

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONSTITUENCY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (CDF) IN HARARE SOUTH AND WARREN PARK
CONSTITUENCIES IN HARARE PROVINCE, ZIMBABWE

BY

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Abstract

This study sought to examine the effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in promoting fiscal decentralisation in Zimbabwe. It was an exploratory study focusing on two constituencies Warren Park and Harare South. In this study 1 Member of Parliament, 2 Senators, 2 Councillors, 1 Former Minister, One Permanent Secretary, 26 Community members and 1 local development specialist were used as the research subjects. Questionnaires and Interview guides were used as research instruments. Available literature was also reviewed to provide contextual information. The study concluded that the CDF is a potentially transformative mechanism for fiscal decentralization. However, the design and management mechanism was weak and political aspirations affected effective execution of the mechanism. The study recommends that the CDF should be explored as a mechanism for promoting community driven development. It would also make it more effective if future designs for the Constituency Development Funds would include accountability mechanisms to ensure funds earmarked for community projects do not end up being administered by individuals... The CDF design should also ensure administration of the fund is not subservient to political interests and contestations. Finally it is recommended that Multi-stakeholder community committees should be constituted as pre-requisites for disbursement of CDF financing, these multi-stakeholder committees should have independent bank accounts with collective oversight.

DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work except where sources have been acknowledged. The work has never been submitted, nor will it ever be, to another University in the awarding of a degree.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my husband Gift, my daughters Chipso, Nyasha, Tafadzwa, Tatenda, Mukudzei and Kudirai and my grandson Darrel.

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List of Acronyms

CDF	-	Constituency Development Fund
MP	-	Member of Parliament
DA	-	District Administrator

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Constituency Development Funds (CDF) has been introduced in most developing countries with the primary purpose of promoting Community driven development. The major argument in favour of CDFs is that they bypass bureaucratic bottlenecks which weaken the efficiency and effectiveness of the usual government development programmes. Theoretically, by sending funds directly to constituency level and enabling communities to identify their own local development priorities, funds are spent faster, and spent purportedly on the right things. Proponents of CDFs argue as Tshangana put it “it is a vital and innovative means to achieve tangible development outcomes at a grassroots level” (Tshangana 2010:11). Chweya Ludeki has argued that CDFs enhance the process and speed of development through the provision of social and economic services (Chweya 2010).

In introducing the CDF in 2010 the Government of Zimbabwe argued in its Constitution that it would promote and advance socio-economic and cultural rights by ensuring all the 210 constituencies in Zimbabwe are progressively developed, spearhead community driven development and complement Government development programmes (Zimbabwe CDF Constitution 2010) The importance of the CDF as innovative means to support community driven development has been supported by evidence from various multi-country studies which all concluded that despite operational

challenges, the mechanism remains one of the most significant tools for fiscal decentralisation (Baskin 2010, Mapesa & Kibua 2006 and Tshangana 2010). This study examines the effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in promoting fiscal decentralisation in Zimbabwe. It is an exploratory study focusing on two constituencies.

Coetzee in Wabwire defines community development as “...the connotation of favourable change moving from worse to better; evolving from simple to complex; advancing away from the inferior...a form of community social change that will lead to progress...the process of enlarging people’s choices, acquiring knowledge, and having access to resources for a decent standard of living” (Wabwire, 2010:12). Other scholars like Allen and Thomas (2000:24) have expanded the definition of community development to by articulating it as an “all encompassing change, not just an improvement in one aspect”. A consistent theme across all authors is that development is actually a process where change is continuous and where improvements build on previous improvements and that these changes occur at the level of social change and of the individual human being at one and the same time”. Michael Todaro (1987:85) adds that community development is “a multidimensional process involving major changes in community social structures, popular community attitudes as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and eradication of absolute poverty”.

Fiscal decentralisation refers to the devolution of authority for public finances and the delivery of government services from the national to sub-national levels (Tanzi, 1996). It

is an issue of considerable practical importance facing many developing economies and has been championed by international bodies such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (World Bank, 2003). Cheema and Rondinelli, highlight that fiscal decentralisation is more than just a transfer of authority or resources, but that it has a recognized bearing on governance and on the quality of government as well (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983).

1.1 Background

Constituency Development Fund (CDF) schemes are decentralisation initiatives that send funds from the central government to each constituency for expenditure on development projects intended to address particular local needs. A key feature of CDF schemes is that Members of Parliament (MP) typically exert a tremendous degree of control over how funds are spent. The policy was first introduced in India, but gained prominence when Kenya established a CDF in 2003. Based on the perceived success of the Kenya model and various political and historical drivers, the trend has spread to other African countries and across the world in recent years Tshangana (2010). Prior to introducing the CDF in Zimbabwe a team led by the Secretary for Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs went on a learning visit on the CDF in Kenya. It is not clear what lessons they drew for Zimbabwe as the Zimbabwean structure seems to have been nothing similar to the Kenyan one.

Zimbabwe's inclusive Government introduced the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in the 2009/2010 fiscal year. The goal was to support development at constituency level under the management of the Member of Parliament. Prior to the CDF in Zimbabwe the district was the unit of local development and a district is made up of an average of three constituencies. With the CDF the constituency would function as a local development unit, a situation, it was assumed that would put constituents in charge of their share of the national cake. Under this arrangement a district would receive an average of three CDF allocations. To the Members of Parliament (MPs) the CDF came as a relief as it provided some capital to finance development projects in the constituency. Previously MPs were not provided with development finance and could not provide any tangible support towards community development projects.

In Zimbabwe the management structure of the CDF comprises of the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, the MP, Local Councillors, the Constituency Senator and the District Administrator. The Zimbabwe CDF has been in operation since 2010 and has had one allocation of US \$8million for the 210 constituencies. Each MP was entitled to \$50 000 accessible upon applying. It is reported that 209 out of 210 MPs applied and accessed the fund (PMTZ, 2011) According to parliamentary sources only Tsholotsho MP Jonathan Moyo did not apply for the fund. There have been press reports of allegations of funds misappropriation and threats of prosecution of culprit members of Parliament. Prosecution of the alleged abusers of the Fund had already started in 2012 for 55 Constituencies until the Attorney General ordered a halt to the prosecutions and

demanding that an audit of the 209 Constituencies be done and completed first. (New Zimbabwe 11 March 2012) The Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs more than a year later blamed insufficient funding from Treasury for its failure to complete investigations into the alleged abuse of Constituency Development Funds (CDF) (Zimbabwe Independent June 21 2013). To date no single prosecution has been successfully completed. The Anti Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (ACT) included the CDF among abused national resources together with reported corruption in diamonds, corruption in distribution of farming inputs and implements as well as corruption in Zimbabwean Prostates (ACT, 2014) To avoid giving sitting MPs campaign funds Treasury had suspended the paying out of CDF funds until after the General elections held in July 2013.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite the fact that the CDF was generally hailed as a good initiative that would foster community development, the first disbursements have been received with negative sentiments which require exploration. In 2012 the Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs highlighted challenges with MPS failing to account for how they used the CDF. Studies like the one done by the Youth Forum suggest that communities complain that MPs impose projects that maximise political returns as opposed to maximising constituent's welfare on them. In this study the Youth Forum also outlined that "it appears those legislators who used the money for developing their communities decided to embark on the projects without consulting the electorate who

voted them into power, and if they did, then they left out the critical constituency of youths”. Youth Forum (2013: 9).

The National Youth Development Trust (NYDT) in their position paper on the Constituency Development Fund asserts that the management structure of the CDF does not promote participatory accountability. Institutional structures of the CDF exclude the communities, a case in point being the CDF Committees at constituency level which comprise of only the MP, Councillors and the Senator. There have been challenges with accountability and transparency with over a hundred MPs reportedly failing to account for their CDF allocation and a study by the Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe (CCDZ, 2013: 14) concluded that “although Minister Biti (then Minister of Finance) warned legislators that the CDF was not an opportunity for self-enrichment saying strict monitoring of the fund would be implemented, it has emerged that the fund was largely abused as there is little to show for it on the ground in many constituencies”.

The challenges articulated raise doubts on the veracity of arguments by proponents of the CDF like Tshangana (2010) who contend that “by sending funds directly to constituency level and enabling communities to identify their own local development priorities, funds are spent faster, and spent on the right things”. This study sought to understand the performance of the CDF in Zimbabwe in order to understand the nature of challenges which contributed to the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of the CDF as a mechanism of fiscal decentralisation.

1.3 Justification of the Study

The fact that the CDF utilised public finances makes it necessary to interrogate if the funds were used to advance the public good. The CDF constitution explicitly states its purpose as “to finance developmental projects in the House of Assembly constituencies” (Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, 2013). In addition, the objectives of the fund all outline the underlying focus on developing the standard of life for communities.

The overall objective of the fund is outlined as “to enable Members of the House of Assembly to spearhead implementation of projects that seek to alleviate poverty and improve the standard of living of people in their constituencies”. Zimbabwe CDF Constitution (2010:1). The CDF constitution further provides guidance on accountability mechanisms and this study falls within the scope of promoting transparency and accountability in relation to utilisation of the public funds disbursed through the CDF. Unfortunately the CDF constitution did not provide for comprehensive accountability mechanisms and left it to the Ministry to, at a later point come up with a Bill governing the same.

The study will specifically:

- i. Act as a design and performance evaluation of the Constituency Development Fund. This is informed by disgruntlement about the CDF outlined above. As stated above the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs did not complete the audit requisite for accountability demands to be made. On the other hand the Attorney

General is not able to prosecute on the basis of allegations unsubstantiated by audit evidence. While this study does not purport to be trying to replace the work of these official processes it hopes to provide a snippet of how the fund performed and what its flaws were.

ii. Contribute towards the body of knowledge on the CDF. As will be noted from this work literature on the CDF in Zimbabwe is not easily available. What is there are mainly opinion laden media reports. By being among the first independent assessment of the CDF in Zimbabwe this study would facilitate enhanced knowledge on the concept.

iii. Provide suggestions for improving or replacing the CDF as a development vehicle.

As stated in the introduction the CDF is hailed as a possible vehicle for effective community development. It does however have the effect of compromising the oversight role of MPs as they access funds from the consolidated revenue fund. This study hopes to make recommendations that will take these issues into account.

1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of the study are to:

1. Examine the design and implementation mechanisms of the CDF in relation to expected deliverables;
2. Analyse factors that predisposed the CDF to the challenges that it has faced; and
3. Recommend specific actions required to improve effectiveness of the CDF.

1.5 Research Questions

1. How did the design and implementation mechanisms of the CDF contribute towards its effectiveness?
2. What factors predisposed the CDF to the challenges that it has faced?
3. What specific strategies are required to improve effectiveness of the CDF?

1.6 Assumptions

This investigation is based on the assumption that the CDF has not delivered on community expectations because of its structure of management which makes it vulnerable to abuse and stifles participatory accountability.

1.7 Delimitation of the Study

The study will focus on two urban constituencies; one under a ZANU-PF – Harare South - and one under MDC representation - Warren Park - to ensure political balance. Political balance in the Zimbabwean context is critical as there is essentially a bi-polar political structure with the Zimbabwe National African Unity-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) being the two key protagonists. The political contestations and ideological differences between the two parties mean constituencies run by the two parties will ensure adequate representation of the two key competing ideological forces. This is not an assessment of the general performance of legislators but of whether the CDF administered by the

legislators has met expectations. The time-frame for this study covers 2010 to 2012 which is the period covered by the initial and only CDF disbursement.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

One major limitation of the study was the logistical impossibility of accessing all the 209 Constituencies that benefited from the fund. Findings do not strictly speaking; reflect the national picture since they are from selected constituencies. An overview, however of the national implementation of the CDF is provided which should give the reader an insight into the overall picture. It is my hope, therefore that the findings provide information which should inform positive change. Scrutiny of a fund run by political players has its challenges particularly in Zimbabwe where political differences result in violence. It was therefore not easy to get community members and other players to speak freely and openly about the CDF as this could amount to criticizing an MP. An attempt was made therefore to create conditions that allowed for confidentiality and made sure informants are adequately briefed on the objectives of the study. A third limitation was the fact that empirical data on the CDF is still very scarce and this is because the concept is still very new in Zimbabwe.

1.9 Definition of Terms

Development-For purposes of this paper development shall be used to refer to growth or progress

Decentralization- the spread of power away from the centre to local branches or governments

Constituency-A designated area that elects its own representative to Parliament

Expectations-eager anticipation

1.10 Structure of Study

Chapter 1 of the study introduces the study and gives a background to the CDF initiative. It is in this chapter that the statement of the problem has been introduced together with the justification of the study, the research objectives and questions, assumptions, delimitations, limitations of the study and definition of terms. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the CDF including lessons from other countries so as to provide a contextual and conceptual framework that will guide the study. In Chapter 3 the study outlines the research methodology that was used in the study and describes the target population and the procedure for selecting the sample that was studied. Chapter 4 provides an analysis and interpretation of the data gathered from the study. In Chapter 5 findings of the study are discussed and explanations for the findings are offered and recommendations made.

1.11 Conclusion

This Chapter introduced the study justified it and set the research objectives and questions. The statement of the problem informing the study is also done in this chapter and limitations of this study were also acknowledged. It is in this chapter that the background to the study is also given.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. Introduction

This chapter outlines the literature review and outlines the theoretical framework guiding the study. Proponents of the Constituency Development Fund proffer it as a fiscal decentralisation tool that would bring development decisions to the local level. This section therefore will set the context by examining the conceptual framework of fiscal decentralisation as a development strategy. The policy of decentralisation will be looked at as the overall policy informing the CDF concept.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1. Conceptual framework of fiscal decentralisation

This study is informed by the fiscal decentralisation framework. Fiscal decentralisation, defined as the devolution of taxing and spending powers to lower levels of government, has become an important theme of governance in many developing countries in recent years. Fjestad and Semboja(2000) in Tanzi has defined it as the devolution of authority for public finances and the delivery of government services from the national to sub-national levels (Tanzi, 1996). What it entails is local level structures being enabled by central government to levy taxes and make expenditure decisions. Fiscal decentralisation may however be one- sided as is the case with CDFs where there is transfer of expenditure decisions without accompanying revenue collection responsibility. In

Zimbabwe the Local government structures retained the revenue collection authority and the MP through the CDF was given the expenditure authority of funds disbursed from the Central Revenue Consolidated Fund divorced from the revenue collection and expenditure of local government structures. In conceptualising Fiscal decentralisation Oates has contended that Fiscal decentralisation hinges heavily on the two concepts of efficient and effective allocation of resources in the public sector.

Oates (2006) advances the arguments on the theory of fiscal decentralisation which presupposes that regional or local governments are in a position to adapt outputs of public services to the preferences and particular circumstances of their constituencies, as compared to a central solution that presumes one size fits all. Moreover, in a setting of mobile households, individuals can seek out jurisdictions that provide outputs well suited to their tastes, thereby increasing the potential gains from the decentralised provision of public services (Tiebout, 1956:416). Oates (2006) emphasizes that fiscal decentralisation may encourage experimentation and innovation, as individual jurisdictions are free to adopt new approaches to public policy. In this way, the theory holds that decentralization can provide a valuable “laboratory” for fiscal experiments (Oates, 2006).

The core logic is based on the following: if growth and poverty issues are to be taken into account, one should be concerned about efficiency-supplying services up to the

point at which, at the margin, the welfare benefit to society matches its cost (cited in Wabwire, 2010). Fiscal decentralisation is an issue of considerable practical importance facing many developing economies and has been championed by international bodies such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (World Bank, 2003). Advocates of fiscal decentralisation, highlight that it is more than just a transfer of authority or resources, but that it has a recognised bearing on governance and on the quality of government as well (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). Porcelli outlined the benefits of fiscal decentralisation as the assumed preference matching that comes with it. The argument is that local government or the MP is closer to its local citizens and hence is possibly better informed about local preferences and priorities. Localised effort is therefore better positioned to be more responsive. Fiscal decentralisation is also purported to stimulate participation and improve accountability (Porcelli 2009). The same author however acknowledges that fiscal decentralisation can have the cost of inefficient decisions and use of resources, and can be derailed by constrained local capacity, as an example an MP without a constituency office and no secretariat might not be able to efficiently administer development funds. This study acknowledges that fiscal decentralisation has its theoretical advantages but is guided by the critique that necessary structures to facilitate effective implementation of decentralisation are often not in place in contexts where fiscal decentralisation has been attempted.

This study acknowledges that fiscal decentralisation is a tool that can potentially spur locally driven development by addressing practical community needs. However, the study is also cognisant of two key points which will inform utilisation of the theory as an analytical tool. The two points are as follows:

- i. Fiscal decentralisation on its own cannot support the overall decentralisation process. Its success is largely dependent on the context especially the political and administrative structure along with the willingness of different actors to account;

The first point is critical in outlining that fiscal decentralisation transcends giving money to Members of Parliaments. It encompasses a process of ensuring that money is disbursed to structures that are ready to utilise as well as to account for disbursed funds. The point is significant in analysing if introduction of the CDF in Zimbabwe mapped out and addressed the differences between fiscal decentralisation as a political process and fiscal decentralisation as an administrative process.

2.1.2 Fiscal Decentralisation as an administrative Process

For fiscal decentralisation to deliver on local level development it to be supported by administrative bodies, systems and mechanisms, both local and intergovernmental, which help to manage and support the decentralisation functions. It also includes mechanisms that link formal government bodies to other key local actors—traditional local authorities, non-governmental organisations, private sector partners, etc. This is the critical institutional architecture on which decentralisation is built. Smoke (2003) Fiscal decentralisation, as an administrative process, therefore involves building adequate

institutional mechanisms and capacity and empowering sub-national governments with clear functions and appropriate resources for them to provide for local development needs.

2.1.3 Fiscal Decentralisation as a Political process

As Smoke has argued the functionality and efficiency of fiscal decentralisation is dependent upon the ability of sub-national governments to understand and act on the needs and preferences of local people better than the central government (Smoke, 2003). If this willingness to be guided by community aspirations is not there in structures spearheading fiscal decentralisation then the administrative structures will be frustrated. Fiscal decentralisation as a political process ensures MPs are provided with finances in order to initiate projects that uplift their constituency. In doing so, they fulfil pledges they would have made to the electorate during campaigns.

Fiscal decentralisation as an administrative process ensures that proper delivery and accountability mechanisms are put in place to ensure the political commitment is fulfilled. In the context of Zimbabwe, it can be argued that while the administrative side of fiscal decentralisation in as far as the CDF was concerned was weak and inefficient , the political will to act on the needs and preferences also left a lot to be desired. This was mainly because the exercise placed expenditure responsibility in an individual, the MP without putting in place mechanism for communities to demand accountability and without the requisite administrative structures. This study will focus on the structure

readiness for roll out of fiscal decentralisation especially ensuring coherence between the political and the administrative structure.

ii. Fiscal decentralisation can only succeed if accompanying accountability and transparency mechanisms are instituted/ and strengthened. In the Zimbabwean context analysis will focus on whether or not sufficient systems were put in place to ensure the CDF delivered on the promise of decentralised development.

This point will guide analysis of the accountability and transparency mechanisms in place to guide administration of the CDF in Zimbabwe. A system wide analysis will ensure discourse and focus shift beyond the strategic to the operational levels. The approach adopted will ensure findings do not generally attribute CDF challenges to the absence of a system. It will ensure focus analyses the extent to which different actors within the system worked collaboratively to ensure the system delivered. An example is that in theory the MPs were supposed to account but analysis will focus on the extent to which the system compelling MPs to account was functional.

2.2 Conceptualizing Decentralization

According to Faguet(2012) the past two decades have seen decentralisation becoming one of the broadest movements to dominate policy debate in the world of development theories. Consequently it is at the centre of reforms throughout Latin America, Asia and Africa. Faguet(2012). Rondinelli & Cheema, (1981) define decentralisation as

devolution of planning and decision– making authority from central government to lower levels of government including local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organisations, local governments or nongovernmental organisations. They further contend that different forms of decentralisation can be distinguished primarily by the amount of autonomy the “decentralised organisations” were given to execute their tasks. From their perspective political decentralisation seeks to create or strengthen independent levels or units of government through devolution of functions and authority. Administrative decentralisation on the other hand involves the distribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central government, in its field offices for instance. There have been arguments on administrative decentralisation without decentralisation of power Fesler (1968: 373) notes that “administrative decentralisation may not involve any decentralisation of power, that is, it may not provide the opportunity to exercise substantial local discretion in decision making”.

This study reviewed the decentralisation policies in Zimbabwe and the extent to which they can facilitate or impede successful implementation of the CDF projects. It is important to note that while decentralisation presents an alternative to centralised planning, it is not necessarily devoid of its own challenges i.e decentralisation does not automatically yield positive impacts. Significantly, some scholars have argued that in the absence of appropriate systems there can be decentralisation of poverty. Prud’homme (1995) and Bennett (1994) argue that while local governments may help to promote allocation efficiencies, they lack the capacity to reinforce the distributive functions due

to the absence of a democratic sphere and the prevalence of corruption. Other problems include lack of exploitation of economies of scale in the decentralised provision of goods and services and lack of coordination and equity across jurisdictions (Bardhan & Mookerjee, 1998).

2.3 The Concept of Development

The Constituency Development Fund is hailed for its purported potential to facilitate community development. In examining this potential and the necessary conditions for it to become a reality it is necessary to analyse what development means to communities. Shale (2004) has defined development as the improvement of the social and economic lives of the people. Shale (2004) and Peet and Hartwick have simply defined development as making a better life for everyone. They further argue that in the present context of a “highly uneven world, a better life for most people means, essentially, meeting basic needs: sufficient food to maintain good health; a safe, healthy place in which to live; affordable services available to everyone; and being treated with dignity and respect”. Peet Hartwich (2009:1).

The development terrain however, has been changing and as Pieterse has observed, in development approaches from the classics to dependency theory the conventional unit of development has always been the nation. The key development statistics and measures used by the international institutions are still country statistics. However, while the

nation remains the central domain of development it is no longer the sole unit. Gradually development is becoming a multilevel, with multi-layers of efforts, taking place at levels lower than the nation at the same time, at the national level and at levels beyond the nation. Below the national level are community development, local economic development (LED) and micro-regional development and community development. Pieterse(2009). More often than not, policy makers and politicians are integrating development programs to address issues of citizen participation, incorporate the poor in policy decisions, and aid in poverty reduction at the local level hence encourage sub national autonomy and creativity in addressing local needs, targeting development. Additionally, as Peet and Hatwick have argued, bringing stakeholders together to define priorities for projects and programs increases interest and a sense of ownership, which in turn promotes sustainable development. Peet and Hartwick.(2009) This approach ensures that, community participation, which is enabled through development strategies such as fiscal decentralization, plays a major role in boosting the effectiveness of development initiatives. The CDF concept therefore is informed by the policy of decentralisation as a tool for community development.

2.4 Development Strategies

2.4.1 Central Planning

Central governments have largely been responsible for development initiatives in most parts of the Global South. This administrative approach was premised on the notion that

central governments were better placed to design and implement comprehensive policies and programs to address the varying needs of the citizens across the country. Scholars like Cheema & Rondinelli, (1983) have argued that the rationale behind central planning in developing countries at that time was that it was a means of providing rational and coherent policies for using scarce resources effectively to promote economic growth in industrial output.

The central planning approach is critical as it allows for analysis of why the CDF has been proposed as essentially a tool to depart from the overly centralised approach to development planning and resource allocation. It further provides scope to understand the extent to which central government will potentially be willing to fully support the CDF whose success can potentially weaken the argument for continuation of a greater role for central government in development planning. Central planning has already been widely criticised especially for its “one size fits all” (Oates, 2006). This criticism stems from the fact that most central planning approaches do not adequately consider the heterogeneity of needs and conditions of various regions of the country or groups within society. Wabwire (2010) argues that greater equity in the distribution of income and wealth requires wider participation in the economic, social and political processes through which wealth is generated and distributed. This, they argue, is provided for through decentralisation.

2.4.2 The CDF Policy

Constituency Development Fund,” or CDF,” is the generic name for a policy tool that dedicates public money to benefit specific political subdivisions through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by their representatives in the national parliament. In different places, they are known as Electoral Development Funds, Member of Parliament Local Area Development Schemes, Constituency Development Schemes, Earmarks, Pork Barrel, Priority Development Assistance Funds, among others names”. Baskin (2010: 1). Van Zyl (2010) contends that the phenomena of CDFs are growing rapidly and a total of 23 countries have adopted the funding mechanism. The countries are Bhutan, Ghana, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Southern Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the policy level, Baskin (2010) articulates that because CDFs make available substantial political resources to be employed in local development, the universe of CDF policy makers is potentially quite large. He maps the universe as constituting executive agencies, parliamentarians, locally based service providers, local and regional government, constituencies, contractors, financial institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organisations and national and international donors. Studies have attempted to explore the diverse actors and the different routes they take in entrenching their own individual positions within the development of CDF policy, in decisions about the nature and scope of projects which will be invested in, the contracting modalities to be put in place, the reporting, oversight

and accountability mechanisms as well as the overall transparency within the policy process.

Kimani et al (2009) expands the argument further by focusing on the paucity of evidence on CDF policy making and he argues that “beyond anecdotes and a handful of case studies, the manner in which policy is made on CDFs remains virgin soil”. This is highly relevant to the Zimbabwean context where the broader background to the CDF policy making process was not clear though political actors expected cooperation from all stakeholders. While the two studies provide critical insights on the deficiencies of evidence around CDF policy making, they altogether exclude the public in the CDF policy formation processes. This provides key challenges as CDF success will depend on and will be validated by the public from the various beneficiary communities.

Another key study was conducted by Francis K, et al, (2009) who sought to interrogate CDF best practices in ten Kenyan constituencies. The study concluded that although communities were happy with the CDF as a concept, they felt there was need to put in place mechanisms for implementation of affirmative action for marginalized and vulnerable groups, separation of powers, civic education on CDF matters and enhancing transparency and participatory monitoring and evaluation of CDF activities.

The study also affirmed that the CDF has great potential to transform people’s lives if better implemented (Kimani et al 2009). The study above is critical in supporting

evidence around the mismatch between conceptual aspirations of the CDF which are noble and transformative and the practical implementation practicalities which are vulnerable to abuse as well as limited accountability. As outlined, this study starts from an understanding that the CDF is a transformative concept though its implementation modalities need to be well thought out and accountability mechanisms should be instituted.

The study also builds on work done by Baskin (2010) who develops simple questions that guides analysis of performance in relation to corruption in operations of CDFs. Baskin asks the following questions:

- In what forms does corruption take place?

This question provides the basis for analysing the various forms of corruption within the country. In the context of Zimbabwe corruption has been documented to thrive in the form of weak accountability. The CDF however, place financial management and reporting responsibility within the control of legislators without requisite mechanisms of demanding accountability from them. This ensures that findings are framed in the context of a design that deliberately did not take cognisance of the various manifestations of corruption within the public sector in Zimbabwe.

- What actions are taken against individuals and organizations accused of corruption?

This question focuses on the perceived risks if people engage in corruption. In Zimbabwe there have not been significant prosecutions for corrupt abuse of public office despite key events linked to corrupt abuse of office. In the context on low risk of punishment for abusing public resources and the absence of strong accountability mechanisms, there was high potential for the CDF not to serve its intended purpose.

- What type of rules and practices can reduce the potential for corruption and misuse?

Asking and answering this question at the planning phase for the CDF would have potentially facilitated strengthening of accountability mechanisms. The rules in other countries have included properly constituted committees, committee bank accounts and procedures for selecting projects as pre-requisites for disbursement of funding. Within the Zimbabwean context, the study intends to draw recommendations on how best to institutionalize the CDF as a mechanism of resource allocation which transcends political party lines. This can be an appealing proposition to both the Government of the day and the opposition.

Baskin (2010) further argues that a compelling case for the development of CDFs must identify a set of tools that enable for the transparent and ethical use of such funds in a manner that is free of corruption. Beyond this framework, the study outlines key challenges which can affect the effectiveness of CDFs. The study further notes that CDFs can represent a quick fix and fiscal illusion or free money causing the increase in

the burden of long-term expenditure on the central government. On the other hand, CDFs can serve to reflect the priorities of local communities. The key lesson from the study above is that analysis on effectiveness of the CDF should be based on distinct articulation of local demand, by which MPs identify CDF projects, from local government administration, which is a separate issue of local government managing the fund disbursements.

Baskin (2010) contends that given the political nature of Parliament as well as the contest between elected MPs and Local Government technocrats in Zimbabwe, the study above provides scope for understanding relationships between the various structures at the local level such as government and other agencies in order to address potential overlap, contradiction and redundancy which impacts on the quality of service delivery.

Another argument is outlined by Baskin (2010), who argues that CDF policy making should clearly be based on critically answering key questions like how legislative institutions organize themselves to address the issue of distributive allocations. In the context of Zimbabwe all MPs were provided with USD50, 000 which does not demonstrate efficiency in the allocation of resources. There is no explanation and clarity on the rationale behind equal distribution and the methodology for deciding on the USD50, 000. In the absence of clarity on the key questions outlined above, it could be argued that CDF decision making was either based on gut feeling or was based on the available financial resources divided by the number of parliamentarians. Although

Government representatives and MPs outlined that the amount was insufficient, there needed to be a ranking of need and for allocations to reflect the magnitude of need within the different constituencies.

At the administrative level and with cognisance of the competing powers behind the CDF, there are additional critical questions around the limits of the CDF in development administration. This has been a critical question in Kenya where Kimani et al (2009) argue that administration of the CDF as well as financial resources administered by the CDF need to be constantly monitored to ensure they do not potentially affect the balance of power among different branches of government. Wabwire(2010) This argument is critical when framed against the background of CDF as a mechanism directly in competition with centralised fiscal management. The key question focuses on the extent to which government will be willing to support a mechanism that intends to demonstrate its own weaknesses. In that argument, the failure of CDFs does not owe much to neither systemic weaknesses and poor designs nor the propensity for MPs to be corrupt. It owes much to efforts by central government to portray the mechanism as an unnecessary parallel system that exposes public resources to abuse.

2.5 Politics and Development

The effectiveness of the CDF is as much a political question as it is a development one. Baskin 2010) argues that “the sustainability of CDFs as tools of decentralised and effective development rests both on the efficiency and the effectiveness of its

implementation and on its political acceptability to stakeholders throughout the political system” (Baskin 2010: 5). The study is based on the premise that the current popularity of CDFs appears to rest mainly on the generally held political calculus in which centrally placed politicians bring home development resources to local communities and groups in exchange for political support. In the Zimbabwean context the processes of initiating the CDF excluded the public and this raises possibilities of politicians misrepresenting CDF investments as their own donations to communities. That dimension raises further challenges around the sustainability of investments especially as communities may not feel the need to safeguard CDF assets because they would be perceived as only gifts from politicians. The intersection between politics and development is critical in that politicians get into office by promising to bring development to local level. With the CDF, the MP who is supposed to advocate for development is handed the prerogative to administer finances.

A study by Mapesa & Kibua (2006) found that majority of constituents in some selected constituencies in Kenya took CDF funds for the local politicians own development gesture extended to the people. They further contend that “with this kind of mentality, it is expected that when such funds are embezzled, the local people may not know, and if so may be unable to question or may not know the channels through which to complain” (Mapesa & Kibua 2006:15). This argument is closely tied to conceptual definitions of politics and its central tenets which are attaining and retaining power. Politicians mostly concern themselves with attaining and retaining power and if development can be used

for that agenda it will be used. However, development requires other competencies which are administrative in nature and ordinarily politicians do not possess the scientific administrative competencies to administer development processes.

Tshangana (2010) has described the CDF as a double edged sword where if delivery can garner votes, non-delivery may cost them. The CDF Accountability Project (2008) undertook some investigations and learnt of various incidences where voter anger over MP non- performance or poor performance in spending CDF funds likely cost the politician the re- election. The report cites statistics from the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) which indicated that 60% of the legislators from the 9th parliament did not return after the 2007 elections. The ECK statistics in collaboration with those from the CDF National Board and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Secretariats demonstrated that a majority of the MPs who lost their Parliamentary seats across Kenya had accumulated billions of CDF cash in Kenyan shillings lying un-used in bank accounts with scores of incomplete projects.

Baskin (2010) argues that many MPs believe that CDFs have contributed to a system of political competition in which candidates are measured, in part, on their effective employment of CDF allocations based on the perception of political dividends to be derived from successful implementation of the CDF. However van Zyl (2010) has argued that CDFs breach the principle of separation of powers by conferring parts of the executive functions of budget execution on the legislature, reduce government capacity

and weaken the oversight capacity of the legislature. He concludes by recommending that as an alternative to CDFs, investments should be directed towards building the capacities of legislators to enable them to influence budget allocations more effectively and that CDFs need to be researched further before being totally embraced. The study by van Zyl is critical as it challenges the overall notion of the CDF as a tool for fiscal decentralization.

While there is substantive literature on Kenyan CDF experience and other places there is very little on the Zimbabwean experience. What are available are Government inception documents, Constituency CDF reports, newspaper articles and a policy position paper. The media articles are disappointing as they generally tend to reflect the political polarisation that characterizes the Zimbabwean media. The Constituency CDF reports might lack in balance and objectivity and rather are more concerned about showcasing what would be viewed as the Legislator's achievements. There is, therefore, a dearth of research objectively analysing the CDF funding mechanism in Zimbabwe and very little has been obtained from communities themselves. It is this gap that this study addresses.

2.5 Conclusion

This Chapter has identified and discussed the theoretical framework guiding the study. It has looked at arguments for and against fiscal decentralisation as the theoretical framework informing the study. Development as concept being aspired by fiscal decentralisation has also been looked at together with development strategies. The CDF as policy has also been extensively discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The investigation employed the qualitative research methods in order to gather relevant and comprehensive information on the research topic.

3.1 Methodological Approach

In order to enhance the depth of the investigation, a number of research tools were used. These included a literature review, secondary data analysis and qualitative research methods such as informal and semi-structured interviews, Focus Group Discussions. Additionally, the use of a questionnaire was applied to gather quantitative data.

3.2 Research Design

The research design is highly qualitative due to the nature of information required as these allow the researcher to explore perceptions and meanings that people use and enable the researcher to acquire in-depth information regarding the research. The study used the case study approach since it offers an in-depth understanding of the complexities of the topic by limiting the scope and basing the study on a real life setting. The study was carried out in two constituencies as outlined above. The design is also wary of validity pitfalls synonymous with rigid designs hence allowed for quantitative methods where necessary.

Bryman and Burgess' (2002) note that qualitative research and the qualitative research process cannot be reduced to particular techniques nor to set stages, but rather that a dynamic process is involved which links together problems, theories and methods. They further contend that the focus is upon the links between research design, research strategy and research techniques as well as the relationship between aspects of research design, data collection and data analysis. The centrality of the qualitative approach adopted is captured by Bechhofer (1974:73) who argued that "the research process, then, is not a clear cut sequence of procedures following a neat pattern, but a messy interaction between the conceptual and empirical world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time".

3.4 Research Population

The research universe or population refers to the sum of all individual elements within the selected study area. This study did not focus on the representativeness of the constituencies but the qualitative and in-depth perspectives of selected constituency members. In both constituencies the approach was to target the MP, senator, councillors, former members of the community level CDF committees. At national level the former Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs which was the Ministry with the CDF mandate and the Secretary for the same Ministry. The other CDF experts within the Ministry like Directors had initially been included in the research population but the Ministry felt the Secretary's views were representative enough. At Ministry level the study had access to 2 representatives, the former Minister and the Secretary. At MP

level only one MP the Warren Park MP was interviewed. The MP for Harare South declined to participate in the research. Two senators from both constituencies were interviewed. In Warren Park eight community members, five women and three men were consulted in a focus group discussion. For Warren Park only one Councillor, the councillor for ward five was available to be interviewed. The Councillor for Ward 15 was not available to be interviewed. In Harare South the councillor for ward one was interviewed. Twelve community members' ten women and two men were consulted in a Focus Group discussion. One civil society representative from the Elected Councillors Association of Zimbabwe was also interviewed as a local development expert.

3.4 Sampling

i. Purposive or judgmental sampling

Purposive sampling involves selecting respondents based on prior knowledge of their potential to provide key information. This was used to target local members of parliament as well as key respondents within the community. For community based Focus Group Discussions the research therefore worked with a community member to identify community members who were former members of the CDF Committee and others who were actively involved in the projects without holding any office. Using purposive sampling the study accessed a total of twenty community members, four of whom had been CDF Committee members in Warren Park, the remaining four were members of the community who according to the leading community member had interest and knowledge on the CDF in Warren Park. In Harare South the Councillor

assisted in identifying community members who in her assessment were active community members and some had been informally voicing concern about the absence of information on the CDF from the MP. The purposive sampling was therefore to the extent they were identified as people who would have knowledge on what the CDF was supposed to and what it did not do. These made up the remaining twelve purposively sampled members of the targeted communities. The Members of Parliament, Senators and Councillors were also targeted because of the assumed knowledge they would have on the CDF because they were on paper, part of the CDF Committee.

ii. Expert Case sampling

Expert case sampling is where the researcher will sample respondents who are known experts in the field of study. It facilitates selection of respondents that are likely to "yield the most information and have the greatest impact on the development of knowledge" (Patton, 2001, p. 236). This study used the approach to identify experts in Local Governance, decentralization and Parliamentary accountability within the Zimbabwean context. The expert case sampling yielded the Councillors as experts in local governance, decentralisation and local development. They also had the advantage of knowing development needs and development initiatives in their wards. Two Councillors were interviewed under this method of sampling. Ministry officials and the Minister were also made part of the sample because of their expert knowledge gained from implementing the pilot CDF scheme in Zimbabwe. Two experts were identified within the Ministry and these were the Minister and the Secretary for Justice, Legal and

Parliamentary Affairs. The Chairman of the Elected Councillors Association of Zimbabwe, a civil society organisation was also interviewed as a local development expert.

3.5 Data Collection Procedure

i. Key Informant Interviews

In line with the exploratory study design and purposive sampling approach, a key informant interview was developed to collect data with Members of Parliament, constituency residents along with other respondents who were identified through an iterative process as data collection progresses. The Key informant interview guide allows for exploration without limiting respondents to predetermined responses. This is in line with the highly qualitative research design adopted.

Key informant interviews were conducted with key people associated with the CDF including at design and implementation level. These provided insights on the design and operational modalities. Further key informant interviews were done with constituency leaders like, Senators and MPs. Community level leaders like Councillors were also interviewed separately. These provided perspectives on the extent to which the CDF delivered on its mandate as well as their recommendations for improving the operational design of the mechanism. At Ministry level two key informants were interviewed, that is, the former Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Secretary for

the same Ministry. At Constituency level one MP and two Senators were interviewed. Two Councillors, one from each Constituency were interviewed as community level key informants.

ii. Focus Group Discussions

A focus group discussion (FGD) is a data collection method in which a researcher gathers together people from similar backgrounds or experiences to discuss a specific topic of interest. The group of participants is guided by a moderator (or group facilitator) who introduces topics for discussion and helps the group to participate in a lively and natural discussion amongst them.

The strength of FGD lies in allowing the participants to agree or disagree with each other so that it provides an insight into how a group thinks about an issue, about the range of opinion and ideas, and the inconsistencies and variation that exists in a particular community in terms of beliefs and their experiences and practices. In this study this approach provided a balanced view of how the CDF is perceived to have performed in the two Constituencies.

An unstructured focus group discussion guide was developed to guide discussions with constituency members who form part of the electorate. Questions were open ended and depersonalised as the researcher intended to collect as much objective information as possible without influencing respondents.

Focus Group Discussions were conducted with community members who benefitted from the CDF as well as those who did not. The study worked with incumbent as well as past Councillors to mobilise respondents for discussions. Discussions included a minimum of eight and a maximum of 15 participants. Using FGDs was aligned to the participatory approach within the study design and critical discourse analysis was used to determine and eliminate levels of bias from respondents' responses. In addition the approach included a strong focus on ensuring that FGD participants provided tangible examples of any claims made. The approach discouraged exaggeration and bias. One focus group discussion was held per constituency, the one in Warren Park having eight participant's five women and three men, and the one in Harare South had twelve participant's ten women and two men making a total of twenty participants.

3.7 Data Analysis

i. Thematic Analysis

Due to the qualitative nature of the study, findings were analysed through thematic analysis and synthesised into the report. According to Ezzy (2002), thematic analysis identifies themes within data. It is more inductive than content analysis because the categories into which themes will be sorted are not decided prior to coding the data. While general issues for analysis are guided by the overall study, the specific nature of the categories and themes to be explored are not pre-determined. This approach to analysis is critical as the researcher is open to engaging with issues not anticipated. Findings were put in six themes, that is, the rationale for the CDF, design and

implementation mechanism of the CDF, legislator knowledge and capacity, Community knowledge and ownership of the CDF, Performance of the CDF and Challenges to the fund. The answers to the questions were then analysed to determine what how they speak to the theme under scrutiny. A comparative analysis with the Kenyan experience was also done in as far as the design is concerned.

ii. Critical Discourse Analysis

The study also used discourse analysis. Slembrouck (2000) defined discourse analysis as concerned with language use beyond the boundaries of a sentence or utterance. He further adds that it is concerned with the interrelationships between language and society. Discourse analysis is further concerned with the interactive or dialogue properties of everyday communication. Discourse analysis “allows researchers to move beyond the obvious to the less obvious so that we become empowered to reconstruct the meaning of all things”. (Babbie and Mouton 2005:355). This is important as community members may not explicitly divulge their perspectives on the effectiveness of the CDF but a critical analysis of their use of language was useful in drawing relevant and valid conclusions. Critical discourse analysis allowed extrapolation of key nuances around effectiveness of the CDF. During interviews an attempt was also made to figure out the hidden meaning and implications of said words. In Warren Park although the CDF seems to have been properly used a certain assertion kept on being made within the focus group discussion. About 3 participants at different stages of the focus group discussion made the assertion that the fund was not adequate and the MP had to put in his own resources. When the participants were asked about the cost of the projects they

did not have that information. The study came to the conclusion that without knowledge of what the projects cost the participants had no way of knowing certainly that the MP subsidised the CDF projects with his own resources. This was more of a reflection of the culture of viewing the MP as a benevolent benefactor to the constituency rather than a duty bearer and the community as rights holders. The stated acceptance that the generator that was refused by the Police was at the MP's house was also disconcerting because it also reflected a lack of understanding that the projects were a right not a privilege.

In this study, discourse analysis was used to look at binary oppositions, recurrent terms, phrases and metaphors and identifying objects within responses from FGD participants. Finally, discourse analysis will be used from Fairclough's (1990:13) assertion that, "language is a form of social practice, it is a part of society and not somehow external to it. Language is a social process and it is a socially conditioned process, conditioned by other parts of society". This was critical in understanding that language used by respondents is not independent to their responses and more meaning regarding the question can be derived from analysing language use.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

All research presents ethical and moral dilemmas which must be identified and addressed before the research is carried out in order to protect all participants from potential harm. This study was only done after ethical approval by the Human Ethics

Committee. The following ethical principles were followed as a guide to possible issues:

1. Do no harm and benefit society

The aim of the research was to contribute to the effectiveness of the CDF, findings therefore should benefit and not harm participants. Privacy and confidentiality was respected at all times. No personal or identifiable information was recorded in the study.

2. Free will

The researcher always obtained informed consent before carrying out an interview. The procedure of consent where a review of what the participants had consented to was used. (Munhall, 2001). All participants will be reassured that the option to withdraw from the research at any time without penalty or repercussions.

3. Justice and fairness

All findings and results presented were actual facts stated in the interviews. Every participant's experiences and perceptions were portrayed as they were shared in the interviews; no false information was included in the final report.

Conclusion

This Chapter has outlined the methodology used in the study. It has also outlined how data collection methods like focus group discussions and key informant interviews were used in the study. The sampling methods used and the thematic data analysis approach

used has also been discussed. Ethical issues taken into account in carrying out the study have also been discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the results and analysis based on responses from interviews as well as literature review outcomes. Inclusion of findings from secondary literature is in line with the triangulation approach, which will validate primary findings and increase the reliability of results. Primary analysis is based on data collected on the effectiveness of the CDF as a community development tool in Warren Park and Harare South Constituencies in Zimbabwe.

The data presented and analysed in this chapter was obtained through the administration of questionnaires that were responded to by one MP, two senators, two Councillors, the then Minister of, Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Permanent Secretary, one civil society member. In addition data was also obtained through conducting two focus group discussions with 20 Community members.

4.1 Overview of the CDF implementation in Zimbabwe based on document analysis

To provide a complete picture of the CDF in Zimbabwe this section will give a general overview of the implementation before going specifically to the findings pertaining to the two constituencies. This overview will be informed by interviews with the Ministry Officials. Members of Parliament (MPs), Senators, Community members, information

available from press reports, articles written within civil society in Zimbabwe and Ministry documents were the sources of data.

In their 2013 policy position paper the National Youth Development Trust(NYDT) noted that the CDF is meant to bypass bureaucratic process that typify government projects by going directly to local levels. This, the paper argues would provide people at grassroots level with the opportunity to make expenditure decisions and be directly involved in community level development. This would provide more responsiveness for specific community needs. NYDT(2013) In assessing the performance of the CDF it was therefore imperative to look at whether its design and management structure did take funds directly to the local and whether the target communities were therefore in control of expenditure decisions. For this to happen community control had to be inbuilt in the design and implementation mechanisms of the CDF and not be dependent upon an individual's interpretation of the provisions of the CDF Constitution.

In the same report the NYDT identifies some constituencies where the CDF was said to have been used constructively. In Lobengula- Njube the MP Samuel Sipepa Nkomo is reported to have repaired 1112 school chairs and bought 275 new ones using the CDF resources. He also is said to have repaired 356 desks and bought 15 new ones and bought generators and science equipment for schools in the constituency. In implementing these projects the MP is also said to have created employment in the constituency by engaging local youth to do the reported repairs. The other MP who is

reported to have transparently used the CDF allocation according to the NYDT paper is MP Nomalanga Khumalo of uMzingwane who is said to have allocated the \$50 000 to 20 wards in consultation with councillors in the constituency. Others include Pearson Mungofa of Highfield, Margaret Zinyemba of South Mazowe, Fani Munengoni of Glenview North and Thokozani Khupe of Mzilikazi. This list does not purport to be exhaustive in identifying MPs who are reported to have constructively utilised their CDF allocations but a list as provided in the NYDT position paper referred to earlier on. While acknowledging these positive reports on the CDF the NYDT paper also noted that even where the funds were reportedly used in the Constituency there was limited participatory problem identification and implementation. Few MPs are reported to have done concise consultation on the needs and expectations of the intended beneficiaries of the CDF. The NYDT laments the apparent lack of community involvement in the problem identification, appraisal, implementation and monitoring and evaluation stages. The result of this limited community involvement in decisions pertaining to the CDF has been that communities generally are uninformed about what the CDF is and what it is supposed to do in their lives (NYDT 2013).

This negative development is not peculiar to Zimbabwe as the same NYDT paper notes that in Uganda a study of the CDF done by that country's Parliament found that 87% of the population were not aware of the fund 4 years after they had been introduced. In the same paper NYDT contends that among other drawbacks the CDF in Zimbabwe has suffered from an information gap that has worked against it and reduced its effectiveness

in contributing towards community driven development. From the above assessment it would be a fair comment that in as far as the CDF failed to provide for mechanisms to enforce mandatory community consultation by the MP and local level accountability mechanisms it failed to deliver on its promise of putting communities in charge of their own development. Expenditure decisions in as far as the CDF was concerned seem to have been transferred, but not necessarily to lie with communities but to a large extent with the MP. Similarly Investigations by the Parliamentary Monitoring Trust (PMT) on the CDF in Zimbabwe revealed serious areas of concern by communities about the way the CDF has been implemented.

The most prevalent concern raised was that House of Assembly representatives did not consult constituents on what development projects to implement (PMT 2011). According to the PMT report as a result of non consultation the CDF has implemented white elephants, development initiatives that were irrelevant to the aspirations of the communities and duplication of efforts as was the case in one unnamed constituency where the MP bought a water tank for a school which already had enough reservoirs. The PMT investigation also found that despite having represented the constituencies for more than two years the House of Assembly representatives had no clear developmental agenda for the local communities. In most cases MPs were reported to have rushed to prepare irrelevant project proposals so as to quickly draw down on the fund without subsequently facilitating any significant improvement in the quality of life of the communities. In addition to the failure to consult communities and foster ownership of

the CDF some of the MPs were also reported to have, in implementing the CDF, used the fund as a an instrument of patronage. In some cases, MPs are said to have claimed they had sourced the funds for development without making it clear that the funds were in fulfilment of government plans and therefore were not a reflection of any effort on the part of the MP (PMT, 2011).

Kubatana. net an online Zimbabwean activist blog in July 2013 , asked their subscribers to share how their sitting MP had utilised the Constituency Development Fund between 2008-2013 to benefit their community. Their report says they got over 300 replies, from subscribers in 130 of Zimbabwe's 210 constituencies. As is to be expected the feedback was mixed and reflected the different ways in which MP had interpreted the CDF and communicated it to their Constituents. About "one-tenth of respondents did not know how their CDF had been used. Around two-thirds did not think it had been used f. or anything constructive (or had barely been used). And about 30% of respondents were impressed with how their MP had used the fund, and noted this as a worth accomplishment". Kubatana(2013) This being crowd sourced information that has not been verified with the MP or with any public record or audit is to be interpreted as an indication of the extent to which an MP communicated with the constituency on the Constituency Development Fund. The point here is that for a national programme that covered 209 of the 210 House of Assembly Constituencies to be so diversely implemented and interpreted is an indication of poor coordination and a poorly understood management structure.

The general impression created by press reports is that CDF funds were misappropriated by legislators. The Marvelous Khumalo case tends to support this impression. The St Mary's MP (MDC-T) was arrested after Parliamentary and Constitutional Affairs Minister Eric Matinenga called in the police on him. He was later released on bail and eventually benefited from the Attorney General's refusal to prosecute those who could not account for the funds.

The legislators who are according to press reports reported to have failed to account for Constituency Development Funds so far include Zanu-PF : Peter Chanetsa (Hurungwe N), Edward Chindori-Chininga (Guruve S), Franco Ndambakuwa (Magunje), Larry Mavhima (Zvishavane Runde), Abraham Sithole (Chiredzi E) and Minister Douglas Mombeshora. MDC-T: Marvelous Khumalo (St Mary's), Naison Nemadziva (Buhera South) and Ministers Sekai Holland and Lucia Matibenga.(The Zimbabwean 2012)

According to the Permanent Secretary for Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs a total of 195 MPS filed returns on the CDF. Of the 209 MPS who applied and got the funds this leaves 14 and statistically this gives the impression that the fund was well utilized. However since the Secretary would not shed light on which of these returns passed the audit that question remains unanswered and open to speculation.

Some of the reasons that made it easy for MPs not to account for the funds, according to the Secretary were loopholes in the CDF Constitution and the Accounting Officers Manual. The Accounting Officers Manual does not clarify the role of the MPs, Senators,

District Administrators and the general populace on the management of the fund. The lack of specific statutory penal provisions and offences for misappropriation, abuse and corruption did not help. The then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs laments a culture of impunity on the part of political leadership and political interference with police work as the drawbacks for bringing the errant legislators to book.

Both the Secretary and Minister confirmed the view expressed at the beginning of this study that to this day no one has been prosecuted for failing to account for the funds. This none action against the alleged fund abuse points to one major weakness in the Zimbabwean CDF approach, the lack of CDF specific legislation. One difference between the Kenyan and Zimbabwean design is the fact that the Kenyan design starts with legal legislation, the CDF Act. Everything that follows, the management structure, the signing arrangements, the complaints subcommittee and the accounting procedures is defined in the Act. One advantage about this is that it provides a clear reference point in what is expected to be done and how with should done. In the event that things are not done in the way defined by the Act penalties for none complaints are also defined by the Act. Wabwire(2010) This in sharp contrast with the Zimbabwean experience , government constituted a fund and started the process of enacting a Bill to provide for the disbursement, control and application for the fund after disbursing. The proposed Bill does provide for the establishment of a CDF Board, a CDF Chief Executive Officer and a local level Committee that has wide ranging representation. This Bill remains a proposal in the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. During the study it

did not become clear why the Bill had been brought before Parliament. Probing the Ministry about this did not produce a clear answer.

4.2 Findings from the research

Findings presented here are based on an evaluation of outcomes of the CDF against its stated objective of Community driven development. It further identifies factors that impeded effectiveness of the CDF. Analysis further informed recommendations which provide alternative approaches for ensuring the CDF delivers as a mechanism for fiscal decentralisation. The findings analysis results are presented in various forms including narratives, tables, photographs and figures. A brief analysis of the findings is provided under each theme. Responses were analysed through critical discourse analysis which enables obtaining meaning beyond spoken words. The critical discourse analysis approach is utilised as the political context in Zimbabwe is highly polarised and conversations around the CDF are likely to be highly nuanced.

4.3 Respondents Profile

In Harare South 1 Senator, 1 Councillor and 12 Constituents were interviewed, the last group in a focus group discussion. In Warren Park Constituency 1 Councillor, 1 Member of Parliament, 1 Senator and 7 Members of the Community

Table 1: GENDER DISAGGREGATED RESPONDENTS PROFILE

ORGANISATION	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
MP	1		1
SENATOR	2		2
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS	1	1	2
CIVIL SOCIETY	1		1
COMMUNITY WARREN PARK	3	5	8
COUNCIL		2	2
COMMUNITY HARARE SOUTH	2	10	12
TOTAL	9	18	27

4.3.1 Rationale for CDF

Findings demonstrate multi-level clarity on the rationale for the formation of the CDF. Government Ministers, Members of Parliament, Senator and Ward Councillors along with Community Members all concurred. The most consistent understanding was that the Fund was supposed to assist MPs to facilitate development in their constituencies. The view that the MP needed to provide tangible service to the constituency and therefore should be supported with the CDF was consistently expressed at all levels. The approach defeats arguments advanced by Cheema & Rondinelli, (1983) who have argued that the rationale behind central planning in developing countries was that it was

a means of providing rational and coherent policies for using scarce resources effectively to promote economic growth in industrial output. Findings from the study demonstrate an acknowledgement that central government has failed to adequately allocate resources equitably to sub-national levels and there is need for an alternative mechanism that promotes efficiency in the allocation of resources. The expectation that the CDF was supposed to take development and expenditure decisions to the local level was also expressed at the Ministry and Legislator level. The Warren Park MP was of the view that leaving central government to make decisions on what was a priority at local level not only bred inequitable allocation of resources but also created undesirable local dependence to the centre. The MP was also quick to point out that he did not see accessing CDF resources as conflicting with his oversight role as a representative of the people because in his opinion the campaign platform for prospective legislators is not legislative reform but tangible development. The trend in Zimbabwe being that the average MP is not an affluent person; resources for delivering on the promise of community development were not always easily available. The CDF therefore provided a welcome opportunity for the MP to facilitate development for his constituency. As elaborated below this feeling of obligation to deliver on bread and butter issues contributed to the CDF being used more for the political rather than community development agenda.

Beyond acknowledgement that the CDF was a tool for fiscal decentralisation, there were additional sentiments that introduction of the CDF in Zimbabwe during the time it was

introduced was more a political rather than a developmental move. A former Minister in the Government of National Unity in an interview, outlined that in a normal environment the MP and local council were supposed to plan together but due to the power retention agenda, MPs personalised CDF financing and excluded all other significant players. The above assertion is critical as it ties in with studies which have concluded that the CDF in African countries have mostly been used to consolidate political power as opposed to develop a constituency.

One such study was by Kimani and others whose findings concluded that the CDF is a good mechanism in principle but can only succeed in the context of broad based and inclusive planning and implementation (Kimani et al 2009). Similarly, Tshangana (2010) described the CDF as a double edged sword where if delivery can garner votes, non-delivery may cost them. The CDF Accountability Project (2008) further undertook some investigations and learnt of various incidences where voter anger over MP non-performance or poor performance in spending CDF funds likely cost the politician the re- election.

4.4 Design and implementation mechanism of the CDF

In its theoretical design, the community level management design of the CDF in Zimbabwe as stated in the CDF Constitution consisted of a CDF Committee comprising of the MP, District Administrator and all Councillors and Senator as an ex-officio member. Findings from the study however show that the structure seemed to

have been interpreted differently from constituency to constituency. Both Senators and MP contended that there was no proper orientation and capacity building for managing public funds by the Ministry at inception. According to informants at MP and Ministry level the Ministry disbursed funds as soon as the MP indicated through a draft project proposal that the constituency was ready to use the funds. The MP would then access the funds without any Ministry involvement.


This lack of contrasts with arguments advanced by fiscal decentralisation theorists like Oates (2006) who argues that fiscal hinges heavily on the two concepts of efficient and effective allocation of resources in the public sector. Oates (2006) advances the arguments on the theory of fiscal decentralization which presupposes that regional or local governments are in a position to adapt outputs of public services to the preferences and particular circumstances of their constituencies, as compared to a central solution that presumes one size fits all.

According to the figure below The Minister of Justice legal and Parliamentary Affairs, his/her Deputy and the Secretary for the Ministry were at the apex of the CDF and worked with a National CDF Committee, who worked with the Management Committee and the Procurement Committee who then worked with the Constituency level CDF Committee . Its not clear in the CDF constitution and even upon probing it did not become clear during interviews with the Secretary for the Ministry what role these

Committees played and what checks and balances were there to ensure their functionality.

What emerged as the actual occurrence on the ground was that the MP applied for the funds to the Ministry and the Ministry disbursed the funds and it was up to the MP to decide who he wanted to work with or how he wanted to use the funds. This would explain why the Ministry only became aware that the fund could not be accounted for in some constituencies during audit. The management structure also did not provide for continuous monitoring of CDF activities which left a lot to the discretion of the MP. The Ministry also depended for the functionality of the design on the CDF constitution which had no legal force. The figure below shows the Zimbabwean CDF structure which was devoid of any accountability or transparency mechanisms.

Figure 1: Zimbabwe CDF Structure



4.5 Limited Legislator Knowledge and Capacity

The respondents from the Ministry as well as from Parliament outlined that information on the CDF was limited while those tasked with operationalising the funding mechanism had inadequate capacity. There was also concern that there had been no consultations on the management structure of the fund. This apparent absence of consultation not only on

the design and management structure of the CDF but on the very desirability of the CDF in Zimbabwe negates a very important ingredient to successful policy making multi-stakeholder agenda setting and policy formulation and adoption. The apparent poor management structure is an indication that the CDF scheme could have benefitted from pre-formulation consultations with the public and other interest groups like civil society. This might have ended up having the effect of delaying disbursement but the final product would have enjoyed the benefit of wide ownership by all stakeholders. The then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs insisted there had been an orientation exercise done nationwide on the CDF which however he conceded had been poorly attended in most constituencies.

The evidence from Warren Park shows that some information was provided by the MP on how to manage the CDF. There was some evidence of a coherent approach to implementation of the CDF and both the MP and the community outlined that in the context of the USD50, 000 allocation, the CDF had been a success in the constituency. An illustration of this was a clear community structure that was responsible for making implementation decisions. There were sharply contrasting levels of progress between Warren Park and Harare South where in the former community members could articulate issues related to the CDF while in the latter there was very limited community knowledge of the CDF. The knowledge about the CDF in Harare South was according to information obtained in the focus group discussion was based on press reports and

general knowledge that constituencies were supposed to benefit from a CDF. There was never any official communication from the MP about the CDF.

Evidence from the study demonstrates that the CDF management structure within the Zimbabwean context effectively made the MP the chief recipient of funds. The fact that there was no capacity assessment done of the MP before deciding to make them the principal managers of the fund meant resulted in major oversights on their suitability. Their major qualification was being a constituency representative which is quite a strong one, however the management structure overlooked the fact that MPs no longer have offices in their constituencies (These were given up by Parliament when the relevant UNDP facility ended). Consequently they also do not have a secretariat. These two would be necessary in successfully leading the management of a fund like the CDF. Making the MP the chief recipient of the CDF meant the success of the mechanism was highly dependent upon the capacity and integrity of the MP. If the MP chose not to work with the community and even not to utilize the funds in the constituency there was no mechanism for holding him/her accountable. The CDF management design made its success also dependent upon good relations between the MP, Senator and Councillor, if these were not cordial or if they belonged to different political parties it could derail development in the affected constituency.

Respondents outlined that in the in the unfortunate event of poor relations between the three, the MP had the opportunity again to arbitrarily make decisions. As this analysis is framed in the context of a politically polarized environment, Senators, MPs and

Councillors often belonged to different political parties and this resulted in difficult working relations which in turn unavoidably had an impact on the functionality of the CDF. In Harare South, for example the Senator belonged to MDC-T and the MP was ZANU-PF and there was never according to the Senator any discussion on the CDF between the two. However it is important to acknowledge that different political persuasion was just one of the reasons for lack of communication between the two leaders since the MP did not talk to anybody about the CDF, including his party supporters. The political dynamics and contestations expose the design flaws of the CDF which put the success/failure of the mechanism in the hands of political actors who were highly likely to have broader disagreements. In Harare South for example the situation was made worse by the fact that while the MP was ZANU-PF the Senator was MDC-T. These two political parties have a history of sharp differences. The nexus between politics and the success of the CDF is consistent with findings and conclusions from a study by Baskin (2010) who argued that “the current popularity of CDFs appears to rest mainly on the generally held political calculus in which centrally placed politicians bring home development resources to local communities and groups in exchange for political support”.(Baskin 2010: 15). In the context of the study, the MPs stood to get political mileage by holding on to CDF financing and framing development projects as their own gifts to communities.

The CDF management and implementation mechanism also did not seem to have a clearly defined role for local authorities, who should have been made responsible for the

maintenance of finished projects. Commonly owned resources suffer from the tragedy of belonging to everyone for use but to no one for maintenance. CDF projects have not been spared this tragedy. The effect of this lack of clear allocation of responsibility after implementation is evident in Warren Park where one of the six sunken boreholes is in a permanent state of disrepair because it broke down and has not been repaired and the public toilet at Mereki shopping centre is always locked because there are no cleaners. The approach to asset management is also at odds with the theoretical approach to decentralization which primates a specific focus on the devolution of authority for public finances and the delivery of governments' services from the national to sub-national levels (Tanzi, 1996).

4.6 Community knowledge and ownership of the CDF

On this theme, again the contrast between the two constituencies was remarkable. In Warren Park the MP, Senator, Community members, Councillor all concurred that projects were chosen by a community based Committee which included a church leader, teacher representative, Police representative, Clinic representative and a Councillor. All respondents expressed high levels of knowledge and satisfaction with the CDF in the constituency. Satisfaction was largely justified by the fact that the CDF addressed challenges around limited access to water which consistently affected the community prior to boreholes being sunk. Respondents in a focus group discussion explained how the MP first briefed them about the fund, and then facilitated a meeting that chose the CDF Committee, which was then responsible for selecting projects to be implemented.

Community members were clear about what they wanted the CDF to do in the community and were happy though they highlighted that the amounts allocated were insufficient given the scale of challenges they face.

In contrast in Harare South the councillor and community members stated that their knowledge about the CDF was limited to rumours and press reports they had heard that every constituency had been given through the MP US \$50 000. All respondents contended that the MP never talked about the CDF to them. This apparent information gap supports the view expressed by the NYDT that the CDF suffered from an information gap that prevented it from being community driven. NYDT(2013) The Kenyan structure that includes a Publicity sub committee whose mandate is to facilitate community education on the CDF would remove this information gap. According to the Senator, he was only aware of the CDF in connection with Hatfield constituency, an area also covered by his senatorship and not in connection with Harare South. Although all the informants were clearly aware that the CDF was meant to facilitate development in their constituency they professed ignorance about any CDF related development work in the area. The Councillor and community members were not aware that the management structure of the CDF included them. There had never been any briefing or consultation about the fund from the MP. The running theme in both individual interviews and the Focus Group discussion was that the MP was very difficult to approach and would come to the constituency for brief meetings after which he would not have time for questions. According to the Councillor the MP would get particularly impatient when asked about

the CDF. From testimonies given by community members on the non availability of information about the CDF it became clear that if the CDF is to achieve its goal of placing development decisions in the hands of local communities then information dissemination should a priority. It was evident that people can not lead community development in the absence of adequate information. Findings in Harare South on this theme point to an implied refusal by the MP to held accountable on the CDF by the Constituency. It was very difficult for the Community to take any action to demand accountability as the CDF design did not have any mechanism for doing this.


In contrast the Kenyan design has a Complaints sub-committee that provides an outlet for any aggrieved member of the community in as far as the CDF is concerned. The Secretary of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs recommended that in the next phase of the CDF there should be grassroots education so to enable the public to be whistle blowers. While this recommendation would provide some kind of outlet it still falls short in providing an official channel for receiving and processing public grievances on CDF Management. Whistle blowing implies fear and anonymity which does not reflect a sense of ownership of the fund and an understood right to demand accountability. It would be strange indeed if the Ministry relied on whistle blowing rather setting up proper structures for accountability and grievance handling.

4.7 Performance of the CDF

4.7.1 Harare South Background Information

According to mapping by the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network in the 2008 harmonised Elections this Constituency had 23999 registered voters. It was represented by ZANUPF Member of Parliament in 2008 who was still MP during the subsistence of the CDF disbursement under review. During the study the House of Assembly representative had changed but it remains under ZANU-PF. The constituency is made up of a combination of medium and high density suburbs. It is this constituency that covers the newly settled residents of Southlea Park and Stoneridge farm which was subdivided and turned into a residential area. These new areas have undeveloped roads that are practically impassable during the rain season. They are also in urgent need of both a primary and secondary school as the nearest schools are practically unreachable for children. Water is also a challenge in these two areas and they risk waterborne diseases. Their nearest health centre is in Mbare which poses transport challenges for the sick and expectant mothers. Some of the areas covered by Harare South include Sunningdale and old suburb with a sewer system that is constantly bursting and exposing residents to disease. This Constituency is therefore in need of multisector local development. Below is a map of the Harare South Constituency

Figure 2: Map courtesy of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network



According to the Harare South community members the CDF did not get to the community as no projects were done. The MP's decisive refusal to be interviewed on the performance of the fund in his constituency left the study with no option but to conclude that he did not use the funds for community development as he was supposed to. The community seems to have been impotent in the absence of a complaints mechanism and with no comprehensive knowledge of their rights to the CDF. The CDF can therefore be said to have performed poorly in Harare South vindicating the observation made earlier that the management design of the CDF made it vulnerable to failure if the MP is not committed to making it work.

4.7.2 Warren Park Background information to the Constituency

According to mapping by the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network in the 2008 harmonised Elections this Constituency had 30586 registered voters. The Constituency was held by the MDC-T in 2008 and the same MP was in office during the subsistence of the CDF disbursement under study and is still MP to this day. Warren Park Constituency embraces Belvedere a low density mainly Indian Community and Strathaven, an old low density suburb. It then stretches to Cover Warren Park D, Warren Park 1 and Westlea which are High density suburbs. Residents in Belvedere and Strathaven are generally better resourced than those in the Warren Parks and Westlea. Warren Park has a serious water problem and residents were reporting that some areas had gone for more than six months without seeing running tap water.

Electricity load shedding was also reported to be more frequent and for longer periods than in the Belvedere and Strathaven areas. Participants in a focus group discussion revealed that nurses at the Warren Park polyclinic had resorted to using candles to deliver babies for women in labour. This was possible only if the patients went into labour one at a time because of the two requisite night duty nurses one would hold the candle and the other would deliver the baby. However if two patients went into labour at the same time then there would real danger of compromised vision on the part of the nurses. The different busy Warren Park shopping centres had public toilets which did not have modern plumbing. Members of the public were therefore reported to have stabled bush toilets behind the dysfunctional public toilets.

Belvedere in contrast boasts of a big shopping centre which also houses a satellite police station a well maintained road network, seven schools, a teacher's college, a technical college and an Electricity training centre. Although both the low density and the high density areas were both affected by water rationing and power outages some residents, particularly the Indian community have personal boreholes and generators. Some of these residents have put water taps outside their walls to enable their less fortunate neighbours to draw water in the event of water cuts. Local level development was therefore clearly a priority for the two Warren Park suburbs and Westlea than it was for Belvedere and Strathaven. As will be shown in the study this assessment seems to have been shared by the Councillor and residents who prioritised the three high density suburbs over the low density ones. Below is a map of the Warren Park Constituency.

The map displays the Warren Park Parliamentary Constituency in 2008. It is bounded by coordinates 284000 to 292000 Easting and 8622000 to 8632000 Northing. The constituency is divided into several wards, including Warren Park North, Warren Park, Warren Park South, and others. Key settlements shown are Monivale, Avondale, Belmont, and Harare. Infrastructure such as roads, schools, and health centres are marked. A legend in the top left corner defines the symbols used. A scale bar at the bottom indicates distances up to 1 kilometer. A north arrow and a small map of Zimbabwe are also present.

➤ Sinking of 6 boreholes in Pfukwa shopping centre, Ziga shopping centre, Warren Park 1 shopping centre, Hilltop area, Mereki shopping centre and Westlea to address the reportedly incessant water challenges in Warren Park

- Repair of 6 public Toilets however it was reported that the toilet at Mereki shopping centre was always locked because council had no cleaners thereby defeating the service of a public toilet.
- 1 incomplete market stalls at Divaris shopping centre.
- 2 Generators one for Warren Park Polyclinic and one intended for the police station. The police are however reported to have declined the generator upon presentation citing fear of being compromised by receiving a gift from an MP.
- Repair of 1 toilet at the Warren Park Polyclinic
- Purchase of a double door refrigerator for the Warren Park Polyclinic for medicine storage.(Before the clinic was failing to store medication and sending new born babies to Harare hospital for immunization.) Harare Hospital is in Southerton , a taxing distance for new mothers from Warren Park.

The CDF in Warren Park therefore seems to have focused on health, water and sanitation, security and tried to deal with economic empowerment as community development activities. It can therefore be a fair conclusion to say that in this constituency the fund did try to deliver on its objectives. However the issue of efficiency of the fund remains unanswered as the funded projects were not accompanied by financial statements to show the funds were used efficiently and all for the CDF objectives.

4.8 Challenges to the Fund

This section presents challenges to the CDF as pointed out by the respondents and as observed by the researcher. At all levels in Warren Park where the fund was used for community projects the concern that the funding levels were too low compared to community needs on the ground was repeatedly expressed. The CDF therefore had the effect of creating a crisis of unfulfilled expectations. Although this is an immediate challenge to beneficiary communities, it needs to be analysed within the bigger context of CDF allocative efficiency.

One observation made at the Ministry level and validated at Community level was that at times political contestations affected uptake of development. A case in point being the Warren Park Police Station refusing to accept a generator from the community when they are clear victims of power cuts which compromises their work. The reason they are said to have given that they did not want to be compromised by receiving gifts from an MP is a pointer to the political polarisation in the country where the police would not want to be associated with a former opposition MP. This challenge however needs to be analysed in the wider context of the Zimbabwean political history. Traditionally the police are associated with the long time ruling party ZANU-PF. The Warren Park MP from the MDC-T part of the Government of National Unity during the period under review. It would therefore fit in with political misconceptions of the time that the police would not want a gift associated with him. The fact that the generator was not a personal gift from the MP seems to have been lost in the process. This refusal creates a further

context to be taken into account in reading these findings. The does not seem to be understood as owned initiative and not as a gift from the MP. As has already been pointed out earlier in the study, differences between the MP and Councillors at times impeded communication and planning within the Constituency. This is illustrated by an example from Warren Park Constituency where the MP asserted that the Councillor in Ward 15 did not cooperate with him in the administration of the CDF.

Whether this assertion should be accepted as fact or not the fact is relations were not cordial between the two. It was also observed that finished projects The Challenge of maintainance of finished projects after the CDF had lapsed was also observed. An example being the maintenance of boreholes sunk in Warren Park Constituency. These were reported to have frequently broken down due to overuse and needed constant repair. The locking up of the Mereki public toilet due to lack of cleaning services also raised issues of maintenance and defeated the need for a public toilet. This seeming abandonment of CDF funded projects points to lack of inclusivity in the management of the CDF. It is evident that the end phase of the CDF was not planned for as should have been by including the authority that should is responsible for local development, the local council.

While in theory the Warren Park CDF did fund community development projects like public toilet repairs in practice this benefit was taken away by blocked use because there

were no plans for maintenance and use of existing development structure by new initiatives. It is because of this lack of handover mechanism that the Harare South MP could get away with not using CDF funds in the constituency knowing there is no other authority expecting to manage CDF projects in his constituency. Although in theory the community level CDF includes the District Administrator, his role is not clearly spelt out making it easy for the MP to exclude him/her.

The Ministry seems to have been involved up to the disbursement process only. After the disbursement there is no evidence of monitoring of implementation. The Ministry's involvement was also documented at the point of filing returns. The study did not come across evidence that there were conditionalities for disbursement set by the Ministry to ensure proper use of the disbursed funds. According to respondents from the Ministry, the mechanism meant that irregularities were only noted at the stage of filing returns and some of the irregularities could potentially be avoided if proper implementation tracking and monitoring systems were instituted. The Ministry reported to have tried to get the Attorney General to prosecute those who failed to file returns. These efforts were reportedly frustrated by Political polarisation and internal party dynamics in the country as illustrated by the example below.

An example cited was that when the Ministry tried to prosecute, the Minister reported that his own party accused him of targeting those who did not belong to his faction within his political party. Members of ZANU PF in turn are said to have accused him of targeting them because they did not belong to his political party. The fact that there was no CDF specific enabling legislation did make it easy for the law makers not to account for the fund as there were no specific definitions of what would constitute abuse of public funds in the context of the CDF.

To date none of the defaulting MPs have been prosecuted. Based on critical discourse analysis, the total refusal by the Harare South MP to answer any questions about the CDF is not just an indication of possible misuse of funds but a lack of appreciation of the obligation to account for public funds. His angry retort “Is Harare South the only constituency? Find another constituency and don’t phone again!” reflects arrogance informed by a culture of a leadership that is never questioned by rights holders. The assertion during the focus group discussion that the MP being a busy person had no time for questions also reflects an unhealthy acceptance that an elected leader can be too busy to entertain questions from those who elected him and on funds he received on their behalf! There is however no evidence that government being aware of these challenges of leadership accountability took them into account when designing the CDF management structure.

4.9 Comparative Analysis Zimbabwe and Kenya

Lessons from Kenya

The dysfunctional Zimbabwe CDF design is in contrast with best practices in developing countries which have implemented the CDF. A case in point being Kenya which has a National Committee(NC) composed of representatives of relevant central government ministries, technically competent officers appointed by the Minister of Finance, representatives from civil society and the manager of the fund. It is chaired by the Permanent Secretary (PS) in the Finance Ministry. The overall function of the National Committee is to disburse the funds and oversee their efficient utilization, by receiving and checking reports and returns from the constituencies. The National Committee is supported in its work by the following specialized sub-committees:

Publicity Sub committee

The Publicity Sub committee's main mandate is creating awareness to the public on the CDF.

Projects Technical Sub committee

The Projects Technical Sub committee's area of focus is the provision of policy guidance on technical issues regarding to CDF projects.

Finance and Administration Sub committee

This sub committee is in charge of preparing the National Committee budget and relevant financial reports for the whole CDF project. It is also responsible for managing the CDF tendering process.

Complaints Sub committee

This Committee handles all complaints raised by the public, media and other stakeholders pertaining to the CDF.

Audit Sub committee


This Committee provides liaison and communication between the internal and external audits and the National Committee. It also sets standards of effectiveness for the CDF secretariat's internal control system.

It is clear from the structure outlined above that Kenyan CDF National Committee is supported by issue based technical Committees as an acknowledgement that the membership of the main Committee does need technical advice for effectiveness. While the MP has the people's mandate there is clear acknowledgement that does not make him an expert administrator or accounting officer. At Constituency level there is the Constituency Fund Committee which assesses project proposals and makes appropriate recommendations to the NC.

Working with the Constituency Development Fund Committee is a multi-stakeholder Constituency Development Committee. All these committees are provided for in the Kenyan CDF Act which further disqualifies all politicians from being Constituency account signatories. Signatories include the District Accountant and other nominees of the constituency development committee and funds are withdrawn based on resolutions

by the Constituency Development Committee. Theoretically the CDF management design provides for accountability and has the necessary checks and balances required to manage public funds. (Wabwire 2010) A diagrammatic illustration of the Kenyan CDF structure is shown below.

Figure 4: Kenyan CDF Structure



The Kenyan design is elaborate and makes it difficult for one individual to access CDF funds without approval from the other structures. While this is good for efficient resource manage and transparency and provides for checks and balances that are necessary in managing public funds it has the danger of duplicating the bureaucracy that

in principle the CDF is trying to avoid. Incidentally, Van zyl in joining critics of the CDF in Kenya, has argued that the scheme sets up a parallel administrative structure that is expensive, unnecessary, and burdensome for the local authority. Van zyl(2010) Based on findings from the study, it can be argued that the CDF was good in principle that both Government and Parliamentarians ended up implementing without thinking through the design, capacity requirements along with transparency and accountability mechanisms. This is also validated by critiques of Oates' conceptualization of fiscal decentralisation who argue that the theory presupposes existence of transparency and accountability mechanisms and that presupposition is inherently flawed. Wabwire (2010) also argues that fiscal decentralisation can only succeed if accompanying accountability and transparency mechanisms are instituted and strengthened. In the context of comparing the Zimbabwean experience with the Kenyan model it is surprising that the Zimbabwean CDF design and management structure finally emerged very different from the Kenyan because as mentioned earlier on, Government actually sent a delegation from the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on a CDF learning visit to Kenya in 2012. Not that then they should have swallowed the Kenyan model without modification but an Act of Parliament would at least have been a good lesson learnt. To then produce such a scant and vague management structure after having been exposed to the elaborate Kenyan one defeats the whole purpose of the learning visit.

4.10 Overall Analysis

It was evident in the study that the CDF is widely acknowledged both at community and policy making level as a critical tool in the fiscal decentralization process. Legislators, communities and government respondents concur that central planning is insufficient for community level development and is inefficient in resource allocation. They further articulated that the CDF provides a vehicle through which communities can access stronger voices on projects to be prioritized for development. The study concluded that despite the empowering aspirations behind the CDF as a concept, the accompanying design in the Zimbabwean context was insufficient, lacked accountability mechanisms, was open to abuse by MPs and its success was highly dependent on a functional and rational political culture which was not in place. Additional evidence showed that some politicians like the Harare South MP could not account for the funds and in some cases did not clearly advance the CDF as a community development financing mechanism.

Loopholes in the CDF Constitution and the Accounting Officers Manual which did not clarify the role of the MP, Senators, District Administrators and the community members on the management of the Fund were also factors in hindering the success of the CDF. The lack of specific statutory penal provisions and offences for misappropriation, abuse and corruption in CDF activities seems to have provided a loophole for lack of accountability thereby creating conditions for failure. The fact that target communities did not have a culture of demanding accountability and the design

did nothing to stimulate such a culture made it possible for communities to be silently frustrated by the non performance of the fund.

4.11 Conclusions

The study concluded that the CDF is a potentially transformative mechanism for fiscal decentralisation. However, the design and management mechanism was weak and political aspirations affected effective execution of the mechanism. Weaknesses in the design meant the responsible Ministry could not effectively track implementation and hold defaulting MPs to account. The study concluded that design weaknesses inherent within the CDF meant genuine development aspirations became subservient to political contestations. Due to this failure of the design to deliver, the study also concluded that fiscal decentralisation does not necessarily deliver on community driven development as it is purported to do by its proponents. What has emerged from the study proves what Oates has argued about fiscal decentralisation, that on its own it cannot support the overall decentralisation process and that it can only succeed if accompanying accountability and transparency mechanisms are instituted Oates (2006).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter will present the main conclusions from this study and proffer recommendations as well as suggesting areas for further research. The research has assessed the effectiveness of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in terms of its design as well as delivery as a fiscal decentralisation tool.

5.1 Conclusions

The CDF in Zimbabwe did not have a clear design and the weakness failed to promote accountability and exposed the mechanism to failure in some constituencies. The study concluded that although the CDF as a concept is strong and inculcates noble aspirations, those cannot be achieved if appropriate implementation systems are not instituted. The CDF structure was supposed to include local committees which presided over funding decisions, financing and project management but this was not the case. The design and implementation structure of the CDF did not contribute towards effectiveness of the CDF. On the contrary, these hampered its effectiveness in terms of delivering development to communities and accounting for public resources.

5.1.2 The CDF Design did not include mechanisms to deter abuse

The study concluded that best cases of CDF performance were based on designs which deterred abuse of funds. The key arguments were that deterring abuse of financing would ensure MPs only accessed funding after fulfilling the criteria set as well as proposing development investments that had the backing of targeted communities. The study concluded that in the absence of deterrent measures the CDF design actually contributed towards the fund's ineffectiveness. One way of discouraging abuse of the fund would be to make disbursements proposal based with proposal committee that considers and approves proposals. This would minimise the possibility of MPs accessing CDF funds with a clear plan for using them. Would be in line with the Kenyan best practice where community informed proposals are approved by the National Committee and assessed by relevant sub committees. The putting in place of multi-signatories for the fund would also act as a deterrent for abusing funds. The Ministry could also have insisted on paying service providers directly. The effect of penal provisions for abusing the fund cannot be overemphasised. An Act of Parliament outlining clear structures and defining misuse of the funds and the accompanying punishments would have gone a long way in ensuring the fund is properly used.

5.1.3 There were no appropriate mechanisms for promoting accountability

The study concluded that while the design of the CDF exposed it to abuse, there were no mechanisms for ensuring accountability. In the absence of such mechanisms MPs knew they could access funds without consulting communities, without appropriate

development projects planned and without potential for prosecution. The study concluded that the low risk of prosecution may also have encouraged MPs not to plan properly and to put in place accountability mechanisms.

5.1.4 The CDF design was not harmonized with existing development modalities

Although the CDF was meant to provide financing to MPs, it was implemented in the context of existing development financing mechanisms and structures. The study concluded that there were key missed opportunities in terms of harnessing existing structures to enhance effectiveness of the CDF. The local government structures in Zimbabwe have mechanisms of administering and accounting for financing meant for local development financing. However, the study concluded that the CDF did not attempt to utilise neither the existing structures nor their accountability systems. In the absence of efforts towards harmonizing approached and not duplicating efforts, the CDF failed to utilise existing structures and competencies which could have been critical in contributing towards improving its effectiveness.

5.1.5 Political Factors Played a Key role in hampering effectiveness of the CDF

The CDF was conceptualized and operationalised in the context of a Government of National Unity (GNU) where different political actors focused more on the power retention agenda. The study concluded that where CDF finances were indeed used to finance community projects, MPs were not open enough to disclose that these were finances meant to develop communities as opposed to donations by MPs to

communities. The key conclusion was that where MPs did not out rightly misappropriate funds, they misrepresented facts to communities in order to campaign for political office (power retention).

5.1.6 There is no culture of accountability among elected officials

The study concluded that the CDF would have been more effective if there was a strong and vibrant culture of elected leaders accounting to the electorate. Evidence gathered validates that there is no culture of accountability among elected officials in Zimbabwe and one of the MPs whose constituency was part of the study refused to provide any information around the CDF. Community members also failed to strongly outline their role in the CDF while showing that they felt MPs provided them information as a matter of courtesy not because it is an accountability requirement. In the absence of upwards and downward accountability, the CDF could not be effective and where it was effective, there was no collective ownership of the successes.

5.1.7 The power retention agenda affected CDF effectiveness

Beyond CDF funds being used to finance the power retention agenda, the study concluded that prosecuting MPs who misappropriated funds was difficult as Government Ministers were accused by the MPs of having received vehicles and other benefits while MPs had not received any packages. In addition, prosecuting MPs would have been detrimental to both key political parties in Government as there were impending elections. In addition to the weak design and implementation modalities, the

political dynamics meant the CDF was ineffective especially as there was limited will to prosecute MPs who abused funds.

5.1.8 Limited harmony among elected officials hampered effectiveness of the CDF

The study concluded that the CDF needed key critical enablers and one of the enablers identified is harmony between the Senators, Members of Parliament and Councillors. However, political persuasions often superseded development imperatives and there was often disunity among the elected officials who formed the core of the structure for ensuring effectiveness of the CDF. The study further concluded that while harmony among elected officials would have potentially contributed towards effectiveness of the CDF, the lack of harmony actually contributed towards challenges faced by the CDF.

5.1.9 Minimal community involvement in CDF Management and Administration

The CDF was meant to bypass bureaucratic roadblocks associated with centralized development planning. This meant financing development projects based on input from key community members. However, the study concluded that there were no systematic strategies for engaging communities and getting their input into potential development projects as well as project implementation, management and accountability mechanisms. In the absence of community involvement, there was no framework for communities to demand accountability on the CDF from their MPs.

5.10 Structural Weakness threatened the sustainability of CDF funded projects

The study concluded that in instances where funding from the CDF had been used to support project, there were no community based management and oversight mechanisms for the project. As a consequence, assets created/rehabilitated using CDF funding were not likely to be sustained especially as some MPs lost elections and new ones came with their own development ideas.

5.2 Recommendations for Government

Overall

Government should explore the CDF as a mechanism for promoting community driven development. Despite challenges around effectiveness of the mechanism, it has conceptual strengths and its underlying principles have potential to facilitate community driven development.

CDF Design

The Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs should ensure that future designs for the Constituency Development Funds include accountability mechanisms to ensure funds earmarked for community projects do not end up being administered by individuals. In the absence of accountability mechanisms, those tasked with administering finances can misuse it without consequences. The CDF design should ensure administration of the fund is not subservient to political interests and contestations.

CDF Administration

The Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs should also design a CDF management structure that includes a multi-stakeholder community committee, which should be constituted as a pre-requisite for disbursement of CDF financing. This committee should include local level civil society, AIDS Coordination structures, Child Protection Practitioners; Faith based organisations, representatives from Service Ministries and local government representatives. This multi-stakeholder committee should have an independent bank account with collective oversight.

5.2.2 Recommendations to Parliament

Members of Parliament should ensure that there a CDF enabling Act in place. This Act should be informed by wide ranging consultations in the form of public hearings at proposed legislation stage.

5.4 Possible Area for Further Research

The effectiveness of the CDF in the context of other existing community development financing mechanisms: - This is a potential area of enquiry especially as this study concluded that the existence of other community development financing systems (though with challenges) potentially affected the extent to which the CDF received serious attention as it seemed to be bent on creating parallel structures whose custodians were vulnerable to election results.

The relationship between the CDF and different political systems: - The study concluded that there were different approaches to the CDF. The approaches towards implementation are as broad as the forms of political organisation in the contexts where the mechanism has been implemented and studied. Understanding key relationships between the political systems and the likelihood of CDF effectiveness will be critical in mapping a set of critical enablers required to ensure the CDF delivers on the promise of community driven development.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Focus Group Discussion Guide for Community Members

This study has been approved by the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance at Africa University. The study is an assessment of the performance of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Harare South and Warren Park Constituencies in Harare Province.

Participation in the study is voluntary and confidential. Information collected during the study will remain confidential and respondents will remain anonymous. Responses will be used strictly for academic purposes. If you are not willing to participate in the study you are free to excuse yourself.

COMMUNITY/CONSTITUENCY

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Do you know of the CDF?

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2. If Yes to question 1 did you know why its was formed and the amount of money allocated to your constituency?

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3. If Yes to question 1 what developments were initiated in this area using CDF funds?

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4. How were projects identified?

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5. How was the community involved in the management and utilisation of CDF finances?

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6. Was the community satisfied with the way the CDF was implemented (Ask for reasons behind satisfaction/dissatisfaction)?

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7. What factors contributed to your satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the CDF?

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8. Was the CDF design and implementation mechanism adequate in ensuring the CDF delivered on its expectations?

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9. What recommendations would you make towards improving the CDF?

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THE END
THANK YOU

Appendix B: Key Informant Interview Guide

This study has been approved by the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance at Africa University. The study is an assessment of the performance of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Harare South and Warren Park Constituencies in Harare Province.

Participation in the study is voluntary and confidential. Information collected during the study will remain confidential and respondents will remain anonymous. Responses will be used strictly for academic purposes. If you are not willing to participate in the study you are free to excuse yourself.

COMMUNITY/CONSTITUENCY

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Do you know of the CDF?

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2. If Yes to question 1 did you know why its was formed and the amount of money allocated to your constituency?

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3. If Yes to question 1 what developments were initiated in this area using CDF funds?

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4. How were projects identified?

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5. How was the community involved in the management and utilisation of CDF finances?

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6. Was the community satisfied with the way the CDF was implemented (Ask for reasons behind satisfaction/dissatisfaction)?

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7. What factors contributed to your satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the CDF?

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8. Was the CDF design and implementation mechanism adequate in ensuring the CDF delivered on its expectations?

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9. What recommendations would you make towards improving the CDF?

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THE END
THANK YOU

Appendix C: Interview Guide Members of Parliament

This study has been approved by the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance at Africa University. The study is an assessment of the performance of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Harare South and Warren Park Constituencies in Harare Province.

Participation in the study is voluntary and confidential. Information collected during the study will remain confidential and respondents will remain anonymous. Responses will be used strictly for academic purposes. If you are not willing to participate in the study you are free to excuse yourself.

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What was the rationale behind creation of the CDF?

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2. What were the key achievements recorded by the CDF in your constituency?

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3. Did you file returns on how the CDF was utilised in your community?

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4. What factors contributed to these achievements?

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5. What were the key challenges with the CDF in your constituency?

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6. What factors contributed to these challenges?

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7. Was the CDF design and implementation mechanism adequate in ensuring the CDF delivered on its expectations?

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8. How did you decide on projects to fund using CDF finances?

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9. What contributed towards some MPs not filing returns on how they utilised their CDF allocations?

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10. What were the key lessons learned from implementation of the CDF?

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11. What recommendations would you make towards strengthening of the CDF?

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THE END
THANK YOU

Appendix D: Interview Guide for Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Staff

This study has been approved by the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance at Africa University. The study is an assessment of the performance of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Harare South and Warren Park Constituencies in Harare Province.

Participation in the study is voluntary and confidential. Information collected during the study will remain confidential and respondents will remain anonymous. Responses will be used strictly for academic purposes. If you are not willing to participate in the study you are free to excuse yourself.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What was the rationale behind creation of the CDF?

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2. What were the key achievements recorded by the CDF?

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3. What factors contributed to these achievements?

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4. What were the key challenges with the CDF?

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5. What factors contributed to these challenges?

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6. How many Members of Parliament filed returns on how the CDF was utilised in their constituencies?

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7. What were the reasons behind some MPs failing to acquit?

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8. What curtailed the proposed audit on how MPs utilised the CDF?
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9. Was the CDF design and implementation mechanism adequate in ensuring the CDF delivered on its expectations?
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10. What were the key lessons learned from implementation of the CDF?
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11. What recommendations would you make towards strengthening of the CDF?
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THE END
THANK YOU