

THE ROLE OF DONORS IN INFLUENCING THE NATURE OF PEACE  
INTERVENTIONS IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE OF HARARE BASED DONORS

BY

WELLINGTON MBOFANA

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## ABSTRACT

*Zimbabwe's history is replete with conflicts. There have been numerous donor funded initiatives to deal with issues of peace building, conflict transformation and national healing at several critical moments. The involvement of donors and the asymmetrical power relations between donors and recipients begs the questions, "What Peace?" and "Whose peace?" This study sought to determine the role of Harare based donors in influencing the nature of peace interventions in Zimbabwe. In this study 18 Western donors based in Harare were used as the research subjects. The research instruments used were questionnaires and interviews. Modernisation was used as the theoretical framework to ground the study. Literature review was also used to provide information on the role of donors in the peace field. Neo-liberalism is the dominant development paradigm favoured by donors. This paradigm and its attendant values and policies manufacture conflicts and crisis in the Global South. The study revealed that donor funds are created with little input from the locals as the terms of reference are decided in Western capitals. The donors push for liberal values through their funds. These values emphasize the rights of the individual and are not always in sync with indigenous practices that emphasise community rights. It was also established that the funds established do not seek to make connections between conflicts and crises in Zimbabwe with the geopolitical factors. This study recommends that locals actively and creatively assert themselves to ensure that their agendas are pushed and their needs addressed. It is also recommended that project beneficiaries be involved in their own right in engagements with donors as opposed to representations by agencies. Further, it is also recommended that further research be undertaken in order to establish the full extent of the donor influence and embeddedness of local project holders.*

## **DECLARATION**

This Dissertation is my original work except where sources have been acknowledged.

The work has never been submitted, nor will it ever be, to another University in the awarding of a degree.

STUDENT ..... DATE .....

Signature

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Africa University

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## **DEDICATION**

To the memory of my Father and Mother. May God grant them eternal repose.

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## **Acronyms**

CBO	Community-Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UN	United Nations

## **CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Introduction**

Zimbabwe is a landlocked Southern African country bordering Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia. The country attained its independence from Britain in 1980.

According to the Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency - ZimStat (2013), Zimbabwe has a total area of 390,757 square kilometres. It has a population of 13,061,239 people of which women are 6,780,700 or 52% and men 6,280,539 or 48%. Average Life Expectancy at birth is 38 years. The population is relatively young with 41% of the population aged below 15 years and about 4% aged 65 years and above. 67% of the population lives in the rural areas. The country has a literacy rate of 96%.

Harare is the capital city of the country. It houses the executive, legislature and judiciary arms of the state.

### **1.2 Background of the study**

Zimbabwe's history – pre and post independence – is replete with conflicts which have been characterized by political violence, intimidation, victimization, torture, killings and destruction of property.

The Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ has been festering for many years (Raftopolous, 2004). As with any other protracted crisis or conflict, its organic nature makes it difficult to single out its root cause. This is demonstrated by the different voices and commentaries on the Zimbabwe issue. The ruling party and opposition parties have contrasting interpretations of the situation, its effects and its causes. Outside of the main political actors there are also different opinions on the nature of the crisis. These include a failed transition to democracy (Savage and Chimhini, 2003) poor policy formulation and implementation (Chan, 2003) poor governance and corruption (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Blair, 2002 and Meredith, 2002), poor governance and poor policies (Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Campbell, 2003) and a crisis of legitimacy (Raftopolous, 2004). However whilst the nature and identity of the crisis is contested, there is generally little disagreement on its manifestations. The crisis is characterized by an uncertain political environment, ailing economy, poor service delivery, growing unemployment, widespread apathy and hopelessness (Muzondidya, 2011). The manifestations of the multi-faceted ‘conflict’ or crisis fit into Galtung’s characterisation of physical, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1996).

Since 2000, elections were perceived by many in the country and internationally as the best means to address the crisis. This stems from the rationale that the manifestations as articulated above point to a dearth of good governance – governance being simply “the delivery of high quality political goods to citizens by governments of all kinds” (Rotberg 2009, p. 113). These political goods are security and safety, rule of law, participation

and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. However, despite numerous elections i.e. 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013 that left the country in perpetual election mode, the crisis raged unabated. In between the elections the country undertook a constitutional reform process that was also expected to help address the crisis. Needless to say, the situation did not change much as the elections and constitutional reform process were contested, polarizing, limiting and marginalizing.

As demonstrated above it is not easy to attempt to isolate the crises and or conflicts in Zimbabwe. As the manifestations show, the crises and conflicts feed on and drive each other. Similarly; and perhaps more importantly; in this case is what would be peace? Who defines it, how and why?

It is therefore important to investigate the different peace actors, their understanding of peace and the role they play in determining peace initiatives. It is appreciated that if attempts were to be made to undertake such a study, more resources, time and personnel would be required which were beyond the scope of this project.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

There have been ample opportunities to deal with issues of peace building, conflict transformation and national healing at the end of the guerrilla war and attainment of

independence in 1980; at the end of the *Gukurahundi* (Literally, ‘The rain that washes away the chaff’) campaign that resulted in the death of over 8,000 innocent civilians in Matebeleland and the Midlands in the late 1980s (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation, 1997); at the end of the land reform programme that was characterised by *jambanja* (violence) in 2002 (Sachikonye, 2012); in the aftermath of the urban clean-up dubbed *Murambatsvina* (Literally, ‘Discard the filth’) in 2005 (Shale, 2006) and in the post election period of 2008-2010 (Sachikonye, 2011).

Different actors in the peace and conflict sectors – foreign and local as well as state actors and non-state actors have been engaged in different ways and at different levels in efforts to bring about ‘peace’ in the country. Donors have bankrolled most of these interventions or peace efforts. Given that donor funds are released on the basis of specific terms of reference detailing strategic and specific objectives as articulated by the donor, this begs the questions, “What Peace?” and “Whose peace?”.

#### **1.4 Purpose of study**

The purpose of the study was to investigate the role of Harare based donors in influencing the nature of peace interventions in Zimbabwe. This study sought to understand the nature and scope of peace interventions promoted by Western donors based in Harare. Peace interventions are broader as they include peace building in its



various forms, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict transformation and many other areas in the peace field. For the purposes of this study it was not important to single out any one area as the interest was in the influence of the donors in the peace field.

### **1.5 Objectives of the study**

The study sought to meet four objectives. The objectives were to:

1. Investigate the different donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe and the terms of reference of their funds
2. Analyse donors' positions regarding local beliefs and understanding of peace
3. Establish the extent to which locals can input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives
4. Recommend appropriate strategies that correspond to the findings

### **1.6 Research Questions**

The study sought to answer the following questions:

1. Which Harare based donors are supporting peace initiatives in Zimbabwe?
2. What is the nature of peace work that they are supporting?
3. How do the donors regard local beliefs and understanding of peace?
4. To what extent do locals input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives?

### **1.7 The scope of the study**

Whilst the scope of the study appears large, the reality is most donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe are located in Harare and design terms of reference to which local organisations respond by way of proposals or applications for funding. The study sought to establish the donors' priorities regarding peace work in Zimbabwe.

### **Limitations**

The study was affected by the post 2013 election refocusing that most donors and donor countries are undertaking. With the constant talk of the Zimbabwe fatigue, global recession and inevitable reengagement with the Zimbabwe state, some of the donors shifted priorities and or modus operandi of the funds hence limiting the study.

Since the study was about donor policies and geo-politics, it is possible that some donors were unwilling to volunteer information.

Related to the above it is also possible that those based in Harare, especially local staff may not have had the full picture of what is going on as decisions are made in the donor countries' capitals or headquarters of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and multilateral institutions.

The study focused on donors based in Harare. It was estimated that these did not number more than twenty and all of them could be surveyed.

### **Delimitations**

The study was conducted in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. Harare is also the political, industrial and commercial hub of the country. Most of the donors resident in Zimbabwe are located in Harare. Because of this the city was purposively selected. Informants were mostly officials of the donor organisations mandated to give information to the public.

### **1.8 Significance of the Study**

The research findings and conclusions of this project provide insightful information about the role of Harare based donors in influencing peace initiatives in particular and by extension peace and development in general. This study is useful as it highlights donors' understanding of the nature and state of peace in Zimbabwe and their attendant priorities in this sector. Further, the study helps CSO's working on peace to reflect on their interventions and engagements with funding partners. It also helps donor organisations to reflect on their interventions and also inform some of their interventions especially in the area of peace and governance. Lastly the study forms part of the body of knowledge on peace and development assistance in general and the role of donors in local processes in particular.

## **1.9. Definition of terms**

### **Civil society**

Civil society is the arena of voluntary action within institutional forms that are distinct from those of the state, family and market. This collective realm, or ‘public space’, includes networks of institutions through which citizens voluntarily represent themselves in cultural, ideological and political senses.

### **Conflict**

Is when two or more people or groups of people have or perceive to have incompatible goals. Conflict may either be manifest i.e. recognisable through actions or behaviours or latent i.e. be dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated.

### **Conflict management**

Since conflicts cannot be completely resolved but minimized, reduced, downgraded or contained, conflict management are interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts.

### **Conflict transformation**

Changes in all, any, or some combination of the following matters regarding a conflict: the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament, or the structures affecting any of

the aforementioned. It aims to generate opportunities for conflict resolution or conflict management.

### **Crisis**

Any event or condition that can lead to instability and pose danger or strife to an individual, group, community or whole society. Crises are negative changes in the economic, social, security and environmental condition.

### **Donor**

A person or organisation that voluntarily contributes funds to advance a cause.

### **Human rights**

The universal, indivisible, equitable, and indispensable claims and entitlements that are endowed to all persons simply by virtue of being human.

### **Hunhu/Ubuntu**

A worldview and way of life of the Bantu people of Southern and Central Africa that connotes a collective responsibility among human beings for common benefit. It is hinged on the belief that a person is a person because of other people.

**Ideology**

A comprehensive perspective or worldview that provides a general framework for interpretation, conceptualization and action i.e. it is used to interpret the past, analyse events and provide criteria for future and present action.

**Liberalism**

A philosophical approach and theory premised on the promotion and maintenance of rights, freedoms, and equality in the pursuit of individual interest. In defending freedom, liberalism is concerned with differentiating private and public space and placing limits on the latter to allow citizenry to attain specific ideals based on rational thought and action. It is inherently linked to defining the limits of politics, economics, social and civic life in relation to individual liberty.

**Military-industrial complex**

The informal structures resulting from relations between the military services and industrial corporations involved in the military defence industry. These pressure each other and their respective governments to maintain or expand the national defence budget.

**Peace**

A condition of justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices and norms. It is more than mere absence of violence.

Several conditions must be met for peace to be reached and maintained:

It is about mutual understanding, sense of equality and respect, balance of political power among the various groups within the community, legitimacy for leaders, interdependent relationships and reliable and trusted institutions for resolving conflicts.

### **Peace building**

Policies, programs and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political and economic institutions and structures in the wake of violent conflict.

It aims to promote positive peace.

### **Political Goods**

Those intangible goods demanded by the citizens of the country to their government.

These goods provide the foundation for the development of political cultures. Examples include safety and security, a legal system, sustainable economic development, civic participation.

### **State**

The political institutions responsible for making the rules governing the people of a specific territory (i.e., a government).

### **Washington Consensus**

The common policy prescriptions that underlie reform packages promoted by the

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The consensus normally includes specific policies that includes fiscal discipline, redirecting public expenditures, tax reform, liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. These policies refer to the market fundamentalism associated with such policy prescriptions.

### **1.11. Conclusion**

The chapter has identified that Zimbabwe has experienced crises and conflicts in both the pre and post independence periods. There have been numerous attempts at bringing peace in the country. These attempts have been supported by donors. Given the donor recipient power relations that tend to be skewed in favour of the donor, the question becomes, whose peace? The study then sought to establish the role of Harare based Western donors in influencing the peace initiatives in Zimbabwe. The chapter then set the parameters of the study detailing the research interest, statement of the problem, the research objectives and questions as well as the limitations and delimitations. The next chapter will set the theoretical framework of the research and review literature on the role of donors.



## **CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter will present what other scholars have said about the role of donors in promoting peace. It will begin by setting a theoretical framework and proceed to outline donor and state relations, explore the nexus of peace, development and ideology and conclude by looking at indigenous conceptions of peace.

### **2.2 Theoretical framework**

#### **Modernisation**

Modernisation theory emerged from Socrates and Rousseau's age of Enlightenment whose central idea was that people could change and develop their society. Marquis de Condorcet added to the idea the concept that technological advancement will change people's lives and society's values i.e. morality and cultures (Giddens, 1991).

Influenced by people like Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, Modernisation theorists saw the world as dichotomous – undesirable traditional and desirable modern. These theorists were to a large extent Structural-Functionalists. Structural Functionalism or simply functionalism is a social theory that emphasises on values, consensus, integration and order and on the way elements of the system fit with each other and fulfil a function for the whole (Etzioni-Halevy, 1981). Functionalism sees society as a complex system whose parts work together for solidarity and stability or consensus and order (Macdonis,

2010). This theory considers the social structures that shape society as a whole and believes that society evolves like organisms. It looks at both social structure and social functions. Functionalism considers society in terms of the functions of the elements that constitute it i.e. norms, customs, traditions and institutions.

Like many classical theories, functionalism leans towards biological analogy and ideas of social evolutionism i.e. the gradual development of society and social forms, institutions, etc. usually through a series of peaceful stages. Hebert Spencer presented this in the form of organs of the body that work for its proper functioning (Urry, 2000). Durkheim and Comte before him suggest societies, like organisms, are coherent, bounded and fundamentally relational constructs whose various parts or social institutions function (work together) unconsciously toward achieving equilibrium. In this sense social and cultural phenomena are functional in terms of working together despite existing separately. And their significance is derived from their functions and connections or relationships. As Spencer and Parsons noted the structural parts of society function interdependently to help society function i.e. social structures work together to preserve society (Macdonis, 2010). It gives prominence to the social world over constituent parts of the same (Giddens, 1984).

Critics of functionalism e.g. conflict theorists, have argued that functionalism's concept of systems gives too much weight to integration and consensus to the exclusion of independence and conflict that is a product of contradictions (Holmwood, 2005).

Marxism attacks functionalism for its partisanship, acquiescence and tacit support for the status quo. Functionalism was seen as implying that certain institutions were necessary to fulfil the functional prerequisites of society. Feminism also criticises functionalism for neglecting the suppression of women within the family structure (Holmwood, 2005). Others like Talcott Parsons regard structural functionalism not as a theory as such but as macrosociological analysis with a broad focus on social structures that shape society (Parsons, 1975; Macionis, 2010).

Emile Durkheim in his proposition of the interdependency of a society's institutions and their interaction in maintaining order, contributed significantly to the development of Modernisation theory. Principally his concept of division of labour in society explains how traditional or primitive societies transition to more economically advanced industrial societies. Durkheim emphasised that Capitalism would be the vehicle to such an industrial society; regulations would have to be developed and enforced to maintain order; and this transition would take time as change would be evolutionary just like with living organisms that evolve through several stages i.e. from a simplistic level to a more complex one (Giddens, 1991).

In this vein Modernisation theorists saw development as conscious, purposeful and non-violent change as societies move from traditional to modern. And the traditional would follow a unilinear progression to modernity which was then equated to liberal democracy. They argued that the core of development is for a society or country to

transcend from traditional behaviour and social institutions to modern behaviour and institutions. In the case of the Global South this would entail trading with the West, achieving Capitalist industrialisation, social differentiation and individualism and, to the extent possible, democracy. For this to happen the traditional or backward countries had to be in contact with Western countries that had already developed. In other words modernity or development can only be dispensed by the Western countries (Giddens, 2006; Chilcote, 1994). Rostow (1960) argues that all societies must pass through a well defined sequence of five stages of economic development. In this thinking economic development is seen as either synonymous with development or *condicio sine qua non* for development.

Huntington (1968) acknowledges that some traditional societies had elements of modernity and some societies regress in the process of development in what he terms negative development. He then concludes that development is rather a multi-linear process as opposed to Rostow's uni-linear treatise.

To conclude this section, it is important to note that thinkers like Auguste Comte in France, Herbert Spencer in England and Karl Marx in Germany and later England were of the evolution school which believes that societies move through stages where each stage is higher and more complex than the preceding. These theorists, including Emile Durkheim of France, saw the new industrial era as destructive. Marx saw capitalist growth as bringing misery to the people as the process of worker exploitation would not

only alienate them from the product of their labour but also from their community or relationships with others. Durkheim saw the modern society as resulting in what he called *anomie* which is loneliness and lack of meaning for life. In concurrence Ferdinand Tönnies of Germany argued that industrialisation and with it modernity transforms life from *Gemeinschaft* or the traditional communities characterised by natural, close and lasting relationships that are hinged on loyalty, honour, friendship, mutual trust and solidarity to *Gesellschaft* or society where relations are artificial, impersonal characterised by egotism, suspicion, mistrust and conflict. The theorists observed that the transition results in the breakdown of traditional sources of moral and spiritual guidance as well as social mores. Whilst this may afford freedom to the modern individual, it also exposes the same individual to greater frustration, unhappiness that arise from the loss of moral order and meaning i.e. Durkheim's *anomie* – soulless individualism (Webster, 1984; Etzioni-Halevy, 1981).

Donors and their interventions are guided by the conviction that they have roles to play in maintaining peace wherever this is perceived to be absent. This idea will be developed below.

### **2.3 The role of donors**

Aid relations have a long and varied history. Although the phenomenon of development aid emerged in the late 1940s, aid relations existed long before this time. These relations

were through colonial, missionary and commercial experiences. The Marshall Plan that was set up to reconstruct Europe after the devastation of the Second World War became a model and example of development aid relationships (Frerks, 2006).

Many countries are engaged in development aid on the basis of different frameworks that include the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the OECD and others. However the interests and motives behind development aid, reflect political, security, normative, economic, social and cultural interests and positions of the donor countries or collections thereof. Frerks (ibid) asserts that development assistance is an instrument to pursue foreign policy objectives and not the oft stated altruistic motives. In this vein it is instructive to note that even The Marshall Plan was executed under explicit political and economic conditions aimed at containing the spread of Soviet Union led communism and assuring the political-economic hegemony of the United States. During the Cold War the rival camps of the United States led Western block and the Soviet led Eastern bloc provided aid directed extending their influence and spreading their ideologies (ibid).

Dominant themes in aid ranged from rural and industrial development in the 1960s and 1970s; community and participatory development in the late 1970s; the environment and sustainable development in the 1980s; and social development, gender, governance, human rights, security and peace in the 1990s and 2000s. With the fall of the iron curtain and emergence of a unipolar world dictated by neo-liberalism new conditions and considerations came to play a role in the aid debates and practices of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Other than the mainstream aid flows from the international financial institutions, bilateral agencies and NGOs also provide considerable funding with their own preferences and choices (Frerks, 2006; Goodhand, 2006).

There is an unequal power relationship between donors and the recipients. Donors can augment their individual power through forging common voices and common fronts. This unbalanced power relationship or ‘gang-up’ can be exercised through common agreements to withhold support.

In some instances the donors become deeply immersed in the affairs and operations of the recipient state in what Graham Harrison termed a ‘post-conditionality regime’ where external and internal interests are blurred (Goodhand, 2006; Harrison, 2004). In such kind of regimes donor intervention is not exercised solely through conditions but through direct involvement of the donor in state institutions and through use of incentives.

Killick et al. (2005) observed that the nature of government-donor relations is predominantly shaped by the following factors: aid dependence which is coupled with limited pressure for accountability from parliament, civil society and or the media; lack of political clout and technical capacity; and rewards for acquiescing to donor demands. De Renzio and Hanlon (2007) conclude that this situation does not encourage the political leadership to contradict the donors.

De Renzio and Hanlon (ibid) assert that aid-dependent countries are typical post-conditionality regimes and these are normally hailed as success stories. They gave Mozambique and Tanzania as examples. In these countries, despite energetic efforts to promote partnerships and ownership, the donors still adhere strictly to their predominant development paradigm.

Aid dependence has weakened states and compromised democracy in recipient countries which the same donors purport to promote. A study in 2004 by Tony Hodges and Roberto Tibana on the Political Economy of the Budget in Mozambique revealed that aid dependence results in the exclusion of the other pillars of state and the citizenry in governance as only the executive and foreign donors make decisions. This gives donors more power as states, in this case the executive branch of the government, may not always be able to resist donor pressure. The transparency gaps created by the exclusion of the oversight organs of the state, opens avenues for corruption which is rife in donor dependent countries (Hanlon, 2004a).

Aid dependence put to question claims of national sovereignty and legitimacy. Many southern states have weak capacity to set the terms of the aid relationship. Donors are on the main inflexible in their imposition of specific policy prescriptions, creating an environment where the questioning of the predominant development paradigm is seen as a losing strategy for an aid-dependent country which needs to keep aid resources flowing into the economy. However Killick et al (2005) observed that the recipient's



governments bargaining power stems from the fact that in some respects donors will be anxious to maintain active and substantial presence through assistance.

Killick et al's encouragement notwithstanding, donor relations are predominantly dictated by the donor country's strategic interests and not necessarily by any set of values that are oft mentioned. For instance, the donor community showed its eagerness to work with the new government of Mozambique headed by President Armando Guebuza despite evident electoral irregularities in his rise to power (De Renzio and Hanlon, 2007).

The theoretical framework and donor state relations above provide the basis for understanding the challenges of peace; the conception and incubation of conflict; and the role of donors. Modernisation theory has been the dominant force informing donors or the West's engagement with Africa since the dawn of independence. To appreciate this it is important to elaborate on the Modernisation theory.

According to Giddens (1991), Modernisation means the appearance of modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influences.

Modernisation theory entails assessing the internal factors of a country and assumes that 'traditional' and or economically 'backward' countries can develop in the same way

‘modern’ countries did. This processes would be easier and faster with external assistance e.g. The Marshal Plan in Western Europe. It is Eurocentric, therefore ethnocentric (Willis, 2005).

W.W. Rostow, the father of Modernisation as currently understood, devised five stages of development. The Rostovian model was developed after studying how Western Europe, especially Britain and the United States of America had developed (Willis, 2005; Webster, 1984).

The theory was given currency and impetus because of the following reasons: the emergence of USA as a lone super power that needed to extend its hegemony; deepening poverty and civil unrest experienced in the world after the Second World War which was threatening Capitalism; the collapse of imperialism and the resultant emergence of newly independent states of Africa, Asia and Latin America who needed an ideology and developmental paradigm; and the spread of Communism by the Soviet Union which posed an ideological challenge to the West’s Capitalism.

According to Rostow (1960) the stages in an aeronautical development model are: traditional society, preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, the drive to maturity and age of high mass consumption.

The traditional Society is typified by rudimentary means of production characterised by poor technology, subsistence farming and no formal institutions of development. This society is also marked by traditions, conservatism and maintenance of the status quo. The family and the clan are dominant institutions. Political power is centralised and reposed in the regions and landowners.

The preconditions for take-off are literacy, skilled labour, entrepreneurship and financial capital. To this end, this stage is characterised by the establishment of institutions like banks to encourage savings and schools to bring in new values and get rid of beliefs, cultures, traditions etc. that are perceived to retard development. Infrastructural development in such areas as transport and communication is necessary. Limited industrialisation takes place in the form of manufacturing of raw materials.

The takeoff stage is characterised by transition from conservatism/traditions i.e. society is driven more by economic processes than traditions. It is a stage of technological advancement and the emergence of an elite in whose group political power is reposed. It is this group that spearhead modernisation. New industries, which expand and produce better results, emerge. These industries yield huge profits the bulk of which are re-invested. Further, it is these industries which stimulate growth through the rapid expansion of factories and increasing number of factory workers and the establishment of businesses to service the needs of both factories and workers. This results in the

expansion of urban areas. It is also through the 'take off' that mining is intensified and new techniques are introduced in agriculture.

The drive to maturity stage sees the diversification of the economy. It is characterised by sustained economic growth i.e. profits are higher than costs; economic growth and investment outstripping population growth; improved technologies; placement of the local economy in the international economy; goods formally imported are produced at home i.e. import substitution.

The age of high mass consumption is the stage where luxury goods which meet people's wants are produced and consumed as basic needs in what Max Weber called consumerism. Rostow asserted that these are mature economies of which there is increased security and welfare to the citizens. At this stage, the society is more worried about the quality of life.

It is important to note that according to Rostow different countries would take different periods or durations to transition from one stage to another. The durations are determined by different factors like geography and the external environment. However on the main the model is nationalistic and considers internal factors and conditions as determinants of development or lack of it. This point is important and will be referred to later.

It is also worth emphasising as noted by Coetzee (1996) that according to Modernisation theorists, progress or development happens when the influence of religion, tradition, mystical views or supernatural ideas decrease. This means secularisation of society.

The model is ethnocentric based on American and European history. As Charles K. Wilber (1988, p.2) observed, "... the criticism centres to begin with, on the bias and ethnocentrism perceived in the Western model and on its applicability to societies with quite different traditions, histories and cultural patterns". Thus the theory has been seen to be entirely relevant to the area in question and not other parts of the world e.g. Africa, Asia and Latin America. Wilber (1988, p.62) further argued that, "..... the timing sequences and stages of development in the West may not necessarily be replicable in other areas."

Frank (1969) posited that the condition of under-development of Africa is historical. Modernisation adopts an ahistorical stand as it does not take into account Africa's experiences of slavery and colonialism. The model also views development as a cooperative process. Experience has shown that it is rather conflictive e.g. Sudan – Darfur region, Somalia, Chad, Northern Uganda, the great lakes region, DRC, etc.

The Rostovian model assumes that countries want to modernize i.e. Westernise (Latouche 1991) or aspire to reach the American norm of high mass consumption.

African, Asian and Latin American countries, whilst enticed by some aspects of modernization, still cling on to some of their traditions.

Whilst Modernisation is premised on Liberalism, most third world countries e.g. Venezuela, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan etc. still have command structures. Huntington (1976) citing the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea noted that modernization does not necessarily need democracy or lead to it, but needs order. Recent experiences of China and Libya attest to this view.

In their critique of Modernisation theory *Dependenistas* (Dependency theorists) observed that there were two categories of countries in the world – poor countries that they called the ‘periphery’ which specialise in the production of primary products i.e. raw materials and the ‘centre’, ‘core’ or rich countries that produce manufactured products. This centre – periphery model or arrangement was not accidental. That is the system. It was rather structured that way as most core countries are former colonisers and the periphery made up of former colonies. Andre Gunder Frank observed that this was in line with the Capitalist system which generates economic development for the minority and underdevelopment for the majority (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984). Dependency theorists collected evidence that actually proved that during World War II when Latin America was cut off from trade with the North, economic growth actually increased.

Propounding the World Systems theory, Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 2000; Giddens, 2006) observed that the modern nation state exists within a broad economic, political, and legal framework which he calls a World System of Capitalism. This system is based on dual division of labour in which different classes of people and status groups are given differential access to resources and services within nation states and the same differential treatment happens to the different nation states at the global market or level. Both the markets - within the nation state and between nation states – are dictated and distorted by power.

Unlike the *Dependistas*, Wallerstein divides the world into three groups of core states or the centre, semi-periphery and periphery. The periphery consists of the least developed areas. These are exploited by the centre for their cheap labour, raw materials, and agricultural production. The semi-periphery is intermediate. It is exploited by the core but also exploits the periphery. The core is the geographically advantaged Europe and North America. These core states promote capital accumulation internally and in the world economy and maintain social order to minimize class struggle. More importantly these states have the political, economic, and military power to enforce unequal rates of exchange between the core and the periphery. It is this excessive power that allows significant capital to be accumulated into the hands of the few and produce as well as maintain the gross economic and political inequalities within and between nations.

The unequal power within and between nation states causes internal contradictions that in time cause political and economic instability and social unrest.

## **2.4 What Peace? Whose Peace?**

Bendaña (2003) observes that the UN, national and donor governments grossly overestimate their capacity to bring sustainable peace or justice to conflict areas. This is because they focus on dealing with the symptoms instead of tackling the root causes of the problem. Conflicts or breaches of peace arise from the system.

Bendaña (ibid) states that the most serious defect of peace processes has been the design of and delivery on the economic and social issues. Recidivism to violence or cycles of violence are experienced in many post conflict situations as the citizens or factions thereof begin to question the peace dividend. The majority of the population does not regard Liberalism as the peace dividend. They rather expect improvement in their material conditions. This reinforces Pope Paul VI's assertion that development is the new name for peace (Paul VI, 1967). This means meeting the people's felt needs is one of the necessary roads leading to peace.

As Dot Keet argues, peace or lack of it is influenced by "the complex interaction of internal and external factors that create social tensions, conflicts, civil and inter-state wars, war-lordism, and even 'collapsed' states" (Keet, 2002). It is incontestable that



economic crises cause social tensions and instability and vice versa. In other words social conflicts and violence have a cause and effect relationship with economic crisis.

In most cases when outsiders intervene in conflict situations there is no common understanding of peace. In the majority of cases premium is put on securing 'peace' now and justice later. In this context peace is taken as merely ending of organized civil violence, mere cessation of military hostilities and or simple political stability (Bendaña, 2003) when it is supposed to be the practice of justice.

Peace initiatives as broadly applied by governments – both Northern and Southern as well as multilateral organizations – tend to be top-down, externally and service delivery-mode driven, elitist and interventionist. The externally driven approach does not encourage addressing external or global structural constraints and forces affecting peace. The systemic international root causes of conflict are ignored and where they are raised, summarily dismissed. In this context peace initiatives become inherently conservative undertakings seeking to manage conflicts as opposed to transform them (ibid).

The Ugandan political economist Yash Tandon concurs. Tandon (2000) argues that the dominant discourse that identifies lack of economic growth and poor governance as the causes of conflict in Africa only seeks to hide the systemic causes of poverty and conflict on the continent. It is not surprising that this approach is the one that guides Northern countries and the multilateral institutions' interventions.

Fisher and Zimina (2008) observe that many interventions in the peacebuilding field follow a technical approach which focuses on immediate problems without addressing the underlying social system and dynamics thereby reinforcing the status quo i.e. the global system. They rather propose that interventions follow the transformative approach which goes to the root of the problem i.e. changing geopolitical hegemony and globalised business. Transformative peacebuilding is meant to achieve what Galtung (1996) calls positive peace whilst technical peace building can only make what he terms negative peace.

Donors, INGOs and NGOs demonstrate subscription to the idea of liberal peace which is generally defined in terms of a democratic system, human rights and free market economy as conditions for peace (Fisher and Zimina, 2008). As illustrated by the Dependency and the World System theories above, conflicts in Africa are not necessarily products of lack of liberal values. In any case, as pointed out by both theories, the core countries do not practice what they preach regarding the free market and human rights as they exploit the periphery in the unequal exchange i.e. raw materials, labour, the environment etc.

Donors, who are principally Northern countries or their agents in the form of multilateral institutions and INGOs, believe in or are influenced by Modernisation theory. As with

colonialism they act as if they have an obligation to Modernise the rest of the world in replication of Rudyard Kipling's 'The White Man's Burden'.

Donors and intergovernmental bodies are part of the global power structure and indeed reflect it. The question of power – which influences both policy and practice – should be critiqued as power is not neutral and neither is its exercise. Whoever wields power tends to dictate the nature, direction and pace of initiative. Further, as power is never shared with the weak, the global powers will not allow anything that aides weakening of their grip on power. It is telling that the understanding of power and market generated inequalities in the global context does not figure prominently in the design, execution and review of peace initiatives (Bendaña, 2003).

Donor dependent countries and organizations including the multilateral bodies like the UN, INGOs and national NGOs are guilty of deference to political and economic power as they seek political correctness by acting in and ensuring conformity to the power centres, especially the Washington Consensus lest they are starved of funding and political support (Fisher and Zimina, 2008).

Like many other terms in social sciences, peace is an inexact term. Its meaning depends on who is talking and their point of view. As noted, most of the talking is done and in very loud and clear voices by Northern governments and their agents.

Roland Paris states that Liberal Internationalism appears to be the only paradigm that is guiding the work of most international agencies engaged in peace work. The assumption here is that peace is the product of a combination of liberal politics and liberal market-oriented economies i.e. ‘free market democracies’. Peacebuilding and indeed any other peace initiative by the Northern countries are enormous experiments in social engineering. These experiments entail “transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organizations into war-shattered states in order to control conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization” (Paris, 1997 p.56).

As David Moore notes, models for development, peace etc. are already chosen for countries in the periphery by the dominant Northern powers. These models have the sole intention of integrating the recipient countries into the global market (Moore, 2000). As noted above, Tandon (2000) concurs arguing that the incessant attribution of poor governance as the cause of conflict in Africa is a ruse meant to camouflage the pillaging of the continent’s resources by the same Northern powers.

The dominant theories on the causes of conflict in Africa fail to analyse the international or global dimensions of the conflicts. They also do not connect in a holistic manner the various factors that have impoverished Africa e.g. exploitation by foreign capital under ‘free market’ conditions. Tandon (ibid) states that the external is also the internal. To buttress this point, globalization has affected and transformed the nature of the African state and its economy which has led to worsening poverty. Poverty is the single biggest

cause of conflict in Africa and that this poverty is created. The systemic creation of poverty in Africa takes place in the context of integration into the global economy. For as long as the system continues to impoverish the continent, peace will remain a pipe dream.

Gandhi (2000) suggests that an economic war is not different from a physical war as its effects are the same. He also observes that economic exploitation by the Western powers does not breed peace. Bendaña (2003) concurs arguing that violent conflict may not be as costly in human terms as indirect violence.

Bendaña (ibid) observes that instead of prescribing neoliberal interventions as solutions to conflicts, these should actually be recognized as conflict-producing factors. Bendaña quotes the US Central Intelligence Agency in its Global Trends 2015 study as having predicted that the rising global economy will not benefit all as it will widen inequalities and create many conflicts as those regions, countries, and groups left behind will face deepening economic stagnation, political instability and cultural alienation.

Nathan (2001) argues that as violence is a symptom of intra-state crises rooted in structural conditions, it is imperative to focus more on the structural causes than on the violence itself. Peace strategies that do not have strong structural analysis do not promote justice and or peace as they only end up reinforcing the flawed system. In fact peace initiatives can be a double edged sword. On one side they can be tools of positive

social change that address the structural forces behind the conflict and on the other tools of social control and perpetuation of the status quo. Peace initiatives become suspect if their objectives are not about addressing the root causes of both direct and indirect violence.

In this era of globalisation, the national social relationships do not exist in separation from international economic relationships. It is not enough to talk about the interdependence of peace, democracy and development on a national basis. This discourse and practice must also permeate the international power structures of global governance, which it does not.

Bendaña (2003) opines that technical assistance by the West only seeks to deflect criticism of the global status quo by developing countries. The assistance rendered does not focus attention on the nature and functioning of the global economy as well as global governance, that is, the structures, policies and practices created and sponsored by the world powers i.e. neo-liberalism.

The crises in Africa are in large part caused by the Northern governments' insistence on neoliberal policy prescriptions that mainly deregulate domestic markets and expose the weak and poor countries to skewed competition on the global market. As Ninsin (2001) notes neoliberalism impoverishes countries of the South and creates cultures of dependence of people on the state and of the state on external powers.

The result of such exposure to the global market and inevitable dependency is intensified poverty, social polarization, instability and conflict. Bendaña (2003) observes that when confronted with the reality of economic dependence and political weaknesses, Southern governments tend to become part of the problem as they start to survive by any means necessary – many becoming autocratic and dictatorial.

Generally, conflicts in Africa are caused by a myriad of factors that include the colonial legacy, the cold war legacy, economic exclusion and unequal access to resources engineered by capitalism, political intolerance arising from winner take all politics, social polarization, artificial borders, fractionalization, neoliberal policies of the Bretton Woods institutions i.e. IMF and World Bank, corporatocracy or unbridled interests and profiteering by transnational corporations and the Global Military Industrial Complex (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1998; Sachs, 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, Nathan, 2001). These factors make up the global system. As Wallenstein suggested in his World Systems theory, this system ought to be changed if peace is to have a chance.

Despite the move to substitute the term donor with partnership, the partnership limits one party to receiving packages from the other. There is no room for discussion of the dominant global system that impoverishes and brews conflict in countries of the Global South. Indigenous knowledge and systems are ignored as Western created toolboxes, models, formulas and methods etc. are preferred (Bendaña 2003; Killick et al., 2005).

Instead as advised by Lederach (1997) there is need to build peace from the bottom up as well as from the top down and the middle outwards. This calls for serious consideration of indigenous knowledge and systems.

There are alternatives to the dominant models used in peace initiatives as described above. Cortina (2007) calls for the respect of local cultures, traditions and practices. This means moving from ethnocentrism to multiculturalism and interculturalism as this is the only way to building positive peace.

Modernisation's thrust to supplant local values and traditions with neoliberal values and practices has been explained above. It is now important to look at the local cosmology of peace and development. The Bantu ideology of *hunhu* or *ubuntu* common in Zimbabwe and the whole of Southern and Central Africa will be considered.

*Ubuntu* avers that a person is because of other people. Mbiti (1969, p. 135) summed up *ubuntu* as, "I am because we are and since we are, therefore I am". The Bantu believe a person is not a single entity. Rather he or she is a community of persons comprising the individual, members of the nucleus family, the extended family, others in the physical location of the person e.g. village, the unborn and the living dead or ancestors (Some', 1998; Moyo, 1987; Samkange, 1980; Mbiti, 1969). Further, sharing and cooperating are givens since an injury to one is an injury to all.



The ancestors who occupy a venerated position in the family and community and act as intermediaries between the living and the Supreme Being cooperate with the living in resolving family and community problems (Some', 1996; Kibicho, 1990; Moyo, 1987). In this case religion and spirituality are not affairs of the individual but of the community as they permeate all aspects and institutions of life. This means there is no segregation between the religious and the secular i.e. social, cultural, political, economic, environmental etc. (Kibicho, 1990; Moyo, 1987). Even issues of leadership and governance like chieftainships are decided in consultation with the ancestors and the chiefs so appointed wield both religious and secular authority (Moyo, 1987).

In *hunhu/ubuntu* life is anchored on the following three pillars; community, ritual and nature which are explained below.

According to Some' (1998 p.69) community is "a group of people meeting with the intention of connecting to the power within" (Some,' 1998 p.69). It is about communion, serving, supportive presence, being intimately connected and a place of self definition. Given the foregoing Mbofana (2011) deduced that community is both a place or physical location and a state of being.

There are different ways and levels of being in community. The Bantu believe human beings live on earth as body and spirit and only as spirit when they die and enter the spirit world (Moyo, 1987). This means the body and the spirit live as a community. As

generally human beings are born in families – the nucleus family – that extends the community or creates community of communities. The extended family is a further extension of the community. The concentric circles of community widen and multiply with the involvement of more people.

Some' (1996, 1998), Samkange (1980) and Mbiti (1969) posit that a community is characterized by unity of spirit, love and caring, trust, openness, respect for elders, respect for nature and reverence of the spirits.

Everyone has a purpose for being and the community helps the person to realise and fulfil that purpose (Some,' 1996). Similarly as noted in the definition of *ubuntu* above, the general health or wellbeing of an individual is connected to the community (Tacey, 2006).

From the brief narrative, it can be concluded that community is about interdependent individuals, a state of being and a place of belonging. It is both secular and spiritual.

The second pillar is ritual. Kibicho (1990) defines a ritual as when a person or persons get in contact with or connected to the spirits and bound by an emotional energy through libations or offerings. Some' (1996) adds that it is a connection with the hidden spiritual realm, with which the entire community is genetically connected. Some' (1998) clarifies that it is when spirits of the living interact with those of the other world as well as spirits

of the living interacting with each other. This makes a ritual a spiritual exercise conducted by living members of the community which connects them with the spirit world and with each other. The Spirit world consists of God – the Supreme Being and the ancestors in their hierarchy (Moyo, 1987; Kibicho, 1990; Some', 1996 and 1998).

Rituals serve different purposes that include invocation or calling on the spirits for specific assistance; solemn dialogue with the spirits and themselves; and healing of ailments and dysfunctions of different nature i.e. physical, social, economic, political, environmental etc. afflicting individuals, families and or the entire community (Some', 1996 and Some', 1998). Rituals are held in community and on nature which is the third pillar.

There is a strong relationship among the physical being, spirit and nature. For instance illness is regarded as “a physical manifestation of a spiritual decay” Some' (1998, p.73). If a person is sick, a ritual is performed to cleanse the spirit or spiritual ailment before attending to the body or physical ailment (Some', 1996; Torbet 2005). Most of the Bantu communicate with the spirit world through trees, grass or other natural phenomena (Moyo, 1987). In support of this Kasiera (1990, p14) attests “humans maintain spiritual relations with the elements of their environment”.

Some' (1998) states that the sanctity of the natural environment is respected as nature is regarded as the source of life, meaning, healing, wisdom, nourishment and livelihood.

Rites of passage like birth, initiation to adulthood, marriage, death etc. and cleansing ceremonies are rituals performed on nature. Some' stresses that healing, ritual and community are connected.

Colonialism, neo-liberalism, globalisation and technological advancement i.e. modernisation has contributed significantly to the adulteration of *ubuntu*. This has resulted in the majority of the population – regardless of class, gender, level of education etc. – practising syncretism i.e. Christianity during the day and African traditions at night (Nabudere, 2004). Syncretism is most evident in times of personal, family or social distress or misfortune e.g. death, illness, poverty, conflict etc. To prove the emersion of Zimbabweans in traditional beliefs and practices, Mbofana (2011) cites the case of the government of Zimbabwe which at very senior level was duped by a local *n'anga* (witchdoctor) – Rotina Mavhunga, a primary school dropout – into believing that purified diesel was oozing from a rock and subsequently investing in a project to harvest the commodity.

Mbofana (ibid) argues that the syncretism practised in Zimbabwe is evidence of a deeply religious and spiritual people. Further, modernisation's influences notwithstanding traditional practices are still observed in both rural and urban areas and the meaning of the practices has not radically changed.

In times of violent conflict members of the community are affected differently both directly and indirectly. *Ubuntu* recognises the need for healing i.e. treatment of the physical and psycho-social as well as material compensation which is social and economic. During conflict resolution the emphasis is put not on punishment of the offender but on restoring relations. In other words *ubuntu* is premised on restorative justice as opposed to retributive justice. The compensation paid to victims and the attendant rituals conducted are meant to restore relations between the perpetrator and the victims who are: the one who suffered the direct injury, their family, the community and the spirits.

The foregoing has demonstrated that *ubuntu* is a way of life that regulates relations and manages conflict. Indeed it is a development paradigm that Modernisation sought to destroy.

Cortina (2007) and Gasper (2004) suggest peace has to be sought through just development in the distribution of goods and the respect for cultures.

As noted by Fisher and Zimina (2008), most Northern scholars and practitioners as well as the majority of locals appear unwilling to consider peace in the wider context, and to address the obvious contradictions. A handful of Southern scholars and practitioners take the risk to call for the recognition that the global system is the major driving force behind violence, despair and poverty within and among nations.

## 2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the theoretical framework and the dominant ideological basis of donor involvement in peace. It noted that donor state relations are skewed in favour of donors. Donors influence processes through conditions. Some donors are so embedded in the recipients processes in what has been called post conditionality. It noted Modernisation as the dominant basis of donor engagement. It also considered the alternative views to Modernisation and neo-liberalism. It was noted that the global system of Capitalism and its attendant centre periphery model of development is the main contributor to conflict and yet is rarely considered in conflict analysis and peacebuilding. It concluded with a look at the Southern and Central African ideology of *hunhu/ubuntu* as an alternative to Modernisation.

## **CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This section details the design, methods and procedures employed in the conduct of the research. In articulating the design and procedures, the chapter will be discussing the several stages and justifying the choices in the design, methods and procedures.

### **3.2 The Research Design**

The research design is the conceptual structure within which research is conducted. It articulates what data are required; the methods used to collect and analyse the data; and how the data will help answer the research questions (Kothari, 2003; Kombo and Tromp, 2006).

A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods of research was used for this study. Creswell (2003) submits that qualitative research is concerned with subjective reality which is personal and socially constructed. Qualitative data cannot be expressed as a number and are much more than just words or text. Photographs, videos, sound recordings and so on can be considered qualitative data. On the other hand quantitative research is concerned with objective reality. Creswell (ibid) as well as Aliaga and Gunderson (2006) define quantitative research as explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analysed using mathematic methods. Data is expressed as a number or quantified.

Trochim (2006) and Marsland (2000) suggest that qualitative information can be converted into quantitative. This can be done by dividing the qualitative information into units and numbering them. Simple nominal enumeration enables one to organize and process qualitative information more efficiently. In this study, the responses by respondents were analyzed using the identified themes. Numbers were used to describe phenomena and percentages and graphs used to summarise findings. This justifies the mixed methods applied in this study.

Hanson et. al. (2004 p. 224) define mixed methods as a “collection or analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study in which data are collected concurrently or sequentially”. A major benefit derived from employing the mixed model is the complementarity of the methods as they make up for the others’ weakness. Marsland et. al. (2000) and Hanson et. al. (2004) assert that a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods improves trustworthiness as it caters for both range and depth. However because of the researcher’s limitations with quantitative methods, the model is skewed in favour of the qualitative model.

The major characteristics of the mixed model, according to Creswell (2003), are that its method is both deductive i.e. allows the testing of hypothesis and theory with accumulated data and inductive i.e. allows the generation of new theory from data assembled from the fieldwork; human behaviour can be predicted to some degree of



accuracy; multiple objectives can be achieved on one work e.g. description, explanation, exploration, discovery and prediction of phenomena; multiple forms of data collection i.e. quantitative and qualitative can be used; the nature of data collected is a mixture of variables, words and images; and the findings may be generalized.

Creswell (ibid) argues that it is difficult for a single researcher to employ the mixed research model as it is not often that the skills and expertise demanded by both quantitative and qualitative research are reposed in one person. The argument is proved true in this case as the mixed model adopted is tilted towards the qualitative model. In Creswell research continuum, this research would be classified as a partially mixed research. The other strands on the continuum are the monomethod which is basically a single method i.e. either quantitative or qualitative and the fully mixed research.

### **3.3 Sampling Frame**

A population, according to Bless and Higson-Smith (1995) is the full set of elements upon which the research is focused and from which generalisations are subsequently made. Caswell (1985) opines that it is in fact the elements' opinions and behaviours that form the population. Kombo and Tromp (2006) clarify population as the entire group of persons that have at least one characteristic in common and of interest to the researcher. Herein population or the full set is restricted to the donors located in Harare and who are

involved in funding peace initiatives. Their opinions and behaviours are actually subject of the study.

According to a survey and mapping of donors conducted by Diakonia in 2012 there were 18 donors supporting peace initiatives in Zimbabwe. This is such a small population that all the donors could be surveyed. It was appreciated that new donors could have entered the fray and others stopped or changed focus.

### **3.4 Data Collection Methods**

The survey instruments used are questionnaire and standardize open-ended interviews.

Questionnaires are formulations of questions based on the research questions. They aid the collection of data. In this study the questionnaire comprised both closed questions and open ended questions.

Creswell (2003) and Dooley (1995) state that questionnaires are used when one needs to quickly get a lot of information from people as they are easy to administer and non-threatening to respondents.

The major advantages of questionnaires include easy and inexpensive management, confidentiality as respondents complete questionnaires anonymously; wide reach as

many people can be surveyed; the wider reach also brings lots of data; the biases of the interviewer are minimised and the informant has time to consider the questions and give thought-out responses (Creswell, 2003; Caswell, 1985). Questionnaires are also easier to analyse.

Creswell (2003) and Caswell (1985) identify some of the disadvantages as including poor responses since some questionnaires may not be returned; biases as only those with an interest in the subject matter may respond; nobody to ask questions for clarity if respondents don't understand a question; little, if any, direct contact between the researcher and the informant.

The questionnaire used was a piece of paper with eleven (11) questions. It was administered to thirteen (13) informants. These were representatives of the donor organisations with the mandate or responsibility to give information to the public. The questionnaires were hand delivered and collected.

Interviews are used when one needs to fully understand someone's views or feelings or learn more about their answers to questionnaires. These are questions asked orally. There are two main types of interviews namely face to face interview and telephone interview. Interviews are further subdivided into structured and unstructured. Structured interviews involve preparing a set amount of standardized questions that will be asked in a pre-arranged manner. With unstructured interviews questions are not prearranged as

the researcher only has guidelines and asks questions guided by the informant's responses. Whilst with the former the researcher works with the structure, with the latter the researcher is guided by spontaneity Creswell (2003).

In this study semi-structured interviews were used as these allowed probing for underlying facts, perceptions and opinions. This improved responses.

Caswell (1982) articulates the advantages of interviews as follows; the interviewer can physically check things thereby limiting the informant's chances of misrepresentation; high response rate as informants can be persuaded to participate; and the interviewer can explain questions and clarify issues to the informant. Creswell (2003) adds that interviews provide flexibility in terms of time and space; and the interviewer develops a relationship with the informant and this increases the chances of getting more and quality information.

However interviews consume a lot of time and money in their organising and conducting; the data so gathered is difficult to analyse and compare; interviewer's biases may influence the informant's responses Creswell (2003) and the researcher may easily go out of the sample to fulfil an interview (Caswell, 1982).

In this study only face to face interviews were held. Five (5) informants were to be interviewed. As with the questionnaire, the participants were representatives of the donor organisations with the mandate or responsibility to give information to the public.

A simple lottery where all the names were put in a hat and drawn out was used to ascertain the five donors to be interviewed and the thirteen to respond to the questionnaire.

### **3.5 Data Analysis**

Creswell (2003) defines coding as marking different units of data with symbols, categories, descriptive words etc. Whilst it would have been useful to use statistical software, owing to access issues the study was limited to mostly the Open Coding System or method of Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) i.e. reading transcripts line by line and identifying and coding the concepts.

### **3.6 Validity Strategies**

A number of research validity strategies were employed. These included triangulation which is basically cross checking information and conclusions (ibid). This was done through use of different methodologies i.e. method triangulation e.g. questionnaires and interviews as well as multiple sources of information i.e. data triangulation. More specifically questionnaires were used to obtain the primary data and interviews to obtain

primary data as well as validate data collected through questionnaires. Peers were used to review the work at different stages.

### **3.7 Ethical Considerations**

The study was conducted on the basis of the following ethics.

**Informed consent:** Informed consent is the principle that requires a participant to willingly and voluntarily agree to take part in a study after all the risks and benefits have been explained to them. Consent was sought from all informants. Given the nature of the study and informants, written consent was unnecessary.

**Anonymity and confidentiality:** Anonymity is the principle of ensuring participants' identities are not disclosed. Similarly confidentiality is the non-disclosure of information except to another authorised person. Both involve the protection of study participants such that an individual participant's identity cannot be linked to the information provided to the researcher and is never publicly divulged. In this study names of participants or their organisations were not used and questionnaires did not require respondents to fill in their names. Only the researcher was able to identify respondents by way of secret codes. This was only for analytical purposes.

Do no harm: Every effort was made to ensure that informants are protected from harm – physical, psychological, social, economic, political etc. This is important as this study deals with sensitive information.

### **3.8 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has detailed the design, methods and procedures employed in the conduct of the research. Mixed methods were to be used in the research. In Creswell research continuum, this research would be classified as a partially mixed research. The survey used population provided by Diakonia in their survey of donors supporting peace initiatives. According to the Diakonia report, the population was 18. The survey instruments used were questionnaire and standardized open-ended interviews. A simple lottery where all the names were put in a hat and drawn out was used to ascertain the five donors to be interviewed and the thirteen to respond to the questionnaire. Data analysis was limited to mostly the Open Coding System or method of Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) i.e. reading transcripts line by line and identifying and coding the concepts. A number of research validity strategies were employed. These included method triangulation e.g. questionnaires and interviews as well as multiple sources of information i.e. data triangulation. Peers were also used to review the work at different stages. The study was conducted on the basis of informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, as well as do no harm ethical considerations.

## **CHAPTER IV: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter details findings of the survey. It describes the analysis of data followed by a discussion of the findings of the research conducted to investigate the role of Harare based donors in influencing the nature of peace interventions in Zimbabwe.

Data were analyzed to understand the different donors, explore donors' positions on local beliefs and understanding as well as the extent to which locals input into the donors' objective setting.

### **4.2. Response Rate**

Of the 18 donors to be surveyed only 10 i.e. 56% participated. All the respondents were Western donors. Data were obtained from self administered questionnaires and interviews.

There was a response rate of 80% to the interviews as four (4) from the expected five (5) were conducted. One (1) interview was not conducted as the informant kept on giving excuses. The return rate to the questionnaire was 46% as six (6) questionnaires from the expected thirteen (13) were returned. Characteristics of the non-respondents are known and these will not be revealed as given the small population, any details will reveal them and those who participated resulting in violations of the ethics outlined in Chapter 3.



Although the reasons for refusal to participate are not known, bureaucracy, protocol and sensitivity of the issues could be major reasons for the non-cooperation.

All the questionnaires received were usable for this study as they met the required inclusion criteria despite some respondents skipping a question or two.

#### **4.3. Methods of data analysis and presentation of data**

The questionnaire and interviews were designed to answer the questions as follows:

1. Which Harare based donors are supporting peace initiatives in Zimbabwe?
2. What is the nature of peace work that they are supporting?
3. How do the donors regard local beliefs and understanding of peace?
4. To what extent do locals input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives?

Simple narratives, percentages, graphs and tables are used to answer the questions. Not all respondents answered all of the questions therefore percentages reported correspond to the total number of informants answering the individual questions.


No demographic data of the respondents was obtained as this was not necessary. Further any description of the participants would have resulted in identification of the informant since the population is small and as mentioned above this would be unethical.

**Objective 1:** Funding of peace initiatives in Zimbabwe

**4.4.1. Donors funding peace initiatives**

Funding of peace initiatives, just like any donor funding, is guided by different bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

90% of the respondents (n=10) claimed to be funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe.



**Figure 1: Funding of peace initiatives in Zimbabwe**

A question was asked to all informants on who else was funding peace initiatives. This was meant to establish the number of donors funding peace initiatives and triangulate the information.

It was noted that although there is a higher percentage of funding, most of the projects or funds were ending this year and there were no commitments for new funds in this sector. It was noted that donors were scaling down and others moving to social and economic development in what others call the ‘flavour of the month syndrome’.

It was noted that the definitions and interpretations of funding and peace are so varied that in another study or in some circumstances some of the participants may not qualify to be either donors or funding peace initiatives. In other cases some may be neither donors nor funding peace initiatives. Some of the ‘donors’ are fund managers who only administer funds on behalf of the donors – mostly embassies; others are middlemen who get established funds from ‘back donors’ and have some little leeway to formulate or at least influence the terms of reference as they sub-grant; and others are ‘real donors’ who provide direct funding to project holders. At times all the three are identified and identify themselves or act as donors. As a result it was not easy to ascertain the exact number of donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe. Depending with one’s definition, the number may be somewhere between 9 and 21.

It was instructive to note that both the ‘middlemen’ and fund ‘manager’ donors exhibited deference to the back donors. Unsurprisingly their responses matched those of the back donors. This proved true a claim by Fisher and Zimina (2008) that international, multilateral and local organisations defer to political and economic power for their continued existence.

The framework above is consistent with what prevails elsewhere. As Frerks (2006) noted donor support for peace initiatives is channelled through various frameworks. These include funding to multilateral agencies and INGOs who then provide funding to national NGOs who, in turn, cooperate with local NGOs. Multilateral agencies generally fund INGOs or national CSOs directly. Direct donor funding for local CSOs is uncommon, except when donors set up special funding mechanisms linking donors and local organizations.

As in Zimbabwe, funding mechanisms include:

- Direct funding to INGOs or NGOs who submit proposals to access funds set by donors as dedicated budgets for issues they intend to support.
- Strategic partnerships where bilateral donors engage in partnership agreements with a number of INGOs mostly from the donor country. These agreements are oftentimes a mix of basic and project funding. The main rationale for such arrangements is that both partners promote similar values and interests with INGOs working toward the same political and strategic objectives as the donor. At times the relationships arise from the recognition that capacity limitations require close collaboration.
- Dedicated funding mechanisms that include multi-donor trust funds for specific countries or single donor funds. These funds can be established at headquarters e.g. the ZUNDAF fund at United Nations Development Programme in Zimbabwe.

- Tenders that are designed for specific purposes which can be international or national. These can sometimes be combined with funds from dedicated funding mechanisms.
- Smaller discretionary budget lines which are in most cases established in field offices or embassies to support smaller activities.

As (Frerks 2006) noted support to civil society through intermediaries has strengths and weaknesses. Interactions with “middlemen” or intermediaries are relatively easy to handle logistically and easier to monitor on the part of the donor. It was noted that the intermediaries tend to be flexible and may have a good understanding of the local context and partners. This means they can easily connect donors with domestic organisations. They can also provide capacity building for domestic organizations. The downside is intermediaries are easily driven by donor agendas. This compromises effective empowerment of the locals and their ownership of processes. Further, intermediaries crowd out domestic actors.

#### **4.4.2. How the donors define peace**

Peace is defined differently by the organizations. When asked how their organization defines peace, the informants provided the following responses;

- Freedom from disturbance
- Respect for human rights (with emphasis on rights of minorities as well as sexual and reproductive rights)

- Tranquillity
- When conflicts are solved without recourse to violence
- Absence of violence
- Harmony
- Lack of conflict behaviors
- Lack of freedom from fear of violence
- Absence of hostility and retribution
- Healthy relationships
- Economic development
- Living according to one's God given dignity
- Equality
- A working political order that serves the true interests of all
- When survival is guaranteed for all children, women and men
- Economic and social justice
- Gender justice

Although there was no one dominant definition, there was emphasis on the rights of the individual in most definitions. The definitions are consistent with the notion of liberal peace which Fisher and Zimina (2008) suggests is generally defined in terms of a democratic system, human rights with special emphasis on the individual and free market economy as conditions for peace. The emphasis on the rights of the individual as contrasted with the rights of the community demonstrates a Eurocentric and ethnocentric view of rights. This means the respondents subscribe to Liberalism and Modernisation.

#### **4.4.3. The kinds of peace initiatives supported**

The donors have different areas of interest in the wide field of peace. The areas supported by the 10 respondents are the following:

<b>Area of interest and support</b>	<b>No of donors</b>
Mutual understanding and tolerance	1
Gender justice	2
Human rights	4
Peace building	6
Justice and peace	1
Conflict transformation	2
Conflict management	1
Capacity development	1
Democracy	1

**Table 1: The kinds of peace initiatives supported**

60% (n=10) said they support peace building initiatives though they have different understandings and interpretations of peace building. 40% said they support human rights work. Some of the elements of peace building were the same as those for human rights e.g. whilst some respondents said they provide support to victims of violence as peace building others do this as part of human rights.

Even those that support peace building, conflict transformation, conflict management, justice and peace, capacity development, mutual understanding and tolerance as well as gender justice do so from the point of human rights and retributive justice. Although none has programmes and projects labelled transitional justice, some indicated that they support this. The version of justice espoused is mostly of the retributive type. This contrasts with the predominant justice of *hunhu/ubuntu* i.e. restorative justice aimed at reconciliation and restoration of relations.

Civil and political rights tend to be given prominence over economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. The rights of the individual tend to supersede those of the community. The negation of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights as well as the promotion of individual rights over those of the community is both problematic and conflictive. Problematic in the sense that as noted by Moore (2000), Tandon (2000), Gandhi (2000), Nathan (2001) and Bendaña (2003) a lot of conflicts centre on the economic and social issues.

Further and more importantly, the programmes and projects, predominantly focus on Zimbabwe. This limits analysis and intervention to Zimbabwe and assumes that the crisis or conflict in Zimbabwe is only a product of local dynamics. This approach and the resultant areas of focus as tabled above are consistent with the notion of liberal peace. This gives credence to Bendaña's assertion that the assistance rendered by the West does not focus attention on the nature and functioning of the global economy as



well as global governance, that is, the structures, policies and practices created and sponsored by the world powers i.e. neo-liberalism (Bendaña, 2003). Further, as Frank (1969) noted the a-historical stand is limiting.

Some of the donors have separate peace, governance and development portfolios. This segregation suggests little linkages between and among the three areas. This is problematic as the three have strong relations of causality i.e. cause and effect relationships and need to be addressed holistically. The insistence on dealing with peace in isolation is akin to treating a broken leg with aspirin.

The Liberal approach tends to follow the Rostovian model in assuming that recipients of aid want to 'liberalise' or modernize i.e. Westernise (Latouche, 1991) or aspire to reach the American and European level of liberalism.

It appears Fisher and Zimina (2008) were vindicated in their observation that many interventions in the peacebuilding field follow a technical approach which focuses on immediate problems without addressing the underlying social system and dynamics thereby reinforcing the status quo i.e. the global system.


The above areas do not seem to provide sufficient scope to engage in the area of geopolitics. However, when asked to explain how the programmes supported affected global politics and the centre periphery model of development which some attribute to

the manufacturing of conflicts in the Global South, one respondent said that was a function of conflict analysis that project holders are supposed to do and accordingly be guided by it in their programming and resource mobilisation. This, the difficulties notwithstanding, gives responsibility to project holders to use the system to advance their cause.

#### **4.5 Objective 2. Donors' positions regarding local beliefs and understanding of peace**

Liberal peace is not the only model of peace. Indigenous peoples all over the world have different world views and models of peace. Cortina (2007) calls for the respect of local cultures, traditions and practices. This means moving from ethnocentrism to multiculturalism and interculturalism as this is the only way to building positive peace within and among nations. To ascertain the donors' awareness and preparedness to engage local cultures, traditions and values two basic questions on the Bantu way of life – *hunhu/ubuntu* were asked. These questions were, "Do you understand the concept of *hunhu/ubuntu*" and "Do you incorporate *hunhu/ubuntu* in your work?" Both questions had provision for explaining the answers, especially those in the affirmative. The responses are presented and analyzed below.

#### 4.6 The Donors' understanding of the concept of hunhu/ubuntu



**Figure 2: Donors who claim to understand the concept of hunhu/ubuntu**

There was a high claim to understanding the Bantu concept of *hunhu/ubuntu*. 78% of the respondents (n=9) claimed to understand the concept.

Of those who gave their explanations (n=6), their understanding of the concept included the following:

<b>Donors' understanding of the concept</b>	<b>No. of donors sharing the view</b>
It is the African way of life or culture	4
It is the Bantu concept or philosophy of being and living that governs life	2


**Table 2: Donors' understanding of *hunhu/ubuntu***

One informant said, "It stems from the African concept of 'a person is a person because of other people'. Africans believe in community life. The community governs life and everybody has a responsibility to the community."

Another informant put it this way, "*Hunhu/ubuntu* is the Bantu concept of being. It is premised on the saying that, 'I am because you are, since you are, therefore I am'.

There seems to be appreciation of the concept. The explanations also suggest that the respondents understood *hunhu/ubuntu* not to be in sync with liberalism, if not its opposite.

#### **4.5.1. Incorporation of *hunhu/ubuntu* in donors' work**



**Figure 3: Incorporation of hunhu/ubuntu in the donors' work**

71% of the respondents (n=7) claimed not to be incorporating *hunhu/ubuntu* in their work.

When asked how *hunhu/ubuntu* is incorporated, one said by promoting human rights, peace and tolerance they are promoting *hunhu/ubuntu*. The respondent seemed oblivious to the polar difference between *hunhu/ubuntu* and liberalism. The other said by accepting projects proposed and implemented by people who practice *hunhu/ubuntu* they are incorporating the concept as it is the project holders that decide what they want and the values they want to promote. On their part as donors they can only support them for as long as the values are not against human rights, international law as well as international norms and standards. It appears the respondent is giving with the left hand and taking by the right. Just like the first, the respondent doesn't seem to think that the

‘international’ may not be international but just a reflection of the interests of dominant interests that may be resented elsewhere, and ethnocentrism is violence against the small and weak in many respects.

Those who said ‘No’ claimed *hunhu/ubuntu* is too abstract and cannot be implemented and that many Africans were no longer practising it as it was outdated and overtaken by developments. They claimed the fact that no project proposals included the concept suggests the project holders had no interest in the concept. One respondent quipped that the constitution of Zimbabwe does not recognise *hunhu/ubuntu*. Another informant observed that Zimbabwe was a multi-racial and multi-ethnic society and his organisation would not fund the promotion of sectarian values.

It is safe to assume that project proposals that seek to promote *hunhu/ubuntu* may not be funded for fear of promoting ‘sectarian interests’ and the spreading of backward or ‘un-modern’ ideas and practices. *Hunhu/ubuntu* is a direct affront to Modernisation as it only recognises the rights of the community. Whilst *hunhu/ubuntu* posits that peace is achieved through individuals subordinating their rights to the interests and dictates of the community, Modernisation and liberalism believe peace is attained through granting the individual freedom to do as they please without the encumbrance of the community and its traditions.

The glaring omission of *hunhu/ubuntu* in the new constitution of Zimbabwe is noteworthy. It cannot be claimed except perhaps through inference that since the constitution making process was bankrolled by Western donors, perhaps these influenced the adoption of liberal values and negation of *hunhu/ubuntu*. Perhaps taking lessons from South Africa whose interim constitution gave pride of place to *ubuntu* and whose substantive constitution ditched *ubuntu* for liberalism to advance inclusivity and in response to claims that the concept was idealistic and could not be implemented (impractical), the drafters of the Zimbabwean constitution avoided it like the plague.

The above confirms what Coetzee (1996) noted that Modernisation strives to limit the influence of religion, tradition, mystical views or supernatural ideas – in other words secularisation of society.

Further, the superseding of individual rights over community rights and undermining of *hunhu/ubuntu* confirms Durkheim's fear of anomie and Tonnies' transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*.

#### **4.5.0. Objective 3. Formulation of objectives of the funds for peace initiatives**

It was important to ascertain the level and extent of locals' engagement in the processes of setting the terms of reference of the funds designated for peace work i.e. setting the agenda.

#### 4.5.1 How objectives are formulated

When asked to explain how their organisations formulate the objectives of the funds for peace initiatives, the participants (n=9) responded as follows:

<b>How objectives are formulated</b>	<b>No. of donors using this way</b>
Developed at headquarters as international strategies	4
Developed locally after consulting key institutions	2
Respond to government programmes and work within the framework of the UN system	1
Follow back-donors' terms of reference	2

**Table 3: How objectives of specific funds are formulated**


44% revealed that objectives are formulated at their respective headquarters. Given that most of the donors are Western countries, the back donors referred to above are the same Western countries or from the Western countries. The same is true for those that respond to government programmes and work within the framework of the UN system. This means at least 80% of the funds' objectives are formulated outside the country. However all agreed that the funds are designed for the furtherance of the donor country's national interests and to achieve its foreign policy.



As Bendaña (2003) and Killick et al., (2005) noted indigenous knowledge and systems are ignored as Western created toolboxes, models, formulas and methods etc. are preferred.

#### 4.5.2. Locals input into donors work

When asked if locals input into their work, 100% of the respondents (n=9) said ‘Yes’.



**Figure 4: Locals input into donors' work**

When asked how they input into the work, the participants (n=9) responded as follows;

<b>How locals input into the work</b>	<b>No. of donors sharing this view</b>
Government of Zimbabwe set the programmes i.e. MERP, STEP, Medium Term Economic Plan, National healing and reconciliation, national elections, ZIMASET etc. and the donors simply respond by operating within these frameworks and agenda.	9
Consultation processes are held with different stakeholders at different times as per needs.	9

**Table 4: How locals input into the donors' work**

The responses suggest that decisions made at headquarters as part of foreign policy for the furtherance of national interests (as noted in previous sections) can be influenced by aid recipients. This suggests locals participate in the decision making.

Participation, according to Coetzee et al (2001 p.472), is “people involving themselves ... in organisations indirectly or directly concerned with the decision making about and implementation of development”. It is basically taking part in processes.

In the 1960s and 1970s the term participation was loaded with political meaning and denoted people power and revolutionary struggles (Freire 1993). Participation was

invariably linked to change and preceded by mobilisation and organisation. It was not just a ritual of giving legal effect to or legitimising some processes or policies. Chambers (1994 a,b.) argued that in recent times the term has been tamed to mean just involvement in what Hart (1992) called manipulative, decorative and token participation. The World Bank (1994) demonstrated contentment with citizen participation that is de-radicalised. Given the bank's origins and the liberal ideology that underpins its existence and work, it is understandable that it would envisage participation that is not radical. Instead, as observed by Mompati and Prinsen (2002), participation has been reduced to liberal concepts like universal suffrage or one person one vote and individual rights taking precedence over communal rights. In essence participation ought to be people actively engaged in decision making. This entails involvement in all stages of the process. Odhiambo (2002) agrees suggesting the stages to include determining the outcome, controlling the process, use of resources and the ultimate benefit.

There are different reasons for people's participation. Sen (1999) regards participation as the mark of citizenship. This suggests a conscious decision by citizens to conform in order to belong. Following this argument, non-conformity implies dire consequences. Kothari (1999) goes further to assert that a participating citizen fits the bill of Rousseau's moral citizen who strives for ideals of democracy which are underpinned by citizen participation. Again the underlying motivation seems to be approval and acceptance by one's community.

The moral arguments implied by both Sen and Kothari follow the obligations approach to citizenship. People participate out of their own volition and moral choice - as a duty to their community. This means the primary motivation for participation is not what one gets from their action but the fulfilment of duty. If there is any private benefit to be derived by the individual's participation, perhaps it is self fulfilment.

Moyo (1992) challenged the moral argument that people participate out of civic duty or to advance the public good. He rather suggested that people participate out of self interest. Although self interest has become associated with liberalism, even revolutionaries like Amartya Sen tend to agree that people participate to develop themselves in what he intimates is a search for freedom (Sen 1999). The self interest can also not be divorced from the self actualisation or fulfilment that some people derive from participation. This means self interest can be based on both material and non material benefits e.g. acceptance, spiritual and psychological fulfilment etc.

From the above it can be deduced that there is a fine line between the obligations and self interest approaches to participation. In meeting one's obligation to participate a person would also be meeting a personal need or pursuing a self interest.

Some' (1996, 1998) and Moyo (1987) posited that participation by all community members is sine qua non to life and decision making in indigenous African

communities. This means participation is both a right and an obligation to the member and also a condition for decision making i.e. participation legitimises decisions. The danger with this is the abuse of participants as decorations on the decision making floor to legitimise unpopular decisions. Mompati and Prinsen (2002) observed that at times people are gathered to be informed on issues and that is passed as participation. They further asserted that minority and inferior groups as well as women and children participate through their presence and not their ideas. Their participation fits Hart's manipulative, decorative and token participation (Hart, 1992).

Popular participation is important for legitimacy. However it is important to ensure that the participation is measured in terms of its quality.

Participation is also important for development – both personal and community development. As Pope Paul VI (1967) observed, development is not about buildings but people. Nyerere (1973) adds that people are not developed; they develop themselves. Nyerere further suggested that a person can only be developed if he participates in the community in which he lives. Pieterse (1998) disagreed arguing that participation is not always necessary for development as participation itself is subjective and vulnerable to other influences. In essence there is nothing like free participation. Since Pieterse does not define development and freedom, it is possible that the disagreement emanates from differences in definitions of development. It remains therefore uncontested that genuine development is a product of the citizens' genuine participation.

As already outlined, there are several factors that influence people's participation e.g. manipulation and tokenism. As Odhiambo (2002) observed, people participate from where they are and in what they know best. This means people's experiences and awareness influence not only their participation in terms of numbers but also the quality of participation.

Awareness speaks to the availability of relevant information that assists in the participation. Makumbe and Compagnon (2000) concurred arguing that participation requires relevant information. One can only participate to the extent that one is informed.

The people's experiences referred to above can be summed up as culture. Culture is the system of shared beliefs, values, practices, language, norms, rituals, and material things that group members use to understand their world. This means culture can influence participation i.e. who participates in what, how and why. And participation can also become cultural i.e. a culture of participation (Verhelst, 1999).

Further, environmental factors i.e. social, political, economic etc. also affect participation. Makumbe and Compagnon (2000) observed that material conditions influence participation. They proceed to suggest that the less fortunate tend to "be socially conservative" (ibid. p.20) and participation mostly dominated by the elite – petit bourgeoisie. This broad assertion consigns the less fortunate to perpetual apathy, which

history has disputed. Barberton et al (1998) argued that if the material conditions are not conducive, this affects the quality of participation. This is true. Similarly participation can be limited through institutionalised mechanisms e.g. rules of engagement.

Participation is also influenced by apathy which Galbraith (1992) defines as citizens not participating in political processes. In principle, apathy is manifest in attitudes of despair and depression created by political circumstances, non-involvement of people on important issues that affect their societies, a lack of interest in public affairs, an attitude of resignation, withdrawal and despair and a state of hopelessness.

The claim to responding to local programmes, notwithstanding, the previous findings correspond to Bendaña's observation that peace initiatives tend to be top-down (Bendaña, 2003). David Moore was also proven right when he suggested that models for development, peace etc. were chosen for countries in the periphery by the dominant Northern powers. These models have the sole intention of integrating the recipient countries into the global market (Moore, 2000).

#### **4.5. Conclusion**

This chapter has detailed the major findings of the survey. It has been established that the number of donors funding peace initiatives is between 9 and 21; that whilst the definition of peace varies from donor to donor, most of the definitions lean towards

liberal peace; that most funding is directed towards promotion of human rights and liberal values; *hunu/ubuntu* is appreciated but not considered practical and desirable to promotion of peace and development; that locals do not contribute much to donor policy formulation but can still create spaces to advance their causes.



## **CHAPTER V: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations based on the data analysed in the previous chapter.

### **5.2 Study design**

The study was conducted to investigate the role of Harare based donors in influencing the nature of peace interventions in Zimbabwe. It sought to understand the nature and scope of peace interventions promoted by Harare based Western donors.

The study was designed to meet four principal objectives. These are to;

1. Investigate the different donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe and the terms of reference of their funds
2. Analyse donors' positions regarding local beliefs and understanding of peace
3. Establish the extent to which locals can input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives
4. Recommend appropriate strategies that correspond to the findings

The study sought to answer the following questions:

1. Which Harare based donors are supporting peace initiatives in Zimbabwe?
2. What is the nature of peace work that they are supporting?

3. How do the donors regard local beliefs and understanding of peace?
4. To what extent do locals input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives?

The study was framed in Modernisation theory. The literature review showed that most donors pursue liberal policies which are in line with Modernisation theory of development. A number of scholars and activists from the Global South such as Bendaña, Moore, Tandon, Bond, Manyanya and Nathan are critical of Modernisation and neo-liberalism which they accuse of manufacturing conflicts in the poor countries of the South. They allege that most peace initiatives are not meant to address the geopolitical and international economic structural causes of the conflicts. The dominant model of liberal peace was equally challenged. The Bantu philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* was considered as an alternative to Liberalism and Modernisation in promoting peace.

### **5.3 Research methods and procedures**

To answer the research questions and test the positions obtained in the review of literature, different research methods and procedures were adopted. A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods of research was used for this study. Narratives and numbers were used to describe phenomena and percentages and graphs used to summarise findings.

The population was restricted to the donors located in Harare and involved in funding peace initiatives. These according to a survey and mapping of donors conducted by Diakonia in 2012 numbered 18.

The survey instruments used were questionnaire and standardize open-ended interviews. The questionnaire used was a piece of paper with eleven (11) questions. It was administered to thirteen (13) informants who are representatives of the donor organisations with the mandate or responsibility to give information to the public. The questionnaire was hand delivered and collected.

Five (5) informants were to be interviewed. A simple lottery where all the names were put in a hat and drawn out was used to ascertain the five donors to be interviewed and the thirteen to respond to the questionnaire.

The data was analysed using the Open Coding System or method of Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) i.e. reading transcripts line by line and identifying and coding the concepts. Triangulation i.e. method triangulation and data triangulation and peer review were used as validity strategies.

## **5.4. Findings and conclusions**

### **5.4.1 Response Rate**

Of the 18 donors to be surveyed only 10 i.e. 56% participated. All the respondents were Western donors.

There was a response rate of 80% to the interviews 46% to the questionnaires. Characteristics of the non-respondents are known and these were not revealed for ethical reasons.

No demographic data of the respondents was obtained as this was not necessary.

### **5.4.2 Objective 1.**

- **Investigation of the different donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe and the terms of reference of their funds**

Funding of peace initiatives is guided by different bilateral and multilateral arrangements. 90% of the respondents (n=10) claimed to be funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe.

It was established that most of the projects or funds were ending this year and there were no new commitments for funding. Donors were in fact scaling down and others moving to social and economic development in what is called 'flavour of the month syndrome'.

It was also found that the definitions and interpretations of funding and peace are varied. Some of the so-called 'donors' are fund managers who only administer funds on behalf of the donors; others are middlemen who get established funds from 'back donors' for sub-granting; and others provide direct funding to project holders. Since at times all the three are identified and identify themselves or act as donors, it was not easy to ascertain the exact number of donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe. Because of this difficulty, the number of donors may be somewhere between 9 and 21.

The deference to back donors by both fund managers and 'middlemen' donors, proved true a claim by Fisher and Zimina (2008) as well as De Renzio and Hanlon (2007) that international, multilateral and local organisations defer to political and economic power for their continued existence.

### **How the donors define peace**

Peace is defined differently by the organizations. Although there was no one dominant definition, there was emphasis on the rights of the individual in most definitions. The definitions are consistent with the notion of liberal peace which Fisher and Zimina

(2008) suggests is generally defined in terms of a democratic system, human rights with special emphasis on the individual and free market economy as conditions for peace. The emphasis on the rights of the individual as contrasted with the rights of the community demonstrates a Eurocentric and ethnocentric view of rights. In essence this means the respondents subscribe to Liberalism and Modernisation.

### **The kinds of peace initiatives supported**

60% (n=10) said they support peace building initiatives though they have different understandings and interpretations of peace building. 40% said they support human rights work.

Even those that support peace building, conflict transformation, conflict management, justice and peace, capacity development, mutual understanding and tolerance as well as gender justice do so from the point of human rights and retributive justice. This contrasts with the predominant justice of *hunhu/ubuntu* i.e. restorative justice aimed at reconciliation and restoration of relations.

Civil and political rights tend to be given prominence over economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. The rights of the individual tend to supersede those of the community. The programmes and projects limit analysis and intervention to Zimbabwe. This gives credence to Bendaña's assertion that the assistance rendered by the West does

not focus attention on the nature and functioning of the global economy as well as global governance (Bendaña, 2003) and Frank's criticism of ahistoricity (Frank, 1969).

Some of the donors have separate peace, governance and development portfolios. This segregation suggests little linkages between and among the three sectors. Fisher and Zimina (2008) were vindicated in their observation that many interventions in the peacebuilding field follow a technical approach which focuses on immediate problems without addressing the underlying social system and dynamics thereby reinforcing the status quo i.e. the global system.

One respondent suggested project holders should be creative in the design of their programmes and projects to advance their cause.

#### **5.4.3 Objective 2.**

- Analysis of donors' positions regarding local beliefs and understanding of peace**

Liberal peace is not the only model of peace. *Hunhu/ubuntu* is another model.

78% of the respondents (n=9) claimed to understand the concept of *hunhu/ubuntu*. However 71% of the respondents (n=7) claimed not to be incorporating *hunhu/ubuntu* in

their work claiming *hunhu/ubuntu* is too abstract and cannot be implemented; that many Africans were no longer practising it as it was outdated and overtaken by developments; that no project proposals included the concept suggests the project holders had no interest in the concept; that Zimbabwe was a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society hence the constitution of Zimbabwe does not recognise *hunhu/ubuntu*; *hunhu/ubuntu* was sectarian and therefore cannot be supported.

The glaring omission of *hunhu/ubuntu* in the new constitution of Zimbabwe is noteworthy and this calls for redress.

The low regard for *hunhu/ubuntu* confirms what Coetzee (1996) noted that Modernisation strives to limit the influence of religion and tradition i.e. secularisation of society.

The superseding of individual rights over community rights and undermining of *hunhu/ubuntu* confirms Durkheim's fear of anomie and Tonnies' transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*.

#### **5.4.4 Objective 3.**

**Establishment of the extent to which locals can input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives**



44% revealed that objectives are formulated at their respective headquarters, 22% follow back donors' terms of reference, 11% respond to government programmes and work within the framework of the UN system; and 22% develop them locally after consulting key institutions. Given that most of the donors are Western countries, the back donors referred to above are the same Western countries. Similarly those that respond to government programmes and work within the framework of the UN system require their Capitals to make the decisions. This means at least 80% of the funds' objectives are formulated outside the country.

All respondents agreed that the funds are designed for the furtherance of the donor country's national interests and to achieve its foreign policy.

### **Locals input into donors work**

As observed by Bendaña, peace initiatives tend to be top-down (Bendaña, 2003). David Moore was also proven right when he suggested that models for development, peace etc. were chosen for countries in the periphery by the dominant Northern powers. These models have the sole intention of integrating the recipient countries into the global market (Moore, 2000).

## **5.5 Recommendations**

Given the above findings and analysis, the following recommendations are made.

### **5.5.1 Recommendations for donors**

- As advised by Lederach (1997) there is need to build peace from the bottom up as well as from the top down and the middle outwards. This calls for serious consideration of indigenous knowledge and systems.
- Peace initiatives tend to be top-down, externally and service delivery-mode driven, elitist and interventionist. There is need to broaden local participation in the design of terms of reference of the funds meant to address specific and targeted issues.
- There is need to develop holistic programmes that integrate peace, governance and development instead of addressing these in isolation.

### **5.5.2 Recommendations for Practitioners and or local project holders**

- Creativity in designing projects and programmes is paramount. This calls for smart navigation between conforming to the donors' language and acting in the strategic interests of the communities and promotion of the local values and traditions.

- It is important to adopt participatory methods that provide space to project beneficiaries to interface with the world on their own terms. This reduces the influence of implementing agencies or project holders who are mostly compromised by their reliance on Western funding.
- There is need to develop holistic programmes that integrate peace, governance and development instead of following donor prescriptions of addressing these in isolation.
- The glaring omission of *hunhu/ubuntu* in the new constitution of Zimbabwe is noteworthy. There should be concerted efforts to lobby authorities and indeed have sustained campaigns at grassroots to have *hunhu/ubuntu* recognised in the constitution of Zimbabwe.

### **5.5.3 Recommendations for Research**

- Research ought to be undertaken to establish ways of infusing *hunhu/ubuntu* in development policy and programmes in general and peace work in particular.

- It is necessary to establish to what extent project implementers use conflict analysis tools and the types thereof. Conflict analysis helps locate key driving factors of conflicts.
- It is prudent to investigate whether Zimbabwean organizations and institutions working in the peace building field use the transformative approach or the technical approach. Further work stemming from this would be capacity building to enable practitioners to engage in transformative peace building for the creation of positive peace.

#### **5.5.4 Recommendations for Improving this Study**

- The major limitation of the study was that the key informants could have regarded this as ‘an educational exercise’ and perhaps not accord it due attention. It would be important and interesting to undertake the same exercise not as part of a degree programme as this may attract high level respondents and perhaps more open responses.
- The study was limited to asking the donors a set of questions without really engaging them. This study can be improved by engaging the donors on their

ideological positions and theoretical orientations as herein these were assessed using liberalism in its broadest sense.

- It would be useful to investigate the extent of the donors' influence in the selection and determination of programmes i.e. specific case studies.
- The findings and conclusions may suggest that donors are homogeneous in their approach. The study could be improved by exploring the differences in positioning and orientation of the donors.
- Whilst in development circles, experts and practitioners claim that Modernisation theory is dead, the results of this study have shown that it is in fact alive and influencing policy and practice in the donor world. Further work on this and publishing in authoritative publications would reignite the debate on the theories and fuel Africa's search for a development paradigm.

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## Appendix 1: Interview guide

### The Role of Donors in Influencing Peace Interventions in Zimbabwe

#### Interview Guide

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**Objective 1: To understand the different donors funding peace initiatives in Zimbabwe and the terms of reference of their funds**

1. Do you fund peace initiatives in Zimbabwe? 

YES		NO	
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2. Which of the other Harare based donors are supporting peace initiatives in Zimbabwe?  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....
3. How does your organisation define peace?  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....
4. What kind of peace initiatives or work do you support?  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**Objective 2: To explore donors positions regarding local beliefs and understanding of peace**

5. What do you understand by *hunhu* or *ubuntu*?  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

6. How do you incorporate *hunhu/ubuntu* in your work?

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**Objective 3: To investigate the extent to which locals can input into and influence setting of objectives of funds for peace initiatives**

7. How are the objectives of the funds for peace initiatives formulated?

.....

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8. How do locals input into your work?

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.....

.....

## Appendix 2: Questionnaire

### Questionnaire

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I, Wellington Mbofana, am a student with Africa University's Institute of leadership peace and governance (IPLG). I am doing an Executive Masters in Peace and Governance (EMPG). In partial fulfilment of my programme, I have to conduct field research in an area of my choice. In line with this requirement I am conducting a research on *The Role of Donors in Influencing Peace Interventions in Zimbabwe*. You have been chosen to assist in this study. Kindly take a few minutes to fill in this questionnaire. The information you provide will be treated in confidence and no one will be able to identify you or your organisation in the report.

---

1. Do you fund peace initiatives in 

YES		NO	
-----	--	----	--

 Zimbabwe?

2. Which of the other Harare based donors fund peace initiatives in Zimbabwe?

.....

.....

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3. How does your organisation define peace?

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.....

4. What kind of peace initiatives or work do you support?

.....

.....

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.....

5. Do you understand the concept of 

YES		NO	
-----	--	----	--

*hunhu/ubuntu*?

6. If yes, what do you understand by it?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

7. Do you incorporate *hunhu/ubuntu* in your 

YES		NO	
-----	--	----	--

 work?

8. If yes, how do you incorporate it?

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.....

9. How are the objectives of the funds for peace initiatives formulated?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

10. Do locals input into your 

YES		NO	
-----	--	----	--

 work?

11. If yes, how do they input into your work?

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.....  
.....

Thank you for responding to the questionnaire