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**POST-GENOCIDE MIGRATION: A CASE OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN ZIMBABWE**

BY

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Abstract

The study explores the factors behind the increased post-genocide migration of Rwandans with emphasis on refugees and asylum seekers of Rwandan nationality living in Zimbabwe. Despite being hailed as a peaceful, stable and with a thriving economy, Rwanda has continued to see its citizens fleeing the country in search of asylum in neighboring countries and others have gone as far as Europe and America. While there has been the application of the cessation clause, in countries like Zimbabwe, DRC and Zambia, on Rwandan refugees who fled between 1959 and December 1998, the subsequent post-genocide migration becomes crucial to be understood and the factors behind it because if those to whom the cessation clause is being applied to are to be repatriated, there should be guarantee that the post-genocide migration drivers will not affect them. The human security concept is used as the conceptual framework that informs the research and the phenomenological research design was adopted to describe the migrants' lived experiences. Participants were drawn from Tongogara refugee settlement and Harare because these are the two areas with the largest Rwandan communities in Zimbabwe. Findings have shown that these migrants left their country, Rwanda, due to various factors such as insecurity, poverty and persecution. This study, thus recommends that, if there is to be meaningful voluntary repatriation, there is need of political, social and economic reform in Rwanda.

Key words: *migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, migration, post-genocide, human security*

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my original work except where sources have been cited and acknowledged. The work has never been submitted, nor will it ever be submitted to another university for the award of a degree.

Student's Full Name

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Main Supervisor's Full Name

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Dedication

To my parents, Aloys and Leocadie who stood by me always.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The study examines the post-genocide migration drivers and enhancers of Rwandans and describes the experiences of Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers living in Zimbabwe. Globally, since the year 2013, the number of people migrating has exceeded 50 million and this has become the biggest migrant crisis since the Second World War (Metcalf-Hough, 2015). The majority of these migrants are forced to displace by conflicts, such as the Syrian ongoing war.

Regionally, Africans are also migrating due to conflicts in countries like South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi and Nigeria. These new conflicts have increased the number of migrants, on the continent, to the thousands of already standing refugees and asylum seekers from countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Sudan (Amnesty International, 2015).

On the other hand, Rwanda, though not in overt conflict or crisis, has seen a continuous number of its citizens fleeing the country in search of refuge in neighbouring countries across Africa (Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Gahima and Rudasingwa, 2010). Little attention is given to migrants coming from countries which are not in open conflict and hence there is need to understand why these Rwandan migrants are seeking refuge in exile. Rwanda

is a nation that is inhabited by 3 tribes, the Hutu's 84%, the Tutsi's 14% and Abatwa or Twa 2% (Batware, 2012). Over the years, conflicts have always arisen between the two major tribes, the Hutu and the Tutsi, as in 1959, 1972, 1990, 1994; which all resulted in mass exodus of Rwandans who sought refuge in neighbouring countries as refugees and asylum seekers.

1.1 Background of study

Rwanda, though a small nation, has in the past grabbed the world's attention by its' violent conflict, between the Hutus and Tutsi's, in 1994 which resulted in the death of close to a million Rwandans within hundred days, popularly known as the Rwandan genocide (Buckley-Zistel, 2008). According to Eltringham (2004), between 7 April and mid-May, 507 000 Tutsi, around 77% of the then Tutsi population and moderate Hutus were killed by armed Hutu militias with the participation of the local Hutu population.

This violent conflict between the two major groups was triggered by the assassination of the, then, Rwandan President Juvenile Habyarimana who was from the Hutu ethnic group on 6 April 1994 (Dagne, 2011). A lot of Rwandans were displaced (nearly a third of the population, 1.7 million) to neighbouring countries, across Africa, others ended in Europe and America (Straus, 2008).

However, stability was restored by the end of 1994 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under Paul Kagame, took over control after overthrowing the, then, Hutu government. Since then Rwanda has seen positive transformations in terms of democracy, economy, technology, politics and social cohesion (Dagne, 2011). Rwanda has also been hailed by the international community for its positive progress regardless of its tragic history and it has even occupied one of the non-permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council in 2013.

Regardless of these positive economic achievements, reports on human rights violation in Rwanda are alarming with the disappearances of opposition newspaper editors, unlawful detainment of opposition candidates, former government officials seeking refuge in exile, the killing of government critics both internal and external and the involvement of Rwanda in supporting armed rebel groups in neighbouring DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Arguing along the same sentiments, Reyntjens (2004:1) also depicts the government in Rwanda as a government that has

.... concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a very small minority, practiced ethnic discrimination, eliminated every form of dissent, destroyed civil society, conducted a fundamentally flawed 'democratization' process, and massively violated human rights at home and abroad.

Nyamwasa et al (2010) also depicts Rwanda as a country run by an authoritarian regime with its citizens afraid to speak out despite the governments' failure to provide basic goods to its population.

1.2 Problem statement

Despite the Rwandan government call for the application of the cessation clause since 2009, and the subsequent application of the clause in 2013, for Rwandan refugees across the world who fled between 1959 and December 1998 (Parker, 2015), there has been insignificant voluntary repatriation with most Rwandans sceptical about the political, social and economic environment back in Rwanda (UNHCR and WFP Joint Assessment Mission Report, 2014). Instead, Rwanda has continued to see a number of its citizens (government officials, high ranked military personnel and other citizens) fleeing the country to seek asylum in neighbouring countries on the continent and abroad (Nyamwasa et al, 2010). According to the International Migration Report (2015), Rwanda has 441 500 international migrants and this figure excludes illegal migrants who are not documented. A lot of Rwandans are fleeing and most of them are denied refuge because their country is regarded as peaceful (UNHCR, 2007). This is typical of most African migrants who are often denied refugee unless they are fleeing countries with open conflicts as is noted by (Ncube, Dube and Sithole, 2014) that, in South Africa, Ethiopians, Somalians and Angolans (countries in conflict) have high chances of being accorded asylum as compared to Zimbabweans and Zambians (no open conflicts in their countries) who have slim chances. While prospering economically and visibly at peace, Rwandans refugees fear going back home (Parker, 2015) and even though their refugee

status have been revoked, they have devised new survival strategies, such as pretending to be Ugandans or Congolese and in other instances they even disappear from official radar (Hovil, 2010). Moreover, Straus and Waldorf (2011) note that as long as there is still the collective guilt constructed around Hutus as genocide perpetrators, discriminatory laws, massive human rights violations and cosmetic reconciliation, then there will be no meaningful voluntary repatriation of Rwandans. Thus, there is need to understand the migration reasons of Rwandans before any action can be taken to repatriate those living in refugee settlements and the absence of overt conflict should not be taken as guarantee of peace as there are other various threats to human security that can cause people to migrate.

1.3 Significance of study

There has been debate around repatriating Rwandans back to their country since 2009, especially those who fled the 1994 genocide and most/if not all are unwilling to go back (UNHCR Report, 2013) citing issues of insecurity and also because they continue to see more Rwandans migrating hence they are sceptical of the environment back in Rwanda. As such, it is unrealistic for the UNHCR to conclude that those who fled the 1994 genocide should be repatriated back because the threat which made them leave their country has ended when there are also refugees and other migrants who are fleeing the same country post-genocide. Yes, the Rwandan genocide is over but before the UNHCR can repatriate Rwandan refugees who fled the 1994 genocide, they should understand that the post-genocide threats that are forcing some Rwandans to flee could also be threats to these 1994 Rwandan refugees if repatriated.

Mangala (2010) cites migration as among the new security threats on both national and global levels. Irrespective that the post-genocide migration is on a minimal level as compared to the 1959, 1972 and 1994 refugee migration from Rwanda or any other migration crisis that is spoken of in the global media, it should be treated as it is 'migration' and it should also make relevance to those responsible because these, like any other migrants, are leaving their country to seek better lives away from a potential threat.

Thus, if not addressed while the migration is at a minimal stage, there is the possibility of the threat escalating and leading to mass migration as was in 1959 and 1994. Additionally, there cannot be meaningful durable solutions to the problem of refugees and migrants if reasons for migrations are not understood fully before any conclusions can be drawn as what action to take. Despite this being a study addressing the factors contributing to post-genocide migration from Rwanda, this research will also be contributing to the already existing literature on migration.

1.4 Assumption

- i. Rwanda is not peaceful and hence people are migrating to other countries due to their concern for their human security.

- ii. Tribal tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi are contributing to the migration of Rwandans from Rwanda.

1.5 Objectives

The objectives of this study are to:

1. To identify the factors that are contributing to migration of Rwandans post-genocide
2. To explore the experiences of Rwandan migrants in Zimbabwe.
3. To suggest strategies that can be put in place so as to manage the migration of Rwandans from Rwanda

1.6 Research Questions

1. What factors contribute to the migration of Rwandans post-genocide?
2. What are the experiences of Rwandan migrants in Zimbabwe?
3. What strategies can be put in place to manage the migration of Rwandans from Rwanda?

1.7 Delimitations

The research project is delimited to Rwandan migrants and asylum seekers who reside in Tongogara refugee settlement and those who reside in Harare. The research focuses on Rwandan migrants who left Rwanda after 2003, as this is the period the post-genocide

transitional government was dissolved and the first post-genocide elections were held during the same year. Participants range from 18 years of age going upwards and they also are drawn from both sex men and women.

1.8 Limitations

The researcher faced some challenges and these included the threat of flooding in Tongogara refugee settlement which put people on high alert most of the time and this made it difficult for the researcher to have more interaction time with some participants. The researcher had to engage in helping such participants in packing their valuables in preparation for the possibility of flooding. While interviewing participants, some would ask for *gusengererwa* (which is traditional to Rwandan and Burundi communities where, often men, drink traditional beer often banana beer) while conversing. The researcher however enlisted the help of a resident Rwandan interpreter, an old man himself, who would help in informing such participants that the researcher was doing the research for academic purpose and hence he had no incentives or stipends to offer. Rwandan in Harare were the most difficult to get hold of as majority of them would be busy running their shop outlets and the researcher would have to help, at times, in the shops as he interviewed the participants.

1.9 Definition of Key Terms

Post-Genocide- this refers to the period, in Rwanda, after 2003 when the transitional period had ended.

Migration- is the movement of people from one place in the world to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary.

Migrant- an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than a year, irrespective of the cause for migration being voluntary or involuntary

Refugee- as a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and that such a person is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country

1.10 Structure of the study

This research is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter which is the introduction to the study focused on the background to the study, statement problem, significance of the study, research objectives, assumptions and the research questions. Chapter two considered the review of literature related to migration, migration theories and the global migration trends. Chapter three focuses on research methodology where the research design, research methods, population and data analysis are explained. In Chapter four the research analyses the findings from collected data and chapter five presents the conclusions and recommendations.

1.11 Summary

While there is a global migration crisis, little attention is paid to migrations of smaller magnitudes. This chapter provided the background to the study, its significance, objective and the assumptions. This chapter has argued that, despite the economic development in Rwanda, there is continuous outward migration. There is need to address the migration that happens on a smaller scale before the threat grows to the extent where there is mass movements.

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the review of literature related to migration, its causes, and impacts and how it has been tackled. Literature that is reviewed also looks at migration from a global level, regional and human security in Rwanda. The literature reviewed provide an objective analysis of migration and how its impacting geopolitics. Emphasis is also given to how the human security concept identifies itself to migration. It is through this review of literature that one grasps the gaps that in turn justify the need for such a research.

2.1 Conceptual framework

2.1.1 Human security concept

According to Tigerstrom (2007), what security means is what entails citizens' demands from the law. Since the term "security" is a social construct (Mangala, 2010), different societies interpret the term differently. In the academic circles of politics, security often took the state-centric approach. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new approach to security, which took the "humanist" (Mangala, 2010), was gaining ground. It is, thus, this paradigm shift in global politics, from the state being at the core of security to one where the human being is "the true metric of security" that is reviewed in this chapter (Mangala, 2010:2).

Buzan (1991) defines security as the provision of protection to a referent object by reducing its vulnerability or lessening/removing the threat to its survival. Mangala (2010) asserts that, if one is to fully grasp the security concept, there is need for clarity as to who or what is being protected, what is it being protected from and what instruments are used to ensure security of the object.

The traditional definition of security centered exclusively on the defense a nations' territorial sovereignty against external military threats (Gasper, 2008). This concept of security was dominant during the Cold War era and the state was the referent object. The security of the individual was seen as secondary to the security of the state and this school of thought held that state security was guarantee of human security (Buzan, 1991). The state was thus the core for security and its ability to defend itself from outside aggression was seen as guarantee for the security of the individual (Sheehan, 2005).

Security was defined in military terms in this period because of the prevalence of inter-state conflicts that were taking place during the Cold War period. This was a period marred by interstate wars based on ideological differences between the Capitalist West and the Communist East. In Europe and America, the war did not overtly manifest itself into open conflicts as was the case of proxy wars fought on the African continent.

However, since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of challenges to the traditional thinking of security and these challenges emanate from the shifting of conflicts from inter-state to intra-state during the post-Cold War period, post-Cold War economic crises in Africa and South America, the mass migration of refugees and economic migrants from states in conflict (Mozambique 1981, Rwanda 1994) which posed as burdens to the host countries, widespread deaths due to diseases such as HIV/AIDS and states repression on their own citizens (Dowty and Loescher, 1996; Posen, 1996; Mangala, 2010; Atim 2013). The fall of the Soviet Empire, structural changes in the international system and resurgent ethnic conflict, all generated new insecurities at the same time downgrading the traditional importance of military security (Suhrke, 2003).

There was need to revise the security concept so as to accommodate the new non-military threats that had just emerged into the picture and hence the birth of human security as the true metric of security (Gasper 2005). The Human Development Report (1994), advocates that human security is equal to ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want and’ these became the two pillars of the human security concept. The Human security concept pursues’ the protection of the individual as the core of security in seven supplementary security clusters; political, food, health, personal, environment, community and economic (Human Development Report, 1994; Mangala, 2010).

Human security, therefore, means creating “political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Commission on Human Security, 2003:4). The Human security concept, therefore adds vital elements that give more focus to human basic needs (Gasper, 2008), basic rights for all (O’Brien, 2007) and the concern for stability and average levels of freedoms for all. Thus, the state is obliged to protect its citizens from any harm and this includes protection from the state itself.

The state, among its obligations, has to provide for the well-being of its citizens and protect them from starvation, persecution, dehumanisation, poverty and other forms of deprivations, unlawful detentions, and any inhuman treatment such as torture and grant citizens personal freedoms among other obligations. What this implies is the fact that, the state should provide for its citizens enough political goods for them to leave a dignified life and realise their full potential.

It would be justified to postulate that the human security concept is rooted in the realization of human rights because it promotes the protection of citizens and has the individual as the unit of analysis. When states protect their citizens and give them the political space to realize their full potential, this cannot be distinguished from states promotion and protection of citizens’ human rights.

Therefore, when states fail to protect their citizens from harm, be it human engineered or natural, this can result in the interference by the international community into the domestic politics of sovereign nations to protect human life. What is important to note is the fact that the human security concept has changed geopolitics from a non-interference stance to one where foreign nations can interfere in the politics of a sovereign nation in the name of human rights protection. The intervention can be in the form of a regional coalition force intervening to stop civil war or it can be on a global level where the United Nations (UN) would send peacekeeping forces.

Contrary, the human security concept has had criticism and one of the critics, Krause (2004), questions the concept's treatment of certain problems like HIV/AIDS as detrimental arguing that such treatment could create divisions instead of fostering relationships. In the same vein, Hudson (2005), from a feminist point of view, notes with concern how the human security concept's emphasis on protection of individuals is detrimental to women especially in societies where women have no equal rights with men. Smith (2006) cited in Gasper (2008) argues that the Human security concept legitimizes the intervention of stronger powers in domestic affairs of other sovereign nations.

Despite criticism about its conceptual limitations, the human security concept has flourished, representing itself as an agenda for action and this is due to its inclusiveness of varying issues; such as illicit drug trade, forced migration, environmental degradation,

terrorism, HIV/AIDS, peacekeeping, refugees and internally displaced persons and peace keeping, have all been brought under a single umbrella (Mangala 2010).

2.2 Types of migrants

Human migration has occurred for as long as humanity itself and reasons for this mobility varied and they included, but are not limited to, food searching, for pasture and resources, travel and exploration and also for conquest and territorial expansion (King, 2012). Migration is the movement of people from one area to another for the purpose of finding work, fleeing conflicts, taking up permanent residence or semi-permanent residence and this can be within the same state (internal migration) or across national boundaries to another state (external migration) (Human Migration Guide, 2005).

Migration in this case can be either voluntary or forced; voluntary migration is when people, of their own accord, choose to move and forced migration is when people are forced to move due to reasons that include conflicts, natural disasters or other human induced disasters (Ogwang, 2014). Migration occurs on various levels ranging from rural-urban migration and internally displaced persons which are internal migration within one state to international migration which involves the migration of people across international borders.

This study, however, concentrates on international migration and not internal migration as it looks at Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers residing in Zimbabwe and thus these qualify as international migrants as they have crossed their national boundary into another state. On the international side of migration, further classification of migrants can be done to distinguish between refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants (Human Migration Guide, 2005; Crawford et al, 2015).

International migrants can also be characterised by their form of entry into the host state, whether they entered legally or illegally. Legal migrants are those migrants who enter another sovereign territory through proper channels which include attaining a visa that grants them permission to enter, having temporary or permanent residence that allows you to stay within the host territory. On the other hand, illegal migrants or irregular migrants are migrants who enter a foreign country using means that are outside the legally established or accepted by that state (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008).

There are four types of illegal migrants' namely unauthorized entry, visa overstaying, fraudulent entry and violations of terms and conditions of a visa (Papademetriou, 2005 cited in Baldwin-Edwards, 2008). Unlike economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are protected by international conventions for illegally entering a country and this is enshrined in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Thus, economic migrants can be deported or even imprisoned for illegally entering a sovereign territory but forced migrants are immune.

2.3 Macro, meso and micro theories of international migration

Migration is a global problem that is affecting all nations be it in the developed world or in the third world countries. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA, 2011) estimates that in 2010 they were around 214 million international migrants globally and this represented 3% of the total global population. Moreover, the Human Development Report (2009) estimates around 740 million internal migrants and altogether there are almost a billion migrants globally.

The United Nations defines a migrant as an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than a year, irrespective of the cause for migration being voluntary or involuntary (Metcalf-Hough, 2015:3). This definition of a migrant is a broad one as it encompasses all migrants be it forced migrants, asylum seekers and economic migrants.

Scholars such as (Bilsborrow and Zlotnik, 1994; Massey et al, 1993; Massey, 1999; Lund and Mehler, 1999; Faist, 2001; Kurekova, 2011), in a bid to unravel human migration patterns, distinguish between what they call macro, meso and micro theories of international migration. Micro level theories focus on individual migration decisions, macro theory focuses on mass migration and meso theories are theories that are in-between the micro and macro theories (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

2.3.1 Macro theories of migration

2.3.1.1 Neo-classical macro migration theory

The neoclassical theory “understands migration to be driven by differences in returns to labor across markets” (Kurekova, 2011:5). The most basic model originally in the works of Hicks (1932) and Lewis (1954) highlights that migration is due to wage differentiation. The central argument in this theory rests on wages. This theory postulates that migration flows from regions/countries with high labor supply and low wages to regions with high labor demand with high wages (Massey, 1993; Borjas, 2008). More than 30% wage differential has been cited by Mansoor and Quillin (2006) as necessary for migration to occur.

2.3.1.2 The Dual Labor Market Theory

Contrary to the neo-classical migration theory, the dual market theory explains migration as the result of a temporary pull factor, the structural labor demand in developed nations (Piore, 1979). This theory posits that there is economic dualism on the labor market of advanced economies and hence there is a primary sector and a secondary one. Citizens of developed nations are unwilling to work in the secondary sector due to the low wages and more importantly due to the status that these secondary jobs are affiliated with (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

Migrants, on the other hand, are motivated to work in these low-status jobs as they do not consider themselves bothered by the job status. Thus, this theory argues that

migration is driven by labor demand rather than labor supply and, in a related study, Parusel and Tamas (2015) present Sweden's new immigration policy which pulls immigrants into sectors that locals neglect due to the low-status associated with such sectors.

The macro theories explain the migration of the 1st wave of voluntary migration which Boswell (2003) terms the 'pioneer migration'. The macro theory has had its fair share of criticism due to its shortfalls in explaining the migration patterns. Faist (2000) accepts the macro theories at the same time citing shortfalls since the macro theories do not give answers as to why so much migration occurs from few places despite similar push (low wages) factors occurring in many potential sending areas. Similarly, Boswell (2002:3) is also critical of the macro theory as it is not "equipped in accounting for the persistence of voluntary migration despite changes in economic conditions or legislation in receiving countries".

2.3.2 Meso theories of migration

2.3.2.1 The network theory of migration

According to Massey, Douglass, Arango, Hugo, Kouaci, Pellegrino, Taylor (1993), the network theory does not look at what determines migration but rather at what perpetuates migration. This theory explains why migration continues even when wage differentials cease and migrants friendly policies cease to exist. Systems and networks are the two concepts that are important for meso theories. Boswell (2002) assumes that

migration occurs within a migration system and this system comprising of countries that are linked by economic, political, cultural ties and also migration flows. The existence of a diaspora network influences continuous migration flows (Vertovec 2002, Dustmann and Glitz 2005). The network theory also helps to explain why the migration pattern is not evenly distributed and hence why migration tends to occur from certain areas, what Faist (2000) terms migration regimes.

Therefore, the meso theory postulates that the conditions that generate movement is the relationship between two areas, “rather than a set of objective indicators” (Boswell, 2002:3). Faist (2000) refers to networks as set of individuals and collective actors (these include migrants and their families, religious and social groups) and the multiple social and symbolic ties that link them together. Once these networks are in place, they can influence the direction and volume of migration flows at the same time providing resources that help people to move such as information, contacts, social and economic support.

2.3.3 Micro theories of migration

2.3.3.1 Lee’s Push and Pull factors

Lee (1966) was the first to postulate migration in a push and pull framework on an individual level looking at both, the supply and demand of migration. Push factors occur in the migrant’s country of origin and pull factors are those that make the migrant to migrate and they occur in the migrants’ country of destination. Push factors may include

conflicts, unemployment, low standards of living, poor health care and lack of economic stability. On the other hand, pull factors may include, better employment opportunities, free health care, high standards of living, economic stability and peace (Faist, 2000).

2.3.3.2 Neo-classical micro migration theory/ Human capital approach

Based on Sjaastad (1962) migration is viewed as an individual rational decision done for the sole purpose of maximizing profit. This theory builds on the rational choice theory, seeing migration as a calculated move which only occurs if the migrant sees benefitting more in moving than in staying (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). Thus, at the center of this theory is a rational individual who migrates to maximize his gains and hence human capital endowments such as age, skills, gender and occupation determine who migrates and who does not (Kurekova, 2011). Thus, according to this theory, migrants tend to be young and skilled as this increases their chances of employment (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999).

These migration theories focus more on voluntary migration and they are less irrelevant when explaining forced migration except Lee's push and pull factors which can be twisted in a way that allows it to cater for forced migration. The micro, meso and macro theories of migration look at the economic, social and cultural aspects of migration at different levels but they do not go beyond these tenets to look at the political side and other causes of migration like natural disasters, conflicts and diseases such as

HIV/AIDS. Moreover, these are Western and American theories that were postulated to explain the migration trends in the Northern developed states.

Finally, these theoretical approaches are all relevant in explaining voluntary migration with no one approach being good enough on its own to fully explain migration but rather that these theories complement each other. The macro theory gives insights into factors that trigger mass migration and the meso theory explains the continuous flows of migrants despite positive changes in the migrant's country of origin and why migration flows come from one country despite similar push factors in various countries. The micro theory shows how individuals translate the macro and meso factors into individual decision to move.

2.4 Defining a Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons

During the year 2009, the refugee population stood at 15 million and 26 million people were internally displaced (Mangala, 2010). As of 2015, the refugee crisis was the worst since World War 2 (Metcalf-Hough, 2015) and this refugee flow is no longer being viewed as a humanitarian problem alone but more as a security threat especially by European countries.

The 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person;

.....who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and that such a person is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country

On the other hand, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are migrants who have been forced out of their homes by varying factors that may include conflicts and natural disasters but unlike refugees, IDPs though uprooted, stay within the confines of their national borders (Mangala, 2010).

Refugees represent a category which is protected through a legal regime supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and legal binding instruments like the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, also complemented by the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention (Mangala 2010:40). On the contrary, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1998) categorizes IDPs as a new group of vulnerable population whose protection rests on the real of human rights conventions and not on a globally legal binding instrument.

In summation, the difference between refugees and IDPs is the fact that one group (refugees) have been forced to move and at the same time they have crossed their national boundary into another state while the IDPs, though also victims of forced migration, have not crossed their national boundaries. Another difference between these

two groups of forced migrants is the fact that the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status for Refugees recognizes only refugees as those who have crossed their national border into another country and these are the ones that are internationally regarded as needing protection as defined by the 1951 refugee convention. Though the causes for displacement and the need for protection are often similar for both refugees and IDPs, refugees are given the special attention than IDPs.

2.5 The Global refugee Crisis and its effects

Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Libya, South Sudan, Iraq, and Yemen are few among a long list of countries that are either in conflict (violent conflict) or in crisis. All these states are migrant producing countries with Syria being, currently, the largest refugee producer due to the ongoing Syrian war. Though the effects have been and are still being felt globally, the refugee crisis effects on Europe have attracted so much attention in media circles and politics worldwide and hence the need to look at how this refugee crisis is affecting the European Union (EU).

The European Union 28 member states policy on migration has been traditionally reliant on economic migration (Subirats and Leon, 2015). Traditional economic migrants to Europe were skilled males whose labor contributed to the continued development of the European Union (Metcalf-Hough, 2015). Solidarity, Liberty, dignity, freedom of Movement within the European Union, open markets and free trade (Onghena, 2015) are

among the core values of the European Union but the recent surge of refugees into the EU has put all these values to the test.

According to the UNHCR, by mid-2015 more than 500 000 refugees had reached Europe by sea and this is twice the number of refugees that reached Europe in 2014. This migration surge is the largest Europe has faced since the Second World War (Metcalf-Hough, 2015). More than 80% of all refugees arriving in Europe are from the world's top ten refugee producing countries among them Syria, Iraq, Eritrea and Libya (UNHCR, 2015). The majority of these refugees are using clandestine means to reach Europe, often, crossing the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa and as of 2015 more than 3000 refugees have drowned while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea (Guterres et al, 2015).

EU states are viewing this large refugee migration as more of a threat than a humanitarian crisis and most member states have reacted accordingly, tightening irregular access to their controls, visas and other legal channels (Hagen-Zanker, and Mallett, 2015). These restrictions have not been effective in starving off the continuous influx of refugees and other migrants; “instead, they have resulted in increased clandestine efforts to reach Europe” (Metcalf-Hough, 2015:2).

The effects on Europe have been enormous from security, economy, politics and social divisions. In Turkey, there has been high insecurity due to continuous bomb attacks which also culminated in a coup attempt in 2016. European states face the threat of Islamic State and this problem is made more acute by the volume of refugees, the dynamics of their profiles, countries of origin, clandestine means by which they get to Europe and the difficulty of deducting who is a refugee and who is a potential terrorist.

Similarly, with the slow economic recovery of most EU states, the cost of supporting these refugees is one that most are not willing to bear. Given that, more than half of the total global population of refugees had been displaced for more than ten years (protracted refugees), this means European states would have to support these refugees for a long time (Crawford et al, 2015). There is also the perceived competition over jobs between refugees and European citizens and how this would lead to social cohesion (Metcalf-Hough, 2015).

Europe has been divided by this refugee crisis between those who see the refugee crisis as a humanitarian crisis that Europe has a moral obligation to help and those who see this as a security threat. Extremist populist parties are on the rise in Europe and intolerance, xenophobia and racism are now characteristic of Europe (Onghena, 2015). Anti-migration political leaders are heard publicly denouncing refugee accepting policies using terms such as 'Islamic Tsunami', 'testosterone bombs', 'terrorists', 'clandestines', which are all racist and derogatory (Onghena, 2015:2). In some European

countries, the xenophobic behavior has taken to violence as in Germany where arson attacks on refugee settlements are on the increase.

Europe which was a champion of human rights has now turned into a violator. Scenes of refugees being denied entry into Europe, dead bodies being washed on Europe shores, are portrayed in media circles globally but still Europe denies these migrants asylum. Thus, Europe, though advocating for human rights as inalienable, when faced with a problem that they had not encountered for decades, they resort to the state centric notion of security putting human lives secondary to national security.

2.6 Forced Migration and its causes

Ogwang (2014) defines forced migration as the movement by refugees and internally displaced persons as a result of natural disasters, famine, chemical or nuclear disasters and developmental projects. Forced migrants are migrants who leave their country of origin involuntary because of varying factors which include wars, politically motivated violence, persecutions, tribal conflicts, famine, developmental project and floods.

Despite forced migration being caused by a myriad of factors, numerous scholars (Suhrke, 1994; Rwamatwara, 2005; Saundry, 2008; Atim, 2013), agree to the notion of violent conflicts such as wars, civil wars, political violence and ethnic violence to be the major cause of forced migration. Suhrke (1994), while analyzing refugee producing

situations concluded that levels of forced migrants correspond to the levels of violence in their country of origin. Ogwang (2014) characterizes the causes of forced migration into three categories; conflicts, developmental projects and disasters.

Conflict induced displacements are those people who are forced to flee their homes, as the state is unable or unwilling to protect them, from armed conflicts which include civil war, persecutions on the grounds of race, political opinion, religion, social group or ethnicity (Oxford Department of International Development (ODID) Refugee Study Centre, 2010). From the 1st and 2nd World War, the liberation struggles in Africa during the 1960s, the Cold War proxy wars in Africa, the Rwandan genocide and the ongoing Syrian war, violent conflicts have been seen to be the ones that produce the largest number of forced migrants.

Though they may not produce the volume of forced migrants as comparable to conflicts, disasters, be it natural or man-made, have had their fair share of displacing populations from their homes. Hurricanes (Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in New Orleans), torrential rains and floods are some of the natural disasters that have been at the epicenter of forced migration (Cresswell, 2006). Between the years 2000-2005, the *International Disaster Database* (EM-DAT) estimated that the number of people who had been affected by flooding to have been around 106 million worldwide and those affected by hurricanes to be around 38 million (Piguet, 2008).

In the same vein, the number of people affected by droughts has been comparable to those that have been affected by hurricanes and floods. Figures given by the EM-DAT shows that between 2000 and 2005, 146 million people were affected by droughts worldwide with the hardest hit being Sub-Saharan Africa. Future projections have predicted an increase in droughts due to an increase in global population and fresh water shortages. The effect of lack of drinking and irrigation water is, however, less sudden than is the effect of conflicts and disasters such as floods on displacing populations (Piguet, 2008).

Sen (1981), Findley (1994), smith (2001), Henry, Boyle, and Lambin (2003), while studying the effects of droughts, in Bangladesh, Burkina-Faso and Mali, all concluded that, although droughts did force populations to displace, this was on a minimal level. The majority of people affected by droughts are poor peasants who reside in the rural areas and thus, while they might opt to migrate, the unavailability of resources to finance the journey stops them (Fidley, 1994). In some cases, as was during the 2016 drought that affected most parts of Southern Africa, governments offered relief aid to the affected communities and areas as was the case in Zimbabwe and South Africa and this resulted in less population mobility.

Contrarily to hurricanes, rains and droughts, rising sea levels are virtually irreversible and, though this manifests over long periods of time, the only option for such a disaster

is population migration (Piguet, 2008). Coastal areas comprise of 2.2% of dry land and are home to 10.5% of global population and half of this population lives in the poorest countries of the world (Anthoff, Nicholls, Tol, and Vafeidis, 2006). It would be an exaggeration to consider the whole 10.5% population living in coastal areas as potential migrants (Piguet, 2008) but future projections of 7 meter rise in sea level (though this is projected to take place over hundreds of years) pose future migratory threats.

2.7 The situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Africa

Although there has been a decline in refugee migration on the continent as compared to post independence Africa, the refugee situation in host countries has been far more hostile than it was during the decades of decolonization and post-independence. Contrary, there has been an increase in regional integration, economic migration and trade. Atim (2013) notes, ironically, how those who escape persecution and violence from their country are unable to find safe refuge in countries that offer them asylum.

Migrants, in the late 1960s and 1970s were products of liberation struggles/wars of national liberation from colonial rule; from countries that included Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and South West Africa (Atim, 2013). During this period, refugees were viewed as brothers who needed help to free themselves from colonial repression and hence the humanitarian assistance preceded the notion of viewing refugees as a security threat and this was despite internal bombardments by colonial forces in refugee held camps in sovereign territories.

The ideals of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism were the rhetoric of the day across the continent and influential leaders such as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda did set an example by not just receiving migrants but also turned refugee camps into guerilla training camps for freedom fighters (Atim, 2013).

However, Post-Cold War view of migrants changed from a humanitarian crisis to a security threat and Mangala (2010) and Atim (2013), both, are of the view that, the magnitude of the refugee crisis and the destabilizing effects that these had on neighboring countries was the turning point of such a paradigm shift. The example given by Mangala (2010) is the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its regional effect that saw the Rwandan invasion of DRC and the subsequent regional war that saw fighting between 5 African countries in DRC in 1998.

Scholars such as Dowty and Loescher (1996) and Posen (1996) support this view of refugees as a security threat and they argue that refugee migration can provoke international hostilities between states. In the same vein, Atim (2013) also echoes along the same lines by postulating that states are not independent units but rather interconnected networks and hence conflicts in one state have spillover effects in other countries.

Sudanese refugees from Darfur who fled to Eastern Chad were attacked by government forces seeking to eliminate ethnic-political rivals (Atim, 2013:7) and Rwanda's invasion of Zaire (now DRC) in 1996 was largely motivated by the Rwandan government desire to clear refugee camps in Zaire which harbored militant groups; are all examples of refugee induced international conflicts.

Refugees are now viewed as a threat, unbudgeted for burden and communities have become more hostile and so have been governments on the African continent. Refugees, unlike voluntary migrants are less likely to contribute to productive economic activities given that they are often unskilled (Cortes, 2004) and this inflicts an economic burden on the host government as they have to provide for the well-being of these refugees (Martin, 2005). Refugees also contribute to the international spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Malaria and Diarrhea (Rowland and Noosten, 2000), refugee inflow increase organized crime in host country (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006) and rebel groups' formation as refugee camps become recruiting bases.

The treatment of refugees in Post-Cold War Africa is reminiscent of the state-centric notion of security as it puts the security of the state before those of human beings. Had human security been the core, refugees would be among those primarily being offered protection but rather the situation in refugee camps and the location itself signals marginalization of refugees.

Countries such as Tanzania which was regarded as a model for refugee protection in Africa, have adopted restrictive measures aimed at limiting refugee movements and confining refugees in remote areas which are hardly accessible (Mangala, 2010). Similarly, refugee camps like Tongogara refugee settlement in Zimbabwe, Maheba refugee settlement in Zambia and Dadaab refugee settlement in Kenya, just to mention a few, are all remote and secluded settlements designed to limit the movement of refugees and their contact with local communities. Thus, the freedoms entitled to refugees by the 1951 UN convention have been ignored and states have their own definition of refugee rights and these are arbitrarily defined.

2.7.1 Refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region

Although the global refugee migration has increased, regionally, Africa has seen a decline in the number of refugees. Unlike the 1980s when Africa was labelled “the continent for refugees” (Mangala, 2010:39), the 21st century has experienced a decline in refugee migration and this can be attributed to the decline in violent conflicts on the continent, more open multiparty democracy and states’ shift from a state-centric security paradigm to a human security one where citizens are being given more personal freedoms and political goods to realize their full potential.

Despite this decline in refugee migration, the Great Lakes region still remains the region which produces the biggest volumes of refugees on the African continent. The Great lakes region comprises of five countries and these are Burundi, Rwanda, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Tanzania (Ogwang, 2014). Apart from Tanzania, all the other countries in the Great Lakes region have experienced successive conflicts since independence with the climax of these conflicts being in 1998 when the war in DRC drew in five African countries in what was termed Africa's First World War (Ogwang, 2014).

According to the UNHCR (2000) the epicenter of political violence, in the 1960s and 1990s, that resulted in mass refugee movements throughout the region was Rwanda. The Republic of Rwanda was born in a refugee crisis (after the 1959 Hutu rebellion that saw more than 100 000 Tutsi refugees fleeing to neighboring countries) in 1962 and successive political conflicts in 1973, 1990, 1994, 1996 and 1998, have all resulted in mass refugee displacements (Ogwang, 2014).

Similarly, Burundi has also been a refugee producing country due to conflicts in 1972, 1988, 1993- 2001 and the 2013 refugee crisis in Burundi. Conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda have all been shaped by political violence that manifested itself as ethnic violence of one group against the other. These two countries share history in almost all respects; they have the same ethnic composition, Hutu 84%, Tutsi 14% and Twa 2%

(Batware, 2012), were all colonies of Germany before the 1st World War and later protectorates under Belgium till their independence in 1962.

Uganda has also had its share of refugee displacements caused by armed conflicts and the initial mass displacement recorded was that of Idi Amin's expulsion of Asians in 1973. This was followed by the Langis (Northerners) persecution by Idi Amin, because of their ethnic relation to ousted president Milton Obote, and they fled into neighboring countries and some went as far as Europe and North America. The 1981-86 guerrilla war which brought Museveni to power also led to mass refugee migrations from Uganda and so is the ongoing rebellion in Northern Uganda led by Joseph Kony which can be traced as far back as 1986 (Ogwang, 2006).

It can be, thus, noted that the politics of the Great lakes region is shaped by forced migration. The region is characterized by armed conflicts, massive internal displacements, mass refugee migrations and violence (Ogwang, 2014). According to Conflicts Report (2010), there were eleven conflicts in Africa and The Ploughshares Monitor (2010) notes that three of these conflicts were in the Great Lakes Region (Burundi, DRC and Uganda) and they led to mass internal displacement and refugee migration into neighboring countries and beyond. Murison (2003) notes that, ironically, countries in the Great Lakes Region, with the exception of Tanzania host refugees from each other's territory.

2.8 Human Security in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Rwanda is a land locked country in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, bordered by Burundi, DRC, Uganda and Tanzania. Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa with 350 people per square kilometer and 450 people per every square kilometer of arable land (UNDP, 2007). The political, social and economic fabric of Rwanda is affected by the civil war of the 1990s and the 1994 genocide that saw over 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu killed in a period of hundred days (Mamdani, 2001). The effects of the 1994 genocide still lingers through every fabric of Rwandan society and despite this tragic past, the country has managed to reestablish itself among other thriving states on the African continent.

One of the most impressive achievements that Rwanda has been hailed for internationally has been the promotion of women in all spheres of leadership, both, in the private sector or in government. Women in Rwanda occupy half the seats in the National Assembly and more than a third of portfolios in government (United States Agency for International Development, 2002). Women have been elevated, from their traditional passive role in pre-genocide Rwandan politics, to influential leadership positions and this has seen the country being among the top countries in the world with majority of parliamentarians being women.

Rwanda's economy has also been among the fastest growing economies in Africa with 7 to 8 percent growth rates since the year 2003 and has been among the top achiever of the UN millennium development goals in Africa; "it has moved up the ranks to number 46 on the World Bank's Doing Business Index" (Reyntjens, 2015:1). Strizek (2003), however, is critical of the post-genocide RPF monopoly over the country's economic resources. He argues that, though there is economic growth, the fruits (revenues from the export of tea and coffee) are only benefitting the new urban elites who control all the states resources while the majority of the people leave in poverty in the countryside.

Within the health sector, the country has rebuilt damaged infrastructure from the genocide. Though the sector still has more to be done, there are notable improvements like reduction in infant mortality, HIV/AIDS transmission, malaria prevention and mother to child HIV transmission (Institut National de la Statistique, 2006). One of the major challenges within the health sector has been the issue of mental health problems largely due to horrors of the genocide and the health sector is not equipped to deal with that.

Quality and affordable education have been noted by the Rwandan government as critical for achieving sustainable economic growth. The government provides free mandatory primary education and conducts campaigns to encourage parents to send their children to school; and this has resulted in an increase in primary school enrolment from 87% in 2003 to 95% in 2006 (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2007).

Reyntjens (2015:1) notes that the developments in post-genocide Rwanda, “has come at a steep price”. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has eliminated political opposition, killed scores of its own citizens, silencing civil societies and keeping tight control over the flow of information (Rwanda 2013 Human Rights Report).

The Rwandan 2014 Human Rights Report documents government sanctioned torture and killings of political opponents, Rwandan human rights activists and editors of newspapers critical to the government. Among those recorded by Human rights watch 2014 are; former Rwandan intelligence Chief Patrick Karegeya who was killed in exile in South Africa, Transparency International Rwanda Office Coordinator Gustave Makonene and Alfred Nsengimana the former secretary of Cyuve Sector in Musanze District both died in mysterious circumstances that depicted the governments’ involvement.

Rwanda 2013 Human Rights Report also notes the increase of disappearances and politically motivated abductions. The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and the Rwandan Police are reported, by the 2010-14 Human Rights Reports, as being responsible for these disappearances. From March to September 2014, the Rwandan Human Rights Report (2014) alleges that

several hundreds of persons disappeared in Musanze and Rubavu districts and this was in connection with extensive operations conducted by the RDF and the Rwandan Police.

Similarly, on June 27 2014, the secretary of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGPR), Jean Damascene disappeared after meeting an unknown individual in Bugesera district and leaders of the Party Social-Imberakuri (PS-Imberakuri) and United Democratic Forces-Inkingi (FDU-Inkingi) reported of their party members' disappearances and the police failed to investigate (Rwanda Human Rights Report, 2014; Rwanda Human Rights Report, 2015).

Despite the Rwandan constitution prohibiting arbitrary arrests and torture, members of opposition parties alleged that the police arrested more than 200 persons, who were suspected to be linked to the rebel group FDLR, and they were “interrogated, abused, and in some case tortured at military and police detention centers (Rwanda Human Rights Report, 2014).

Elections in Rwanda have been anything but pluralistic, open and competitive (Schedler, 2006). The May 2003 elections, the first in post-genocide Rwanda, were characterized by restriction on freedom of expression, freedom of association, on activities of political parties, disappearances of political opponents and restriction on civil society mobility and monitoring (Mission d'Observation Electorale de l'Union Européenne, 2003).

Similarly, during the 2010 elections, leaders of opposing political parties “were met with swift and radical repression” (Reyntjens 2015:22). The vice president of the Democratic Green Party was found beheaded a few days before elections (Rwanda Human Rights 2010), leaders of opposition parties were arrested and handed long prison sentences and the government banned two of the remaining independent newspapers. As noted by Hayman (2008:2), “Rwanda demonstrates characteristics of a hegemonic electoral authoritarian’ system”.

While being one of the smallest and densely populated countries in the world, Rwanda is faced with the problem of shortage of land, be it for settlement or farmland. Traditionally, Rwandans lived on small homesteads in the middle of their fields (Strizek, 2003) but due to the population explosion, the Rwandan government introduced, in 2000, a new policy that puts all homesteads in collective settlements and abolishes the system of scattered homestead.

Additionally, in 2005 a new land law made a radical and sudden break of past practices (Rwandans made their living through subsistence farming) and the law aimed to create a land market (through a registration system for individual tenures) and to enlarge holdings (through a system of consolidation) (Guichaoua, 2007). Pottier (2005) notes that this has possible implications for future tribal tensions as land owned by Hutu

peasants is being acquired by the new Tutsi elites who are absentee landlords. Guichaoua (2007) and Nyamwasa et al (2010) generally agree that the number of landless peasants has increased in Rwanda due to this law and there has also been an increase in regional famines and impoverishment of landless peasants.

Therefore, post-genocide Rwanda has two opposing views, from one side there is a Rwanda under the visionary leadership of Paul Kagame, economically progressing, women being empowered, reforms in education, agriculture, health and market oriented policies and this is the view held by most international aid agencies and public figures such as Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The second view of Rwanda is one held by most scholars and this is a view that portrays Rwanda as a country under autocratic rule with gross human rights abuses, growing inequality, persecution of Hutu ethnic group, rural poverty and closed political space (Strauss and Waldorf, 2011).

2.9 Summary

This chapter reviewed literature that looks at migration, its causes, types of migrants and theories that have been formulated in trying to explain migration patterns. In an effort to try and understand the reasons for migration in post-cold war, focus was also paid to the human security concept and how it captures migration causes in 21st century. Moreover, this chapter also captured the effects of the European migrant/refugee crisis and how it's affecting Europe, migration trends in Africa with specific emphasis on the Great Lakes Region and human security in Rwanda.

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design used by the researcher. The study was conducted using the qualitative method as this is a study conducted with the sole aim of finding out peoples' experiences and interpreting them to derive new meanings, hence the phenomenological approach. In this chapter, the population sample, the research community, sampling methods, data collection instruments and the method of data analysis are presented.

3.2 Research Design

This is a qualitative research that utilizes the phenomenological approach. Phenomenology insists on the notion of laying aside our prevailing understanding of phenomena and "revisit our immediate experience of them in order that new meanings may emerge" (Gray, 2004:40). This is an approach that advocates for a rejection of 'preconceptions' and a creation of new meanings derived from revisiting the immediate experience. There is a perception of post-genocide Rwanda as a peaceful and economically progressing country and this is the widely held notion, hence there is need to reject the perceived and construct new realities from recent people's experiences; and it is through this phenomenological approach that this can be achieved.

Thus, phenomenology is an approach of qualitative research that allows the study of experience and cultural understanding (Gray, 2004) via the perspective of the individuals who lived through it (Husserl, 1970). There are various approaches to phenomenology but the approach taken, and the one that suites this research, is the descriptive and interpretive approaches with the individual as the unit of analysis (Tesch, 1994). Therefore, individual experiences are described and interpreted in an effort to derive new meaning and at the same time refute or challenge preconceived phenomena.

3.3 Population

The study population is composed of 40 Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers in Zimbabwe who reside, both, in the urban area of Harare and those in Tongogara refugee settlement. The population sample was drawn from these two areas because Tongogara refugee settlement is the only refugee settlement in Zimbabwe that hosts Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers. Those who do not reside in Tongogara are either new arrivals in the transit centre in Harare or working refugees who have been granted work permits to work in urban areas.

3.4 Entry into the research community

The researcher sought permission, to conduct the research within the Rwandese refugee communities in Harare and Tongogara refugee settlement, from the UNHCR. While in the refugee settlement, the researcher also got cleared by the director in charge of the

settlement to conduct his research and this enabled the researcher to conduct the research without much hindrance and suspicion by the targeted community.

3.5 Sample size and sampling technique

3.5.1 Sample size

The sample size was made up of 40 participants. All participants are recognized refugees, some are still asylum seekers as they have not yet been granted refugee status, in Zimbabwe under the UN 1951 refugee Convention and they all fled Rwanda post-2003. Participants were all above the age of 18 at the time this research was conducted. Participants were drawn from both sex males and female. Both sex comprised of participants from different regions in Rwanda, different ethnic groups (all participants were from the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups), different religions, different age groups, different migratory periods from Rwanda and different social backgrounds.

3.5.2 Sampling Techniques

Stratified sampling- Stratified sampling is a method used to ensure that participants are proportionally distributed according to the population size (Bryman, 2012). The research drew participants from all variables exhibited within the Rwandan refugee population, age, sex, ethnicity and period of forced migration. The researcher utilized this sampling method as it allowed the inclusion of participants from every part of Rwandan society.

Snowballing- Bryman (2012:424) argues that snowballing is a sampling technic in which the researcher identifies a small group of participants relevant to the research and this group “propose other participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research”. This technique was utilized in identifying Rwandan refugees who reside in Zimbabwe under a different nationality. The researcher identified, with the help of a resident Rwandan interpreter in Tongogara refugee settlement, two Rwandan refugees who were registered as refugees from other countries and these acted as the gateways to other refugees who had changed their nationalities. Noy (2008) points out that snowballing is a technique used when trying to sample hard to reach populations.

3.6 Data collection methods

There are many channels of collecting data and the medium of data collection used often depends on the objectives of the evaluation (Gray, 2004).

3.6.1 Semi-structured Interviews

The use of the semi-structured interviews was chosen as it gave the researcher room to probe further. The questions asked were formulated in a way that reflected the research questions. The aim of these questions was to give the participant enough room to relate their experiences openly and freely. There were two different semi-structured interview guides for the two different groups of participants. One was for Rwandan refugees and the second one was for the representatives of the Rwandan refugees in Zimbabwe who went on ‘come and see, go and tell’ visits in Rwanda. Those who went on these come and see, go and tell visits were the key informants to the research as they had gone to

Rwanda in December 2015 and spent time there visiting through out the country assessing if it was peaceful enough for Rwandans to go back.

The researcher made appointments with each participant and conducted the interviews when the participant was free. The participant was given information regarding the purpose of the study beforehand and when the participant agreed to be interviewed, he/she would give the time when they felt they would be accessible for the interview.

3.7 Data Analysis methods

Data collected from the semi-structured interviews was analyzed using the thematic method of analyzing data. Thematic analysis is a method that is used in examining data by attracting core themes from recurring data (Bryman, 2012). Each transcript of data is coded and the recurring data is labelled under the same theme. Using the thematic analysis method, the researcher created themes from the data collected and these themes are used to describe the findings from the collected data.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

Any academic research has to be conducted within the bounds of research ethics as this give credibility and depth to the research itself. One of the major components of research ethics is that participants give their full consent. The researcher, before conducting interviews, informed participants of the intent of the study and how the participants

fitted within the scope of the study, why they were chosen and that cooperation was at their own free will. Upon informing them and when they had agreed to partake in the interviews, participants were given a consent form that they signed as a sign of their willingness to participate in the research.

Participants were also told as to how the researcher would protect their identity and to ensure anonymity, the researcher used codes and no names of participants were asked even during the interviews. The researcher also ensured that all participants who partook in the research were above the age of 18 by checking the participant's identification documents.

In addition, the researcher sought permission from the relevant authorities, Commissioner for Refugees, before partaking in the research within the refugee community. The researcher was also given a letter from the College of Business, Peace, Leadership and Governance that legitimizes the research as approved by the College and the letter also proves the research is for academic purposes only.

3.9 Summary

This chapter presented the research design, population sample and sampling design and the method of data collection that was used during the research. The chapter also

presented the method of data analysis, thematic analysis, and the ethical considerations that guided the research.

CHAPTER 4 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents research findings from collected data in Tongogara refugee settlement and Harare within the Rwandese refugee communities on the reasons behind their migration to Zimbabwe from post-genocide Rwanda. The study sought to understand the reasons behind the influx of Rwandans into Zimbabwe and whether tribal tensions between the two major groups (Hutu and Tutsi), that have always in the past been at the epicenter of the migration, have any influence. Moreover, the study also sought to come up with strategies, from the Rwandan migrants that can help manage the migration. Thematic analysis was employed in the analysis of data that emanated from the interviews. The researcher transcribed the interviews that were conducted within the Rwandan migrant communities and meanings deduced were developed into themes.

4.2 Presentation of findings

4.3 Factors contributing to post-genocide Rwandan migration

Data gathered from the research posits of political, economic and social causes of post-genocide Rwandan migration. Unlike during the post-independence mass migrations and the 1994 migration which all had political factors as the causes of migrations, post-genocide migration has various causes that transcend ethnic divisions and affect people and families individually.

Post-genocide migration is mixed migration as it comprises of Rwandans from both the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, has people fleeing a myriad of problems and Rwandans from all sectors of Rwandan societies are among those fleeing. One key informant who was the leader of the Rwandan refugee community in Zimbabwe for the past ten years, since 2005-2015, echoed the same sentiments when she describes post genocide migrants as:

These days migrants who are coming from Rwanda have personal problems, some are fleeing bad politics, others are fleeing because they are related to someone whom the government is after and when they cannot find the person they go after the family, others are coming to Zimbabwe to do business, others are students who want to further their studies as they would be unable to do so in Rwanda, others are criminals who have plundered government resources and the majority are fleeing due to poverty but they cannot say so because they know that such a reason would not allow them to get refugee status (Key informant interview 3, 26 February 2017)

The major difference between post-genocide migration and other pre-2003 Rwandan migrations is that these previous migrations comprised of homogenous ethnic groups and the migrations were sudden and mass while post-genocide migration is mixed and majority of these migrants change their nationality and names as they do not want to be identified as Rwandans for different reasons that include security ones.

4.3.1 Political causes

4.3.1.1 Insecurity

Majority of informants interviewed claimed fleeing post-genocide Rwanda because they felt insecure. Some were victims of harassment by the armed forces, others claimed being persecuted because of their ethnicity and others were victimized due to their

relations to those accused of genocide. One 51 aged man who was a primary school teacher in pre-1994 Rwanda, identified himself as a Hutu, when asked why he had fled Rwanda he pointed out that:

Ubwoba konshobora kwichwa. Ubwambere nahunze mukwakarindwi icyenda nakane maze nzaguhunguka mukwamunane icyenda nakarindwi. Nahise mfungwa imyaka itatu ndegwa kuba narakoze genocide. Bamfunguye nahise mpunga njaTanzania. Muri 2003 twarongeye dutahuka kungufu ariko nongeye ndahunga mukwambere kwabibiri nakane kubera narimfite ubwoba konashobora kwichwa. Nahise mpitamo guhungira kure yuRwanda nibwo naje kugera muriZimbabwe mukwacyenda kwabibirinicyenda nyuze muri Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania na Mozambiwue. (Fear that I might be killed. I had first fled in July 1994, I repatriated voluntarily in August 1997. I was unjust put in jail over genocide allegations for three years. When I was released I fled the country to Tanzania. In October 2003 I was repatriated by force then I fled again in January 2004 because I was afraid that I would be killed. I decided to go as far away from Rwanda as I could and I passed through Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique and reached Zimbabwe in September 2009.....) (Interview 30, 26 February 2017)

Rwanda is depicted as not being a secure country especially for a person facing allegations of having participated in the genocide. Another Rwandan refugee man aged 47 who registered as a Congolese refugee echoes similar sentiments when he notes that:

Narihinduye niyandikishakondumukongomani kubera navuye muRwanda muri2005 mfite amakuru avuga ko iyo widekraraye kurumunyaRwanda muriZimbabwe nhabyangombwa ubona kandi ko nhamutekano uhagije uhari kubiyise abanyarwanda kubera koguvernoma yuRwanda ibakurikirana. (I am registered as a Congolese because when I fled Rwanda in 2005 I had information that told me that if one called himself a Rwandese in Zimbabwe there was no chance of getting refugee status and also that there was no security for Rwandese refugees as the Rwandan government was always after them) Narumwarimu muriprimary kandi ndumuHutu. Ubutegetsi buriho bukaniriye abaHutu, abaHutu nibobonyine bafungwa, nibobajyanwa kurwana mumutwe waM23 muriCongo ibi bigatuma ubona igisigaye aruguhunga gusa. Nabonaga abaturanyi babahutu bafubgwa kubera ubwoko bwabo, abandi bakubitwa kubera kubera kubazaguza ibyapolitiki ibi bigatuma mporana ubwoba konange nshobora kumererwa nabi. (I was a primary school teacher and I am a Hutu. The regime that is there is very oppressive especially if you are Hutu, Hutus are the ones forced to fight for M23 in Congo, they are the only ones who get arrested and this leaves you no choice

but to seek refuge outside of the country, I saw some Hutu neighbors who were arrested for their ethnicity, others beaten for asking political questions and myself I was always insecure that one day I would face the same oppression) (Interview 1, 22 February 2017)

The insecurity felt by these refugees does not end when they have crossed their national border into foreign territory, they perceive that their government can still get to them even in exile and in a bid to secure themselves; some have changed their nationalities and names. In the same vein, a 46 year old woman identified herself as a Tutsi who was a university lecturer had this to say about her reasons for fleeing Rwanda:

Nahunze muri 2009 kubera umutekano mucye. (I fled in 2009 because of insecurity) umugabowange baramwishe nshatse kumenya imhamvu nahise mfungwa iminsi mikeya. Nkimara gufungurwa nahise mfana umwana wange maze ndahunga kubera umutekano wanjye numvanga arimuke. (My husband was killed when I tried to know why I was threatened and when I asked again I was put in prison for a few days. When I was released I took my son and fled for my security) (Interview 27, 16 February 2017)

Despite some of these refugees having been employed in the white collar jobs back in Rwanda, they choose to live in a refugee settlement where their means of survival is nothing but being dependent on \$13 dollars a month from the UNHCR. They chose to leave their good jobs behind and seek refuge for their families because they felt insecure in their homeland.

On the other hand, some refugees did flee because they were being persecuted and victimized simply because they were related or married to those wanted for genocide crimes. According to one Tutsi woman aged 45 who was a farmer in Rwanda:

I fled in 2013, I am a Tutsi and my husband is Hutu. I fled because my husband was arrested because he was Hutu who was accused of having killed people

during the genocide but I know that he was innocent. He was only arrested for being Hutu and his charges were fabricated. I visited him bringing him food and they started harassing me saying that I was feeding a murderer. I was afraid for my life and I took my 7 children and fled. My husband is still in prison, people are being killed and persecuted on trumped charges, others are arrested for no reason and those who manage to flee are lucky, I consider myself lucky (Interview 5, 22 February 2017)

Similarly another 35 year old man, who identified himself as only a Rwandese arguing that there is no more ethnic identification (but claimed to have been born of Hutu parents), vowed never to go back to Rwanda pointing out that:

I fled because my family's security was not good. Policeman came to our house looking for my parents charging them of having been part of the genocide and when my parents fled and could not be found, they came for me wanting to arrest me for my parents crimes. I fled in 2005 and that is how I became a refugee when I did not commit any crime. People get arrested for no reason in Rwanda, others disappear without a trace and I can never go back (Interview 4, 20 February 2017)

Another 41 year old Hutu man who changed his identity and is now registered as a Burundian had this to say regarding his reason for fleeing Rwanda:

I fled in 2004 because the regime was very bad. My father was arrested and after spending seven years in jail, he was killed, my brother in law was found dead together with his 4 children and my mother was killed coming back from her farm. I was the only one in my family left and I decided to take my children and flee only to rich Zimbabwe in 2006. I changed my nationality to Burundian because I wanted to get asylum since those who were registered as Rwandans had a hard time getting refugee status. I was a builder back home but now I am have a small plot given to me in Maheba (a place in Tongogara refugee settlement where refugees have been given small plots to farm) where I farm vegetables to supplement the \$13 I receive monthly (Interview 3, 22 February 2017)

After successively losing loved ones under mysterious circumstances, this man decided to flee fearing for his own life and that of his family. Though he changed his own nationality and name to get asylum, he also mentioned that he did it so as not to be

identified by whoever was after his family. Thus, irrespective of being thousands of miles from Rwanda he is still afraid and changing his identity gives him some kind of comfort of being safe for the time being.

A group of four Rwandan refugees comprising of three men and a woman went on a go and see visit in Rwanda arranged by the UNHCR and one of them, a 40 year old woman told of their experience:

As soon as we got in Rwanda I started feeling insecure. One of my colleagues whom we had gone with immediately disappeared that same day we got there only to be found the day we came back. He does not know what happened to him for the three days that we were in Rwanda the only thing he remembers is going out of the hotel and waking up three days later at the Red Cross offices. When we were at the airport, we were not met by UNHCR officials but rather government secret service agents who demanded to see what type of phones we had. We showed them our phones and I was the only one among my colleagues who had a smartphone. Later that night while taking a shower, in a hotel we were accommodated in, I had left my phone on the charger and when I came back I did not find my phone and when I reported the issue to the agents who were always trailing us they said I might have lost it at the airport. I am sure they took it because they did not want me to take pictures. For the next three days we travelled through Rwanda and to our surprise almost in every 500meters there was a roadblock manned by the army and every 200meters one could spot a soldier in full combat gear. I wonder why a peaceful country should have so much military presence even my 12 years in Zimbabwe I have not met a soldier in full combat gear. They never took us where we wanted to go, they only took us to places they had prepared for us to see. We demanded to go to the national university and speak to students but they refused (Key informant Interview2)

Hence, from this woman's experience Rwanda is pictured as a country that is insecure for there is constant high alert from the security forces as though facing an imminent threat. These were UNHCR representatives invited to go and see in an effort to present Rwanda as a peaceful country where refugees can repatriate back but they were not even granted the freedom to see and speak to whom they wanted to.

Moreover, respondents concurred that in Rwanda they felt insecure and when asked to give a comparison between Zimbabwe and Rwanda as to how they feel secure, some had this to say:

In Zimbabwe there is rule of law and no one is arrested for no reason (Interview 30, 26 February 2017)

In Zimbabwe I sleep and feel secure, in Rwanda I would always be worried and be grateful to see the next day. Yes I cannot farm and eat and I survive on charity but at list I am assured that my children are safe. (Interview 5, 22 February 2017)

Zimbabwe is a country that I saw to have the rule of law unlike Rwanda where the Gacaca system only prosecutes Hutus only. The judiciary system in Rwanda only serves the ruling Tutsi regime (Interview 1, 22 February 2017)

In Zimbabwe there is freedom of expression, no one is persecuted for crimes committed by relatives and the government is not oppressive (Interview 27, 16 February 2017)

Here I sleep and feel secure, I eat and feel the food reach my stomach while in Rwanda, even what you eat does not settle well in the stomach because of fear. I am grateful to the Zimbabwean government for the peace and security we continue to enjoy (Interview 4, 20 February 2017)

In Zimbabwe there is no Rwandan embassy and this makes me feel secure because I know that the Rwandan regime cannot get to us (Key informant 3, 26 February 2017)

Therefore, respondents regarded Zimbabwe as a safe haven for them where, despite not being their home, they felt secure more than they had been in their homeland. They claim to be enjoying freedoms that they would not be enjoying back in Rwanda. Despite some of them being confined to Tongogara refugee settlement due to their limited resources to live the settlement, not even one respondent complained of feeling trapped in the camp but rather they gave a picture of being secure and some even vowed to rather die in the camp than go back to Rwanda.

Some of the respondents were widows, interview 5, 7, and widowers, interview 16, but despite their tragic past, they claimed being happy in the camp even though they faced hardships and limited survival means in the camp, like surviving on US\$13 dollars a month for an individual. Thus, security has been their number one aim and despite Tongogara settlement having its own hardships that one face, respondents contended feeling secure in Tongogara than in Rwanda.

4.3.1.2 Persecuted over refusal to give false testimony in court against Hutus

Some of the respondents, 3 to be exact, fled Rwanda post-genocide because they were being harassed and persecuted for refusing to testify against Hutus on fabricated charges. One of them, a 49 year old Hutu man who resides in Tongogara refugee settlement pointed out that:

I worked in a jewellery store belonging to Gihindamuyaga Catholic Works and Ibuka (Association of Genocide Survivors) connived with some officers of Department of Public Prosecution and they were harassing me. The reason was that I had refused to press charges fabricated against Hutus in the United States of America and in Arusha. In October 2009 I fled Rwanda passing through Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and reaching Zimbabwe in 2011 January (01 March 2017)

Echoing similar sentiments was a 50 year old Tutsi man who worked as a farmer and now is a refugee in Tongogara refugee settlement. This man fled in September 2008 and his reasons are elaborated below:

I am a survivor of the 1994 genocide. In the aftermath, Ibuka, the Association of Genocide Survivors, was putting too much pressure on me to press fabricated

charges of genocide to Hutus. I refused on the grounds that it was those Hutus who had hidden me. My wife, who since then passed away, had sought refuge in her own family. She was Hutu. Then I was banned from their meetings. They started harassing me, persecuting me, throwing stones on my house roof during the night. Then some people in my care were killed and mutilated during the night and the following days I was ambushed for killing but managed to evade and I fled (interview 24, 23 February 2017)

As was noted by one respondent that, *“there is a rampant concept that every Hutu committed genocide”* (Interview 32, 1 March 2017). Thus, in Rwanda, Hutus are stereotyped as genociders. In another interview, a 30 year old Tutsi woman who fled in July 2005 elaborated how she was also persecuted for refusing to testify against a Hutu priest:

My life was in danger, I was orphan my parents were killed in Kibeho camp and after was taken by soldiers to go and testified against a Hutu priest who save me that he committed crime genocide. When we refuse they put us in salted room till got infection of my foot and later was released and fled. Now I work as baker and dancer in Tongogara camp. I don't want go back because what made me fled still there nothing has changed (Interview 9, 16 February 2017)

This young woman was tortured for refusing to falsely accuse a priest who had saved her and she speaks of an experience that she did not succumb to alone but also says that others who refused to falsely accuse those they were told to also suffered the same fate. She was just 18 years old when she went through this torture and she does not want to go back because she believes that what she went through is still happening. These respondents paint a picture of a Rwandan society where Hutus are the only ones who face the wrath of the law for the genocide. One of the respondents went on to criticize the Rwandan government for not doing enough to reconcile the Rwandan society and he puts it this way:

As long as there is discrimination and victimization, I do not consider ever going back to Rwanda. Genocide really happened in Rwanda but there is no genuine will to reconcile the ethnicities (Interview 24, 23 February 2017)

What this presents is a voice of reasoning, a voice that accepts the tragic past but at the same time believes that true development will come only through reconciliation. These sentiments posit of a Rwanda were even 25 years after the genocide, ethnic polarization is still lingering and there is little sign of reconciliation. The reasons given by these respondents for fleeing their country corresponds with an answer given by one female respondent when she was asked what she wanted to see take root in her home country before she could consider going back:

The truth (Interview 27, 16 February 2017)

She believes that much of Rwandan society live in a lie, some falsely accused and rotting in prison, others forced into exile over forced allegations, some afraid to go back because they were trialed and sentenced in absentia and others denied the freedom to speak the truth.

4.3.1.3 Ethnic discrimination

Despite post-genocide Rwanda being a country where ethnic identification was abolished in order to create a homogenous Rwandan society, some respondents point to the post Rwandan society as one divided more than it was in pre-genocide era. According to these respondents the post-genocide Rwandan society is one where Hutus, who are the majority, have no political or economic power with the Tutsis now in full control of

all aspects of Rwandan society. One 42 year old Hutu man who fled Rwanda in December 2004 gives the following as his reason for living Rwanda:

I left Rwanda because I could not get a job and let alone go to University even though I had finished my secondary school. In Rwanda there are certain privileges that are only for Tutsi since Hutus are discriminated in education, employment and business (Interview 38, 28 February 2017)

Another 36 year old Hutu woman echoes similar sentiments when she notes:

I fled Rwanda in 2008, I had finished my form 6 in 2000 but despite applying several times to University I could not get either a place or even a scholarship. Most Tutsis who went to school with me and I even had better marks than them did get places and scholarships immediately. I knew I was not able to do anything or to continue my education because of my ethnicity. Seven years later I decided to live Rwanda after hearing how refugees in other countries can manage to go to University. I reached Zimbabwe in July 2008 and I was able to get into university in 2011 and graduated in 2014 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. From the time I left my country, my life has improved and that make me not to think of going back, there is no ethnic problem in Zimbabwe and people are treated equally and justly (Interview 17, 18 February 2017)

Additionally, another 51 year old Hutu man who worked as a secondary teacher also gave ethnic discrimination as his reason for living Rwanda and he put it as follows:

I was persecuted and jailed because of my ethnicity as there is tribal discrimination (Interview 19, 21 February 2017)

One of the Rwandan refugees who went on come and see, go and tell visit in Rwanda from the 19th - 25th of December 2015 also notes that:

There is ethnic discrimination in Rwanda against the Hutus, the scene itself in Rwanda depict ethnic discrimination. While in Rwanda, we visited Kigali the Rwandan capital and other rural parts of the country. In the cities where Kigali is glittering like Brussels, you find mostly Tutsis who are well off and so was the scene in the Universities and the orphanages we visited. In the rural areas, Hutus are in absolute poverty, they have *amavunja* (sores that develop beneath toes due to constantly walking barefooted). In the *midugudu* (new modernized villages being built collectively in Rwanda) are occupied by Tutsis and the *girinka* system (a system devised by government to help its citizens in alleviating poverty by loaning cattle) is only given to Tutsis. Even the education system

which is said to be free in Rwanda especially primary education, is only free for Tutsis because if it was free for all Hutus children would not spend most of their time herding cattle and goats (Key informant interview 2, 16 February 2017)

However, the same key informant reiterated that Rwandan society, in as much as it discriminated against Hutus, it was not the Tutsi population per se but rather a structural system devised by those in power, the Tutsi elite, and any Tutsi who dared question or speak out for the Hutus him they hated even more.

4.3.1.4 Biased and corrupt gacaca court system

A 63 year old Hutu man who fled Rwanda in January 2007 pointed out that he fled from Rwanda because the Gacaca courts were too corrupt and biased and they wanted to send him back to prison where he had spent 8 and half years earlier:

I worked as a project officer for the global fund project to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and was falsely accused for playing a role in the 1994 genocide and I spent 8 and half years in prison from September 1994 to March 2003. I was about to be taken back to prison where I had spent 8 and half years over genocide allegations. A regular tribunal (Kigali Court of Appeal) had cleared me of all charges and set me free in March 2003. When the emergence of '*inkiko gacaca*' the so-called peoples courts in 2006 attempted to reverse the verdict (despite the sacrosanct law which provides that no case shall be tried twice unless by an institution of appeal higher than the previous one) I decided to flee because I knew how corrupt the gacaca system was and how it was biased to only convict Hutus only and I did in January 2007 (Interview 37, 13 February 2017)

In a related case, 59 year old Hutu man also fled Rwanda because he was being trialed in Gacaca courts despite being acquitted and all charges dropped in another court two years earlier and he pointed out that:

I was a security guard at a business mans' warehouse and when genocide start I run with family to DRC. I come to Rwanda in 2004 I imprisoned for genocide crimes. A court released me and charges dropped but in 2007 gacaca court bring

new charges I did know not. So I run away again because gacaca court very corruption (Interview 39, 14 February 2017)

These two men despite being acquitted of their charges by the established court systems, they had to unconstitutionally go through the gacaca system which they regarded as biased and corrupt and hence they decided to flee. Furthermore, a 49 year old Hutu man who fled Rwanda in 2009, because he was being persecuted for refusing to press fabricated charges on Hutus in exile, gave his perspective of the gacaca court system:

There is no justice in the gacaca court system, Hutu are afraid to tell the truth. When he comes as a witness for a Hutu defendant he is afraid to tell the truth; if he does so he will be charged with complicity. A Hutu cannot press charges against a Tutsi (Interview 32, 01 March 2017)

The gacaca system is here presented as a corrupt system biased towards the Hutus. Such a system cannot be counted on delivering justice as it is a selective legal system.

4.3.2 Economic causes

4.3.2.1 Poverty

Some respondents cited living Rwanda because they is structural poverty imposed by the government mainly to impoverish the Hutus. One of these respondents, a 23 year old Hutu woman pointed out that she fled Rwanda because:

All Hutus are asked to pay a lot of taxes (Interview 28, 16 February 2017)

Another 28 year old Hutu woman who left Rwanda in October 2016 when asked why she left his country he pointed out that it was because of:

Poverty; in government and other administrations only Tutsis are cared for. There are projects which donate cattle to Tutsis but not Hutus. There are

programs to alleviate poverty for Tutsi and to improve their housing and nothing for Hutus, in Rwanda there are a lot of taxes and impositions on Hutus (Interview 21, 24 February 2017)

Moreover, in another interview with a 36 year old Hutu man who left Rwanda in 2010, when asked the reason for him living his home country he pointed out that it was also because of structural poverty and he went on to elaborate that:

I left Rwanda because of poverty induced by the government. Hutus are made to pay a lot of taxes and contributions to a lot of Funds. For example FARC (Funds d'Appui aux Rescae du Genocide). Mutuelles de Sante (Health mutual where each family member must pay 5 000 Rwandan Francs for annual health care). Agaseke, fund to compensate for the loss of money that some countries imposed on Rwanda, education fund and many more (Interview 31, 26 February 2017)

From the responses given it can be noted that such taxes are too high especially for a population that survives on subsistence farming and have no other means of survival except foreign aid.

4.3.2.2 Persecution over seized family property

Being one of the smallest countries and among the top densely populated countries in the world has had conflict implications for Rwanda. Among the causes of post-genocide migration in Rwanda has been this conflict over scarce resources be it land, property and other scarce resources. 8 respondents concurred to have fled post-genocide Rwanda because they had been dispossessed of all their family property and hence their means of survival.

According to one 22 year old Hutu woman who fled in March 2010:

I was a high school student in Rwanda and my parents died in jail where they had been put over allegations of genocide. Family property (land and house) were seized by the gacaca court to be sold so that proceedings of the sale can be given to the genocide survivors, my parents were gone and so was my inheritance. Houses and lands taken over no parents there, no family there how could I survive? (Interview 20, 16 February 2017)

This young woman's inheritance was taken from her as compensation for the genocide survivors but one should also note that she has also become a victim, already she was an orphan having lost both parents in prison and now the only means of survival for her is also taken. Herself being a Hutu and her family's property being taken to compensate for genocide victims, who are Tutsi, creates a future conflict.

While interviewing one of the Rwandese refugees who went on go and see visits to Rwanda, arranged by the UNHCR, the respondent spoke of Hutus being impoverished by the ruling regime:

Hutus are the ones who are very poor living in villages as they cannot afford to live in the cities. The Hutus we saw were in the rural areas, barefooted, dispossessed of their land, those who still have their land are told what to farm and those we managed to speak to said that they could not even afford to send their children to primary school. When we inquired why they could not send their kids to primary school when primary school was said to be free in Rwanda, they said that it was free for Tutsi and not for the Hutus. The government has changed tactics, it does not kill Hutus as they used to, they now kill you spiritually and live you to suffer in your own misery (Key informant interview 2, 16 February 2017)

The respondent presents a picture where Rwandan politics is divisive and favors one ethnic group over another. According to this respondent, who identified herself as a Hutu, Rwandan society has no space for Hutu to grow and progress, be it economically

and politically. She argued that, the abolishment of ethnic identification and criminalization of ethnicity is a ploy for the Tutsi ruling regime to suppress Hutus progress and at the same time have the law on their side as anyone who spoke of such ethnic suppression would be arrested on the grounds of promoting divisionism as ethnicity was abolished.

Another 51 year old Hutu man who was a shop owner in Rwanda and fled in May 2009 spoke of receiving death threats from some powerful Tutsi elite who had a high ranking job in government all because he wanted his shop and this is what had to say:

I received death threats from a powerful Tutsi. I myself am a Hutu and was a shop owner in Rwanda. He wanted to appropriate my shop and land. He had come to Rwanda when the RPF seized power, had usurped my properties when I was in prison over genocide allegations. When I was released in 1999, he was not happy because I was demanding my property back. That is when I started to receive death threats and one night I was ambushed on my way home and that is when I decided to flee. My relatives sent me papers to the effect that all my properties had been allocated to my foe by the authorities. I do not consider to even go back to Rwanda, I have no job here but I am alive (Interview 35, 27 February 2017)

Similarly, another 37 year old Hutu woman laments over her family's property which the government took and in trying to reclaim it, it nearly cost her life:

I am a Hutu woman born of Hutu parents in Ruhengeri. I had just finished high school in 2005 when the military soldiers of the Rwandan army killed my father, a well-off business man on the assumption that they were financing the Rwandan rebel group based in DRC (FDRL a Hutu rebel group comprised mostly of old pre-1994 Rwandan army). They took over the property, commercial houses and lands and money deposited on bank accounts. When I reported the case to the local government authorities, I was hunted down for killing and I fled in December 2005. That is why I run away from Rwanda. Even now lands belonging to Hutu have been taken away and given to Tutsi for money very little issued after a mock valuation. They claim those Tutsi's are better exploiters of land (Interview 22, 23 February 2017)

In the same vein, another 38 year old Hutu man who has changed his identity and is registered as a Congolese speaks of how he tried to reclaim his fathers' property and was imprisoned for it:

I am a Hutu man married with 5 children and I live in Zimbabwe as a Congolese from DRC to avoid the risk of being repatriated to Rwanda where there is no peace and security. I fled Rwanda in January 2014. I had fled first to Tanzania in 1994 June and had come back to Rwanda in July 1998. The reason I fled this second time was harassment and persecution. My fathers' property (land) had been usurped when I was in Tanzania. When I started claiming back I was put in prison. Each time the prosecution assessed my case, he told me to forget my fathers' property in order to be released. Finally I agreed but I left Rwanda right away. My 3 brothers are still in jail over that issue of land (Interview 25, 23 February 2017)

The 1994 genocide did not just devastate the country but it also ushered in regime change that came with new elites who had lived in exile for more than 4 decades. This new elite comprised of what the pro-Tutsi RPF which comprised of old caseload Tutsi who had fled the 1959 Hutu rebellion. This new elite required land and houses to accommodate them and with Rwanda being a small country already, there was bound to be competition for the scarce resources. The Hutus who had fled in 1994 had started to repatriate and they had come to claim their houses and land which had already been occupied by some of these returning old caseload. Thus, it became a conflict over land and property between those who had legitimacy as their claim and those who had power at their disposal.

4.4 Migration and ethnicity

Respondents who were interviewed were from both the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups with the majority being from the Hutu ethnic groups. 34 of the 40 respondents were Hutu and only 6 identified themselves as being from the Tutsi ethnic group. Thus, the fact that only 15% (6 respondents) were from the Tutsi ethnic group and the other 85% (34) being from the Hutu ethnic group corresponds to the ethnic composition of these tribes in Rwanda where Batware (2012) argues the Hutu to be around 84% of the population and the Tutsi to be around 14% with the remaining 2% being from the Twa ethnic group.

None of the respondents identified themselves as being from the Twa ethnic group. Despite most of the factors leading to post-genocide migration cutting across ethnic lines, some respondents cited being persecuted, their property seized and they felt insecure because of their ethnic identities. In as much as there is evidence of structural ethnic violence against the Hutus, it should be clarified that this type of violence is not one that emanates from social cohesion between the Hutus and the Tutsis at the grassroots level but rather that the ruling elite, comprised mostly of old caseload Tutsis from Uganda, has devised a system of discrimination against the Hutus and at the same time also discriminating and persecuting any Tutsis who would want to speak the truth as put by the following respondents:

The Rwandan regime does not only discriminate against the Hutus but they also do not like Tutsis who want to speak the truth out (Key informant interview 2, 16 February 2017)

The situation in Rwanda has even worsened after I left, the latest being people who want to go back home to Rwanda and are refused such as father Nahimana (a catholic priest who wanted to go back to Rwanda to campaign for the 2017 presidential elections and was denied entrance into Rwanda while wanting to board a flight to Rwanda from Kenya). Tutsis who helped Kagame seize power in Rwanda had to flee; it did not protect them well (seeking refuge in exile) because he pursued them abroad and killed them such as Patrick Karegeya (former Rwandan intelligence chief who was killed in December 2013 in South Africa where he was living in exile) and Kayumba Nyamwasa (Former chief of staff to Kagame now in exile in South Africa) who survived 3 gunning down. I will also site Victoire Ingabire (a woman who had come back from exile to contest in the 2010 presidential elections) who is serving a long term in a Rwandan prison (Interview 24, 23 February 2017)

Only Tutsis from Uganda have hegemonic power over the rest of the population and the rest whether you are Hutu or Tutsi genocide survivors you just do as commanded (Interview 22, 23 February 2017)

Arguably, the above responses indicate a regime that is not keen in promoting the power of one ethnic group over the other but rather a regime that has concentrated its power within a small circle among the Tutsis, old caseload Tutsis who returned to Rwanda from Uganda in 1994 after decades in exile. This regime is more interested in holding on to power that it even eliminates elements within its inner circle that are deemed to have grown soft and are more liberal towards the peasant population.

Thus, ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, though they may be there, they have not been at the epicenter of post-genocide migration as has been noted in the past. At the center of post-genocide migration are other reasons that include insecurity, structural poverty, biased judiciary system, harassment and persecution of Rwandans who refuse falsely accuse other Hutus of fabricated crimes and also is the issue of persecution and harassment of Rwandans for reclaiming their seized property.

4.5 Experiences of Rwandan migrants in Zimbabwe

Despite Zimbabwe having its own economic crisis, Rwandan migrants, those interviewed, gave a positive narration of their experiences in Zimbabwe. Tongogara refugee settlement, where the majority of Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers are housed, was regarded by these migrants as their safe haven.

Though they are not contempt with the \$13 dollars that they receive from the UNHCR monthly, they are however, grateful for the assistance. One of the respondents had this to say:

Amafaranga baduha kukwezi nhabwo akwiye ariko iyo utarumunebwe ujya imaheba ugahinga maze bikera kandi nimishinga irahari yokworora inkoko, kubaza, gusudira, kudoda nindi myinshi (the monthly allowances we receive is not enough but if you are not a lazy person, there is a lot to do here, you can get a piece of land do your farming in Maheba, there are also projects such as poultry, carpentry, welding, sewing and many other) (Interview 1, 22 February 2017)

Thus, in Tongogara refugee settlement, there are also other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and government of Zimbabwe ministries which collaborate with the UNHCR with assisting the refugees in other areas. These NGOs offer various assistances be it in financial, monetary or service assistance. One of the NGOs is the Jesuit Refugee Society (JRS) which offers Technical and Vocational Skills Training in field such as carpentry, welding, building, dressmaking, electrical engineering and tilling. These skills are meant to help the refugees in being self-sufficient in cases where they choose to repatriate or even when they are resettled and this also helps in supplementing to their monthly allowances.

While some of those residing in Tongogara rely on UNHCR for assistance, Rwandan migrants in Harare are self-dependent, working in different sectors to sustain themselves. Those in Harare do rely on the UNHCR for documentation and they occasionally report to the immigration offices for residence and work permit extensions. Given that some of these refugees fled from poverty, lack of education and being dispossessed of their property, one can understand when, some of them never want to go back home preferring life in the refugee settlement. They are contempt because their children go to school, Tongogara primary school and St Michael secondary school, for free, at the expense of the UNHCR. Those who manage to pass their Advanced Level are funded to go to Universities in Zimbabwe.

In terms of security, majority of respondents, felt secure in the camp where there is the presence of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) which has a stationed office. There were also some respondents who cited insecurity, both in Harare and in Tongogara, arguing that they had fears that some of the Rwandan government operatives were after them. These government agents were infiltrating the Rwandan migrant community camouflaging themselves also as migrants running away from Rwanda when in reality they were spies.

Key informant 1 was of the notion that there was a growing fear among Rwandan migrants, especially those residing in Harare, over the Rwandan airline (Air Rwanda)

which is now operating in Zimbabwe as of 2017. The fears emanate from the Rwandans government tendencies of stilling migrants from exile and taking them back to Rwanda to imprison them and the opening of the airline has spooked some Rwandan migrants who feel that the government is after them.

4.6 Strategies to manage the Rwandan migration

The migration from Rwanda was argued, by all respondents, as a continuous process as long as there is political oppression, ethnic discrimination in education, business opportunities and politics, selective justice and denial of basic human rights to the majority. Respondents mentioned various strategies and reforms that need to be implemented in Rwanda in order to manage the migration process and these reforms include justice and rule of law, peace, security and stability, good governance, genuine reconciliation and end to discrimination.

4.6.1 Regime change

On one hand, the majority of respondents argued that there was need for regime change if migration from Rwanda and repatriation to Rwanda was to be effected. Interviewee 30, 26, 25, 16, 15, 14, 11, 7, 6, 3 and 1, reiterated that the reasons for their flight from Rwanda were affected by the current regime which promotes discrimination, selective justice, dispossesses people of their property and denies people of their basic human rights.

Although the majority of respondents cited regime change as the reform that they consider to be vital for the management of Rwandan migration, it is important to note that, evidence from the past denotes otherwise. Regime change from as far back as 1959, 1970s and in 1994 did nothing in managing the migration of Rwandans but rather these are the periods when we see mass migrations from Rwanda.

Another important aspect to note about regime change is that, there has never been peaceful regime change in Rwanda and thus regime change is often associated with violence and human loss at a large scale. Therefore, the aspect of regime change, not that it is outrightly dismissed, is not what Rwanda needs but rather, instead of asking for regime change, what is needed is an open political space where Rwandans can freely choose their government.

4.6.2 Justice and the rule of law

Seizure of peoples' property, fabricating genocide crimes against innocent people, structural violence against one ethnic group and selective justice all depict the absence of justice and the rule of law. Interviewee 27, 9, 23, 20, 10, 2, and 32 were of the notion that there is need for justice and the rule of law if Rwandans are to live freely and justly. Interviewee 27 believed that, had there been justice she would still be in her country for she could not have been persecuted for asking about the circumstances of her husbands' death. Similarly interviewee 20 also believes that the absence of justice resulted in her

fleeing her country for she had been dispossessed of her family's property and hence her means of survival was stolen from her.

Related, to the absence of justice, is the rule of the powerful and not the rule of law. Interviewee 9, who was being forced to testify against an innocent priest on fabricated genocide crimes, believes that as long as there is the absence of rule of law, managing migration from Rwanda would be a challenge.

Therefore, as long as certain organs in Rwanda, such as IBUKA, have more power than the common man before the law and as long as the law is selective in its application of justice, there will be no meaningful co-existence as some will be passive because they are oppressed and not because they want to be while others will be active because they are powerful. Such a society is one that has the potential to culminate in violence in the future and hence there is the need to avoid this by impartially promoting justice in all sectors of Rwandan society by not discriminating race, ethnicity and gender.

4.6.3 Peace, security and stability

Peace does not entail the absence of war for as long as there are threats to human survival there is no peace. Yes the genocide in Rwanda has ended and there is economic growth but as long as certain sections in Rwandan society feel insecure then that is not

peace. Interviewee 5, 12, 13, 34, 8 and 4, argue that peace, security and stability are necessary in order to manage migration and also if there is to be voluntary repatriation.

As put by one respondent, “*as long as people (Rwandans) are still fleeing, then there is no peace in Rwanda*” (Interview 34). What this entails is that, for those who are already in exile, chances of them going back, when they see others fleeing, are very slim. Security and stability go hand in hand because what is needed is human security from fear and want that in turn gives citizens stable and meaningful lives. Thus, peace entails security from, as put by respondents listed above, unlawful property seizure, unlawful imprisonment, respect for human rights and equality before the law.

4.6.4 An end to discrimination and victimization

According to one interviewee 24, Rwandan society is divided into three groups, genocide survivors (Tutsis who lived in Rwanda pre 1994 and survived the Genocide), genociders (people who committed the genocide, mostly Hutus) and the old caseload who are now the new ruling elite (mostly Tutsis who came back in 1994 from Uganda, descendants of the Tutsis who fled the 1959 Hutu rebellion). As such interviewee 18, 19, 37, 28, 38 and 24 are of the view that this is why post-genocide Rwanda is a discriminatory society.

Stereotypes have emerged out of these generalizations of the three groups mentioned above. Tutsis were victims of the 1994 genocide and Hutus were the perpetrators. Irrespective of abolishing ethnicity and the creation of a homogenous Rwandan society, these respondents affirm that there is discrimination based on ethnicity and other variables in post-genocide in Rwanda. They go on to suggest that there is need to stop discrimination in all sectors be it ethnic, political, social and economic. Unless there is an end to ethnic, political, economic and social discrimination, Rwandans will continue to migrate.

4.6.5 Good governance

Interviewee 21, 22 and 17 are of the notion that good governance should be the core policy in Rwanda if there is need to manage migration and if these respondents are to consider going back to Rwanda. According to these respondents, only through good governance can there be:

Alleviation of poverty for all and not one ethnic group (interview 21)

Freedom of speech, an end to victimization of Hutus, free and fair elections and a representative government of all three tribes, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa (interview 22)

Reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi, rule of law, fair trials and fair distribution of land (interview 17)

Good governance, according to one interview 17, entails “*a government that serves the will of the people, especially the poor*”. Thus, good governance is needed and it can only be attained if there is free and fair elections and if there is accountability of those governing to the people whom they govern.

4.6.6 Genuine reconciliation

Genuine reconciliation between the Hutu and the Tutsi was mentioned by interviewee 33 and 36. According to these respondents there is no genuine reconciliation in Rwanda between the Hutus and Tutsis because the political, economic and social organization in the country depict of mistrust between these societies. Interview 36 goes on to mention that there is a lot that:

There is a lot being said about the genocide that is untrue and even more than 20years after the genocide, there is still no reconciliation because the truth has not yet been spoken fully

Therefore, as mentioned above, genuine reconciliation has to take place in Rwanda and this can only happen when both sides are willing to tell the truth and accept the tragic past and at the same time forge a future that benefits all.

4.7 Summary

In as much as post-genocide Rwanda has done a lot to rebuild itself from the tragic past of the 1994 genocide, without forgetting the progress the country has undergone, there is much to be done in order for the new Rwanda to be habitable for all Rwandans regardless of race, political affiliation and ethnicity. From the findings it has emerged that post-genocide Rwanda is still a divided society along ethnic lines regardless of the abolishment of ethnic identification. More importantly, post-genocide Rwanda is still facing the challenge of outward migration due to insecurity, unlawful seizure of peoples' property, discrimination be it socially, economically and politically, structural poverty and injustice.

Therefore, there is need for good governance that promotes the will of the people, alleviates the poor from chronic poverty and ends discrimination by criminalizing it. Moreover, there is also the need to reform the legal system so as to put a stop to the unlawful seizure of people's property and also promote the rule of law. Only in so doing can there be an effective management of outward migration from Rwanda because a society that promotes these tenets of democracy is also a society that promotes the security of its people from both fear and want.

CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the research and with much emphasis on the research findings. It is the researchers hope that the findings and conclusions drawn from this research will be valuable to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Rwandan migrants and other organizations and government departments that work with the UNHCR in an effort to help refugees and asylum seekers.

5.2 Summary of findings

This study sought to investigate the factors contributing to the migration of Rwandans in post-genocide Rwanda. The study concentrated on refugees and asylum seekers in Zimbabwe residing both in Harare and in Tongogara refugee settlement. The study also aspired to investigate whether migration from post-genocide Rwanda was influenced by ethnic cohesion before suggesting strategies that can be put in place to manage the migration from Rwanda.

The study therefore revealed that the migration from post-genocide Rwanda had many factors but ethnic cohesion was not at the center as has been in the past. One of the factors that were contributing to this outward migration was the issue of insecurity where most Rwandans are insecure because of repression, harassment and persecution at the hands of the government and its various forces. Despite living their country and

living in exile it was also noted that these Rwandans are still insecure as they perceive being followed even in exile and hence they change their names and identification.

In the same vein, it was also ascertained that Rwandans refugees/asylum seekers face difficulties acquiring refugee status as their country is regarded as peaceful mainly because of lack of overt violent conflicts. As such, networks that exist have played a role in providing these to be immigrants on how to attain papers and in most cases they change their nationalities, names and reasons for fleeing their country all in an effort to attain asylum.

Findings from the study have also shown that Rwandans are fleeing their country because, some have been dispossessed of their family property be it land and houses. Given that the majority of Rwandans survive on subsistence farming, being dispossessed of ones' land entails being robbed of the means to survival.

On the other hand, others are fleeing due to persecution for being married to someone accused of having committed genocide, refusing to bear false witness to those falsely accused of genocide and for being related to someone being accused of genocide. Findings also showed that they are those fleeing because they are charged of crimes committed by their parents. There are also those fleeing structural poverty due to high

taxes that they are made to pay. The tax system has been noted to be discriminatory, from findings, as Hutus pay taxes which far exceed what Tutsis pay.

Contrary, there are those also fleeing due to the gacaca court system which they regard as corrupt, biased and selective in its application of justice. Arguments posited are that the courts only convict Hutus and once convicted few are ever found innocent. Findings also pointed out that Hutus could not press charges against a Tutsi.

Both the Hutus and the Tutsis were among the migrants with proportions averaging the national ethnic composition 14% Tutsi and 84% Hutu. Therefore, post-genocide migration is unlike the previous migrations which were mass, caused by inter-ethnic violence and were in most sudden. Post genocide migration is carefully, planned, destinations are chosen with the help of networks of migrants already in exile, migrants come already prepared for all the process they have to undergo through in order to attain asylum.

5.3 Conclusion

If the migration from Rwanda is to be managed, the key lies with certain reforms that require implementations in Rwanda. Among the reforms key is the promotion of good governance; governance that promotes the will of the majority and at the same time protects the minority. With good governance comes the elimination of discrimination in

politics, economy and society. There is also the need for the promotion of the rule of law where all men are equal before the law and none is unfairly detained on the bases of ethnicity or political affiliation. All men should also be allowed to enjoy their inalienable human rights so that they may realize their full potential.

5.4 Recommendations

5.4.1 Recommendations for the UNHCR

The 1951 refugee convention definition of a refugee has become less-relevant in the 21st Century where people are fleeing their countries due to other factors that are not covered by the 1951 convention definition of a refugee. One would expect that, more than 60 years down the line, there should have been policy reform so that the convention could cater for the new threats that force people to migrate. It would be best to align the refugee definition along the Human security concept so as to widen the human protection spheres.

The fact that the current definition of a refugee does not cover causes of migration such as poverty and environmental causes, results in migrants lying to get asylum. Migrants are aware of the terms of getting asylum and they end up lying because their true causes of flight, though being human security threats, could not get them asylum. There is also need for the consideration on how to protect IDPs as they are also refugees despite the fact that they have not crossed international borders.

Moreover, the UNHCR should reconsider its stance on cessation clause and repatriation because their policy has proven to be irrelevant in the 21st century. The fact that repatriated refugees are again found seeking asylum in other countries should be a signal to the UNHCR that repatriation should not be based on the cessation of cause of flight but rather the attainment of peace and stability. The UNHCR should not be quick to support repatriation of any refugees from a country where there is continuous outflow of refugees.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Institutional Permission Letter to Undertake Research



INSTITUTE OF PEACE LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Investing in Africa's Future

P.O. BOX 1320, MUTARE, ZIMBABWE - OFF NYANGA ROAD, OLD MUTARE, ZIMBABWE - TEL.: (263-20) 88788/61785 - EMAIL: ipgdirector@africau.edu - Website: www.africau.edu

27 January 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Re: Permission to Undertake Research for Dissertation: January 2017 – March 2017


Jean Pierre Kwizera Student registration number **151724** is a student at Africa University. He is enrolled in a graduate programme in Master in Peace and Governance and is currently conducting research for her Dissertation, which is required for completion of the program in June 2017. The research topic is **"Post-genocide migration: A Case study of Rwandan refugees in Zimbabwe."**

Jean is expected to undertake this research during the month of January 2017 to March 2017 before the dissertation can be submitted to the Institute in April 2017. The student will share with you the results of this research after its approval by the institute.

We thank you for your support and cooperation regarding this research.

Yours, sincerely

Mr T Masese
Assistant Dean CBPLG



Appendix 2: Participant consent form English Version

INFORMED CONSENT GUIDE

My name is Kwizera Jean Pierre, a final year (Master's in Peace and Governance) student from AU. I am carrying out a study on Post-Genocide migration of Rwandan refugees and I am kindly asking you to participate in this study by answering/filling the questions on the second page.

Purpose of the study:

The purpose of the study is to explore the factors that are leading to the migration of Rwandans. You were selected for the study because you are a Rwandan refugee who fled Rwanda after 2003 and this was a time when Rwanda was hailed by the international community for having fully restored stability, peace and democracy.

Procedures and duration

If you decide to participate you will be required to fill answer the questions and you are also allowed to omit whichever question you feel uncomfortable answering. It is expected that this will take about an hour of your time.

Risks and discomforts

If by any reason, after the completion of this interview, you feel that this might put you at risk or harm, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation without penalty. You should also be informed that your participation in this research is not compulsory but rather should be of your own volition.

Benefits and/or compensation

There are no benefits to be received by your participation as this is an academic aimed at documenting refugee plights.

Confidentiality

To keep the informants' identity confidential, names and other identifiable information of the participant will not be asked in this interview. It is the participants' right to know that any personal information of theirs provided in this interview will not be included in the study.

Offer to answer questions

Before you sign this form, please ask any questions on any aspect of this study that is unclear to you. You may take as much time as necessary to think it over.

Authorisation

If you have decided to participate in this study please sign this form in the space provide below as an indication that you have read and understood the information provided above and have agreed to participate.

Signature of Research Participant or legally authorised representative Date:-----
-

If you have any questions concerning this study or consent form beyond those answered by the researcher including questions about the research, your rights as a research participant, or if you feel that you have been treated unfairly and would like to talk to someone other than the researcher, please feel free to contact the Africa University Research Ethics Committee on telephone (020) 60075 or 60026 extension 1156 email aurec@africau.edu

Name of Researcher -----

Appendix 3: Informant interview guide in English

Section A.

- a) Date of interview
- b) Place where the interview was held
- c) Time
- d) Age
- e) Gender
- f) Marital Status
- g) Family Size
- h) Level of education attained in your home country

Section B

- a) Nationality and ethnic group (if any)?
- b) If you changed your nationality please state reason?
- c) What was your occupation In your home country?
- d) When did you leave your country?
- e) Why did you leave your country?
- f) Which countries did you pass through before you reached Zimbabwe?
- g) When did you arrive in Zimbabwe?
- h) What is your occupation in Zimbabwe?

Section C

- a) Do you think that, from the time you fled your country to current there has been positive or negative improvements that can make you consider either going back or not going back? Please clarify on your stance?
- b) What do you want to see take root in your home country before you can consider going back?
- c) Compared to Zimbabwe, what is lacking in your home country that you find here and which makes you stay as a refugee?

Interviewee Name..... Participants' signature.....

Interviewee Signature.....

Appendix 4: Key informants interview guide in English

Section A

- a. Age
- b. Gender
- c. Nationality
- d. Occupation in Zimbabwe
- e. Place where interview took place

Section B

- a. What position do you hold or did you hold within the Rwandan refugee community in Zimbabwe when you went on the exchange visit on their behalf?
- b. When did you go for the exchange visit and for how long where you in Rwanda?
- c. How was your experience in Rwanda during your stay for the exchange visit?
- d. From your experience in Rwanda during your stay for the exchange visit, what are your views on the issue of repatriating Rwandans back to Rwanda?

Interviewee Name.....

Participant Signature.....

Interviewee Signature.....

Appendix 5: Informed consent guide in Kinyarwanda

Invandiko imfasha:

Umwirondoro:

Amazina yanjye ni Kwizera Jean Pierre. Ndi umunyeshuri mu mwaka urangiza (wanyuma) (nkaba ndimo nkora impamyabushobozi muby'amahoro n'ubutegetsi bwiza) kuri Kaminuza ya Afrika (Africa University). Ndimo nkora ubushakashatsi ku ukujya n'uruza rw'impunzi z'abanyarwanda nyuma ya Jenocide. Ndasaba ko Mushobora gusubiza ibibazo bird ku urupapuro rwa kabiri.

Impamvu yubu bushakashatsi:

Impamvu yubu ubushakashatsi ni ukugira ngo nshake impamvu zituma abanyarwanda bakomeza guhunga igihugu cyababyaye. Naguhisemo kubera ko muri muri zimwe mu munzi zahunze u Rwanda nyuma y'umwaka wa'2003. Iki ni igihe u Rwanda k'urubuga mpuzamahanga rwari ku isonga mu bihugu bya Afrika mukubahiriza umutekano, amahoro na demokarasi.

Imiterere n'igihe

Niba mwemeye kugira uruhare muri ubu ubushakashatsi, musabwa gusubiza ibibazo, byaba ngombwa, mufite umufasha bwo kudasubiza cyangwa kureka bimwe mubibazo mubona biraturenze impungenge. Gusubiza ibi bibazo birashira nibura isaha imwe yonyine.

Impungenge

Kubera impamvu zanyu zitandukanye n'impungenge k'ubuzima bwanyu, nyuma yo kurangiza iki kiganiro, mufite ubwigenge bwo kwivana muri ubu bushakashatsi ntakibazo. Ni ukugira ngo mbamenyesheko uruhare rwanyu atari agahato, ahubwo ko ari kunyungu zanyu.

Indishyi

Nta ndishimye cyangwa inyungu z'amafaranga ziri muri ubu bushakashatsi, kuko bushingiye ku amasomo no kwiga kugira ngo nshobore gushyira ahagaragara ibibazo by'impunzi.

Ibanga (confidentiality)

Imyirondoro n'indi miterere yabagize uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi izabikwa mu Ibanga. Ntabwo izakoreshwa mu nyandiko y'ubu bushakashatsi.

Ibibazo

Mbere yuko mushyira umukono kuri uru rupapuro, ndasaba niba mufite ibibazo mutumva neza kuri ubu bushakashatsi ko mwabibaza. Mufite umwanya wose mushaka.

Gutanga uruhushya

Niba mweneye kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi, shyira umukono wawe kuri uru rupapuro ku mwanya uri hasi kurupapuro nk'ikimenyetso cyuko wasomye kandi ukumva neza inyandiko ikurikira kandi ko wemeye kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi.

Umukono.....

Itariki.....

Izina ry'umushakashatsi.....

Appendix 6: Informant interview guide in Kinyarwanda

Ikiganiro n'impunzi

Igice cya mbere (A)

- d) imyaka y'amavuko
- e) Igitsina
- f) ese warashatse cyangwa oya
- g) uko umuryang ungana
- h) amashuri wize ukiri mu gihugu

Igice cya kabiri (B)

- a) ubwenegihugu n'ubwoko (niba buhari)
- b) niba warahinduye ubwenegihugu, bivuge hamwe n'impamvu
- c) wakoraga akazi ki ukiri mu gihugu?
- d) wahunze igihugu cyawe ryari?
- e) kuki wahunze igihugu cyawe?
- f) ni ibihe bihugu wanyuzemo mbere yuko ugera muri Zimbabwe?
- g) wageze muri Zimbabwe ryari?
- h) ukora iki muri Zimbabwe?

Igice cya gatatu (C)

- a) Kuva aho uhungiye igihugu kugeza ubu, ubona hari ibyiza byabaye mu gihugu byatuma utaha cyangwa hari ibibi byinshi byiyongereye bikubuza gusubirayo? Sobanura neza aho uhagaze
- b) ni iki cyakorwa mu gihugu kugira ngo Utahe?
- c) ugereranyije igihugu cyawe na Zimbabwe, ni iki kidahari mu gihugu cyawe ubona hano gituma ukomeza kwibera impunzi.

Umukono w'umuganirizwa

Umukono w' umuganiriza

Appendix 7: Key informant interview guide in Kinyarwanda

Igice cya mbere (A)

Ikiganiro twagiranye n'impunzi z'abanyarwanda baguye gusura u Rwanda

- b) Imyaka
- c) Igitsina
- d) Ubwenegihugu
- e) Akazi ukora muri Zimbabwe
- f) Aho ikiganiro cyakorewe

Igice cya kabiri (B)

- a) Ni uwuhe mwanya mubuyobozi wari ufite cyangwa ufite mu muryango w'impunzi z'abanyarwanda baba muri Zimbabwe igihe wabahagarariye usura u Rwanda
- b) Wagiye mu Rwanda ryari kandi wamazeyo igihe kingana iki
- c) Mbese igihe wasuraga u Rwanda watubwira uko byakugendekeye nicyo wungutse
- d) Mubyo wahuye nabyo igihe wasuraga u Rwanda, ni iki wavuga ku byo gucyura impunzi z'abanyarwanda ngo zigasubira iwabo?

Umukono w'umuganirizwa.....
uruhare.....

Umukono wuwagizemo

Umukono w'umuganiriza.....

Appendix 8: Application letter to the Commissioner for refugees

The Commissioner for Refugees

P.O Box CY 429

Causeway

Harare

29 January 2017

Kwizera Jean Pierre

3577 Mainway Meadows

Harare

RE: SEEKING PERMISSION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH AMONG REFUGEES IN TONGOGARA AND HARARE

Dear Sir

I write this letter to your office seeking permission to conduct research among Rwandan refugees in Tongogara refugee camp and in Harare.

I am a master's student at Africa University and currently in my final year. As required by my post-graduate degree, I must conduct a research and write a thesis in order to pass. I am writing my thesis entitled; **Post-genocide migration: A case study of Rwandan refugees in Zimbabwe.**

My inspiration for writing my thesis in this field emanates from my life experience as I have been a refugee since I was 2 years old. I am a refugee from Rwanda myself and have been residing in Zimbabwe for more than ten years now. My refugee status reference number is RF/174/2015 and my permit number 25046/15.

I kindly ask for your assistance and I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours faithfully

Kwizera Jean Pierre

0774111666

Appendix 9: Letter of Permission from the Commissioner for refugees

*Official communications should
Not be addressed to individuals*

Telephone: Harare 703711/790721-4
Telegraphic Address: 'WELMIN'
Fax: 7543/703714



ZIMBABWE

THE DIRECTOR OF SOCIAL SERVICES
P.O. Box CY 429
Causeway
Zimbabwe

Our REF :50/17

Date: 09 February 2017

Mr. J.P Kwizera

Dear Mr. J.P Kwizera

**REF: AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A STUDY AT TONGOGARA REFUGEE
CAMP**

Reference is made to your application dated the 29th January 2017.

This note serves to inform you that permission to conduct a study at Tongogara Refugee Camp and Harare has been granted.

We hope that you will share with our office the final report of your findings.

Yours Sincerely


S. Soko

COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
cc: Mr. Zengeva.

