such approaches, if any, help the situation, and why?

7. In your opinion, how best the challenge OCEP currently faces in its fight against corruption can be addressed so that Kinshasa city achieves a zero level of corruption.

Appendix 4: Guide interview

Les informations obtenue dans cette interview seront utiliser seulement pour cette étude et aucun nom des répondants sera requis.

Organisation : _____

Genre : Masculin Féminin

Age : _____

1. Depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous avec l'OCEP ?

2. Quel est votre poste ou titre de travail à l'OCEP ?

3. Brièvement, expliquer vos fonctions en tant que membre de l'OCEP ?

4. Avez-vous été en appréciant votre travail depuis que vous êtes devenu membre de l'OCEP ?

b. Si Non, pourquoi?

5. Pouvez-vous me dire les réalisations OCEP a pu formulée dans sa lutte contre la corruption par des fonctionnaires du gouvernement ?

Pouvez-vous élucider les sucée que L'OCEP a pu réalisation dans sa lutte contre la corruption vis-à-vis des fonctionnaires du gouvernement ?

b. quelles sont les cas échéant, qui pourrais expliquer une telle réussite ou réalisations ?

6. A votre avis, quelles sont les défis que l'OCEP a pu rencontrer au cours de sa lutte contre la corruption pour pouvoir réduire certains aspects de celle-ci dans la vie commune des fonctionnaires ?

b. Si oui, donner un bref aperçu des défis.

c. Comment est-ce que ces défis ou ces problèmes ont été résolus ?

e. Si non, quelle est la situation dans laquelle l'OCEP se retrouve maintenant et pourquoi ?

7. A votre avis, quelle est la meilleure résolution que l'OCEP doit adopter pour surmonter les défis actuels pour lutter effectivement contre la corruption, de telle sorte que la ville de Kinshasa puisse atteindre un niveau zéro de la corruption ?

Appendix 5: informed consent letter for participant

My name is SAKISA NDINGA SACKY, registration N: 129393. I am in my final year in the institute of peace, leadership and governance; Master in peace and governance, student at Africa University. I am required to conduct a research and submit a dissertation as part of the requirement for the completion of this course. I am therefore conducting a research on the topic: The role of code of ethics for public officials in the fight against corruption in Republic Democratic of Congo. Case study Kinshasa city. I am kindly requesting you to participate in this study by answering and filling in the questionnaire.

The information you give will contribute to the understanding of the problems caused by corruption and how they affect the democratic governance, and will help to suggest concrete strategies. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not participate or withdraw your consent to participate at any given time. You will not be penalized in any way should you decided not to participate or withheld from this study.

It is my wish that the research benefits all in the society to keep creating awareness on corruption.

THANK YOU

Appendix 6: Lettre des informations sur le consentement

Mon nom est SAKISA NDINGA SACKY, l'enregistrement N: 129393. Je suis dans ma dernière année à l'Institut de la Paix, le Leadership et la Gouvernance (IPLG); Maîtrise dans la Paix et la Gouvernance, étudiant à Africa University au Zimbabwe. Je suis tenu de procéder à une recherche et présenter une thèse dans le cadre de l'obligation pour l'achèvement de ce cours. Je suis donc effectuant une recherche sur le thème: Le rôle de code d'éthique pour les agents publics dans la lutte contre la corruption en République démocratique du Congo. Étude de cas de la ville de Kinshasa. Je vous demandant de bien vouloir participer à cette étude en répondant et en remplissant le questionnaire.

Cette recherche n'est pas payable et est également volontaire. Vous pouvez choisir de se retirer à tout moment si vous le souhaitez. Vous êtes assuré de la confidentialité tout au long du processus et vous serez également informé sur les résultats de la recherche si vous le désirez. Le seul avantage et c'est mon souhait que tous les citoyens dans la société gardent la sensibilisation sur la corruption.

Appendix 7: Appointment letter for interview

APPOINTMENT LETTER FOR INTERVIEW

AFRICA UNIVERSITY

P.O BOX 1320

MUTARE, ZIMBABWE,

20TH, February, 2015.

OBSERVATORY OF CODE OF EHTICS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS

KINSHASA, DRC. 20TH , February 2015

Dear Sir/ Madam,

LETTER OF APPOINTMENT FOR INTERVIEW

I am a Master's student from the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance (IPLG) at Africa University in Zimbabwe. I am writing to book an interview appointment to carry out a research on corruption. The study is done in order to contribute to the exploration of the multiple facets of corruption with specific reference to national anti- corruption institutions, and suggest concrete strategies geared towards solving issues on corruption. The information you give will contribute to the understanding of the problems caused by corruption and how effective anti- corruption institutions are. The findings will help to suggest concrete strategies to these issues for further research. The research is a partial fulfilment towards the conferment of the Master's degree in peace and governance (MPG). Thanking you in advance for your understanding and cooperation.

Yours sincerely

Appendix 8: Approval letter from the research committee



INVESTING IN AFRICA'S FUTURE

AFRICA UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (AUREC)

P.O. BOX 1320, MUTARE, ZIMBABWE • OFF NYANGA ROAD, OLD MUTARE • TEL: (+263-20) 60075/60026/61611 • E-MAIL: aurec@africau.edu • WEBSITE: www.africau.edu

Ref: AU203/15

March 20, 2015

Sakisa Sacky
Institute of Peace Leadership and Governance
Africa University
Mutare

RE: The role of the observatory of code of ethics for public officials (OCEP) in the fight against corruption in the Republic Democratic of Congo (DRC): A case study of Kinshasa City.

Thank you for the above titled proposal that you submitted to the Africa University Research Ethics Committee for review. Please be advised that AUREC has reviewed and **approved** your application to conduct the above research. However it is important that you address the comments below before implementing your research study:

1. Outline plan for informing participants of outcome of study.

The approval is based on the following.

- a) Research proposal
- b) Questionnaires
- c) Informed consent form

- **APPROVAL NUMBER** AUREC0203/15

This number should be used on all correspondences, consent forms, and appropriate documents.

- **APPROVAL DATE** March 20, 2015
- **EXPIRATION DATE** March 19, 2016
- **TYPE OF MEETING** Expedited

After the expiration date this research may only continue upon renewal. For purposes of renewal, a progress report on a standard AUREC form should be submitted a month before expiration date.

- **SERIOUS ADVERSE EVENTS** All serious problems having to do with subject safety must be reported to AUREC within 3 working days on standard AUREC form.
- **MODIFICATIONS** Prior AUREC approval is required before implementing any changes in the proposal (including changes in the consent documents)
- **TERMINATION OF STUDY** Upon termination of the study a report has to be submitted to AUREC using standard form obtained from.

Yours Faithfully

MITI G. P. AUREC Programmes Officer-
FOR CHAIRPERSON,
AFRICA UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

