

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY'S
ORGAN FOR POLITICS, DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS: A CASE OF
ZIMBABWE (2000-2013)

By

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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Abstract

The study sought to investigate whether the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was successful or failed in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis and whether in the end it brought finality to the politico-economic crises. In this study 44 respondents were used as research subjects. They comprised of 24 from political parties, 5 from civil society, 5 diplomats and 10 political analysts and academics. Questionnaires and interviews were used as research instruments. The qualitative method was employed to provide and analyse information. It was the most appropriate in finding out views and feelings of Zimbabweans on the crises. This study has revealed that the crisis begun in the late 1990s and was catalyzed by continual bad economic and political governance by the Zimbabwean ZANU-PF government as well as the MDC that lobbied for the West to introduce sanctions on Harare. The researcher came to the conclusion that though the SADC made some progress in resolving the conflict it has failed to completely resolve and put finality to the Zimbabwean conflict. The researcher therefore recommends that the SADC OPDSC and Summit of Heads of State must adopt strategies that will enable the decisions that they make to be binding on SADC member countries if ever it is to be successful in completely resolving and eradicating intrastate conflicts in the region for commands without swords or embedded in law is not binding. The SADC must also ensure that they choose mediators who are neutral rather than choosing those who sympathize with one of the contesting parties to the conflict like what the South African mediator did.

Declaration

I Precious Kamedzera declare that this dissertation is my original work except where sources have been acknowledged. The work has never been submitted, nor will it ever be, to another University in the awarding of a degree.

STUDENT DATE

Signature

SUPERVISOR DATE.....

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my children, Mngobi P, Sarah, Charmaine-Sandy and Thoko Cleo and their father, my parents whom I have deprived of quality time and happiness to let me be occupied at the time they were in need of my care. And to all peace- loving people around the world.

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List of Acronyms

AU	African Union
AFDL	Alliances des Forces Democratique Pour La Liberation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
IDSC	Interstate Defence and Security Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPDC	Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee
ISPDC	Interstate Defence and Security Committee
JOMIC	Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
MDC-M	Movement for Democratic Change- Mutambara
MDC-N	Movement for Democratic Change –Ncube
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change –Tsvangirai
MDP	Mutual Defence Pact
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
OPDSC	Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance Army

SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe experienced a political legitimacy crisis and economic deterioration that surprised many people in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region and beyond. This economic deterioration arguably begun in 2000 and went hand in glove with a profound political legitimacy crisis. This politico-economic crisis resulted in instability that nearly brought the country to the verge of a 'civil war'. The crisis continued unabated and came to a climax in the period between 2007 and 2008 after which the situation seemed to have stabilized with the signing of the Global Political Agreement-(GPA) and the formation of the Government of National Unity-(GNU). However after the 2013 elections an economic and political legitimacy crisis seems to be looming. Zimbabwe had the highest inflation rate in 2008 (World Bank 2008). Whilst the crisis continued the Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) continued on its path dubbed 'the 4th Chimurenga', an economic war against neo-imperialism.

The Zimbabwean crisis reverberated across the Southern African region and eventually forced the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to intervene to bring both political and economic sanity to Zimbabwe. SADC has also intervened in conflicts that have taken place in Madagascar, Lesotho, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In Zimbabwe political contestations and unprecedented

violence were seriously experienced with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change. After the 2000 February referendum and the subsequent June election the Zimbabwean situation became a cause for concern for some SADC member states, the AU and the international community. This study therefore is an attempt to explore SADC's role in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2013.

1.1 Background to the Study

The research is born out of a desire to critically analyse the SADC's efforts to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe from 2000 – 2013. This is because the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in 1999, saw a major shift in Zimbabwean politics, as it posed a major threat to ZANU PF's monopoly on power since 1980. This new political dispensation led to intrastate conflicts between ZANU PF and MDC as the liberation party struggled to maintain its hold on to power while the MDC on the other hand, was also putting up a spirited political fight to wrestle power from ZANU PF with anticipation of forming the new government. Dzinesa (2010) notes that as the power struggle intensified, violence escalated in both rural and urban areas leading to the SADC heads of states calling for the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security(OPDSC) and the SADC Summit of Heads of State to be involved in resolving the political conflicts in Zimbabwe. This became notable especially after the February 2000 referendum when the Zanu-PF government lost support to its proposed new Zimbabwean constitution.

Zimbabwe experienced social, political and economic problems in the early 2000s especially after the above mentioned referendum and the June 2000 parliamentary elections. The elections annulled various allegations against ZANU PF which included unequal distribution of resources, unequal access to media, voter intimidation and a partisan security sector. According to Dzinesa and Zambara (2010) it was only after the 2008 March harmonised election that the OPDSC became involved in trying to manage and resolve the Zimbabwean political crisis. Why then did it take long for SADC to realize that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe? This then calls into question when did the crisis begin, how it evolved and whether in the end the SADC managed to successfully resolve the Zimbabwean crisis.

Intrastate conflicts have been experienced in many African States like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Madagascar and of late Zimbabwe. The Lancaster Agreement of 1979 principally promoted multiparty politics in Zimbabwe, but ZANU (PF) under the leadership of Robert Mugabe has tenaciously held on to power for more than three decades despite the unpopularity of his policies that have led to political instability and economic hardships. Political polarization amongst the political parties necessitated the coming in of SADC to come up with a conducive platform for negotiations to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis.

As has already been mentioned above violence during elections have been a recurrent feature in Zimbabwe. The 1985 elections were violent especially ZAPU-PF strongholds, with ZANU-PF politicians like Enock Nkala, Edgar Tekere and Morris Nyagumbo openly threatening the Ndebele for voting for Nkomo whom they openly ridiculed for being in parliament at the mercy of Zanu-PF. The 1990 elections against Edgar Tekere's Zimbabwe Unity Movement were also violent for they resulted in the shooting and injury of Patrick Kombayi culminating in other ZUM electoral candidates withdrawing their candidature in the 1990 elections. (For more information read Edgar Tekere's book: A lifetime of Struggles) Violence escalated especially after the formation of the MDC which posed a very serious challenge to Zanu-PF.

It was against this backdrop, that SADC intervened in trying to resolve and bring finality to these political and economic problems through several strategies. SADC on the sidelines of the African Union(AU) endorsed President Mugabe as the winner of the 2002 and 2008 elections, however, the summit could not ignore the controversy surrounding the elections which led the AU to mandate Mbeki through SADC to resume mediation of the crisis, (Khadiagala: 2010). However it must be pointed out that SADC was acting on the principle of subsidiarity to the AU as the AU had deferred SADC to play a leading role. This was also because Zimbabwe had "withdrawn from being a member of the commonwealth" as a result of the pressure exerted on it to stop the FTLRP. Raftopolous (2007) notes that the process initiated by a SADC Extraordinary Summit on 27 March 2007 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, opened a 'narrow window' of

opportunity to arrest further deterioration of Zimbabwe into a civil war. According to Solidarity Peace Trust (2010), the mediation had three main goals which are, endorsing the decision to hold harmonised Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government elections of 2008, to agree on steps to be taken to ensure that the election will be acceptable to all concerned and representative of the will of Zimbabwean voters, and lastly agreeing on the measures that had to be implemented and the climate that would facilitate such acceptance.

The controversy of the March 2008 election outcome created a wave of politically motivated violence that erupted in several parts of the country perpetrated by all political parties. This compelled the conduction of the June 2008 Presidential run-off election which Tsvangirai boycotted a few days before the election. This led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 in Harare. This was a power sharing deal poised to create a genuine, viable, permanent and sustainable and rationally acceptable solution to Zimbabwe. It was also noted in the SADC communiqué that SADC OPDSC undertook to appoint a team of officials to join the facilitation team and work with Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to ensure monitoring, evaluation and implementation of the GPA. A series of SADC Summit meetings were converged between January 2009 up until the conduction July 2013 election to bring ‘finality’ to Zimbabwe political and economic crises where the three political leaders of the opposition parties participated.

1.2 Purpose of the study

The Zimbabwean environment has been and is still pregnant with economic and political problems that have got the potential of deteriorating into a dreadful civil war. Many MDC supporters including commercial white farmers were targeted for supporting and financing the opposition party. This resulted in a many civil servants abandoning their work as they sought security by going to other countries some without travel documents. The farms labourers were also equally devastated. (For more information read Cathy Buckle's African Tears.) This research explores the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis, how it evolved and evaluates the negotiation strategies employed by SADC as a regional body to 'solve' the crisis/conflict. Does SADC have the capacity to engage and solve political crises in Southern Africa?

1.3 Statement of the problem

The Zimbabwean crisis has reverberated across the Southern African region, the African continent and the international community. Many actors have therefore tried to influence the political events in Zimbabwe through the African Union, SADC or some individual countries to try and solve the political impasse between ZANU-PF and MDC-T its major opposition party. Interventions in the Zimbabwean crisis arguably have divergent ideological and political motivations. ZANU (PF) firmly anchored in the liberation struggle ideology as the basis for its continual hold on power whilst the other political parties (MDC-T, MDC-M now MDC-N etc.) are vehemently calling for a change of government alleging the former to have caused an economic meltdown through

unpopular policies. The opposition parties are calling for good governance firmly embedded in the neo-liberal world ontology. The period from 2000 to 2013 has witnessed heightened political participation amongst all supporters of the main political parties with some involving in voter intimidation, violence and resulting in controversies which could have possibly ignited a civil war. How then has SADC managed to pacify and resolve the impasse? Has it been successful in relegating the Zimbabwean crisis into the historical dustbin?

1.4 Research Objectives

The Objectives of the study are to:

1. Examine the genesis and evolvement of the Zimbabwean conflict from 2000 to 2013.
2. Critically analyse the conflict resolution and management strategies employed by the SADC in its mediation efforts to solve the impasse between ZANU PF and the two MDCs.
3. Assess whether the SADC was successful in resolving the conflict Between Zimbabwe's major political parties.

1.5 Research Questions

This study is going to focus on the following research questions:

1. What led to the Zimbabwean political conflict between 2000 and 2013?
2. What mechanisms did the SADC utilise in solving the Zimbabwe conflict?

3. Has SADC managed to resolve the political conflict in Zimbabwe?

1.5.1 Sub problems

This study is going to focus on the following sub problems:

1. Who was responsible for causing the Zimbabwean crisis?
2. Which forces were involved in influencing the SADC mediation process?
3. What was the effect of Mbeki's failure to be a neutral arbiter in solving the Zimbabwean crisis?

1.6 Hypothesis

The premise of this study is to investigate whether the SADC has been able to successfully resolve the Zimbabwean political crisis that led to unprecedented violence and a catastrophic economic deterioration that threatened the security of Zimbabweans in all works of life. The argument of this study is that the Southern African regional leaders failed to successfully resolve the Zimbabwean legitimacy political crisis and bring finality to the political conflict because the ZANU-PF government still continues to rely on authoritarianism to maintain its hold on power.

1.7 Importance of the study

Despite the existence of several documented academic and other literature on the Zimbabwean crisis, there is little research done on the persistent Zimbabwean problem. There is considerable debate in local newspapers and in academic circles on whether the

Zimbabwean crises that begun in 2000 culminating in the GPA, the GNU and the 2013 elections held under the aegis of the new constitution has marked the end of the Zimbabwean problem. Did SADC do all that was in its powers to pacify and end the polarity between the two main Zimbabwean opposition parties? If not where did SADC go wrong?

This study therefore attempts to answer this conundrum and in the process assesses the conflict resolution strategies employed by SADC. In the same vein this research will generate further research amongst academics, research institutions and civic bodies reevaluating the conflict resolution mechanisms used by SADC to try to solve the Zimbabwean case. This research may have a bearing on how future conflicts in the region and Africa may be handled.

1.8 Research Assumptions

The study assumes that:

- i. SADC has partially succeeded in solving the Zimbabwean crisis.
- ii. Zimbabwe managed to thaw intrastate political conflicts through the involvement of OPDSC, SIPO and SADC Summit of Heads of State in the mediation process

- iii. If the SADC has failed in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis it is because liberation movements in Southern Africa favour fellow liberation movements at the expense of post-independent opposition political parties.

1.9 Delimitations

The study focuses on analysing the SADC's strategies in Conflict Resolution in Zimbabwe's intrastate conflict. The research targeted only representatives of three main political parties' because they were the ones that were signatory to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that resulted in the formation of the GNU, civic organizations and diplomats accredited in Zimbabwe. The study concentrated on the period between 2000 and 2013 because 2000 is regarded by many academic analysts as the starting point when the crisis started and 2013 as the period when "free and fair" elections were held after some of the GPA provisions were adhered to. The researcher mainly focused on Zimbabwe because at independence in 1980 Zimbabwe had the best economy in Southern Africa second to South Africa, its demise has been very dramatic has a potential domino effect on its southern African neighbours if not tackled well.

1.10 Limitations to the study

The researcher conducted this research while at work hence there was less time to interview all concerned stakeholders from the targeted sample. However, the researcher made efforts to post and email questionnaires to respondents within the possible minimal

time. The researcher was also able to conduct telephone interviews to those I was not be able to conduct face to face interviews.

1.11 Definition of Terms

Closer (1967) defines conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure, or eliminate the rivals. Collier (1999), states that conflict is a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Folger, Poole, and Stutman (1997) observe that conflict is the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals. According to Conrad (1990), conflicts are communicative interactions among people who are interdependent and who perceive that their interests are incompatible, inconsistent, or in tension

Conflict – the existence of disharmony between people or groups within the borders or an articulated struggle of at least two interdependent parties perceived irreconcilable views, unequal resource distribution and interferences from others in attaining their goals.

Conflict Resolution – refers to the process of ending disagreements between two or more parties /groups.

Intrastate- refers to conflict occurring within the boundaries of a state.

1.12 Conclusion

The chapter gave an overview of the research through providing the background to the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, assumptions and a preliminary literature review. The research was also justified. Chapter two reviews the literature and synthesizes it into a conceptual framework.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on the Zimbabwean crisis. It gives an in-depth and evolution of the Zimbabwean crisis and how SADC as a regional body has employed strategies to solve problems that occurred in other Southern African member countries like Mozambique, DRC, Lesotho and Madagascar. Literature review is the “focused attempt to get more familiar with what has been said and done in your problem area from documented information” (Vakalisa, 1999:38). It also scrutinises the various methods employed to solve problems similar to the one under study to bring to the fore the gap that exists. Therefore, this chapter gives a synopsis of conflict resolution by the SADC organs in line with intrastate conflicts in the Southern African region with particular reference to Zimbabwe. Literature on conflict resolution shall also be explored in this chapter.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

Borggat, (1996) opines that a theoretical framework is collection of interrelated concepts. It is a ‘compass’ to the research determining what issues to measure and what relationship to look for. The importance of the theoretical framework in any research is to clarify the problem and assist in determining the best approach to its solution (Anderson and Arsenaut, 1999:57). This study makes use of the “Human Security Theory”

2.2 Human Security Theory

The concept of human security has its origins in the Cold War and has been embedded and understood in militaristic terms. However it has evolved to encompass a number of pertinent elements in the contemporary world and has shifted from the traditionally understood state-centric model of security to a human centered one. It now also focuses on individuals rather than simply the state and the military (UNDP: 1994). The UNDP came up with seven elements that are enshrined in human security and include the following: Economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security that entails protection of civil rights, freedoms and responsibility; Personal security which guarantees freedom from physical violence and threats, right to human dignity and freedom of person.

The objective of human security is therefore to “safeguard the vital core of all human lives from....pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long term fulfillment” (Commission of Human Security (CHS) 2001). Human security therefore include both human rights and human needs hence the need to employ it in explaining vital issues like the Zimbabwean crisis. Zimbabweans experienced horrendous eco-political problems that were a threat to their survival, their families and those of their relatives. Eade (1998) noted that the traditional meaning of security took for granted the safety of the individual. Eade went on to argue that: ‘The only legitimate security is security that is rooted in the well-being of people. We have all observed that you can have a secure

state, in the traditional sense-full of insecure people who face poverty, destitution and threats to their integrity. (1998:18)

2.2.1 Theoretical Assumptions and characteristics of Human Security Theory

The theoretical assumptions of human security are centered on the individual as the most important referral point of security. This means that the notion of human security has shifted focus from inter-state and military focus towards the individual and the community he resides in. This entails physical security of the individual, her/his security from injury, violence, sickness, poverty or psychological harm (Ban, 2008). This theory entails taking preventive measures to minimize risk and vulnerability by taking remedial action where prevention fails.

According to the UNDP (1994:22) report human security is vital because it is universal in the sense that security is crucial and of paramount importance. This envisages that it has no boundaries; it has no gender, age, political affiliation, nation or social class. This entails that when the 'individual's security is under threat all nations are likely to be affected. Famine, disease, political disputes and violence are no longer isolated events confined to borders but the consequences affect neighbouring countries. Human security is preventable and the cost preventing human insecurities is better than dealing with disastrous reparations of human insecurity. Human security has become people

centered because it now focuses on how people live in society, how they exercise their ‘political’ choices, and whether they live in conflict or peace (UNDP, 1994).

2.2.2 Relevance of Human Security Framework to this study

The human security theory is relative to this study because of its expansive nature. It provides a broader framework for examining the topic under study. The theory does a good job to unravel that security is much broader than traditional military dimensions. Zimbabwe experienced serious political turmoil that was arguably triggered by a “human-precipitated” economic deterioration (Mahuku 2005). Commercial farmers and their workers were forcefully removed from farms. Those who were alleged to have voted for a “No Vote” in the February 2000 constitutional referendum were equally subjected to harassment and torture that could not be ignored by the regional and international community.

The human security theory encompasses issues of human needs and human rights. It must be borne in mind that freedom to vote for a political party of choice and security is ‘two sides of the same coin.’ Freedom to vote for a political party of your choice is therefore intrinsic to human security since human survival and freedom of choice is the core or ‘crux’ of security. Freedom to choose a political party to provide societal public goods are therefore essential to human security for this also determines life expectancy. Peace and good political and economic governance permits accountability, transparency,

freedom, multiparty-ism and development, hence the thrust of this study is exploring the success of the SADC in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis.

The impact of the socio-political and economic crisis on peace and security among Zimbabweans is arguably linked to human security as the effects reveal themselves in the form of personal security, community security, health security educational security and housing security when people are displaced against their will which are among the seven elements enshrined in the UNDP 1994 report. Intrastate conflict is therefore a serious threat to human security as people are denied the chance to do their day to day activities and are forced to migrate to neighbouring countries as ‘economic refugees’ or running away from political persecution. Because of the crises that occurred in Zimbabwe there were a lot of family dislocations as bread winners sought ‘greener pastures, or when some family members fled from political motivated violence losing their jobs in the process. Many had their homesteads destroyed and have never had the opportunity to freely vote for a political party of their choice.

2.3 An Overview of SADCC and SADC

It must be pointed from the outset that to analyse the Southern African Coordination Conference context it is logical to trace the development of the SADC peace and security policies, processes and structures. This framework is pivotal in that it provides the foundation to understand the strategies that were employed by the SADC to solve the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis. Gavin Cawthra (2012) submitted that the

forerunner of SADC that is the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was not a security complex (Buzan, 1987). SADCC deliberately excluded volatile political and security issue and concentrated on economic development while security concerns were left for the Front Line States. SADCC had four guiding principles that are:

- Reducing dependency on South Africa
- Promoting economic development among member states
- Securing international aid to support its projects and
- Mobilising member state resources to promote interstate and regional development (Logan Cox and David A. Anderson, 2009).

Zimbabwe became a member upon attaining its independence in 1980 and thereafter played a pivotal role in the region's security affairs, rendering support to the FRELIMO of Mozambique against the RENAMO rebel movement. These efforts were preceded by its efforts in peace initiatives in Angola holding the position of commander of the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. In that regard Adolfo (2009:31) described Zimbabwe as;

‘...the anvil upon SADC was formed. Zimbabwe naturally took the lead in SADCC as it had the best economic infrastructure among the region's independent states. This hegemony status inevitably elevated Zimbabwe's position in regional politics prior to the end of apartheid, which later influenced SADC's management crisis in Zimbabwe.

However after the formation of SADC in 1992 the regional Organisation continued to concentrate on economic issues. (Cawthra: 2012). SADC in turn resulted in the formation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The OPDSC would in-turn report to the Summit of Heads of State. A protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was adopted to deal with issues that dealt with peace and security operations. However its operations remained shaky until only after 2004 when a comprehensive plan for peace and security management in the SADC was agreed on.

The strategic implementation Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was tasked to promote regional cooperation on matters that deal with defence and security, prevention, containment and resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflict through peaceful means and only resort to force when all other means to resolve a crisis have been resolved (Cawthra: 2012). The organ operates at Summit Heads of State level as well as at ministerial level that is senior officials in the departments of foreign affairs, defence, police and home affairs who also meet when there are issues that concern them that need to be ironed out or resolved. It must be pointed out that two committees are tasked to make crucial decisions pertaining and these are:

- The Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and
- The Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee

Both of these function at ministerial level as well as at the level of senior officials. The ISDSC has become a crucial actor in SADC Security matters. (Landsberg, 2002) As a

matter of fact Cawthra (2012) noted that SADC is also part of the AU's Africa, Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA) The Peace and Security Council has wide ranging powers that include the use of diplomacy and at times interventions in countries where there are gross human rights violations.

2.4 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

The OPDS was predominantly dormant due to lack of a clearly defined *modus operandi*. It was chaired by Zimbabwe's President, Comrade Robert Mugabe up until 2002 when the SADC head of states resolved that it had to be chaired on a rotational basis. This dormancy stage continued despite challenges that continued to occur in the SADC region. (Landsberg, C. 2003) As will be seen in this study this was later to prove detrimental when the SADC member states wanted to resolve the Zimbabwean impasse between ZANU-PF and the MDC.

Paradoxically, when the Lesotho intra-state conflict started there was no proper structure at the functions and limitations of the OPDSC to effectively intervene to solve the political issues. Nevertheless, South Africa, under Nelson Mandela and Botswana intervened militarily in the intrastate conflict in Lesotho mainly because they were the major trading partners outside SADC OPDS. However the was later adopted into the OPDSC. (Landsberg, C. 2003) However it must be noted that the Zimbabwean intra-state conflict has had a magnitude and propensity of its own since there have been serious lack of consensus amongst member states on how to effectively deal with the

crisis since the Zimbabwean ZANU-PF government categorically stated that it was fighting against a western neo-imperialist onslaught, an argument that the Zimbabwean government has continued to advance meaning that the conflict has not been completely resolved which is the thrust that this study explores.

The first intrastate conflict that emerged that was an acid test to the OPDSC was that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). What began as an internal crisis for the troubled Central African state, expanded to take in an assortment of military players from an assortment of looting armed groups to government armies fighting extraterritorial wars Essuman-Johnson (2009). The war which brought Laurent-Desire Kabila and Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) to power in the DRC, in May 1997, was actually embedded in the larger context of three hostilities namely the Great Lakes conflict, the rebellion in Southern Sudan and the Angolan civil war. The internal dynamics of the SADC intervention to bring finality to this conflict has also never been seriously investigated since the DRC conflict has continued to be a 'hot-bed of recurring intrastate and interstate conflict. This then calls for an academic interrogation of the SADC mediation strategies on whether they are really effective or not when dealing with intra-state and inter-state conflicts that affect member countries.

Zaire, as the DRC was then known, was the epicentre where the various paths of this ravaging war zone converged. The reasons to the conflicts were multifarious with

different tribes giving priority to their own interests but in common were frustration of the perceived Tutsi hegemony, the unresolved issue of the status of the Banyarwanda and the Congolese Tutsi in particular. Ray, E. (2000) noted that the need of increasing a military power base by Kabila fuelled the conflicts (Ibid).

The DRC conflict was met with different perspectives by the SADC countries. Arguably this lack of consensus among SADC countries has continued which may explain weaknesses within the regional body that may explain its lack of seriousness in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. The DRC conflict almost divided SADC member countries as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe were the only SADC states that sent troops to the DRC in response to the request by the DRC government, but South Africa, the sub-region powerhouse did not. Johnson (2009). Tanzania on the other hand though sharing the longest border with the DRC preferred to remain neutral in the entire affair and Zambia, also sharing a fairly long border with the DRC opted to take on a mediatory role (Ngoma 2003). This points to weaknesses within SADC that have never been seriously interrogated.

The above scenario therefore did not fully show the effectiveness of the OPDSC's importance in conflict resolution as the whole body did not act in unison. Another example where SADC has categorically failed to resolve and bring finality to the political disturbances affecting a fellow SADC member state is the Madagascar case; the opposition of the President Ravalomanana led by Andy Rajoelina staged political

demonstrations against the government challenging authoritarian rule. As pressure mounted, Ravalomanana handed over power to the highest ranking army officer who in turn handed over presidential office to Rajoelina resulting in Ravalomanana fleeing the country seeking SADC intervention. The assumption to office by Rajoelina was widely condemned by the international community and was deemed a coup d'état, which in the international relations is defined as an unconstitutional means of change of government. SADC rejected the arrangement and considered imposing sanctions on the new government if constitutional means were not restored. It was through the OPDSC Summit of 31 March (2009) where Heads of State concluded that Rajoelina should vacate presidential office paving way for an unconditional reinstatement of President Ravalomanana. However this has not happened.

In light of the above, this research, guided by academic authorities who have contributed literature on conflict, peace and conflict resolution in international politics delves on the Zimbabwean issue where the OPDSC organ and the Summit of Heads of state intervened at times in agreement to solve a crisis affecting a member state. It is therefore logical to commence by interrogating the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis.

2.5 Genesis of the Zimbabwean Conflict

It must be pointed from the outset that there is no agreement among scholars on the genesis of the Zimbabwean conflict. In this research the researcher uses the terms conflict and crisis interchangeably. Nyakudya (2013) and Mahuku and Mbanje (2013)

note that when the ruling ZANU-PF led government was faced with an acute economic deterioration as a result of the negative effects of neo-liberal economic reforms that were championed by the international financial institutions it began to use repressive colonial legislations such as the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act against its political opponents, undermining the rule of law and violating the rule of law in the process. This according to Nyakudya (2013) also contributed to intrastate conflicts which also needed SADC's involvement. He further notes that an increasing militant labour movement in November 1998 organised workers' stay-away which demonstrated growing worker opposition to state policies. On this note Nyakudya (2013 45) pointed out that;

‘Growing dissatisfaction with ZANU (PF)’s failed policies culminated in the emergence of a strong political party, the MDC, in September 1999 and a more vibrant civic activism’.

In that vein, this research explores on how the SADC OPDSC has managed to resolve the conflict between the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF whose policies are diametrically opposed to each other. Scholars who have made contributions have mainly concentrated on how ZANU-PF has solely been engrossed in instituting survival tactics to remain in office and what the MDC formations have done to get into office without exploring the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of SADC strategies to end the political conflict and whether the political conflict has been finally resolved. It must also be pointed out that there is no agreement amongst scholars on the genesis of the Zimbabwean conflict or crisis.

In contrast to these observations, scholars like Jonathan Moyo and Tafataona Mahoso have also advanced alternatives to the genesis of the political crisis in Zimbabwe to what they term post-modern imperialism. They refer to the;

‘Western world’s emphasis on democracy and governance, the promotion of economic development, the prevention of conflict, and the respect for the rule of law. Under the guise of pursuing these global goals, this view holds, the Western world-as the chief purveyor of post imperialism, seeks to gain control over African politics and economies by linking aid to governance issues....In line with this, ZANU (PF) attributes the crisis in Zimbabwe to the Western interference in its internal affairs with the intention of effecting a regime change.’ (Sunday Mail 17 February 2013, An In-depth Analysis).

Moyo and Mahoso concur that the Zimbabwean crisis started when the Zimbabwean political leadership was erroneously led into accepting IMF/WB economic stabilization programmes at a time when the Zimbabwean economy was still performing well. The government adhering to the IMF/WB conditionalities was forced to abandon its well-farerist approach that was beneficial to the Zimbabwean majority. As government tried to cut on its expenditure it in the process neglected its education and health policies that in the end brought it into a collision path with the workers and the ordinary people (Mahuku and Mbanje 2013).

According to Nyakudya (2013), the imposition of sanctions against on Harare that targeted ZANU-PF politicians, some members of the security sector and some of its notable sympathizers like Ruben Barwe and others by the American government and European Union (EU) in 2001 and 2002 respectively followed the Zimbabwe’s Land

Reform Programme of 2000. However, the sanctions were regarded as punitive measures by the USA and EU in retaliation to ZANU (PF)'s 'anti-imperialist' policies and its quest to be treated as a sovereign state. Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage (2004) observed that the EU and America were bent on whipping the Zimbabwean government into line. By embarking on a Fast Track Land Reform Programme the Zimbabwean government had set a very bad example in Southern Africa. It had violated property rights as well as flouting the rule of law. Commercial farmers as well as all those Zimbabweans who were alleged to be supporters of the MDC were no longer safe. They were branded 'sale-outs' and therefore no longer had any rights in a country of their birth. The situation was tense that many people decided to seek sanctuary in neighbouring countries in the region or went abroad. The matter was tabled at the 2001 SADC Summit of Head of States and Government. Nyakudya (2013 54) pointed out that;

The Summit expressed its concern about the effects of the Zimbabwe economic situation on the region, indicated its readiness to engage in a dialogue with the Zimbabwean government and other actors to resolve the situation.

David Moore (2008) posits that ZANU (PF) blame the crisis on sanctions that were imposed on the ZANU (PF) government by Britain, America and the EU at the request of the MDC. He goes on to point out that the ZANU-PF government strongly contends that the genesis of the Zimbabwean problem goes back to 1997 when the Tony Blair government refused to fulfill Britain's Lancaster House promise to fund the land reform

programme in Zimbabwe. This was further worsened by the IMF and World Bank's refusal to avail money to the Zimbabwean government (Mahuku and Mbanje, 2013). Zimbabwe is therefore a sacrificial lamb at the altar of neo-imperialist political and economic dynamics. It has arguably become a victim of incessant meddling, through declared and undeclared economic sanctions, merely because the Government embarked upon a process of equitable land redistribution after the former colonial power had reneged on its responsibilities. Norma Kriger (2012) noted that President Mugabe lamented that the British and their allies have used their media to "viciously portray Zimbabwe as a lawless and undemocratic country". Moyo (2005) posits that the land redistribution programme was a turning point in the events in Zimbabwe. It must be noted that many scholars during this time concentrated on writing, researching and making assumptions on what would be the result of the Zimbabwean crisis.

Scholars like Masipula Sithole (2002) Martin Rupiya (2004), John Makumbe (2005) and others opined that Zimbabwe was slowly collapsing and this would result in a mass revolt against the ZANU-PF government. Little effort was therefore exerted into analyzing the strategies that would be employed by SADC to resolve the conflict. Some SADC leaders also thought that the country was disintegrating and would not survive explaining why in 2007 President Levi Mwanawasa remarked that Zimbabwe was a sinking titanic (Mahuku 2013).

Masunungure (2005) observed that the MDC formations place the blame for the crisis squarely on the ZANU-PF led government. The MDC politicians like Morgan Tsvangirai, Tendai Biti and Welshman Ncube have always argued that the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis can be traced back to 1990 when the ZANU-PF government agreed to the proposition by the international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) & World Bank (WB) to embark on an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). After having realized the negative effects of ESAP the Mugabe government embarked on a FTLR to gain political mileage since its support base was dwindling evidenced by how they lost the February 2000 Constitution referendum and the disputed June 2000 parliamentary election as well as the 2002 presidential election (Mahuku and Mbanje, 2013).

ZANU-PF's failure to come up with sound economic policies in line with the requirements of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) meant that government had to compete with the private sector for the available funds on the domestic market (Sachikonye, 2004). This forced interest rates higher making the cost of borrowing too high for manufacturers. However, commercial profits were readily achievable and the increased inflow of foreign funds as part of the ESAP provided easy access to imported consumer goods at the detriment of local industry. In 1997 the ZANU-PF led government gave war veterans unbudgeted \$50 000 gratuities as compensation for their contributions in the war of liberation. As if this was not enough Mugabe without consulting parliament subsequently participated in the Democratic Republic of

Congo war where Zimbabwe was using over US \$ 1 million a day (Bond and Manyanya,2003) It was then that the Zimbabwean dollar begun to make a nose dive. In September 1999 a new opposition party the MDC was formed and posed a serious challenge to the ZANU-PF government as evidenced by its successful campaign for the “No vote” in the constitutional referendum that took place in February 2000 and its performance in the June 2000 parliamentary election.

It must be pointed out that this literature did not interrogate on how the SADC had to intervene to mediate on the Zimbabwean evolving conflict. Scholars arguably also became very politicized and most of the literature that was written during the early stages of the MDC-ZANU-PF impasse concentrated on the strategies that were being adopted by the MDC to come into power by either winning an election or through a mass revolt eventually pushing ZANU-PF out of power whilst others concentrated on how ZANU-PF would adopt strategies that would ensure that they remain in power.

2.6 Mediation as a Strategy in Conflict Resolution

Mediation is the starting point of any conflict resolution process. Implied is the idea that disputing parties are brought to the negotiating table. This is notwithstanding the fact that mediation is affected by numerous intervening factors such as military intervention, political and economic sanctions. These are issues that scholars have not interrogated to see to it why it took long for SADC to make a break-through in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. According to Coser (1967), conflict as a concept is difficult to

define. In this study conflict is defined as disagreements or contestations between parties that can only be resolved through a third party. Fetherstone (2007) pointed out that Conflict Resolution has been a very critical force in the theory and practice of Conflict Management. He further argues that Conflict Resolution is constituted within the context of violence as has been noted on human security theoretical frame work that is employed in this study. He also pointed out that Conflict Resolution and Management are social accords which constitute the containment of societal contradiction within a framework of upholding peace within a state. Implied here is the fact that conflicts should be resolved amicably, through negotiations.

It is only when there is conflict between contesting parties that conflict resolution mechanisms are employed for the purposes of trying to reach a compromise. As was the case in Mozambique mediators realized that the conflict between Afonso Dlakama's RENAMO and the Mozambican government now under Joaquim Chissano had to be resolved hence the coming in of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and the Catholics to negotiate a settlement. In that regard, conflict resolution according to conflict scholars, begin with mediation process which in this research will take the centre stage since it is of prima facie to conflict resolution mechanisms.

According to Khadiagala (2006) mediation is a form of conflict resolution that involves the third party or an outsider coming in to resolve a long standing conflict. In other

words mediation is a form of conflict resolution which is an intervention that must be acceptable to the adversaries in the conflict who cooperate diplomatically with the intervener. And in that regard mediation ought to be skillful and tactful for it to be successful, which became Mbeki's main preoccupations before engaging in talks. Khadiagala (2010; 123) pointed out that;

‘...schools of conflict resolution have concentrated on round table negotiation when discussing mediation, leaving out entry point.There is little doubt that the preferred mode of entry is one where all the parties involved in a dispute approach a particular agent to assist them.’

Khadiagala is of the view that without due regard to the entry point of the mediator, one will not be able to give a full analysis of the subject. This means that mediators need to know conditions that facilitate negotiation, barriers that negotiation face how these barriers can be overcome effectively. This point can best be exemplified by the SADC - led mediation on Zimbabwe where Mbeki had the ‘knowledgeable background’ of the disputing parties. Its initiators were friendly countries to ZANU PF party, the likes of the Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete who urged President Mugabe to accept SADC mediation.

According to Solidarity Peace Trust (2010), the mediation had three main goals which were to endorse the decision to harmonise Presidential, parliamentary and local Government elections in 2008; agree on steps to be taken to ensure that the elections will be generally acceptable to all concerned and representative of the will of Zimbabwean voters and agree on the measures that had to be implemented to create climate that

would facilitate such acceptance. However it must be noted that it would prove to be very difficult for the SADC to bring finality to the Zimbabwean political problem since Thabo Mbeki was viewed by the two MDC factions as biased towards ZANU-PF explaining why in the end South Africa as the mediating country and other SADC countries never exerted enough pressure to see to it that all agreed issues in the GPA were implemented.

Khadiagala notes that the process of searching for a mediator should be conducted prior to negotiations. This is against the background that most governments are reluctant to look for a third party mediator because it weakens their position as it has a tendency of portraying them as incapable of managing their own affairs. This is equally true to the Zimbabwe scenario where the idea of a third party was not welcome by ZANU PF which preferred that its own problems can only be solved by the Zimbabweans themselves. Nyakudya (2013) pointed out that it was inevitable for Zimbabwe to avoid SADC mediation owing to contributions Zimbabwe made during its formation. According to Galtung (1965), numerous devices, mechanisms and institutions have been invented to manage, deal or resolve disputes among antagonistic actors. Mediation is one of the significant of the devices. This research therefore goes an extra mile to interrogate the mediation strategy used by the SADC in Zimbabwe and see whether it was effective and in the end able to bring finality to the Zimbabwean crisis.

2.7 Thabo Mbeki as a Mediator

SADC was able to mandate South Africa to mediate in the Zimbabwean conflict first through former president Thabo Mbeki and later on Jacob Zuma. South Africa came in as a third party to resolve the political impasse that was there between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations leading to the signing of the GPA and the formation of the GNU. With consent from both the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF SADC managed to prevent the escalation of the conflict into a civil war in 2008 by ‘successfully managing and resolving the conflict. SADC showed that it is increasingly taking on the task of enhancing political and security cooperation amongst its member states, acknowledging that without peace and security, social and economic development is impossible. The basis under which SADC mediated in the Zimbabwean conflict is premised on:

1. Mandate of the organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)

- The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) that entails that mediation is a strategic activity
- SADC protocol on Politics and Security Cooperation that stresses the principle of strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aggression
- UN and AU protocols and Guidelines.

Much of the literature notes with concern the diplomatic role that was employed by the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, in his practice that has been described by many scholars as ‘quiet’ diplomacy. Mbeki’s strategy managed to break the impasse between

ZANU (PF) and the two MDC formations. According to Touval (1985), for mediation to take place, the parties in dispute must reach a point of compromise and contribute equally to the mediation process since conflict is as a result of a stalemate, when a decision is impossible by other means and when parties have equal stalemating power an implication that negotiation will be a joint decision making. In that regard the mediator requires certain skills to convince adversaries that they need to come to the table to resolve issues. It is now the mediator's role to effectively facilitate the communication process between disputing parties which is the hardest part of mediation. This has been highlighted by Saunders (1985 87);

‘.....persuading parties to a conflict to commit to a negotiated settlement is even more complicated, time consuming and more difficult than reaching an agreement once negotiations have begun’.

It is at this stage that adversaries still believe that their interests should prevail in the negotiation before they can take the whole process seriously. In the Zimbabwean scenario, the Mbeki led mediation was faced by this dilemma of getting ZANU PF and the two MDC formations to commit themselves to negotiations. Dzinesa and Zambara (2009), posits that, one of the main problems Mbeki faced was the hardline positions taken by both parties, each claiming legitimacy of leadership of Zimbabwe. They were both arguing that the process should be based on their status as the democratically elected government of the country from the two elections of 2008. On one side ZANU PF was calling for the removal of sanctions on its members and was not ready to entertain any reforms until sanctions are removed. On the other hand, Tsvangirai's

prerequisite for elections were roadmap, security of the vote and electoral amendment law among others. It is through this research that mediation is regarded as an instrumental tool for peace diplomacy. Saunders (1985), further pointed out that prior to the mediation process the mediator should consult the disputants at the beginning to define the conflict problem, to produce to commitment to a negotiated settlement, arrange negotiation and implementing the process.

Much literature documented Thabo Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' as one of his tactic to proffer solutions to the negotiation process. This was done in the hope of providing African solutions to African problems under the auspices of the concept of Ubuntu. Within that context the decision to choose Mbeki was held by many nationalist scholars as a 'mature decision'. This was also because he had started his mediation efforts between ZANU (PF) and the MDCs in 2001, and also being Zimbabwe's biggest trading partner, Mbeki was best placed to mediate in the crisis.

In the early stages, Mbeki managed to persuade the disputants to agree on electoral, constitutional and media reforms which the Zimbabwe Parliament endorsed in December 2007. This research however, acknowledges that some scholars lambast Mbeki for being naive on ZANU (PF) and suggested that he could have taken a head-on approach. (Mlambo 2010) The quiet diplomacy approach is also acknowledged by many scholars as being a normal approach in mediation exercise where protagonists are

ideologically at variance. (Nyakudya, 2013). The mediation of Mbeki was preceded by Jacob Zuma, who in 2007 continued mediation in the Zimbabwe political crises following his election as the South African President. Nyakudya (2013) further notes that Zuma was bold as opposed to Mbeki. Cawthra (2011) noted that when Jacob Zuma came onto the scene this was the turning point in the mediation process because he was not very tolerant with Mugabe in the manner that Thabo Mbeki had been. His report was first presented to the SADC Summit in Livingstone on 31 March 2011 which became the basis for the elections that were later held in 2013.

2.8 SADC's intervention in Zimbabwe

Freeman (2005) suggests that the political and economic decline in Zimbabwe showed the inability of SADC to uphold its principles of regional principles of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Raftopolous (2005) opines that the SADC has been unable to intervene meaningfully in Zimbabwe and remains ineffective. Further limiting its effectiveness was its repeated unwillingness to criticize forcefully, a revolutionary leader from the independence movements of the 1970's and 1980's. Raftopolous (2005) postulates that in 2005, SADC monitors were barred from parliamentary elections which were marked by gross intimidation, ballot stuffing, and inflating ballot counts, but still the election was declared "free and fair" by the SADC and by SADC member countries Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. Moyo (2005) opines that even as the economy descended into anarchy SADC refused to assist Zimbabwe with anything other than

rhetoric. If SADC had been genuine in trying to solve the Zimbabwean problem then it would not have taken them so many years to solve the conflict.

Kagwanja (2006) notes that, SADC members simply remained mum to Mugabe's rhetoric blaming the Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land reform program, on Great Britain and its alleged reluctance to deliver on its Lancaster House commitments. According to Raftopolous (2005) while SADC leaders may have spoken to Mugabe privately regarding the situation in Zimbabwe, their public statements were supportive of Mugabe and critical of a western propaganda war. In 2002, Thabo Mbeki, appointed by the SADC to lead its negotiations with Mugabe, criticized the international community for focusing on Zimbabwe and opposed EU sanctions that might have led to an earlier resolution of the Zimbabwean conflict.

Freeman (2005) the SADC summit in Angola promised so much in terms of solving the Zimbabwe crisis yet delivered so little, as Zimbabwe's feuding parties came back literally empty handed. According to Raftopolous (2008) the seeming lethargy of the SADC facilitation took a dramatic turn at the SADC Troika summit in Zambia on 31st March. SADC noted with 'grave concern' the political polarization in Zimbabwe that was characterized by the 'resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation.' However

without naming Mugabe directly, the summit's resolutions were arguably the most forthright diplomatic criticism that SADC had ever issued of the Mugabe regime.

Political analysts have described the heads of state summit in Luanda as a 'break meeting' for Zimbabwe. Moyo (2010) noted that SADC urged the parties to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) to remain "committed to the implementation and finalise the roadmap on outstanding issues". According to Palmer (2008) analysts described the meetings as more the same, pointing out that the same issues that were raised in Livingstone, Zambia and Sandton, South Africa were echoed by the Angola summit, as the regional leaders failed to take a definitive stand on Zimbabwe. Civic society leaders from across the region expressed disdain at SADC's efforts to solve regional crisis civic pressure groups were disappointed that no firm action had been taken, but found solace in that no ground had been lost. They argued that SADC has become an old boys club, an institution of heads of state.

The renewed international pressure on the government of Zimbabwe pushed SADC into a new effort to deal with the Zimbabwean crisis. Palmer (2008) observes that in political terms this meant attempting to walk the tightrope of keeping South Africa's continental ambitions alive without sacrificing western support. Under the changed conditions after the March 2007 events in Harare, Mbeki received a mandate from an extraordinary summit of SADC held in Tanzania on 29 March, to facilitate dialogue in

Zimbabwe between the major political parties. The central objective of the facilitation was to create the conditions for broadly acceptable elections in the country that would, in Mbeki's words, begin the process leading to the normalisation of the situation in Zimbabwe and the resumption of its development and reconstruction process intended to achieve a better life for all Zimbabweans on a sustainable basis.

Raftopoulos's observation that he had made years back that the SADC mediated talks between ZANU-PF and MDC were undermined by the unwillingness of ZANU PF to allow for a significant opening up of political space in the country was proved right. Raftopolous (2005) had contended that SADC's endorsement of an outcome that did not take broad democratic principles into account was in fact an endorsement of Mugabe. Colder (2007) posits that the 2007 SADC mandate to South Africa to broker an agreement between ZANU PF and the MDC should have been seen as an extension of the "quiet diplomacy" that had been the hallmark of the South African and SADC approach to the Zimbabwe crisis since 2000. Palmer (2008) suggests that the mediation took on an added urgency after the brutal public beating, arrest and torture of Morgan Tsvangirai and other civic leaders in March 2007. A combination of international pressure and the obligation by SADC to be seen to be taking action on the Zimbabwe question, led to an extra-ordinary SADC Heads of State Summit in Tanzania at the end of March 2007 at which South Africa was given the facilitation mandate on Zimbabwe. However it also presented an opportunity for national, regional and international forces to navigate a common approach out of the Zimbabwean debacle by reaching an

agreement that would be broadly acceptable to all sides. Palmer (2008) notes that Mbeki started out with the intention that the dialogue between ZANU PF should achieve three objectives:

- Firstly, both parties should endorse the decision to hold parliamentary elections in 2008.
- Secondly, they should agree on the steps that should be taken to ensure that all concerned accept the elections as being truly representative of the “will” of the Zimbabwean people.
- Thirdly, that there should be agreement by all political parties and “other social forces” on the measures that should be implemented and respected in order to facilitate a legitimate election.

Towards the end of 2007 the facilitation had, “significant but not full consensus” on a number of areas in a political agreement covering issues of violence, sanctions, land, abuse of traditional leaders and food aid. The talks themselves, begun in an atmosphere of enormous distrust, appeared to have made some progress, with ZANU PF swallowing the bitter pill of negotiating with an opposition party that it labeled a puppet of the West. According to Hassan (2008) notwithstanding some small changes to the media and public order legislation, the ruling party proved unwilling to make substantive changes on the issues that would affect the transitional political arrangements that would precede the 2008 elections. At the centre of the political deadlock that emerged in 2007 were three areas:

- the date of the election;
- the timeframe for the implementation of the agreed reforms
- the process and modality of the making and enactment of a new constitution.

According to Raftopolous (2008) Mugabe's unilateral proclamation of the election date for 2008, outside of an agreement of these substantive issues, effectively put an end to the SADC facilitation process. Freeman (2008) notes that civic society felt that the SADC announcement on the 4th February 2008 that Mbeki's facilitation had resulted in the political parties reaching an "agreement on all substantive matters relating to the political situation in Zimbabwe" and that the matters outstanding were merely procedural was the worst kind of political dishonesty. In agreement Moyo (2009) says that what might have been a principled stand by the outgoing President Mbeki turned into another disgraceful endorsement of the politics of a repressive regime. Moyo went on to note that the opposition felt that the SADC has once again demonstrated its inability to distinguish between Africa's concern for imperialist interventions, and its commitment to the democratic and human rights of the region's citizens.

Hassan (2008) laments that SADC had subordinated the MDC-T and MDC-M to a grubby solidarity with a repressive political regime that had transformed a lofty Pan Africanist discourse into a spurious attempt to legitimize an authoritarian political project. The regional organization had an opportunity to send an unambiguous message

to Mugabe that unless he fulfilled the objective of establishing the conditions for a broadly acceptable free and fair election, he could not expect the customary solidarity of SADC. The 2008 March elections took place in the context of the SADC mediation and with relatively little violence.

Colder (2008) notes that it took a month for the Presidential election results to be announced. The results came out as follows, combined MDC won 109 seats and ZANU-PF won 97, while the presidential vote failed to have a decisive winner with a 50 percent plus one majority, thus requiring a run-off election. The period between July and December was marked by further SADC attempts to bring finality to the mediation efforts, with strong criticism from the West, as well as from church and civic bodies in Zimbabwe and the Southern Africa region, about the perceived complicity of SADC in not bringing stronger pressure to bear in solving the continuing crisis in Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe the ZANU PF leader was a one-man candidate in the June 27 election following a pull out by Morgan Tsvangirai at the last minute alleging that he had to protect his supporters from state sponsored violence.

Nyakudya (2013) further highlighted that contradictions amongst intervention by regional bodies as well as principal of sovereignty equality were at play during the mediation process of political crisis in Zimbabwe. This is against the background that Zimbabwe is a sovereignty state with sovereignty rights, which according to Dzinesa

and Zambara (2011) limited SADC's scope to enforce their compliance. This has also been compounded by the fact that SADC has been split into two camps with one group comprising of former liberation movement siding ZANU PF whilst countries such as Botswana Malawi and Zambia were tolerant of MDC formations. Nyakudya (2013)

2.9 SADC and the resolution of the Zimbabwean Crisis

The issue of whether the SADC Zimbabwean conflict has never been rigorously interrogated and has only been referred to by scholars in passing. Ibbo Mandaza (2013) opines that SADC has not been very successful in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. He argues that that from 2000 SADC took little action, supported Mugabe and characterized the conflict as an internal one that required internal solutions. SADC therefore situated the Zimbabwean crisis in the context of an African state fighting against neo-colonialism as it battled to redistribute land to ordinary Zimbabwean. They only firmly intervened in 2008 when the GPA was signed leading to the formation of the GNU in February 2009 only after being pressured by the African Union (AU).

The above process was declared unfair and African Union, some SADC countries and the Pan-African Parliament. France pointed out that the situation in Zimbabwe threatened to destabilize Southern Africa. While supporting mediation efforts by SADC and President Mbeki, France noted that the 29 March elections had seen victory go to Morgan Tsvangirai and his opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. They felt therefore that in order for a true dialogue to begin, pressure was necessary to

protect the people. France and other European Union member States, therefore, supported an irreversible sanctions regime and also called for an arms embargo.

The assumption that the situation in Zimbabwe represented a threat to peace and security in the region was disputed by neighbouring countries especially South Africa that was being pressured to militarily intervene in Zimbabwe. Mandaza (2013) argues that SADC has actually supported Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF party at the detriment of democratic progress in Zimbabwe. Despite the fact that Zimbabwe now has a new constitution and held an election in 2013 some of the issues in the GPA have not been resolved. Landsberg (2009) noted that the SADC problem is that it had put the cart before the horse by failing to come up with protocols that make the decisions that they make binding on all member states.

Jonathan Moyo (2012) contends that SADC has been able to solve the Zimbabwean conflict despite having encountered several challenges. He believes that while political dialogue was ongoing between the contending parties, the President, comrade Robert Mugabe had reached out to the opposition and called for all political parties to enter into a comprehensive inter-party dialogue sooner rather than later. Reconciliation is not a new concept to Zimbabwe, which fully welcomed the African Union resolution. In line with the mandate from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and supported by the African Union, President Thabo Mbeki had been in Zimbabwe to

consult with President Mugabe and the political parties on charting the way forward. Any separate initiatives have been counterproductive and undermined the role of SADC and President Mbeki and later Jacob Zuma since some African countries in the AU openly were campaigning for a regime change in Zimbabwe.

2.10 Summary

The chapter looked at the literature on the genesis and evolution of the Zimbabwean crisis SADC's involvement and how it used its organs like the OPDS and SADC Heads of Summit and SIPO in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. Chapter three shows the methodology and data collection methods that were used by the researcher in this dissertation.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology and the research methods of investigation for this dissertation. The researcher employed the qualitative paradigm and used Zimbabwe as a case study. An array of research techniques were employed in conducting effective data gathering, analysis and presentation. Interviews and questionnaires were used as the major methods for data collection. The target population of this study was made up of representatives of the three main political parties that is; ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M politicians. It also targeted academics that have knowledge on the topic under study, civic Organisations and diplomats from the SADC member countries that is ambassadors from the DRC, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa and others with resident missions in Zimbabwe who do not belong to the SADC that is the British and American and Chinese ambassadors to Zimbabwe. Research ethics were considered in this study. The respondents were told that the information that they were given would be kept in strictest confidence, was solely for academic purposes.

3.1 Methodology

Research methodology refers to the method by which data is collected for a research project. According to Kirby (2000) research methodology is the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data in order to achieve the objectives of a research project. Research methodology is important in research work because it specifies the research design. This chapter mainly focused on the research design and research instruments used to collect data for the present study. The chapter also

discusses and presents a justification for the use of sampling methods used as well as the research instruments. Data collection procedures adopted for the study and how the raw data collected using the research instruments was processed and manipulated are also discussed in this chapter. Data presentation and analysis as well as chapter summary also form part of the chapter.

3.2 Research design

The study employs a qualitative design because its focus is to establish the extent to which the SADC successfully resolved the Zimbabwean crisis. The three reasons why the exploration of research design is significant with particular reference to this research design is as follows. Firstly, it assists the researcher on making decisions on how and whom to collect data from and how to analyse it. These include the type of evidence gathered and how it helps to answer the research questions posed. The research strategy is thus to collect the varied opinions of all the players in the Zimbabwean conflict across the continuum using interviews and questionnaires, Secondly, knowledge of the research design enables the researcher to evaluate and use appropriate approaches by identifying the limitations of particular approaches at an early stage. Smith et al (1997) places significance on the research design as it forms the foundation upon which the research is anchored.

3.3 Qualitative research

The research had the natural setting as the direct source of information and the researcher as the key collector without experimental manipulation. The researcher's sole purpose was thus to collect information. In this case the researcher was investigating the people's perceptions and opinion in an endeavour to gather data on the feelings of the people living in the "crisis" in Zimbabwe. Qualitative design deals with a phenomenon which is not easily quantifiable and thus it was more relevant in this investigation where perceptions played a greater part in explaining the actions of the players. Thus the researcher used the emic perspective meaning that , the researcher was taking information from within the people who experienced the in the Zimbabwean conflict thus getting perspectives of people who were in direct contact to the events that built up to the situation under discussion . Thus the findings could only be generalized only on Zimbabwe.

Fryer (1991) asserts that qualitative research defines the reality it purports to measure meaning that the context under which issues are discussed help to give meaning to the issues. In this case, the researcher defined the "crisis" by juxtaposing her findings against the different realities that were experienced by the different players at the different times with a view to create a continuum against which she could use her assessment to evaluate the degree of conflict and how it was resolved successfully or not. Questions were asked through use of questionnaires and interviews. The researcher interviewed representatives of the three political parties, Civic Organisations, academics

and diplomats to find out the genesis of the Zimbabwean conflict, the mechanisms employed by SADC to bring to an 'end' the Zimbabwean crisis and evaluate whether SADC as a regional body was successful through its organs to resolve the conflict.

The researcher used a wide range of academic material on the Zimbabwean crisis and a variety of lecture papers by scholars, politicians, and civil society practitioners in the SADC region. In brief, qualitative research shares the theoretical assumptions of the interpretative paradigm, which is based on the notion that social reality is created and sustained through the subjective experience of people, involved (Morgan, 1980). Qualitative researchers are concerned in their research with attempting to accurately describe, decode, and interpret the meanings of phenomena occurring in their normal social contexts (Fryer, 1991).

The researcher used the qualitative research design because it obtained a more realistic feel of the world that cannot be experienced in the numerical data and statistical analysis used in quantitative research. It provided flexible ways for data collection, subsequent analysis, and interpretation of collected information. (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Patton, 1980). The method also allowed the researcher to interact with the research subjects on their own terms and its descriptive capability based on primary and unstructured data allowed the researcher to get first-hand information on the Zimbabwean crisis.

3.4. Case study

A case study is an individual element or group member within a sample or population on which data can be collected. McBurney (1994) points out that a case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question. A case study design was chosen because the research sought to have a closer and detailed investigation on genesis, evolution of the Zimbabwean conflict and SADC resolved it.

3.5. Target Population

According to Kirby (1997) population means the people who live in a place. A target population refers to a group of individuals that have one or more characteristics in common that are of particular interest to the researcher. Borg and Gall (1983) concur with Kirby on what a target population is. In this study the target population consisted of representatives of politicians of political parties that were signatory to the GPA, diplomats, Civic Organisations and academics. The three political parties namely ZANU PF, MDC-T and MDC-M/ N were chosen because they were the dominant parties in terms of participating in the Zimbabwe's elections, they had significant percentages of the electorate in the 2008 election in which proved the crisis or conflict had reached a climax.

3.6 Sampling

Saunders *et al* (2003) sampling can be the deliberate selection of a number of people who are to provide data from which one will draw conclusions about some group. Ferber (1974) defines a sample as a small part of anything designed to show the style, quality and nature of the whole. A sample can therefore be classified as a proportion of a population selected for observation and analysis. The researcher used the stratified sampling method under probability sampling and purposive sampling under the non-probability sampling technique.

3.6.1 Stratified sampling

a) The researcher used stratified sampling because the population from which the sample was drawn did not constitute a homogeneous group thus stratified sampling was applied to choose church organizations to be used in the research in order to obtain a representative sample. According to Ferber (1974) in stratified sampling, the population is divided into several sub populations that are individually more homogeneous than the total population. The researcher selected items from each identified group from politicians of different political parties, Diplomats, Civil Society and academic analyst to constitute a sample, since each strata is more homogeneous than the total population.

3.6.2 Purposive Sampling

This type of sampling technique was used to select, political parties, diplomats, civic groups and the academia to be used in the study for a certain characteristic needed to be studied. The SADC as a regional body and some of its organs like the Summit heads of state and the OPDSC, SIPO, ISDSC and the less active IPDC mediated between ZANU PF and the two MDC formations. Though purposive sampling is arguably the most appropriate for qualitative studies, it has its own weaknesses. Purposive sampling has an element of subjectivity because the researcher has a perception of the preferred respondents.

Information was collected from three political parties that were signatories to the GPA that led to the formation of the GNU, these parties were dominant definers in determining intervention by other regional SADC member states to resolve the Zimbabwean conflict or crisis, the academia of certain institutions in Zimbabwe like Zimbabwe Media Trust, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Bindura university of science education SAPES Trust, diplomats and others were chosen for they have been political commentators on the Zimbabwean situation.

3.6.3 Sampling procedure

Stratified sampling method was used to select the churches to be used for the study, then simple random sampling was applied in each stratum to choose a sample from the population, every individual has an equal chance of being drawn into the sample. The

political parties that were signatory to the GPA were chosen. This was done to make sure each political party was represented. Then random sampling was used to pick a representative from each stratum. The researcher then dealt chose the number of representatives in tandem with support given to each political party.

Purposive sampling was used to select SADC countries diplomats to be involved in the study. The researcher chose SADC countries which are member states to SADC and those from European countries that have residents mission in Zimbabwe. SADC countries involved in the mediating talks between ZANU PF and MDC were also chosen using purposive sampling.

Judgmental sampling was used to select diplomats who had an interest in the Zimbabwe conflict. The researcher used purposive sampling when choosing the academia. Academia from Bindura and the University of Zimbabwe were chosen from history and social science department. These universities were chosen for their proximity to the researcher. This sampling procedure was also used to select pressure groups and civic organization which were chosen from the study. The writer used those who were accessible and those who were politically involved with events in Zimbabwe.

3.7 Data Collection Methods

The researcher used questionnaires and interviews,

3.7.1 Questionnaires

A questionnaire is a document containing questions to solicit information appropriate for analysis. Questionnaires that had both unstructured and structured questions were administered to diplomatic community, political parties and the academia. Some questions were in matrix nature, which made it easier for the public to fill in as they simply ticked the appropriate answer or response. Questionnaires involve providing respondents with a printed list of questions to be answered. Kirby (1997) opine that questionnaires are most used when there is a desire to gain information from a large sample of people. The questions used were both closed and open ended. Closed questions allow only a limited number of responses. These can allow the respondent to pick one of a number of statements as best approximately to their opinion, whereas a second type of closed question allows people to choose to agree or disagree. Other scales are also possible.

3.7.2 Advantages of questionnaires

In this study questionnaires were cheap and easy to administer. Large quantities of data on the genesis and evolution of the Zimbabwean crisis was collected from a considerable number of responses over a relatively short period of time. The questionnaires were distributed by hand, and this made the response rate high and allowed the researcher to collect the questionnaires immediately afterwards, ensuring a degree of anonymity and independence as respondents expressed their views freely without influencing each other or being influenced by the researcher.

3.7.3. Disadvantages of Questionnaires

Anything written down draws a sense of reluctance from participants especially when the questionnaires are too long. The researcher therefore did not structure too long questionnaires.

3.7.4 Interviews

According to Kirby (1997) an interview is similar to conversation in that it involves interaction between at least two people. Aggies (1997:26) defines an interview as a formal meeting at which the interviewee is asked questions in order to find out his/her opinions about something. Interviews were held with the following group's churches, pressure groups and civic groups.

3.7.5 Advantages of using interviews

Much information about the "crisis" and the events in Zimbabwe were obtained from interviews held. The researcher used the interview as an appropriate tool for probing and prompting from the respondents in order to clarify responses. The interview questions allowed the researcher to ask numerous open ended questions. The interviews ensured a high response rate and a better cross section sample and the researcher further probed and got more information that the researcher had not anticipated.

3.7.6 Disadvantages of using interviews

Some of the interviews held lacked anonymity and the interviewer told the researcher what they thought the interviewer wanted to hear. The researcher kept on probing until she was satisfied with the responses given. Some respondents seem to have forgotten some of the information, and specific details being asked especially on strategies employed by some SADC organs to resolve the impasse between ZANU-PF and the two MDC political parties. The interviews were costly in terms of time and money to travel. Lack of cooperation from the respondents can also make the conducting of interviews a serious challenge.

3.8 Data Validity

Best and Khan (1993:208) define validity as that quality of a data-gathering instrument that enables it to measure what it is supposed to measure. It is the extent to which a research instrument can measure what it is supposed to measure. Cooper and Schindler (2003) go on to explain content validity of a measuring instrument as the extent to which it provides adequate coverage of the investigative questions guiding the study. According to Sattler (1982:23) validity is the “extent to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure and also the appropriateness with which inferences can be made on the basis of the test results.” In order to incorporate validity in this study, the questionnaires were pre-tested in a pilot study. The questionnaires were then corrected and adjusted so that they focus on relevant areas of the study.

3.9 Data collection procedures

The questionnaires were hand delivered to the respondents who were given two days to complete the questionnaires after which they were collected in person by the researcher.

The contact details of prospective respondents were obtained and used to get in touch with them when they finished completing the questionnaires. Consent letters were also issued to respondents so that they were aware that the study is for academic purposes only and very confidential.

3.10 Data presentation and analysis

The researcher used pie charts, graphs, the descriptive method to present and analyse data collected. Tables were used to represent information solicited from the secondary sources and this was used in conjunction with the descriptive method.

3.11 Summary

In this chapter the researcher described the research design employed to provide the overall strategy for answering the research questions for this project. It highlighted the tools and techniques used in both primary and secondary data collection. The qualitative research design using a case study was found appropriate for this study. The answers to the research questions and attainment of primary objectives were derived from these findings.

CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of this study that was collected through questionnaires and interviews. Furthermore it is in this chapter that an examination and interpretation of the data on SADC intervention in the Zimbabwean crisis is academically dissected. Secondary sources were used to show the disparities between findings from interviews and questionnaires. To facilitate the discussion and presentation of findings tables, graphs and pie charts were made use of when analyzing the data.

4.1 Demographic information of participants.

Information was collected from representatives of the three political parties who were signatory to the Global Political agreement, civil society, political analysts and academics, diplomats who have missions in Zimbabwe and other government officials. Some questionnaires were distributed to officials whom the researcher was not able to meet because of shortage of time and other reasons. Some questionnaires were also dispatched to civic group's offices and embassies to cut on travelling costs. Table 1 illustrates the interviews target population and responses.

Table 1: Interview Response

Target group	Targeted response	Actual response	Response Rate %
Zanu-PF Politicians	10	10	100
MDC-T Politicians	10	7	70
MDC-M/N Politicians	4	4	100
Civil Society	5	5	100
Diplomats	5	3	60
Political analysts/Academics	10	10	100

Questionnaires were then distributed in an attempt to make up for the targeted participants who could not be reached for interviews. Table 2 illustrates the distribution of questionnaires and the response rate.

Table 2: Responses to Questionnaires

Target population	No of questionnaires distributed.	Questionnaires returned	Response Rate %
ZANU-PF Politicians	30	25	83
MDC-T Politicians	15	13	87
MDC-M / N	10	6	60
Civil Society	5	5	100
Diplomats	10	5	50
Political analysts / Academics	15	15	100

4.2 The genesis and evolution of the Zimbabwean conflict that occurred between 2000 and 2013




Figure 1: Genesis and Evolution of the Zimbabwean Crisis

The pie chart above shows a summary of the opinions of the respondents on the genesis and evolution of the crisis. 72 % of the respondents are of the opinion that the genesis of the crisis started in the late 1990s and was eventually catalyzed by the formation of the MDC and the land invasions that started in 2000. They blame ZANU-PF for having caused the crisis. 28 % of the respondents blamed the MDC for having generated the crisis. Basing on the information gathered from the following actors: ZANU-PF politicians, MDC-T Politicians, MDC-M/N Politicians, civil society, political analysts/academics, and Diplomats it is clear that there is no consensus on the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis though they agree on its evolution but give different emphasis on

incidences that exacerbated the conflict amongst the political parties involved... What is clear is that socio-economic and political factors caused and aggravated the political polarity between Zanu-PF and the two MDC formations. The researcher found out that the major parties in the Zimbabwean politics are in agreement that there was/is a crisis in the country but they differ on the causes and genesis and existence of the crisis. This is evidenced from the preamble of the agreement signed during the formation of the GPA:

“We, the parties to this agreement, concerned about the recent challenges that we have faced as a country and the multiple threats to the well-being of our people and, therefore, determined to resolve these permanently, dedicating ourselves to putting an end to the polarization, divisions, conflict and intolerance that had characterized Zimbabwean politics and society in recent times.”

Further the parties are in agreement that the land issue had played a central role in the crisis. This is evidenced in article IV of the agreement, the section that reads:’

And recognizing that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during the colonial conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post-independence period were not only unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity and justice. Noting that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to win one man one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need for the re-distribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was at the core of the liberation struggle. Accepting the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme in Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and injustices in order to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice. While differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the parties acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land had taken place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000.

Accepting the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution, the preamble of the agreement clearly shows that the involved parties were in agreement to the existence of the challenges that bedeviled the country. The political parties involved

thus agreed that the country was in a state of crisis but they differ on what caused the crisis or conflict.

4.2.1 ZANU-PF Politicians

ZANU (PF) blame the crisis on sanctions that were imposed on the ZANU (PF) government by Britain, America and the EU and at the request of the MDC. According to Rugare Gumbo in an interview by author the genesis of the Zimbabwean problem goes back 1997 when the Tony Blair government reneged on the promise that had been made by the Thatcher government to fund the land reform programme in Zimbabwe. This was further worsened by the IMF and World Bank's refusal to avail money to the Zimbabwean government. He strongly contends that Western powers being led by Britain and America wanted to effect regime change starting immediately after Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia's electoral defeat by Fredrick Chiluba and his MMD labour party. This argument is corroborated by findings that were made by Mahuku and Mbanje (2013). Joram Gumbo, the ZANU-PF 'Chief Whip' also in an interview by author opine that Zimbabwe has been a victim of incessant meddling, through declared and undeclared economic sanctions, merely because the Government embarked upon a process of equitable land redistribution after the former colonial power had reneged on its responsibilities. The British and their allies have used their media to "viciously portray Zimbabwe as a lawless, disorderly and undemocratic country" he said. "It is therefore patently clear that the root cause of the crisis is the Fast Track Land Reform Programme that started in 2000 and the Western efforts to try and force a regime change

in Zimbabwe”. This is in tandem with Moyo (2005) when he posits that the land redistribution programme was a turning point in the events in Zimbabwe.

ZANU PF politicians argue that Zimbabwe has suffered from sanctions imposed by the United States of America and the EU, which has caused much suffering on the ordinary people. They contend that the world was made to believe that President Robert Mugabe’s policies have precipitated the political and economic problems that the Zimbabwean people have endured. Many people have therefore been moving to neighbouring countries in search of greener pastures. It is evident from the findings that ZANU-PF politicians agree that sanctions are basically an expression of imperialist conquest and no amount of propaganda or denial can ever wish that away.

4.2.2 MDC-T and MDC-M/N Politicians

MDC formations place the blame for the crisis squarely on the ZANU-PF led government. The two MDC formations politicians are of the view that the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis can be traced back to 1990 when the ZANU-PF government agreed to the proposition by the international financial institutions, the IMF & WB. The Two MDCs formations attribute the crisis of bad political and economic governance. Nelson Chamisa in an interview by author argues that the Mugabe government embarked on a FTLR to gain political mileage since its support base was dwindling evidenced by how they lost the February 2000 Constitution referendum and the disputed June 2000 parliamentary election as well as the 2002 rigged presidential election.

Tendai Biti also opines that ZANU-PF's inability to come up with sound economic policies in line with the requirements of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) meant that government had to compete with the private sector for the available funds on the domestic market. This forced interest rates higher making the cost of borrowing too high for manufacturers. However, commercial profits were readily achievable and the increased inflow of foreign funds as part of the ESAP provided easy access to imported consumer goods at the detriment of local industry. He went on to argue that neither donor withdrawal nor can nefarious economic plots explain the depth and persistence of the crisis. "The crisis can only be located in bad political and economic governance" he remarked. Priscilla Misihairembwi Mushonga also pointed out that "it is obvious that Zimbabwe's current economic difficulties are linked to specific government policy decisions. The FTLR programme resulted in a chaotic disruption on the farms and even now the country has not yet recovered."

James Maridade also believes that agriculture had been destroyed by the politically expedient and often violent land reform programme initiated by the ZANU PF government in 2000. He agreed with Biti that annual wheat production had plummeted from a high of over 30 000 tonnes in 1991 to less than 50 000 in 2007 – production almost one third of what it was over 30 years ago, in which period the population had more than doubled. The Tobacco industry, which used to be the single largest generator of foreign exchange, accounting for almost a third of all Zimbabwe's foreign exchange

earnings in 2000 had all but collapsed. The crop which earned some US\$ 600 million in 2000 generated under US\$ 100 million in 2006.

The two MDC formations agree that bad economic and political governance history of ZANU-PF which goes as far back as 1997 is there for everyone to see. The ZANU-PF led government gave war veterans unbudgeted \$50 000 gratuities as compensation for their contributions in the war of liberation. As if this was not enough Mugabe without consulting parliament subsequently participated in the Democratic Republic of Congo war where Zimbabwe was using over US \$ 1 million a day. This information is corroborated with Bond and Manyanya (2003) quoting an address made in parliament by the then Minister of Finance Dr. Simba Makoni. Biti also observed that the evolution of the crisis continued as a result of financial mismanagement, wanton corruption amongst ZANU-PF 'chefs', the land reform programme and the ZANU-PF leadership's desire to remain in office at all costs. According to the MDC formations neither the drought, nor donor withdrawal explain the nefarious Zimbabwean economic deterioration then the genesis and evolution of the crisis can only be located in bad political and economic governance. In many ways, it is obvious that Zimbabwe's current economic difficulties are linked to specific government policy decisions. The "government's kiya-kiya economy has resulted in a chaotic economic performance that is continuing unabated despite the adoption of a multi-currency" Biti said.

4.2.3 Civil Society

Some civil society Organisations like Zimbabwe Heritage are of the opinion that the Zimbabwean conflict can be traced to the year 2000 when the MDC and the NCA campaigned for a “No Vote” to the government’s proposed constitution. When the War Veterans realized what had happened, that is the MDC and NCA were being supported by the white commercial farmers they besieged white commercial farms. As the conflict evolved the situation was worsened by the urbanites and white commercial farmers who voted for the MDC in the June 2000 parliamentary elections.

Some civil society Organisations like Human Rights Watch and Coalition Crisis contend that the Zimbabwean conflict was a result of bad political and economic governance. It must be pointed out that there is a grain of truth in what the civil organisations said. It cannot be disputed that the Zimbabwean crisis was accelerated by the “No” vote. However one must not lose sight of the fact that the Zimbabwean economy had already started to deteriorate as a result of the negative effects of the IMF/WB sponsored economic reforms. As was pointed out in related studies by Makumbe, Mlambo, Raftopoulous, and Masunungure in the literature review and others. The situation was further worsened by the unbudgeted gratuities and pensions awarded to war veterans in 1997. The situation was further compounded by Zimbabwe’s participation in the DRC war and the IMF/WB’s refusal to give the Zimbabwean government some loans. The situation was further exacerbated by the Tony Blair government that refused to tie itself

to a land reform exercise that was not transparent. Arguably the ZANU-PF politicians realized that they had committed political suicide and therefore had no option but to embark on a FTLR that resulted on sanctions being imposed on 'Harare'.

4.2.4 Perception from Diplomats

From the data collected it can be pointed out that they generally agree on the genesis of the Zimbabwean conflict and trace it to the late 1990s however they differ on the causes of the conflict that later reverberated on the whole Southern African region and beyond. Some diplomats from the SADC member states like that of Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa argue that the intra-state conflict in Zimbabwe was caused by The Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF leadership's desire to redistribute land to its people and was worsened by the Western countries desire to try and force a regime change in Zimbabwe via the Movement for Democratic Change like what they did in Zambia where Kenneth Kaunda lost elections to Fredrick Chiluba.

On the other hand diplomats from the European countries with resident missions in Zimbabwe like Debra Bronnety from Britain contend that what caused the Zimbabwean economic and political crisis was bad economic and political governance by the ZANU-PF led government. She argues that the Zimbabwean government embarked on a FTLR because it had realized that it was going be voted out of power just in the same manner as what had happened during the 2000 February referendum. The FSLR and the violence

that followed were the only cards that were left and were used by ZANU-PF to remain in office.

4.2.5 Political analysts / academia

From the research findings it can be noted that academics have taken sides on the causes of intra-state conflict in Zimbabwe. What is interesting to note is that the academic debate on the Zimbabwean crisis has been politicized ignoring the multi-dimensional approach in social sciences which looks at issues from different positions.

Some academics like Dr Tafataona Mahoso argue that the Zimbabwean conflict can be traced back to the early 1990s when Zimbabwe experienced drought in 1992 and was later forced to embrace the neo-liberal economic structural adjustment programme that was dangled to it like a carrot by the IMF and World Bank. This was later exacerbated by the British who reneged on fulfilling their Lancaster House obligations to fund land reform and the formation of the western sponsored MDC. From ‘bird’s eye view’ it can be deduced that the Zimbabwean crisis that occurred between 2000-2013 cannot only be analysed using a single ontology as there are also alternative approaches which can also help in our understanding of the crisis.

4.3 Conflict resolution strategies employed by SADC in their efforts to solve the impasse between ZANU-PF and the two MDCs




Figure 2: Success of Mechanisms Employed by SADC in Resolving the Zimbabwean Crisis

An analysis of the above figure shows that 65% of the respondents were of the opinion that SADC did not employ effective mediation strategies to solve the Zimbabwean issue and concentrated more on quiet diplomacy that took long to break the political deadlock. 35% of the respondents opined that the negotiation strategies used were effective and this is evidenced by the signing of the GPA and the formation of the inclusive government. The SADC mandated South Africa to mediate in the Zimbabwean conflict to end the political impasse that saw the political parties signing the global political agreement that in turn led to the formation of the GNU. It emerged from the findings that mediation as a strategy was very crucial in solving the Zimbabwean conflict though it did not succeed in bringing finality on the issue. The two MDC formations and some

western diplomats opine that Thabo Mbeki's quiet diplomacy had a lot of weaknesses despite having been able to bring the conflicting opposition parties to the negotiating table. Nelson Chamisa is of the opinion that the SADC organs should have been more vocal, reprimanded Mugabe and should have seen to it that all issues that were raised and agreed to in the GPA were implemented. However some analysts and ZANU-PF politicians contend that strategies employed by the SADC Troika, the Summit Heads of State and OPDSC of quiet diplomacy were very effective for it enabled Zimbabweans to solve their own problems on their own. This strategy enabled the holding of bilateral meetings between South Africa and the Zimbabwean political parties' delegations and between heads of states until the conflict was resolved. President Mbeki and later on President Zuma was frequently involved in persistent negotiations with all political parties in what is known as 'constructive engagement that in the end resulted in the signing of the GPA and formation of the GNU.

The OPDSC successively intervened to solve the Zimbabwean crisis and it in turn occasionally reported to the SADC Summit Heads of States even though it would function at the level of heads of states (Gavin Cawthra 2013). In 2004 SIPO was tasked to deal on matters related to....preventing, containing and resolving inter and intra-state conflicts. Organ operates at summit level as well as at ministerial level. SADC encouraged free and fair elections in Zimbabwe and in 2004 the SADC Summit adopted the SADC principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. SADC did not give itself a mediatory role. It only did so when the matter was referred to the AU at its

Sharm-el Sheik summit in June 2008. In November 2009 an emergency SADC summit in which the ZANU-PF government was told that it had to make the inclusive government work.

4.4 Was SADC successful in resolving the political conflict between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations in Zimbabwe




Figure 3: Was SADC Successful or not in solving the Zimbabwean Crisis

From the above it can be noted that 68% of the respondents were of the opinion that SADC has successfully resolved the Zimbabwean conflict while 32% of the respondents are of the opinion that SADC has failed to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis and to bring finality to the case. From the interviews and questionnaires which were returned respondents gave both positive and negative views on whether the Southern African Development Community has been successful in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict.

Some political analysts strongly believe that the SADC has been much more reluctant to meddle in the Zimbabwean conflict than it has done in other Southern Africa countries. This has mainly been because the argument given by the President Robert Mugabe resonates with some serving or retired SADC heads of states like Thabo Mbeki, Sam Nujoma, Amando Guebuza and others. These leaders and other civic organisations like Zimbabwe Heritage, Heal Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Council of Churches and others contend that SADC has successfully resolved the Zimbabwean crisis/Conflict and therefore continues to lobby for the removal of economic sanctions imposed on Harare. However Coalition Crisis and the Human rights watch contend that SADC has partially succeeded and has failed to put finality to the Zimbabwean problem. The police and the military are still vicious and openly partisan as they were since the beginning of the 21st century. The police are still using AIPPA and POSA and therefore there is still no freedom.

However other academics like Ibbo Mandaza, and SADC leaders like Ian Khama of Botswana, Western diplomats resident in Zimbabwe and the two MDC formations opine that SADC has not been very successful in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. They contend that from 2000 SADC took little action, supported Mugabe and characterized the conflict as an internal one that required internal solutions. They are also of the opinion that SADC saw the Zimbabwean crisis as one of land reform rather than governance and did not make timely interventions. They only firmly intervened in 2008 when the GPA was signed leading to the formation of the GNU in February 2009 only

after being pressured by the African Union (AU) The African Union after having noted some kind of hesitancy by SADC to effectively intervene in the Zimbabwean conflict expressed deep concern about the situation in Zimbabwe, but did not support sanctions. Instead, it had “appealed to States and all parties concerned to refrain from any action that may negatively impact on the climate for dialogue”. The harmonised elections held in March 2008 were held in an environment that permitted the holding of peaceful elections. A crisis arose when ZEC failed to announce the presidential results for almost five weeks. The MDC-T cried foul when the results were later announced arguing that they had been manipulated. Mugabe and Tsvangirai had to go for a re-run in an election scheduled to take place on the 27th of June 2008. Tsvangirai eventually withdrew in a bid to ‘protect his supporters from renewed violence. Robert Mugabe was declared winner.

The above process was declared unfair and African Union, some SADC countries and the Pan-African Parliament. France pointed out that the situation in Zimbabwe threatened to destabilize Southern Africa. While supporting mediation efforts by SADC and President Mbeki, France noted that the 29 March elections had seen victory go to Morgan Tsvangirai and his opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. They felt therefore that in order for a true dialogue to begin, pressure was necessary to protect the people. France and other European Union member States, therefore, supported an irreversible sanctions regime and also called for an arms embargo.

The African Union had decided to support SADC's efforts and recommended that those efforts should continue to assist in resolving the problem. The African Union had appealed to the parties to avoid any action likely to have a negative impact on the climate of dialogue. South Africa was officially mandated by the AU to mediate and was appointed as facilitator at the SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in the United Republic of Tanzania.

The Zimbabwean parties' commitment to dialogue after pressure was exerted by the Summit of heads of states and the Troika was encouraging. This was apparent when all the political parties involved were adhering to the dictates that were being given by SADC on the progress they were making. It led to the improvement of the humanitarian and economic situation, thereby contributing to a better life for all Zimbabweans. South Africa as the guaranteed SADC mediator made sure that talks were continuing, some behind the scenes and continued to monitor the progress that was being made and in turn reported the progress to the Summit heads of states. The Summit had also decided "to encourage President Mugabe and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai to honour their commitments to initiate dialogue, with a view to promoting peace, stability, democracy and reconciliation of the Zimbabwe people". The assumption that the situation in Zimbabwe represented a threat to peace and security in the region was disputed by neighbouring countries especially South Africa that was being pressured to militarily intervene in Zimbabwe. Dr Mandaza reiterated that SADC has actually supported Robert

Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party at the detriment of democratic progress in Zimbabwe. Despite the fact that Zimbabwe now has a new constitution and held an election in 2013 some of the issues in the GPA have not been resolved. It only shows that SADC has leaders who are unwilling to criticize and take a radical stance against another revolutionary leader.

The MDC formations believe that only a change in regime would be the lasting answer to the problems in Zimbabwe. They strongly opine that SADC has once again failed the Zimbabwean people. Professor Welshman Ncube is of the view that ZANU-PF has been let off the hook and yet the situation in Zimbabwe may become volatile at any time. He went on to argue that before the holding of the 2013 elections there was undoubtedly a huge military and war veteran presence in the rural areas where voters were intimidated, this is something that was there in 2000. He also argues that now that ZANU-PF has an undeserved two thirds majority in parliament and the senate the situation is going to be worse as the two houses rubber stamp clueless ZANU-PF economic policies and very soon there will be running battles between the people and the police supported by the military. Many industries have been closed, the people are suffering as the hope that had been ushered in by the years of the inclusive government fades away. What Zimbabwe and its people want is a party with new ideas committed to good political and economic governance.

Professor Jonathan Moyo contends that SADC has been able to solve the Zimbabwean conflict despite having encountered several challenges. He believes that while political dialogue was ongoing between the contending parties, the President, comrade Robert Mugabe had reached out to the opposition and called for all political parties to enter into a comprehensive inter-party dialogue sooner rather than later. Reconciliation is not a new concept to Zimbabwe, which fully welcomed the African Union resolution. In line with the mandate from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and supported by the African Union, President Thabo Mbeki had been in Zimbabwe to consult with President Mugabe and the political parties on charting the way forward. Any separate initiatives have been counterproductive and undermined the role of SADC and President Mbeki and later Jacob Zuma since some African countries in the AU openly were campaigning for a regime change in Zimbabwe.

The imposition of sanctions under the pretext that the country was a threat to international peace and security simply because the elections held did not bring out a result favourable to the UK and her allies is counter progressive. It was not the role of SADC and other invited observers to pronounce the fairness of the Zimbabwean 2013 national elections that brought finality to the Zimbabwean problem. "It is therefore scandalous for Britain, the United States of America and the EU to maintain sanctions saying that the Zimbabwean political impasse is not yet over. Zimbabweans have a right to choose their own leaders, Zimbabwe's problems have been solved by Zimbabwean working together with other Africans," Professor Moyo concluded.

4.5 Impact of SADC intervention in Zimbabwe

It must be noted that the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF welcomed the SADC intervention in the Zimbabwean conflict. The general Zimbabwean populaces were also of the opinion that the Zimbabwean conflict was finally going to be put to rest. It emerged from the research that the people were later disgruntled by the role that the SADC intervention team was making. The people noted that Thabo Mbeki was ‘always dragging his feet’ and openly sided with the ZANU-PF party.

The Zimbabwean people were very much dejected with South Africa especially for failing to take a firmer stance against President Mugabe, ZEC and the military junta whom they contend manipulated the outcome of the 2008 March elections in which they argue Morgan Tsvangirai had won the election. The argument is logical in that it actually took ZEC more than five weeks to announce the presidential result. South Africa and the SADC openly betrayed the mediatory trust that Zimbabweans had in them by failing to condemn the electoral process. They should have condemned the whole electoral process but instead they allowed for an electoral rerun that became a one man event. It also emerged from the findings that the ZANU-PF part was actually playing hide and seek with the SADC mediator. Later on the GNU failed to properly function because SADC had allowed ZANU-PF to continue playing a leading role in everything and yet most people were supporting the opposition. All the agreements of the GPA were not implemented as has already been pointed out. The 2013 elections were also held not on a level playing field. It also emerged from the research that many

Zimbabweans contend that ZANU-PF the 2013 rigged the elections and from then on it has continued to run the country down. Many Zimbabweans therefore opine that SADC failed to bring finality to the Zimbabwean problem and Zimbabweans are continuing to suffer because of SADC's failure to effect strategies to ensure that in future there are mechanisms that will allow Zimbabwe's smooth transition to democracy.

4.6 Conclusion

The chapter presented, analysed and discussed the research findings. The data was mostly presented through graphs and pie charts. Key issues emerging from the research findings are that the Zimbabwean conflict is a result of both internal and external causes with ZANU-PF refusing to renege on its liberation promises. The OPDSC, SIPO and the SADC Summit of Heads of States played a critical role in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. It has been highlighted that though Zimbabwe now has a new constitution and successfully held elections in 2013 the political contestations between ZANU-PF and the MDC-T has not been successfully resolved. The next chapter gives a summary of the major findings, recommendations and areas for further research

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter serves the purpose of appending the whole research work. The researcher comes up with conclusions from the array of findings as well as proffering recommendations for SADC policy makers involved in conflict prevention and resolution and other stakeholders involved in peace initiatives in the Southern African region.

5.1 Summary

There are a lot of journal articles and books that have been written on the Zimbabwean crisis that started at the beginning of the 21st century. The situation that triggered and surrounds the contestations amongst political parties in Zimbabwe has been analysed by academics like Dzinesa and Zambara (2010), Khadiagala (2010), Muzondidya (2008), Mahuku and Mbanje (2013) Raftopoulous (2009) Tutu (2003) Hendricks and Musawengana (2010) Miles-Tendi (2013) Mahoso (2012) and many others. The research findings depict that the Zimbabwean issue is very volatile, politicized and are closely lining to the political beliefs of participants.

The research had three main assumptions which were:

- The SADC was partially successful in solving the Zimbabwean crisis

- The SADC's failure to bring finality to the Zimbabwean problem is firmly fixed in its inability to come up with mechanisms to enforce decisions that will have been agreed on.
- Liberation Movements in Southern Africa supported ZANU-PF at the expense of newly formed opposition parties

The research aimed to analyse divergent views of political parties that were signatory to the GPA and were part of the SADC brokered GNU, civic groups, diplomats and academia's views on the Zimbabwean crisis. Discussion was on the genesis of the crisis and its evolution, strategies adopted by SADC and some of its respective organs to solve the conflict/crisis and evaluating whether SADC succeeded or failed in resolving the crisis. The major findings on the genesis of the crisis were that ZANU-PF politicians blame the crisis on sanctions that had been imposed on ZANU (PF) and related companies at the alleged request of the MDC. They trace the genesis of the Zimbabwean problem to 1997 when the Tony Blair government reneged on the promise to bank-roll the Zimbabwe land redistribution exercise. Zimbabwe has therefore been a victim of incessant meddling by Western nations through declared and undeclared economic sanctions. MDC formations place the blame for the crisis squarely on the ZANU (PF). The two MDC formations politicians are of the view that the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis can be traced back to 1990 when the Zanu-PF government swallowed hook, line and sinker agreed to the IMF & WB SAPs. The situation was further exacerbated by bad economic and political governance that resulted in Zimbabweans wanting a political

alternative found in the MDC. Zanu-PF in a bid for political survival embarked on the disastrous FTLR and became increasingly authoritarian as the crisis evolved.

Some civil society Organisations like Zimbabwe Heritage are of the opinion that the Zimbabwean conflict can be traced to the year 2000 when the MDC and the NCA campaigned for a “No Vote” to the government’s proposed constitution. When the War Veterans realized what had happened, that is the MDC and NCA were being supported by the white commercial farmers they besieged white commercial farms. Diplomats from the European countries with resident missions in Zimbabwe contend that what caused the Zimbabwean economic and political crisis was bad economic and political governance by the ZANU-PF led government. She argues that the Zimbabwean government embarked on a FTLR because it had realized that it was going to be voted out of power just in the same manner as what had happened during the 2000 February referendum. The FSLR and the violence that followed were the only cards that were left and were used by ZANU-PF to remain in office. Academic analysts espoused all the views shared by the above groups. Their opinions were based on their political ideologies. Those who support the neo-liberal ideology arguing from an MDC standpoint while revolutionaries who support the Ubuntu philosophy supported the views from the ZANU-PF camp.

On the issue of conflict resolution strategies adopted by SADC was able to mandate South Africa to mediate in the Zimbabwean conflict first through former president

Thabo Mbeki and later on Jacob Zuma. South Africa came in as a third party to resolve the political impasse that was there between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations leading to the signing of the GPA and the formation of the GNU. With consent from both the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF SADC managed to prevent the escalation of the conflict into a civil war in 2008 by ‘managing and partially resolving the conflict. SADC did this through Thabo Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy that combined soft diplomatic approaches that were done behind the scenes, constructive engagement resulting in the signing of the GPA, the formation of the GNU and the successful holding of the 2013 elections.

However it must be pointed out that it emerged from the findings that the South African presidents, both Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were not neutral in the way in which they handled the Zimbabwean case. Thabo Mbeki openly sided with Zanu-PF explaining why time and again Morgan Tsvangirai was always complaining. This compromised the outcome of the negotiations that were between the MDC formations and Zanu-PF. It also emerged from the findings that ordinary Zimbabweans contend that South Africa is responsible for the continued economic deterioration that is still gripping the Zimbabwean state. Arguably Zanu-PF was allowed to come back through the back door when the SADC member countries openly supported the formation of the GNU. The SADC member countries failed to exert pressure on Robert Mugabe to implement the GPA agreements. When Jacob Zuma became the mediator he at first exerted pressure on Harare but ‘diplomatically climbed’ down when Lindiwe Zulu, Zuma’s international

relations advisor openly criticized Zanu-PF. It was then that President Mugabe threatened moving out of the regional grouping arguing that Zimbabwe's sovereignty had to be respected. The fact that SADC countries remained mum to Zimbabwe's bullish attitude showed its weaknesses.

On whether the SADC was able to successful or not in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis and giving finality to political and economic crisis; from the interviews and questionnaires which were returned respondents gave both positive and negative views on whether the Southern African Development Community has been successful in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. Some political analysts strongly believe that the SADC has been much more reluctant to meddle in the Zimbabwean conflict than it has done in other Southern Africa countries. This has mainly been because the argument given by the President Robert Mugabe resonates with some serving or retired SADC heads of states like Thabo Mbeki, Amando Guebuza and others.

However other academics like Dr Ibbo Mandaza, and SADC leaders like Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania and Ian Khama of Botswana, Western diplomats resident in Zimbabwe and the two MDC formations opine that SADC has not been very successful in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. They contend that from 2000 SADC took little action, supported Mugabe and characterized the conflict as an internal one that required internal solutions. They are also of the opinion that SADC saw the Zimbabwean crisis as one of land reform rather than governance and did not make timely interventions. They

only firmly intervened in 2008 and only ended coming up with an elite pact that was not representative of the wishes of the Zimbabwean people. Despite the fact that Zimbabwe now has a new constitution and held an election in 2013 some of the issues in the GPA have not been resolved. SADC has leaders who are unwilling to criticize and take a radical stance against another revolutionary leader.

The qualitative approach was used in carrying out the research as it was the most appropriate to find out people's views and feelings on how the Zimbabwean crisis started, evolved, was brokered by the SADC member states through the OPDSC, SIPO and the SADC Summit of Heads of State. Data was gathered through questionnaires, interviews and secondary sources. The target population was chosen through purposive sampling that included politicians from three political parties that is ZANU-PF, MDC-T and the now 'defunct MDC-M now known as MDC-N.

5.2 Conclusions

- In this study it emerged that representatives of political parties that is the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF do not agree on causes and genesis of the Zimbabwean conflict. The research has also shown that the GNU was simply a marriage of convenience explaining why the opposition parties will never agree on how to effectively resolve the 'seemingly dormant Zimbabwean conflict.' The research shows that the MDC formations are of the view that ZANU-PF was responsible for causing the Zimbabwean crisis and does not have sound

economic policies to improve the lives of Zimbabweans. ZANU-PF is not therefore prepared to open up political space that allows good political and economic governance. Paradoxically the SADC has fallen victim of Mugabe's rhetoric and has therefore failed to bring finality to the Zimbabwean problem. SADC has only managed to come up with piece-meal window-dressed reforms that have made conflict in Zimbabwe to become dormant but when the conflict erupts again it will be disastrous. The SADC's failure to bring finality to the Zimbabwean problem is firmly fixed in its inability to come up with mechanisms to enforce decisions that will have been agreed on.

The MDC formations as well as some civic Organisations and western diplomats are of the opinion that SADC through OPDSC and Summit of Heads of State should have taken a more nuanced stance against ZANU-PF and see to it that all the provisions of the GPA were adhered to and followed. ZANU-PF is of the view that the crisis is rooted in the western sponsored regime change agenda that came about when ZANU-PF decided to "finish the unfinished business" by redistributing land to ordinary Zimbabweans. The MDC is bent on nothing but regime change and mortgaging Zimbabwe to its erstwhile colonisers shown by its refusal to lobby for the removal of economic sanctions... They contend that the SADC through OPDSC and the Summit of Heads of State have been successful in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis evidenced by the new Zimbabwean constitution and the successful holding of the 2013 elections.

The research has shown that the Zimbabwean political impasse is far from being over. Though the SADC was involved in trying to solve the conflict it failed to timely intervene and only intervened when the conflict had reached a climax explaining why Zimbabwe is experiencing difficulties to successfully emerge from the economic and political crisis that had engulfed it. Zimbabwe has remained a police state and the some of the GPA provisions were not implemented. President Robert Mugabe overtly defied some of the SADC recommendations to make the Inclusive government work and SADC remained mum. SADC approaches favoured ZANU-PF explaining why some sections of the Zimbabwean population opine that ZANU-PF through the SADC was given another lease of political life, rigged the 2013 elections and is continuing to run down the country through corrupt activities.

5.3 Recommendations

Below are recommendations from this study:

- Democracy still remains a pipe dream if the SADC member countries leaders do not openly criticize some of their own to promote democracy
- SADC requires peace building strategies that will enable it to successfully resolve intra-state conflicts and in the process improve the lives of the ordinary people rather than coming up with elite compacts that benefit the political elite.

- SADC must desist from being simply a strategic diplomatic forum and must come up with mechanisms that make the decisions that it makes binding on member countries.
- SADC must also be very objective and transparent in how they choose their mediators and avoid choosing mediators who take sides with any one of the conflicting parties like what they did when they chose South Africa to be the mediator on the Zimbabwean conflict.

5.4 Areas for further studies

- How the SADC can effectively solve intra-state conflicts.
- How the SADC spirit of solidarity has slowed the transition to democracy in Southern Africa.
- Those in the academia and policy makers must research on mechanisms or protocols that must be adopted by the SADC OPDSC and Summit of Heads of State to make decisions that they make binding.

5.5 Conclusion

This study has revealed that the crisis begun in the late 1990s and was catalyzed by continual bad economic and political governance by the Zimbabwean government as well as the MDC that lobbied for the West to introduce sanctions on Harare. The researcher also came to the conclusion that the SADC partially succeeded in resolving the Zimbabwean conflict and failed to see to it that all the agreed outstanding issues of

the Global Political Agreement (GPA) were implemented in before the 2013 elections. SADC has therefore failed to put finality to the Zimbabwean conflict. The researcher therefore recommends that the SADC OPDSC and Summit of Heads of State must adopt strategies that will enable the decisions that they make to be binding on SADC member countries if ever it is to be successful in completely resolving and eradicating intrastate conflict s in the region. The SADC must also be very careful and objective in how they choose their mediators, in future SADC must not choose mediators who are neutral for they will be detrimental to quickly resolving a crisis. The researcher employed the Human Security Theory.

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
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Appendices

Appendix A - Clearance Letter



Appendix B- Interview Guide

My name is Precious Kamedzera (Student No: 129307) and I am a student from the Africa University (AU). I am pursuing an Executive Master in Peace and Governance. My focus is on '*An Analysis of the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in Conflict Resolution in intrastate conflicts. A case study of Zimbabwe (2000-2013)*', done in partial fulfillment for the requirements of the Master in Peace and Governance. No names or any identification marks are required. So please feel free to respond honestly. The information you are going to supply will be used for the purpose of this study only and will be treated with strict confidentiality.

Interview Guide

1. What are your views on the political conflict between ZANU PF and MDC formations in Zimbabwe?
2. In your understanding what is the genesis of the political impasse in Zimbabwe between ZANU PF and MDC formation (2000-2013)?
3. In your view, did SADC' OPDSC handle the Zimbabwean political crisis within its mandate? If yes/no why do you say so?
4. Do you think SADC's OPDS is a crucial organ in resolving conflicts in Southern Africa? If yes - comment
5. In your opinion do you think its involvement in Zimbabwe was timely and appropriate?
6. Do you know any of the mechanisms which SADC' OPDS applied in resolving the Zimbabwe Issue? If yes, did the mechanism effectively aid the mediation process?
7. Do you think other liberation movements in Southern Africa influenced the Zimbabwe mediation process?
8. Do you think the SADC-led mediation process managed to restore political sanity and finality to Zimbabwean political conflict?
9. Can we conclude that SADC – OPDS managed to bring finality to the Zimbabwe political conflicts?
10. Can SADC's OPDSC intervention in the Zimbabwe political conflict be compared to other interventions in the Southern Africa?

11. What were the challenges encountered by SADC's OPDSC in resolving the Zimbabwean political conflict?

Appendix C -Questionnaire

My name is Precious Kamedzera (Student No: 129307) and I am a student from the Africa University (AU). I am pursuing an Executive Master in Peace and Governance. My focus is on '*An Analysis of the SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in Conflict Resolution in Intrastate Conflicts: A Case Study of Zimbabwe (2000-2013)*', done in partial fulfillment for the requirements of the Master in Peace and Governance. No names or any identification marks are required. So please feel free to respond honestly. The information you are going to supply will be used for the purpose of this study only and will be treated with strict confidentiality.

Section A:

Personal attributes:

Question 1.0 Indicate your Sex: 1. Male

2. Female

Question 2.0 Indicate your age 1. Below 25 years

2. 26-30 years

3. 36-40 years

4. 41 years and above

Question 3.0 Which Organisation or professional group do you belong to?

1. Civil society

2. Academics

3. Diplomats

4. Politicians

Other (specify).....

Section B

Question 1: Do you understand the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis? Circle the number of your opinion.

1. Yes

2. No

If yes please elaborate.

Question 2: Who was responsible for causing the crisis? Why?

Question 3: Briefly explain how the crisis evolved.....

Question 4: Which SADC organs handled the issue?.....

Question 5: Which conflict strategies were employed to solve the crisis?.....

Question 6: Do you think the SADC's involvement in the Zimbabwean case was timely and appropriate? Explain appropriate? Explain for each answer you give.....

Question 7: Did the SADC intervention and mediation bring finality to the Zimbabwean problem?

Question 8: Do you think there were any forces that influenced the SADC mediation process? Explain.

Appendix D Appointment Letter

Appointment - 1130 Tuesday 1st April

Dr ibbo Mandaza

From: Precious Kamedzera [pdzera@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 5:07 PM
To: ibbo@sapes.org.zw
Subject: Request for an interview
Attachments: Annexure A-interview guidepure.docx

Dr Mandaza

My name is Precious Kamedzera , a student with Africa University doing my Executive Masters in Peace and Governance is requesting for an appointment to hold an interview with you as part of data collection on my dissertation.

My research topic is : AN ANALYSIS OF THE SADC' ORGAN ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS, A CASE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE (2000-2013).

Hereby attached is an Interview Guide questions for your perusal. I hope for a positive response from you Sir.

Regards

Precious

Precious + Joy U

Martha Mutisi &
Security Sector Reforms:

Appendix E -Interview Consent Form



**AFRICA
UNIVERSITY**

(A United Methodist-Related Institution)

INVESTING IN AFRICA'S FUTURE

INSTITUTE OF PEACE, LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

I grant Permission to conduct an oral interview

With.....

I understand that the data gathered from this interview is for educational purposes only and will not be disclosed to any person other than the Supervisory authority and designated faculty at Africa University.

This authorization expires in 120 days or

.....
(Signature of Interviewee)
Interviewer)

.....
(Signature of

.....
(Date)

.....
(Witness)