

THE IMPACT OF THE RESURGENCE OF AN INSURGENT (RENAMO); A CASE
STUDY OF CHIMANIMANI EAST; ZIMBABWE.

BY

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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ABSTRACT

The research was guided by the following central research question; Are people in Chimanimani East aware of the current activities of Renamo in Mozambique and the consequences on their livelihoods? What are the perceptions of the people in Chimanimani East over the activities in Mozambique?. How has the conflict in Mozambique impacted on Zimbabwe? and what are the ongoing multiple productive strategies of resolving the conflict? The study was informed by both the Theory of Violence by Johan Galtung and Trauma theory by Sigmund Freud. The study relied heavily on qualitative and a bit of quantitative research. The research tools applied were judgmental, snowballing and purposive sampling and direct observation. In-depth interviews, direct focus groups and questionnaires were carried out to gather the relevant information. The collected data was presented in an analytic narrative form and in basic statistical format. The findings revealed that the people in Chimanimani were aware of the current activities of Renamo, the current conflict's impact psychologically as revealed by the general fear of Renamo by the respondents, the likely impact on their livelihoods and the what role SADC and African Union should take in the event of an all out civil war. The study also revealed that dialogue has been initiated between Renamo and the Mozambican government in trying to implement some of the Rome Peace Agreement. The study makes recommendations to the government of Zimbabwe and Mozambique as well as the people in Chimanimani East.

DECLARATION

I, Charles Nyazungu, do hereby declare that the work presented here is a result of my work except where sources have been acknowledged, and this work has neither been submitted nor will be submitted to any university for the award of any degree.

Signed _____

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Roberta and my twins Ruvarashe and Munashe and to my late nephew Miss Fadzai S Shamuyarira and my advisor the late Mr. Killian Mpingo who deceased during the same period I was writing this dissertation.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABC	Attitudes, Behavior and Conflict
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
ANGS	Armed Non-State Groups
AMODE	Mozambique Association of Demobilized of War
AU	African Union
CEDE	Center for the Study of Democracy and Development
CFTM	Conceptual Factor-Tree Model
CIO	Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterintelligence
DGS	General Security Directorate
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FLERIMO	Front of Liberation of Mozambique
LONHO	London Rhodesia
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

OREC	Organization for Conflict Resolution
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance Army
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
PKK	Turkish Worker's Party
PTSD	Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance Army
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAS	Special Air Service (Rhodesia)
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
UMC	United Methodist Church
USA	United States of America
UNITA	United Front for the Total Independence of Angola
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZANLA	Zimbabwean National Liberation Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean Peoples' Revolutionary Arm

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CHAPTER 1

1.0 Introduction

The chapter focused on the background information that acts as the backbone to the study. It also focused on research questions that stressed on the role, extent and the suggestions relating to the study. Issues dealt with in the chapter brought in the research objectives, research questions, statement of the problems, importance of the study, limitation, delimitation and definition of terms.

1.1 The emergence of an insurgent: Renamo

There are many armed groups in Africa and beyond and these can be classified according to a wide array of definitions emanating from what bases of armed groups are in terms of waging violence towards a central government. Some of the armed groups are products of prolonged grievance, frustration, economic inequalities, ideological differences, ethnicity, regionalism or cultural dominance. These groups in Africa and the world over have been called armed non-state groups (ANSGs). Within such groups we find terms such as militia, rebels, insurgent groups, and bandits depending on the main agenda or political philosophy (Okumu and Ikelegbe 2010).

Renamo as a bandit movement was established by the governments of Rhodesia, South Africa and Western countries. The fear of communism and repressions in South Africa and Rhodesia saw the emergence of ZANLA and ZIPRA (Rhodesia) and (ANC) of South Africa which got military support from Flerimo. To counter such, the Rhodesian government through former Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), Ken Flower established Renamo in 1977 who were trained at Grand Reef in Odzi near Mutare. The first groups trained at Odzi testified that they were abducted in Mozambique. After independence in Zimbabwe, Renamo was airlifted to South Africa where it continued its operations against Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Johnson and Martin 1986, Chimanikire 1990; Minter 1989, Human Right Watch 1992).

Training camps were also established in Nyanga and Chisumbanje in the Manicaland province (Venables 2012; Tavuyanago 2011; Robinson 2006; Minter 1989; Robinson and Martin 1986; Flower 1987; Rugumamu, Gbla; 2003).

The propaganda machinery for Renamo was also established in Rhodesia such as Radio Bertha or the 'Voice of Free Africa' and transmitted in Portuguese from Guinea Fowl in Gwelo now Gweru and radio Hyena from Salisbury (Johnson and Martin 1986, Robinson 2006; Tavuyanago 2011).

The worst atrocity committed by Renamo was at Homoine in Inhambane province where Renamo paratroopers massacred 424 civilians who were shot or either killed by machetes. Human rights provisions were often flouted by Renamo (Dava, Chigora, Chibanda, Sillah 2013; Austin 1994; Johnson and Martin 1986, Human Right Watch 1992).

Violence in most insurgents groups has been used to initiate new recruits which make it socially and psychologically difficult for recruits to return back to their societies that they would have destroyed.

A story told by Father Carlos Rodriguez of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative is of a boy in Kitgum who had his ears, lips and fingers cut off by the LRA. His ears were then wrapped in a letter and put in his pocket. The letter contained a warning to anyone who was thinking about joining the Local Defense Units; “*We shall do to you what we have done to him*” Olsen, K.T. (2007).

1.2 Nkomati Peace Accord

To end the military support and incursions by South Africa through Renamo, Mozambique and South Africa signed a non-aggression peace agreement on 16 March 1984, the Nkomati Peace Accord. South Africa was to cease supporting Renamo and Mozambique was to stop offering sanctuary to the (ANC). The agreement entailed economic and security restorations. It also meant placing South Africa as a regional power and resuscitating itself from international isolation. The peace agreement was also seen as a victory for Frelimo socialist policy of peace over South Africa. Despite signing the agreement, Renamo bases remained operational in South Africa. Support in logistics, equipment, and intelligence information for Renamo continued from South Africa (Austin 1994, Johnson and Martin 1986, Minter 1989; Robinson 2006, Erasmus 1984).

1.3 Rome Peace Accord

It took more than a year of mediation and negotiation to sign the Rome Peace Accord that ended the 1977-1992 Mozambican civil war in the Italian capital Rome where religious groups, various leaders from Africa Europe and America convened to end the 16 year old civil war.

1.4 Background to Study

In 1992 the Mozambique government and Renamo signed a peace agreement in Italy. Mediators to end the conflict included Presidents from Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, South Africa and many including officials from the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Nearly one million Mozambicans perished during the conflict with thousands of refugees being displaced into Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland, Tanzania and South Africa. (Gersony, Austin 1994, Human Right Watch 1992)

The conflict affected the economies of most countries within the SADC region. Renamo activities also spilled into Manicaland in Zimbabwe. During the war Renamo committed gross human rights violations in Mozambique and along the Zimbabwe –Mozambique border.

In 2012 Renamo pulled out of the government of national unity citing the following grievances; the failure by the government of Mozambique to implement some provisions of the 1992 peace accord, failure to reintegrate some of its combatants into the security

structures, failure to make reforms to the electoral systems and Constitution, and the failure to share revenue from the natural resources. After pulling from the government , Renamo engaged in violent activities such as attacks on police posts and the killing of civilians and military personnel in the hot spots such as Maringue in Mozambique and creating a state of fear in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In responding to that, Zimbabwe temporarily deployed troops along its eastern border areas.

1.5 Statement of the Problem

The resurgence of the Renamo created panic and fear in Manicaland according to media reports. The infiltration of the bandits in Chimanimani East in the 1980s was attributed to the lack of border security structures.

According to Galula D; (1964), ‘..border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever the administrative structures, and this advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency’.

The resurgence of Renamo has been alleged to pose a serious threat to the diamond mining activities in Marange and Murowa as well as human security in the area. Diamonds have been a source of conflicts in Africa for example in Sierra Leone and Liberia which fueled wars in the two Western African countries in the 90s.

On another note people in Chimanimani East speak Ndau and Shona which they share with most Mozambican people. Shona was a popular language of communication within Renamo during the 1975-1992 conflict. Such proximity and a shared language remains a

security challenge to Manicaland. Besides that most of the former Renamo bandits reside in Manica as well as the Zambezia province, meaning Renamo can easily infiltrate into Chimanimani East and other parts of the country in the Manicaland province. The province shares its border with three provinces of Mozambique; Gaza, Manica and Tete which were used to infiltrate Manicaland in the 1975-1992 civil war.

1.6 Assumptions

1 Those to be interviewed at one point experienced or head or had relatives, community members who were either abused by Renamo and still have the memories of such activities.

2 Due to the long border which stretches for about 1000km there is a possibility that Renamo bandits will cross into Zimbabwe and carry out attacks if the Zimbabwean government commit troops to Mozambique.

1.7 Research Objectives

The study objectives of the study are to:

- (1) Identify if the people in Chimanimani East are aware of the activities of Renamo in Mozambique and the consequences on their livelihoods.
- (2) Explore the perceptions of the people in Chimanimani East over the activities in Mozambique.

- (3) Assess the impact of the current conflict in Mozambique on Zimbabwe.
- (4) To evaluate the ongoing multiple productive strategies of resolving the conflict.

1.8 Research Questions

The study would seek to answer the following questions:

- (1) Are people in Chimanimani East aware of the current activities of Renamo in Mozambique and the consequences on their livelihoods?
- (2) What are the perceptions of the people in Chimanimani East over the activities in Mozambique?
- (3) How has the conflict in Mozambique impacted on Zimbabwe?
- (4) What are the ongoing multiple productive strategies of resolving the conflict?

1.9 Justification of the Study

This study will focus on examining the root causes, nature and consequences of the current conflict in Mozambique which might affect some areas in Chimanimani East. The research will also act as an early warning system between the governments of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, SADC, the Africa Union, and the United Nations. The research will be beneficial to academic institutions as body of knowledge and an insight into further researches. It will also act as an insight to policy makers and leaders not only in Zimbabwe, but in Africa and beyond.

1.10 Delimitations of the Study

The researcher will concentrate in Chimanimani East in the following areas; Demeni, Ndiemi, Mutsvangwa, Nyahode and Ndimba.

1.11 Limitations of the Study

The major limitations to this study is time constraints as the study has to be conducted within six months and the researcher will be expected to balance work demands and the study expectations. The researcher might face resistance from interviewers, however, to alleviate that, respondents will be given assurance that the information provided through the study will be for the purpose of the research only and will be regarded as confidential. The researcher will seek permission from the local authorities and the Mozambique government so as to embark on the research. Some limitations that the researcher is likely to encounter include the bad weather absence of clear border demarcations, and language barriers such as *Ndau*.

1.12 Definition of Terms:

1 Resurgence: the pulling out of Renamo from the government of national unity and the 1992 Rome Peace Accord calling the end of peace in Mozambique, the carrying out of fresh attacks in Mozambique, and the killing of government security apparatus and civilians from 2012 to date.

2 Impact: the psychological, impact of the current military activities of Renamo in Chimanimani East in Zimbabwe.

3 Renamo: a former rebel movement that caused political, social and economic damage in Mozambique and Zimbabwe's Eastern Districts in the 1975-1992 civil war.

1.13 Conclusion

The chapter looked at the origin of militia groups and Renamo, as an introduction and also focused of the background to the study, the statement of the problem, significance of the study, research questions and concluded with a definition of the terms.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The chapter will also introduce concepts and definition of insurgents, leadership, terrorism and guerrilla as tactics used by insurgents, financial backing of insurgents, operational environments for insurgents. It will be informed by the major theories which are the backbone of the study informed by Galtung's theory of violence and the trauma theory by Sigmund Freud and will focus on a detailed analysis of the Renamo. The research will borrow various operational tactics from various insurgents groups that operated in South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. A model such as the Conceptual Factor-Tree Model (CFTM) will be used to give an impression of the commonalities that exist within insurgents.

2.1 Conceptual framework

To fully understand the dynamics of violence it is also imperative to go deeper into the causes of violence in armed conflicts. At one point people may settle their squabbles by forcing the elimination of their neighbor through an insurgent or by the state because of past disagreements or misunderstandings.


2.2 Ideology and violence

Most studies in violence and conflicts had for some years ignored the aspect of ideology which is critical for shaping the operations of an insurgent. Theories that do include ideology, often view it as a secondary issue, dependent on resources or other premeditated concerns. When an insurgent is built around an over pressing ideology, it can change the patterns of violence in which it engages, especially with regard to civilians.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The research will be informed by the ABC (Attitudes, Behavior and Conflict) Model of Conflict and the theory of Violence by Johan Galtung. The Model has the following aspects; Attitudes, Behavior and Conflict. Contextually the Mozambique conflict which span from 1975-1992 can be analyzed using the ABC Model together with the Model of Violence as indicated below.

Figure 1 Model of Conflict by Johan Galtung



Adapted from Czyz M A(2006)


The model of violence can be combined with the theory of violence attitudes and behavior can be institutionalized thus structural and once structural it becomes cultural of which the cultural will then produce a behavior that of either killing, maiming, segregation, assassinations and even deprivation as means of violence which can be visible or invisible.

2.3.1 Theory of Violence by Johan Galtung

Violence is classified into two parameters according to John Galtung and these are visible and invisible violence. Direct violence takes the form of physical such as killing or maiming. The nature of the violence by Renamo from 2012 to 2013 has been Structural and there have been Direct injuries to both civilians and security personnel in Mozambique. According to Johan Galtung the Structural nature of violence forms part

of the visible marks of which encompass visible injuries to any part of the body as a result of the application of excessive force. The invisible marks of violence include the Cultural and Structural. The insurgency activities have been attributed to a culture of violence within Renamo indoctrinated within the former rebels. The resurgence by Renamo has created fear and panic along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. Violence in its invisibility nature has an impact psychologically which produces posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) such as those witnessed in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Bosnian conflict and the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

Figure 2 Model of Violence




Adapted from Czyz M A(2006).

2. 3.2 Criticism of Galtung's theory of Violence

Whilst the theory has been quite informative in social science research Galtung has been criticized for his idea of peace meaning the absence war. They have gone further to include other aspects such as environmental degradation and pollution to mention a few which have been viewed as manifestations of violence on nature. Such structural violence on nature has resulted in massive poverty especially in Third World countries which has been attributed to the massive exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies. Such a structural creation of poverty can be understood from the theories of poverty such as; poverty caused by individual deficiencies. poverty caused by cultural belief systems that support sub-cultures of poverty, poverty caused by economic, political, and social distortions or discrimination, poverty caused by geographical disparities and poverty caused by cumulative and cyclical interdependencies (Boulding1977,McSweeney1998,Prontzos,2004,Bradshaw 2005).

They have also advocated for a new model of peace is indicated below;

Figure 3 Model of Peace



2.3.3 Trauma Theory

The research is also informed by the trauma theory which has its origins in psychology and was postulated by Sigmund Freud. The study of trauma has been perhaps the most fertile area within psychiatry and psychology in promoting deeper understanding of how emotional, cognitive, social, and biological forces interact in human development. In 1964 Sigmund Freud wrote in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* that, ‘ if a person does not remember, he is likely to act out: he reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeat sit, without knowing, of course, that he is repeating, and in the end, we understand that this is his way of remembering.’ He went further and wrote in, ‘*Remembering, Repeating and Working Through* that, ‘while the patient lives it through

as something real and actual, we have to accomplish the therapeutic task, which consists chiefly of translating it back again in terms of the past”(Trauma Centre, Undated).

Researchers have indicated that victims of violence may suffer years of (PTSDs) such as those witnessed in the Israel-Palestine, conflict the Bosnian conflict and the 1994 Rwanda genocide (Munayyer 2012; David Jaeger, 2008). Cultural violence according to Galtung will result in collective and attack trauma such as the experiences that the Palestinians have experienced over the years of occupation, settlement and blockades.

2.4 Five key World events that kept the growth of Renamo

These were the coup d'état in Portugal, the 1980 independence of Zimbabwe, the election to power of Ronald Reagan, the entrance of Zimbabwe to (SADC) and the 'Muldergate' scandal in South Africa which saw John Vorster relinquishing power to P K Botha. The rise to power by PK Botha from a military man to the Head of State in apartheid South Africa saw a transformation of Renamo into a more formidable tool of foreign policy for South Africa, to destabilize Mozambique for its support for ANC and offering training bases for ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. The assertion to power by Reagan in America saw a shift in foreign policy from the previous administration from 'contractive engagement' to 'destructive engagement' Johnson and Martin (2006).

2.5 Perceptions over the demise of Renamo

The report by the *Institute of Security Studies Report of 2013 volume 53* that Renamo is no longer a force to reckon is an intellectual shortsightedness and a lack of an in-depth understanding of insurgent operations. Insurgents today have an array of information at their disposal such as books, manuals and the internet which provide detailed information on how to wage and sustain a conflict, how to make bombs, how to sway public opinion, how to inflict collateral damages and how to counter counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies without costs. An example of a very comprehensive and detailed manual at the disposal of insurgents is easily available on the internet which the researcher also has at his disposal. This manual created wide spread controversy within the American administration, military and intelligence services after its publication. The manual has very detailed information on how to make bombs from, for example, simple tennis balls and how to steal money from automated teller machines using US\$1 and US\$5 bills.

2.6 Brief History of Mozambique

Mozambique is situated to the south eastern side of the African continent and the Indian Ocean to the east. There are ten provinces in Mozambique, and has three critical trade routes to Zimbabwe that is from Harare to Beira; Beitbridge to Maputo and Tete. From 1964 to 1975 the Mozambique revolutionary insurgent Frelimo waged a protracted war of independence. The first leader for Frelimo was Eduardo Mondlane who was later assassinated after a bitter leadership wrangle within Frelimo. After Mondlane's death

Samora Machel a Marxist–Leninist led Frelimo to the independence of Mozambique in 1975. Two years after independence, Mozambique was plunged into a bloody conflict through Renamo which got support from apartheid South Africa to eradicate communism in Southern Africa.

Figure 5 Map of Mozambique



Adapted from Robinson 2006

2.7 Characteristics of insurgents

2.7.1 Definition of insurgency

An insurgency is defined as a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity-including guerrilla warfare, terrorism and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activity-is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of

most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country. David , Burgos,(2009).

Insurgency groups have ever been mutating because of the ever changing global political dynamics and also as a result of factors such as the failure of economic development to keep pace with the expectations of people, the collapse of traditional political systems, economic decline, widespread anger and bitterness, environmental degradation, population pressure, such as 'youth bulge' and a proliferation of small light weapons from the economically challenged nations of the former Soviet Union.

The ever mutation by insurgents result in a change in strategies, the formulation of new tactics and the overall objective being to survive until the government is weakened. The contemporary insurgent group is not likely to take the same dimension like the revolutionary insurgents which in international political dynamics, anarchy, coercion, formation of alliances and the disintegration of such alliances pose new challenges to State security. In the process, international dynamics in world politics will produce very unfavorable explosive situations that may give rise to the emergence of new, collapsed or once dormant insurgents. Most insurgents have exhibited the same *modus operandi* of the institutionalization of violence. Renamo like the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone used horrific techniques to consolidate allegiance to the group so as to avoid disobedience and defections. Once the victims and

the recruits are exposed to high degrees of violence they are psychologically fragmented through flashbacks and the being is lost. The victim is severely traumatized and may become hopeless, if he escapes he seeks sanctuary from refugee camps and churches as witnessed in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the 1992 Srebrenica massacre where he is followed and violently eliminated.

Violence then is socialized through various institutions such as the media, education, family, religion, commerce, marriage and politics. The violence is further extended to infrastructures as sabotage. These acts leave whole communities helpless and traumatized through massive deaths and starvations. (Johnson and Martin 1986; Flower 1987, Africa Watch 1992). To fully appreciate the environment in which insurgents operate the researcher had to consult the Conceptual Factor-Tree Model (CFTM).

2.7.2 Conceptual Factor-Tree Model (CFTM)

The model gives a clear picture of the causes and players within an insurgent and it can be used to analyze many of these groups from their inception to their demise. It has been used by scholars and military strategists in trying to find counterinsurgency (COIN) measures. The researcher managed to analyze most of the insurgent groups from the revolutionary to the contemporary insurgents that rocked the world among them the Lebanese; Hezbollah, the Sendero Luminoso under Abimael Guzman in Peru and Sri

Lanka's Tamil Tigers under the late Velipillai Prabhakaran. The Tamil Tigers resurfaced again on Friday 18 April 2014 after 5 years of dormancy after its defeat in 2009.

Critical to this study is the Mozambique National Resistance Army (MNR). One striking element that was missing in the Renamo insurgent was an ideological base.


For any insurgence to be successful or not or whatever its form it has the following critical elements according to the conceptual tree model and these are leadership, guerrilla operations, intelligence, sabotage, and logistics among others.

2.7.3. Leadership

For an insurgent to be successful there is a need to have a well disciplined charismatic leadership that is both military and political leadership. The role of the political leadership is to win the 'hearts and minds of the population. The leadership must have the charismatic quality that keeps the group intact. Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo), Abimael Guzman (Sendero Luminoso) , Jonas Savimbi (UNITA), Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah), Osama bin Laden (Al-Qaeda) have been charismatic leaders. Afonso Dhlakama as a leader was able to unite Renamo, throughout the conflict.

On the military front intelligence plays a critical role in the application of various strategies and tactics that may neutralize the morale and demoralize the government through the use of terrorism and sabotage activities.

Figure 6 Tactics and Strategy of Guerilla Warfare Model



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy_and_tactics_of_guerrilla_warfare

2.7.4 Terrorism

This is a tactic that is often used by insurgent groups. However there are many definitions for terrorism. Two Dutch researchers from the University of Leiden, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman collected 109 academic and official definitions for terrorism and analyzed them in search for a comprehensive definition.

There is a difference between a guerilla and a terrorist movement and such a difference will help in the application of terms where they carry their legitimate meaning instead of mixing the terms interchangeably which often result in the logical lose of the initial meaning.

Terrorism has many definition among them are the following;

1..the US Vice-President's Task Force (1986) defined terrorism as '.. . the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies.

2 The Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany definition is: ' Terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which . . . [is] intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in art.

3. A British legal definition contains the same ingredients in a more succinct form: 'For the purposes of the legislation, terrorism is "the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear."Merari (1993)

In the definitions above it can be concluded that there are three common elements in terrorism and these are;

- 1 the application of violence;
- 2 political intentions
- 3 the purpose is to sow fear in a target population.

In further studies by Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman to ascertain the use of violence

They found that the element of violence was included in 83.5 per cent of the definitions; political goals in 65 percent, and 51 per cent emphasized the element of inflicting fear and terror. Only 21 per cent of the definitions mentioned arbitrariness and indiscrimination in targeting and only 17.5 per cent included the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals or outsiders. Merari (1993)

2.7.5 Guerilla

To avoid engagement with a well organized arm insurgents often employ guerilla tactics such as the hit and run. The hit and run strategy was often used by Che Guevara in Bolivia through quick and surprise attacks and withdrawal. Such guerilla tactics were part of Guevara's guerrilla doctrine the '*foco theory*'. The theory attributed that for a guerrilla movement to be successful it must count on the population, the terrain, financial support and many attributes.

2.7.6 Sabotage

Sabotage is one of the instruments that is used by insurgents, for it to be successful there is the need to execute it at the right time, right moment and must have the greatest impact physically and psychologically. Renamo once in South Africa started to carry out intensive sabotage activities against the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Renamo infiltrated Mozambique through Mapai near Nkomatiport. This was made possible by the support that Renamo got from the South African intelligence, the navy, the army and Special Forces who had been trained in carrying special sabotage activities. According to Africa Watch Report (1992) Renamo destroyed more than 2,773 primary and secondary schools and about 1,000 clinics in Mozambique.

2.7.7 Financial Support in insurgent movements

Renamo received a lot of financial support from the United States, South Africa and other countries in the Middle East such as Oman and Saudi Arabia. At one point

Matsangaissa was paid \$75, Dhlakama \$65 and the ordinary recruits were given \$20 (Martin and Johnson 1986). Money has a critical effect in insurgent operations. It can be acquired through theft, use of natural resources such as diamonds and ivory, illicit trafficking in drugs or from sympathizers.

Besides the support that Renamo got from both the South African and Rhodesian governments, the villagisation program under Samora Machel had an impact in the lives of the people of Mozambique especially northern Mozambican provinces that had been neglected for over three decades by the Frelimo government, hence an alliance to Renamo. Such an alliance has been manifested in the election results that have over the years showed a significant support of Renamo from provinces such as Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia. The discovery of natural wealth in Mozambique has been an issue within Renamo. (Carter Center 1999, Carter Center 2005, Davidson 2006, Murdock, Zunguza 2010, Igreja 2007, Lloyd, 2011)

However there has been a significant expansion in the Muslim community in Mozambique which can result in the escalation of al-Qaeda cell activities in southern Africa and in Mozambique in particular in view of the current crisis.

2.7.8 Training

Under the Rhodesian CIO training for Renamo was offered at Odzi. This was facilitated by Ken Flower. The trainees came under the direct control of the CIO and was headed by Eric May and members from the Rhodesian Special Air Services (SAS). The training

included sabotage, population disruption contrary to the common Moist perspective of respecting the population when waging an insurgent. Besides these Renamo considerably disrupted the economies of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia.

2.7.9 Sanctuary

In its early stages, Renamo establishes camps in olive-green semi-wooded areas near food and water sources and frequently rotated bases to avoid detection (Martin and Johnson, 2006). Sanctuaries are strategic assets for insurgents all over the world. Such places are ideal for insurgents to rest, recruit, and offer training. Some of the noted sanctuaries that have been used by insurgents include the Swat valley by the Taliban, and Beka valley by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The Rhodesian government under the instruction of Ken Flower established a sanctuary for Renamo in the Gorongosa National Park. Its first sanctuary was in the Manica province which is close to Chimanimani in the eastern districts of Zimbabwe. Gorongosa was ideal according to the plan of the Rhodesian intelligence service because it was strategically ideal to cut Mozambique into three through the Renamo incursions. In Central Africa the Virunga-Bwindi Region just like the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park includes the Virunga National Park in the DRC, the Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda as well as the Mbahinga National Park and Bwindi Forest National Park in Uganda. This region has been a sanctuary for various rebel movements from Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda which have terrorized the Great Lakes region population.

It currently hosts such groups as the FDLR, remnants of Nkunda's CNDP (National Congress for the Defense of the People), Mai-Mai militias and elements of Joseph Koni's Lord's Resistance Army. Koko (2011)

However, the presence of precious minerals in Chimanimani and the proximity of Chiadzwa to the border still remains a security challenge as noted in the previous conflicts in African such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.7.10 Communication

Renamo when it was under the Rhodesian CIO control operated Radio "Big Bertha" which broadcasted from Gweru but with the following address HG 444 Salisbury. *Voz da Africa Livre* (Voice of Free Africa) started broadcasting on 5 July 1976 and was operated by a Mozambican businessman Jorge Jardim who also supported Renamo financially. The radio station became controlled by the Rhodesian Ministry of Information and ran by the Directorate of Psychological Warfare. In Mozambique it was called Radio Quizumba/Radio Hyena (Martin and Johnson 1986).

2.7.11 Shadow governments

Most insurgents have at one point managed to create shadow governments in foreign countries. Renamo managed to open offices in Portugal, Federal Republic of Germany, and Kenya among others. The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka managed to open offices in Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom and managed to penetrate both the South African military and intelligence services at one point.

2.8 Origin of Renamo as an insurgent

This was a pseudo- terrorists group that was created in Angola by Dr Sao Jose Lopes, Head of General Security Directorate (DGS) the most feared Portuguese secret police.

I volunteered to Mugabe at one of our earliest meetings that I had handed over the MNR to the South Africans, rather than him learn the facts from other sources. He expressed no great surprise, indicating that he already knew that I was responsible for the MNR. What came as a greater surprise was to hear Mugabe say that President Samora Machel had commended me as an advisor on whom he could rely. 'But Samora Machel and I had never met!' Mugabe: 'He knows a lot about you; otherwise he would not have recommended you to me.' 'Does he know that I started the MNR, which is causing him so much trouble?' 'Yes,' said Mugabe, 'and I imagine that is why he has so much respect for you!' (Flower (1987))

Renamo was created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization for gathering intelligence information of Robert Mugabe's forces ZANLA, who had been given operational bases in Mozambique by Samora Machel. It first launched its first attacks in Mozambique in 1977. In 1979 Renamo suffered its worst setback after the Mozambique Armed Forces overran its Gorongosa base, killing its leader Andre Matsangaissa, a formidable fighter, on the night of 17 October 1979. In response to the leadership vacuum the Rhodesian CIO airlifted Dhlakama in a helicopter from Odzi and assumed leadership on 18 October 1979. The favored leader was Mhlanga as opposed to Dhlakama who was seen as weak and lacked the credentials that Lucas Mhlanga had. However, Mhlanga was executed at a base in Gorongosa under the instruction of Renamo leader's Dhlakama in a leadership wrangle. From the military support that Renamo got from South Africa it became a more effective better equipped fighting

force. By 1983, Renamo was already operating in more than 9 out of the 10 provinces in Mozambique except Cabo Delgado. The inability of Frelimo to contain Renamo resulted in Samora Machel signing of the Nkomati Peace Agreement with South Africa so as to suffocate both the ANC and Renamo. Moreover, Renamo continued to rely on fear and intimidation to extract information and food to ensure loyalty from the so-called distractive zones. Both Renamo and the Mozambican government were often accused of human rights violations but Renamo was more intermittent in its use (Martin and Johnson 1986, Flower 1987).

This is a statement that was said by Samora Machel;

In February 1983, President Samora Machel announced: "Those who give information to the bandits will die with the bandits. Those who feed the bandits will die with the bandits. Those who deal with the bandits will die with the bandits.(Africa Watch Report (1992)

This is a statement that was said by a Renamo recruit;

Laice recalled the commander of the group as saying, "Go and show your president that the guys you call the bandits, the Matsanga, RENAMO, did this. Go and show your ears to your president Chissano.(Africa Watch Report (1992)

Acts of violence included raids in towns , villages, and refugee centers in search of clothing, food, weapons, recruits, information, villages were destroyed, with most crops and livestock destroyed or stolen and young men forced to join Renamo.

Cases of guerrillas hacking off ears, noses, lips, and sexual organs have been common in the central and southern provinces. Evidence gathered by Africa

Watch suggests that RENAMO was guilty of the majority of such mutilations, but that government forces too have been guilty of the practice. However, mutilations of the dead and living have continued to occur at regular intervals up until the present. Mutilated corpses are often left along a road or trail frequented by the opposing army in effort to lower troop morale. After an FAM platoon came across five corpses cut into pieces with a machete on a road about fifteen miles west of the town of Homoine in Inhambane province in October 1987, many of the twenty-two soldiers were visibly upset and the entire group remained silent for ten minutes. The mutilations also serve the purposes of terrorizing civilians, symbolically humiliating the government, and "initiating" conscripts. A forty-nine-year-old woman who was kidnapped during a RENAMO attack on a bar on the outskirts of Maputo on February 9, 1991, said that at least six skulls had been placed on a path in rebel-controlled territory near the South African border to frighten captives. "RENAMO left them there to warn us that we could not runaway (Africa Watch Report, 1992).

2.9 Renamo after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement

The Lancaster House Agreement which was perceived as a victory for Ian Smith and South Africa became a thorny issue to the new government. As a result Ken Flower had to work on a plan to transfer Renamo to South Africa. He was quite aware as he had on several occasions warned the Rhodesian government about this impending defeat including Abel Muzorewa. Muzorewa was pumped with elections gifts by South Africa under "Operation chicken." Consequently the election won by Robert Mugabe was a turning point for Renamo as its bases and support finally ended. (Martin and Johnson 1986, Flower 1987, Robinson 2006)

Having informed the British government (then responsible for the administration of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) that support to RENAMO was to be cut off, the CIO invited South African military officers in to "pick up the ropes" and RENAMO was transferred "lock, stock and barrel Flower (1987).

Immediately Renamo was given 72 hours to leave Zimbabwe, who numbered about 2000. The first to be transferred were the staff of Radio *Voz da Africa Livre* who landed at Waterkloof military base outside Pretoria. To follow were two batches of MNR who later found sanctuary at Phalaborwa, Zoabastad near Lubato river in South Africa and later Louis Trichardt. Thereafter their numbers and operations increased and intensified against the Mozambican government (Martin and Johnson 1986, Africa Watch 1992).

2.10 Nkomati Peace Agreement

It was signed at Nkomatiport in South Africa near the Mozambican border with South Africa. The South African Defense forces did not want to have a military takeover in view of its military capabilities and activities in Zimbabwe, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia and of course Mozambique. The Flerimo government had no military capability to match South Africa. As a result the main objective was to cripple Mozambique economically more or less a military punishment for harboring ZANLA and the ANC. If it really wanted a complete onslaught, South Africa had the potential to arm Renamo to the teeth, just as what Iran did to Hezbollah insurgent. Contrary to Iran's approach to Hezbollah, Renamo on the other hand were not given lethal weapons to dislodge Flerimo, instead they were given AK-47 assault rifles. The Hezbollah to weaken Israel were given weapons such as missiles and rockets (Erasmus, Martin and Johnson 1986, Robinson 2006). On the other Iran did not fully involve itself in the conflict but instead provided what the Hezbollah needed. In reference to Renamo major

combat attacks against strategic assets within Mozambique were done either by the South African Defense Force or by the Rhodesian Special Air Services through commando raids.

2.11 Violation of Nkomati

South Africa continued supporting Renamo even after signing the Nkomati Peace Agreement. Articles in the Nkomati which were violated included; one article Two (1), (2) a, b, c, d, 3 Article Three (1), (2) a to k. In the infamous “Gorongosa documents” weighing more than 200kg discovered in a latrine when Renamo left the base after losing it to Flerimo, the documents indicated that South Africa continued to support Renamo (Johnson and Martin, 1986). Ammunition was also provided to Renamo from independent Zimbabwe through Supa-Zapu. A notable and credible evidence of South Africa’s support was the discovery of AK-47 rifles and bullet cartridges after military engagements in Mozambique which resembled those also captured from the dissidents in Matebeleland. Some of the serial numbers on AK-47 were rubbed and the bullet cartridges had the number ‘22-80’. One of the bullets with the same serial was seen on site where Paul Savage a farmer in Matabeleland was killed. (Johnson and Martin 1986).

2.12 Zimbabwe in Mozambique

The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was first deployed in Mozambique in 1982 to protect the Beira corridor and trucks travelling along the Tete road linking Zimbabwe

and Malawi. The better trained and equipped Zimbabwean Army was no match for Renamo and turned the war tide in favor of Flerimo. By mid-1985 Zimbabwe had nearly 10,000 troops in central Mozambique undertaking offensive operations against Renamo. In late 1988, more were deployed to protect the northern part of the Limpopo rail line, which runs from Chicualacuala on the Zimbabwean border to Maputo (Martin and Johnson 1986).

2.13 Cross border raids

Renamo carried out cross border raids into Zimbabwe, killing civilians and looting villages in retaliation for Zimbabwe's support for Mozambique.

A message from the General Staff to President Dhlakama gives the following roundup of operations in April 1988: At the national level our forces carried out 332 acts, 108 infantry attacks, ten by mortars, seventy-five contacts, thirty-six sabotage, ninety terrorism and thirteen destroyed villages.

On June 17, 1988, Dhlakama office received the following message from Section Chief Moises Machava regarding operations in Zimbabwe:

1. Two groups of Machaze Special Forces went with terrorist missions into the interior of Zimbabwe.
2. One group headed by group commander Ricardo Oliveira went with ten soldiers [into Zimbabwe]. On June 16, 1988 they killed five elements of the population and burned down twelve houses.
3. The eighth group was led by platoon commander Yossiforte Bacomento with ten soldiers. He executed eleven elements of the population and burned seventeen houses. (Africa Watch Report (1992))

However as the war progressed and reached stalemate, pressure mounted on all players in the conflict that is Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa to settle the

conflict through dialogue and mediation. With the war causing more damage to Mozambique pressure was put on the Zimbabwean government to sign the Lancaster House Agreement with an escalation of violence against ZANLA and ZIPRA forces in Mozambique and Zambia, as well as civilians (Flower, 1987).

2.14 Mediation for peace in Mozambique

In 1988 Mozambique entered a new phase towards peace. Various stakeholders stepped up efforts to end the conflict. Civil societies across Mozambique as a peace building process extended their hand for Afonso Dhlakama to have a direct contact with President Joaquim Chissano.

2.14.1 The Rome Peace Agreement

The negotiations lasted for twenty-seven months, with eleven work sessions and on 4 October, 1992, President Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama signed the Peace Accord, putting an end to the 16 year civil war in Mozambique.

Other major players in the peace process included; the Arms to Ploughshares Program, the Catholic Church through Archbishop of Beira Jaime Gonçalves, UNOMOZ, the Observatories of Development and Elections; and four peace NGOs, namely: Organization for Conflict Resolution (OREC), Center for the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE), JustaPaz, and Propaz (Murdock, Zunguza, 2010).

2.14.2 The Role of the Church

The negotiations for peace in Mozambique were a result of a long-term commitment from the Christian churches, such as the Catholic Church which represents the largest organization in Mozambican civil society with a following of more than two million Mozambicans. Soon after independence from Portugal the government of Samora Machel had a strained relationship between the Church and the State because of the church's allegiance to the colonial regime. At the height of the civil war, these churches managed to set aside their differences in search of unity, and peace. Religious groups as part of track Two diplomacy included the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçalves and the Rome based religious group Sant'Egidio who became prominent for their roles in ending the war in 1992.

2.14.3 Sant'Egidio

Sant'Egidio is situated in Rome Italy and was chosen by the warring parties in Mozambique (Renamo and Frelimo) as a convenient neutral venue for peace negotiations. The Italian government gave way for the efforts of Sant'Egidio and sent its representative Mario Raffaelli. The negotiations were facilitated by two Community mediators, Matteo Zuppi and Andrea Riccardi. Among them was the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçalves. Mario Raffaelli helped in mediation and negotiations process and facilitated the second round of talks in Italy. The first step toward securing peace in Mozambique involved the collection of information about the country's state in all the provinces in Mozambique (Murdock, Zunguza, 2010). Sant'Egidio facilitated the

negotiation and later the release of missionaries who had been kidnapped by RENAMO in 1985. Mediation efforts began to take shape in 1987. To end the 16 year conflict as part of the peace building track two diplomacy was engaged. Prominent in the track 2 peace initiative were Tiny Rowland the former managing director of Lonrho (London-Rhodesia), whose diplomatic clout was extended between Frelimo and Renamo. At one point Tiny Rowland signed secret pacts with Renamo to spare attacks on Lonrho assets in Mozambique.

2.14.4 President Mugabe

In Africa, many heads of State such as Masire, Moi, De Klerk, Banda and President Mugabe actively worked to bring Frelimo and Renamo to the negotiating table. In Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe was involved on several occasions in facilitating and mediating between the Mozambican government and Renamo. In the later periods towards peace, Mugabe personally pledged security and support in retaining the engagement of Renamo leadership in Harare. As part of track 1 diplomacy the United Nations Security Council deployed 7,500 peacekeepers to Mozambique, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) and several countries. UNOMOZ also oversaw the two year transition to democracy. There were also 2,400 international observers who oversaw the conduction of the first multiparty elections held in October 1994. During UNOMOZ's four year stint in Mozambique more than 155,000 arms were recovered and 76,000 soldiers were demobilized. Together with the United Nations Human Rights Commission UNHCR, UNOMOZ managed to repatriate 1.3 million

refugees back to Mozambique. This was the largest repatriation mission on the African continent after the Cold War. During the same period Renamo was transformed from a banditry movement to a political part. Murdock, Zunguza (2010).

2.14.5 The role of Non-Governmental Organization

The four main NGOs that played a greater role in trying to bring peace to Mozambique included; The Arms to Ploughshare Program, JustaPaz, Propaz and CEDE.

2.14.6 The Arms to Ploughshare Program

Its operations in Mozambique began after 1992. The Arms to Ploughshares Program was responsible for the collection of guns in exchange for material as an immediate concern when the peace agreement was underway. The Arms to Ploughshares Program was created as a follow up to UNOMOZ's disarmament and reintegration program after the Rome Peace Accord.

2.14.7 JustaPaz

It was established in 1996 by the United Methodist Church (UMC) as a department. Its main purpose was to call for justice and peace in Mozambique. In 2001, it became a separate institution from the church and widened its operations to the promotion of peace, justice, and good governance.

2.14.8 Propaz

Propaz was established in 1995 as a peacebuilding process and is made up of former combatants from Flerimo and Renamo. It also founded the Mozambique Association of Demobilized of War (AMODEG) in 1992 which was involved in the UN-led Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) under UNOMOZ between 1992 and 1994. As part of peacebuilding (AMODEG) was crucial in the reintegration of former combatants into their communities and facilitated “cleansing ceremonies” as part of restorative justice in Mozambique.

2.14.9 The Organization for Conflict Resolution (OREC)

It is a peacebuilding organization that promotes the management of conflicts and their resolution at the community base. It is involved in capacity building and direct intervention in conflict resolutions through mediation. Since 2001, (OREC) has been involved in training local leaders in peace and mediation in the districts of Magude (Maputo Province) and Macia, Manjacaze, and Chonguene in Gaza Province who, in turn, train their communities in conflict resolution.

2.14.10 The Center for the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE)

The Center for the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE) is one of the key peacebuilding organizations and a key player in the Election Observatory. CEDE conducts researches related to peacebuilding, democracy, development and governance and the promotion of dialogue throughout Mozambique. It has been involved in some of

Mozambique's most violent areas such as Changara, Maringue and Montepuez. These areas are where the civilians in Mozambique still have grievances emanating from the 1977-1992 civil war (Murdock, Zunguza 2010; Cook, Mbilana, 2012).

2.15 Threats to Peace in Mozambique

2.15.1 Leadership intolerance

The threats to peace in Mozambique which have been noted by various stakeholders include the Armed Men of RENAMO, the unfulfilled promises to the ex-combatants, electoral and Constitutional reforms, and the partization of the State and the economy. President Chissano has been tolerant to Afonso Dhlakama, but this has not been the case with President Amando Guebuza who has not initiated dialogue with Renamo.

2.15.2 The Armed Men of Renamo

The greatest threat to peace in Mozambique lies in the 600-1000 Armed Men of Renamo who were not disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into the Mozambican armed forces. These offer protection to the Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, which has been noted as one of the failures by Renamo to comply with the Rome Peace Accord, a cause for concern amongst Mozambicans. Among them are also Renamo and Flerimo fighters whose promises stipulated in the 1992 Rome Peace Agreement have not been fulfilled.

2.15.3 Politicisation of the State and the Economy

For Mozambicans to have a share of the economy they should have a party card to gain access to opportunities and resources and employment. Sadly many former Renamo

soldiers who were integrated in the military have been unceremoniously retrenched over the years among them qualified teachers who have lost their jobs in universities for not having party cards. Graduating students from State Universities are also given party cards during graduation ceremonies together with their certificates. To compliment peacebuilding efforts, the Carter Center established offices in Mozambique and was able to monitor the 1999 and the 2004 elections in Mozambique and also tried to come up with a more transparent electoral system. Carter Center (2005).

2.15.4 Trouble Spots in Mozambique

These include Maringue, Changara and Montepue the worst being Maringue a stronghold for Renamo. Maringue district is where the former leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, has his headquarters and a significant arms depot. It is where the so called “Armed Men of RENAMO” are stationed. Maringue is widely considered by most Mozambicans as a key “crucible of conflict.” As with election-related conflict elsewhere, what happens in Maringue reverberates quickly throughout the country, and thus most Mozambicans recognize that any intervention in this area can have significant ramifications for peace and stability on a national scale (Murdock, Zunguza, 2010).

2.15.5 Possible impact of the conflict to Zimbabwe

In relation to the current crisis in Mozambique on part of Zimbabwe the security situation cannot be compromised. Elements of the former Rhodesians such as Special Air Services, Selous Scouts, Rhodesian Light infantry and the intelligence services took track to South Africa soon after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 (Flower, 1997)

Some joined the South African Military Intelligence Directory some served in various security structures. Whilst within the South African security apparatus, they were responsible for the formation and support of Supa-Zapu so as to destabilize Zimbabwe for its support of Mozambique in the fight against Renamo.

At one point the leader for the Movement of Democratic Change Morgan (MDC) Tsvangirai met with Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama in Nelspruit, South Africa.

‘ the meeting is believed to have been facilitated by recently appointed MDC security chief, Mr. Mike Hogan, a former Special Branch operative during the Ian Smith regime which also assisted in the formation of Renamo together with the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Herald 2 October 1985.

There are two similarities between the strategies of the two oppositions (MDC) in Zimbabwe and those of the Renamo Party in Mozambique. The two parties enjoy the support of white liberals in South Africa and Renamo. The Herald 1 December 2000.

He said, Renamo and MDC are sister parties. Our parties share the same principles and our meeting bordered mainly on how to pursue democratic ways of removing dictatorship in our responsible countries, he said. The Mirror 7 November 2004

2.16 Conclusion

The chapter gave an illustration of the map of Mozambique, definition of insurgence, conceptual Factor-Tree Model (CFTM), leadership, guerilla, sabotage, training,

sanctuary, communication, origin of Renamo as an insurgent, Nkomati peace agreement, violation of Nkomati, Zimbabwe in Mozambique, cross border raids, Renamo after the signing of the Lancaster house agreement, cult of violence in war zones, ideology and violence, and the main theoretical frameworks by Galtung and Sigmund Freud.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter described the methods that the researcher used to collect the data which included the research design, research subjects, data collection techniques and methods, the population, the sample, the sampling procedure ,data analysis as well as the ethical consideration. The types of sampling that the researcher used included snowballing purposive and judgmental sampling, procedure. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003) snowballing, ‘is a particularly useful approach for dispersed and small populations, and where the key selection criteria are characteristics which might not be widely disclosed by individuals or which are too sensitive for a screening interview.’

3.1 Research Design

The research design is critical as it is the backbone of the research in terms of how the data should be analyzed and interpreted.

Qualitative research uses non-probability samples for selecting the population for study. In a non-probability sample, units are deliberately selected to reflect particular features of or groups within the sampled population. The sample is not intended to be statistically representative: the chances of selection for each element are unknown but, instead, the characteristics of the population are used as the basis of selection. It is this feature that makes them well suited to small-scale, in-depth studies, as we will go on to show. Yin (2011)

The research design is critical in strengthening and provides validity to the research the research. The design is critical in answering the research topic under study.

The logic involves the links among the research questions, the data to be collected, and the strategies for analyzing the data—so that a study’s findings will address the intended research questions. The logic also helps to strengthen the validity of a study, including its accuracy. The “choice” approach implied by the title of this chapter seems warranted because qualitative research has no array of fixed designs, as might appear to exist in doing experiments. In other words, because there is no clear typology of blueprints, every qualitative study is likely to vary in its design (Yin, 2011).

In social research the research design can take a certain trajectory but can also change along as the research progresses. Design can start before or after the research question has been formulated. Yin (2011) argued that the design can be embarked on after the field work has been completed. In this research the research design has been a product of chapters one and two.

3.1.1 Research population

This represents the total subjects from which the researcher drew his sample. The population should be of relevance to the general study questions and should be able to give an insight to the research topic.

A population can be defined as all people or items (unit of analysis) with the characteristics that one wishes to study. The unit of analysis may be a person, group, organization, country, object, or any other entity that you wish to draw scientific inferences about.’ Bhattacharjee (2012)

The population might also have some subgroups critical to the research, in these case opinion leaders, for example from the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of State Security and the Ambassador of the Republic of Mozambique form part of the subgroups.

This involves deciding which population will, by virtue of their proximity to the research question, be able to provide the richest and most relevant information. The appropriate population may be obvious, but often it will be necessary to think through the roles, knowledge or behavior of different groups and their ability to shed light on different aspects of the research question. Ritchie and Lewis (2003)

However, defining the study population involves two stages, first specifying the characteristics of the collective units of analysis required and then specifying those of the individual(s) required within them. The researcher concentrated in the following areas; Chimanmani East in Demeni, Ndiemi, Mutsvangwa, Nyahode and Ndimu.

3.1.2 Research Sample

The sample is influenced by a number of factors such as how homogenous or heterogenous the sample is, the number of the selection criteria, the extent to which nesting of the criteria is needed, groups of special interest that require intensive study, multiple samples within one study, type of data collection methods, and the budget and resources available. Too large a sample beyond 50 in the case of individual interviews can be difficult to manage. Ritchie and Lewis (2003)

However, if samples are larger, there should be very clear consideration of how it will be possible to carry out the quality of in-depth research required across the whole sample. It is also important to ensure that samples are not too small. If they are, then they can easily miss key constituencies within the population, or contain too little diversity to explore the varying influences of different factors. It is important to note that small-scale samples only work in qualitative research if good purposive or theoretical sampling has taken place. Ritchie and Lewis (2003)

According to Bhattacharjee (2012) ‘Sampling is the statistical process of selecting a subset (called a “sample”) of a population of interest for purposes of making observations and statistical inferences about that population’

The researcher distributed questionnaires to schools in the area, conduct focus group discussions and in-depth interviews from individuals in Chimanmani East and the Mozambican Embassy, The Ministry of State Security and The Ministry of Defence. For the focus group discussions 9 respondents above 25 years from each village were interviewed.

3.2 Research Instruments

To collect data the researcher made use of in-depth, focus group discussions, and questionnaires to school in the area. Some questions that the researcher needed to take note was to ask some the following questions, does the sample frame provide the details required to inform selection?, will the sample frame provide a sufficient number of potential participants to allow for high quality selection, particularly given that not all will be eligible or willing to participate in the study and lastly can the information easily be manipulated or sorted to highlight the criteria by which the population is defined and selection determined? Ritchie J and Lewis J (2003)

If these questions are not addressed then there is dangers of choosing a sample that will not address the researcher’s needs.

3.2.1 Desk and Internet Research

The internet was used to get the latest development especially in Mozambique between the government of Mozambique and Renamo. Various electronic newspapers from the internet were used to increase the reliability of the information as relying on newspapers articles from one source may reduce the validity of the information. This is because media houses are often guided by the editorial policy as well as influenced by ownership and control as well as the context in which the events might take place.

The media transmits information between science and the general public and between different fields of science. However, since science and the media have different standards, goals, competencies, and funding sources, they can sometimes interact in ways that produce unintended, adverse consequences for the public. Sometimes the public may become misinformed, deceived, or confused as a result of the media's coverage of science. This unfortunate effect can lead to poor policy decisions, ill-informed public opinion, and the inability to make appropriate use of scientific information. In order to prevent these adverse consequences, scientists need to pay special attention to their interactions with the media. David, (1998)

The researcher consulted news sources such as the Herald, in Zimbabwe. Books were consulted to increase the authenticity of the data, but since some are written by individuals there might be a problem of a linear view of issues from an individual's perspective. As a result the researcher consulted journals because of their high degree of authenticity and rigor in scientific enquiry.

3.2.2 In-depth interviews and focus group discussions

The researcher embarked on in-depth interview and focus group discussions to collect data. The researcher used the camera during the interview process to capture the voice as well as the non-verbal cues but in very few cases. Participates were informed about the use of such gadgets. To compliment the interview process the researcher took notes for clarity and make reference to the recorded voice. Open-ended questions and semi-structured questions formed part of the researcher's interview guide.

3.2.3 Focus Group Discussions

According to Bhattacharjee(2012) 'Focus group research is a type of research that involves bringing in a small group of subjects (typically 6 to 10 people) at one location, and having them discuss a phenomenon of interest for a period of 1.5 to 2 hours.'

3.2.4 Observation

The researcher used observation especially during focus group interviews as well as during in-depth interviews as such type of non-verbal communication had a deeper meaning to the interviewed subjects. The no-verbal communication can be used as the silent word which can be critical in emphasis expression, hence was not ignored.

3.3 Analysis of Data

According to Bhattacharjee (2012), 'The emphasis in qualitative analysis is "sense making" or understanding a phenomenon, rather than predicting or explaining. A creative and investigative mindset is needed for qualitative analysis, based on an ethically enlightened and participant-in-context attitude, and a set of analytic strategies.'

The researcher used simple statistical analysis software such as (SPSS) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). SPSS is used to convert raw data into simple visual impressions in the form of pie charts and any meaningful representation of the processed data so that information can be used to give meaning to the research as a whole. This can only be possible that is if the researcher draws commonalities and patterns within the collected data.

3.4 Ethical Considerations

Ethics are standards of conduct that prescribe behavior. Ethics are guidelines which include the following informed consent, the use of recording equipment shall only be used with the full consent of the participant, voluntary participation in research, subjects if not willing they shall not be forced to participate in the research, do no harm principle. (European Union, 2010,.David, 1998).

The study shall not cause harm to the subjects but instead it should be beneficial to the subjects under study. Standards of conduct do not describe our actual behavior, since people often violate them. The moral theory of ethics can be distinguished into three categories that is normative ethics, applied ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics concern the study of standards principles values and theories, applied ethics concerns the ethical dilemma, choices and which have an effect on occupations professions and in

concrete situations as well as the application of moral theories and concepts in particular contexts (David, 1998).

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter focused on the Research design research population, research sample, research instruments, desk and internet research, in-depth interviews and key informant interviews, focus group discussion, observation, analysis of data, verification and validation of data and ethical considerations.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter focused on the presentation, interpretation and analysis of all relevant data that was collected during the research process. The data collected through in-depth interviews and key informant interviews, observation, focus group discussion and administering questionnaire to one primary and one secondary school has been presented in narration and descriptive statistics that included pie charts, using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS).

One important part of data gathering in these kinds of research projects is to obtain the permission of the local authorities—not only the state administration but also the traditional and religious leaders. The traditional chiefs (chief of the zone), and his assistants are the real gatekeepers; they provide access to the people, or sometimes withhold it. They open the doors for outsiders to get into the “people's pockets”, as they say, and explore what is in there. Igreja (2007)

Most of the interviews were carried out in the local language (*Shona*), the researcher was not quite familiar with Ndau but his assistant John was quite supportive.

4.1 Researcher's experience in the field

The researcher had no idea of the area where the research was to be conducted. Since it was for the first time the researcher sought temporary residence at a local Chief (*name supplied*), but the Chief was not comfortable in accommodating the researcher despite the fact that the researcher had produced identification material from Africa University as well as his National Identification Card. The areas which the researcher had sought as part of his sample were quite spaced to such an extent that the researcher had to reduce and change his sample, sampling techniques and the research topic. The terrain was quite un-navigable and visibility was reduced to less than 7 meters especially from Ndima to Mutsvangwa due to thick foliage as well as the meandering dust roads and rugged terrain. In some areas the soils were slippery due to intermittent showers which were common during the morning. However despite such challenges the researcher was able to maneuver the terrain by adapting to the geography and the weather.

4.2 Questionnaires to Demei and Mutsvangwa Schools

The researcher distributed 10 questionnaires at each school after because there were not more than 20 teachers at each school against what the researcher had anticipated. The researcher left the questionnaires which he collected the following day. From the responses especially from the written narrative where respondents had to respond to semi-structured questions the researcher had to randomly select some of the responses for presentation.


4.2.1 Questionnaires to Demeni Primary Schools

The researcher had a brief discussion with the headmaster at Demeni Primary School who also assisted the researcher in locating the Mozambican border. He said the football pitch for the primary school was divided at the center; half was Mozambique and the other half was Zimbabwe. The area is also dotted by tuck-shop some on the Mozambican and Zimbabwean border less than 5meters apart without any physical barriers in between. The border is not secured it has no fence which is a critical security challenge where Renamo insurgent could infiltrate easily into the Zimbabwean territory.

According to the headmaster at Demeni Primary School there are 210 students at Demeni and 300 Zimbabweans representing a 44.2% and 55.7% for both Mozambicans and Zimbabweans respectively an indication of how soft the border is. The researcher distributed 10 questionnaires at Demeni Primary School which he later collected the following day. Out of the 10 questionnaires which were distributed all were returned representing a 100% response.

Table 1 Age Range


Age	Response
Below 30 years	4
31 to 40 years	6
Above 40 years	



The above pie chart indicates that most of the respondents were over forty years and fitted very well in the researcher's age range as these respondents one way or another had the knowledge of Renamo activities. This indicated that 56% were within the age range which the formed part of the researcher's sample whilst 44% were below 30 years.

Table 2. Sex of Respondents


Sex	Response
Female	6
Male	4



There was a 67% response from female respondents and the reason was to ascertain the extent and degree of knowledge of Renamo amongst female respondents. 33% was a male representation.

Table 2 Academic Qualification


Academic Qualification	Response
Graduate	1
Undergraduate	1
Diploma	4
Certificate	4



The idea of including educational qualifications was to ascertain the level of literacy and probably to ascertain the degree of the general knowledge in terms of current affairs amongst respondents and 40% of the respondents had diplomas and a further 40% had certificates whilst 10% was a graduate and 10% an undergraduate.

Table 3 Length of Service


Period	Response
Less than 1 year	2
1 to 3 years	6
4 to 5 years	
6 to 10 years	3
Above 10 years	



The length of service in the field by respondents was also critical to measure the degree of their familiarity to their environment and the symbiotic relationships amongst the respondents and their community as they share information. Amongst the respondents 20% had served for less than three years 20 % had less than 1 year in the profession and a further 60% had served between 6-10 years.

Table 4 Knowledge of Matsanga


	Response
Yes	10
No	



Out of the 10 respondents that responded to the questionnaire all were aware of the activities of Renamo in Mozambique representing a 100%.

Table 5 Medium

Medium	Response
Radio	6
Television	
Newspaper	1
Through rumor	2
Through discussions	1
Others	




The research was to probe the sources of information and 60% said they had heard it through radio. 20% said they had heard the Renamo activities through rumors from the people who ply between the Mozambique and Zimbabwe border in trade activities. 10% said they had heard about Renamo through mere discussions and a further 10% indicated that they had the information through newspapers. The 10% response from newspapers was credible in the sense that the transport network is poor thereby hindering the distribution of newspapers.

4.2.2 Questionnaires to Mutsvangwa Secondary Schools

Table 6 Age Range


Age	Response
Below 30 years	1
31 to 40 years	4
Above 40 years	3



From the above chart the researcher noted that most of the respondents were over 30 years and represented about 50%, 38% were over 40 years which fitted very well in the researcher's presumed sample which had to constitute more than 30 years.

Table 7 Sex of Respondents


Sex	Response
Female	3
Male	5



In this category the researcher noted that most of the respondents were male representing 62%, the main reason for including women 38% was to ascertain the degree of understanding of current affairs issues and also to mask off gender exclusion from the research which demystified gender biases in the research studies.

Table 8 Highest Academic Qualification


Academic Qualification	Response
Graduate	1
Undergraduate	1
Diploma	5
Certificate	1



63% of the respondents had attained a diploma which indicated a high degree of literacy and quality of interpretation of events. 13% had certificates and 12% were both a graduates and an undergraduate.

Table 9 Length of Service


Period	Response
Less than 1 year	1
1 to 3 years	2
4 to 5 years	
6 to 10 years	4
Above 10 years	1



Most of the respondents indicated that they had served for more than 6 years in the profession representing a 50%. 25% represented those respondents within the 1 to 3 years whilst 13% and 12 % represented those over 10 years and less than 1 year.

Table 10 Awareness of Renamo


	Response
Yes	8
No	



From the above pie chart the researcher deduced that most of the respondents were quite aware of the activities of Renamo in Mozambique and the other aspect was that the respondents were close to the Mozambican border.

Table 11 Intervention strategies in the current crisis in Mozambique

Response	Response
Through military intervention by the African Union	1
Through military intervention by SADC	1
Through military intervention by Zimbabwe	1
Through mediation	1
Through dialogue	4
Others	



Most of the respondents indicated that dialogue was the only way to solve the current crisis in Mozambique represented by 50%. 13% indicated that mediation and intervention by Zimbabwe respectively was the only way to solve the crisis. 12% called

for the intervention in the crisis through SADC and the African Union. The responses indicated a high degree of tolerance in terms of conflict resolution.

4.2.3 Findings from the questionnaires distributed to Demeni Primary and Mutsvangwa

4.2.4 Primary School Responses

The researcher distributed 10 questionnaires at Demeni Primary School all were returned representing a 100% response. On question 8; 90% of the respondents indicated that they heard about Renamo through various sources such as newspapers, radio, rumor, television and through mere discussions whilst 10% did not respond. On question 10 90% indicated that they would be affected by the conflict whilst 10% said was not aware of how the conflict was to affect her but lived in fear. On question 13, 90% of the respondents indicated that there was the need for dialogue between the Mozambican government and the government of Zimbabwe to resolve the crisis. On question 12, the researcher noted that 60% of the respondents were of the opinion that only the African Union and SADC had the capacity to resolve the conflict 10% did not respond to the question probably out of fear.

4.2.5 Secondary Schools

Out of the 9 questionnaires that the researcher distributed 8 were returned representing a 88, 9% response and 11,1% for the questionnaire which was not returned. Why such a high response was that the researcher distributed the question in the morning only to

collect them the following day. The researcher noted that on question 7 the respondents got information from various sources representing a 100% response. On question 8 100% of the respondents indicated that they had not heard anyone injured in the current conflict. Meaning to say there was a 0% response on question 9. The researcher noted that 90% of the respondents indicated that they would be affected by the conflict. On question 12 the respondents said the African Union had the capacity to solve the Mozambican crisis though military intervention. Most respondents were quite reserved on the role of Zimbabwe. On question 13 100% of the respondents called for both Zimbabwe and Mozambique to solve the current crisis in a peaceful manner.

4.2.6 Medium through which respondents got information on *Matsanga*

The study revealed that the medium through which respondents sought information was through rumor, television, radio and newspapers. However, besides these, there are also other possible avenues through which information filtered in the area such as the internet. With the availability of modern cell phones there was a high degree of the usage of internet especially in Mutsvangwa, Demeni and Nyahode as one of the service providers established a base station near the Zimbabwe Mozambique border. The airtime was easily accessible especially in Nyahode, Mutsvangwa, Ndimba and Demeni. Some of the respondents indicated that they had heard this information from cross border traders who ply between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Radio as a medium of communication has a higher penetration power and requires less degrees of literacy if transmission is done through the vernacular language of which most respondents had a high degree of

literacy especially those who responded to questionnaires. At business centers most radios were used for playing CDs the research established very few people especially at shops hardly listened to news as they drank beer and doing all sorts of activities. The researcher frequented Copper shopping center and he hardly heard any radio broadcasting news bulletins.

4.2.7 Perception of the people in Chimanimani East

Informants revealed that the crisis in Mozambique had a direct bearing on their lives in general as they live closer to the border. The reason being that they said the Mozambican national resistance army would indirectly expand its activities in the border area. The research also revealed that most of the respondents opted for dialogue between the government of Mozambique and Zimbabwe to end the conflict.

4.2.8 Effects of *Matsanga* in the current or previous conflict

An old aged man within the group revealed that some of his relatives who leave in Mozambique had been affected by the current conflict and this had also affected him. The man said a repeat of the previous conflict was not tolerable. This would have a bearing on their lives as this had been the case in the 1980 Mozambican conflict. Most of the responded lamented at the absence of police post along the border saying it was difficulty in the case of an attack for the police in Copper to come and rescue them. One of the respondents was of the opinion that even if the police were to be deployed they were supposed to do so only as a precautionary measure and not permanently establish

their camps. From the focus group discussion the research also revealed that most of the respondents in Chishiri A and B were not comfortable with the presence of soldiers. The research established that the border areas in Demeni was very porous and when the researcher was taking some photographs of tuck shops that are dotted between the Zimbabwean and Mozambican border some Mozambican nationals even ran towards the researcher requesting him to take them some photos. The research also established that some foot paths would meander into either Mozambique or Zimbabwe. Animals such as goats and cattle could roam freely on both sides. The researcher also requested some of the Mozambican nationals to buy him Econet airtime from the Mozambican side of which he got the air time indicating how porous the border was. One respondent highlighted that it was very difficult for them to actually tell where the border ends because of the vegetation in the area. The researcher noted that most of the men and women who lived in Nyahode, Demeni and Mutsvangwa relied on the trading of bananas which formed part of their livelihoods and as such an escalation of the conflict would affect them. There was a general fear among the respondents, but however the conflict has affected most of them psychologically. The study revealed that most of the respondents in the areas sought by the researcher had a general fear of strangers and it was required of every stranger to report to the headman and from the headman to the chief which the research established was a serious security concern. The researcher arrived at the local Chief's homestead (*name supplied*), around 9pm seeking temporary residence but the Chief was not comfortable in accommodating the researcher despite producing material from Africa University and his national Identification Card that

identified him as a researcher. The Chief opted for the researcher to go to a local police station at Gata that night. He then sought permission from his wives to accompany the researcher to the police station who also refused since it was dark. It took for more than three hours for the Chief to decide whether it was necessary to accommodate the researcher or not he lamented that that it was quite challenging to The following day the researcher went to the police station and was given clearance letters and also to provide another clearance letter to the chief so as to seek permission to reside at the Chief's homestead.

The Chief lamented that for the past 22 years he had served as a chief he had not experienced any problems and never wanted to die from politics. On the eve the chief had to sleep in the dining room with the researcher and during the night the researcher noted that he woke up for about more than six times that night. The following day the Chief had to sleep in one of his bedrooms but by 5 am in the morning he was always on the door to check whether the researcher was in. the Chief told the researcher

4.2.9 The way forward to the current crisis in Mozambique

The research established that the current conflict should be resolved by international bodies such as the African Union and Southern African Development Community. One respondent highlighted that engaging the Western countries in the conflict was trick as most western nation were not comfortable with the land reform program that the Zimbabwean government embarked as a result in trying to engage them they would instead fuel the conflict the carrot and stick diplomacy.

One respondent from Chishiri B lamented that governments waste their time over issues that do not help the development of the countries but instead focus on economic and social and infrastructural destruction. There was the need to engage the Mozambican leadership and focus on the development of Mozambique. Mozambique is still regarded as one of the poorest countries in Southern Africa and over the years there had been some significant growth in the economy, which was to be further catapulted due to the discovery of natural gas and coal.

4.2.10 *Matsanga* effects in the current or previous conflict

The research established that some of the respondents had their relatives been abducted by the Renamo bandits in the previous conflict and as a result the researcher noted that there was a general fear of the bandits especially after their current resurgence. In all the responses from the questionnaires and focus groups and in-depth interviews that the researcher conducted they were quite aware of the recent activities in Mozambique. Some respondents from Chishiri B indicated that they knew some victims of Renamo who were still alive such as Gogo (*name supplied*) who was abducted by Renamo and only escaped when the Zimbabwe National Army made a follow up and how she escaped.

4.3 Focus Group Discussions

The researcher was able to conduct three focus group interviews in Ndimba and these were conducted on the same day. The researcher gave a time allowance of 1 to 2 hours for travelling after each interview since it was raining and the area was too rugged with very steep slopes which reduced the time that the researcher spends travelling. The interviews were made possible by the intervention of the Chief who instructed various headmen to assemble people at the most convenient places.

The researcher had to compliment the focus group interviews with the questionnaires because he wanted to check whether the level of education played a role in understanding the current conflict in Mozambique of which the researcher noted that education and literacy did not matter a lot.

4.3.1 Focus Group Discussion; Chishiri A

The interview started at 09:30 and ended after an hour. There were 6 men and 4 women. Most of the respondents were over 40 years. This meant a 60% and 40% representation between men and women respectively. The focus group interview was conducted at the headmen's homestead in the veranda of huts because of rainfall. The sitting arrangement was that women were separated from men. No refreshments or incentives were offered to the respondents despite the fact that some anticipated for them.

4.3.2 Impact on your livelihood

The study indicated that the conflict would affect them because their proximity to the border and requested for a fence on the border. One respondent in the group lamented that a security fence, posed some s challenge because children there were from Mozambique who attended school in Zimbabwe. Another respondent indicated that this would complicate the process as passport would be required and getting one was a difficult process another respondent in the group highlighted that erecting a fence or barrier would have a negative bearing on with their relatives in Mozambique. The researcher noted because of the inter-relationships amongst Zimbabweans and Mozambique such a social harmony and marriage institutions were supposed to be respected despite the dangers and threats that they were likely to face.

4.3.3 Conflict resolution

One respondent indicated that talks should be initiated and regional bodies were supposed to intervene.

4.3.4 Deployment of soldiers Mozambique

Most of the respondents within focus group indicated that a holistic approach to the conflict was supposed to be done through SADC and the African Union. The respondents were reserved over the role of relying on Western countries and said they would in the process turn the guns against them. The headman indicated that the Western world was not happy with the land reform program especially the farms and some of the wealth they left which they still aspire to get back. Another respondent in

the group said that inviting them to intervene in Mozambique would be like shooting ourselves in the foot.

4.3.5 Fear of *Matsanga*

The respondents showed a high degree of fear especially when the researcher used the term *Matsanga* which most of the respondents were quite familiar with. Another respondent indicated that they had had enough about wars and there was a need to find a long lasting solution to the problem in Mozambique as it was quite traumatizing to always live in fear.

We went through our war the, liberation struggle, and this left some impression in our minds.

One pertinent question that the researcher asked the respondents after the interview was;

How long will I take to walk from here to Ndiemi to interview Mbuya (name supplied) who in the group focus interview was frequently mentioned as one of those who had been abducted by Renamo during the previous conflict.

Respondent; It will take you about 1hr to 2hrs or you can go through Mutsvangwa then you will walk over that mountain to Gogo's place.

Is there any short cut from here?

There is no shortcut.

To go through Mutsvangwa meant a further 8,5km of walking from Ndimba Primary School and more kilometers to Ndiemi Primary School.

4.4 Focus Group Discussion; Chishiri B

The interview started at 11:30pm and ended after an hour at around 12:30pm. There were 7 men and 2 women. Most of the respondents were over 40 years representing a 77,7% and 22,2% for men and women respectively, the overall response was 100%. The focus group interview was conducted at the headmen's homestead in a shed because of rain showers. The sitting arrangement was that women were separated from men. No refreshments or incentives were offered to the respondents. After the interview the researcher was accompanied by other respondents to Ndimba Primary School where he was to conduct his last focus group interview. The researcher noted that most of the respondents had travelled for a distance between 6 and 7km to the interview site which indicated a wider coverage of the interview.

4.4.1 Awareness of Renamo

The respondents indicated that they were aware of the activities in Mozambique because of their proximity to the border in Ndieme.

4.4.2 Effect of Renamo

One respondent in the group indicated that the current conflict had not affected them physically but they always lived in fear.

4.4.3 Deployment of soldiers in Mozambique

The study revealed that most of the respondents indicated that it was not a good idea to engage Zimbabwean soldiers in Mozambique. There was a need to enter into dialogue first. The conflict as noted by some respondents, said it was to cause more bloody shade if not properly handled.

4.4.4 Fear of *Matsanga*

A respondent in the focus group discussion indicated that *Matsanga* was bad. Another respondent in the group indicated that in the previous conflict they had no peace and at times slept about 100meters from our homes during the night as it was no longer safe. Another old man in the group said the Renamo bandits came at Ndieme and took everything in the shops leaving nothing. Another r respondent in the group indicated that on their way they took grandmother (*name supplied*), but when the soldiers (ZNA) made a follow-up and fired in the air the grandmother escaped. *Matsanga* in the process, as another respondent narrated dropped his gun which got hooked onto a wire it had stands.

4.5 Interview: Focus group C

The interview was conducted at Ndimba Primary School under trees and most respondents were comfortable to sit on rocks as most of the 9 respondents were men.

There was an element of flexibility as they could joke and even use some culturally forbidden words. The interview started with at 14:00 hrs with an open prayer.

4.5.1 Awareness of *Matsanga* and its current activities in Mozambique

The respondents were aware of the recent activities of Renamo and heard it from Studio 7 Radio South Africa and on Short Wave citing the pulling out of Afonso Dhlakama from the government of Mozambique. A middle aged man in the group noted that Dhlakama indicated that he was now independent and back in the bush and people were supposed to remain vigilante as he was destructive both on material things and human lives. Another respondent in the group said Dhlakama said he was tired of electoral frauds and the only way into the government was to force it through arms.

4.5.2 Consequences of the conflict

A respondent in the group indicated that *Matsanga* was very capable of infiltrating in the area as the respondent had very vivid memories of the previous conflict when *Matsanga* came at the shopping center in 1987 called (*PaGwiza*) but were later captured by the soldiers who had a camp at Ndima Primary School during the 1977-1992 civil wars in Mozambique.

4.5.3 Impact on livelihoods

The respondents highlighted that it would result in human loss through killings of innocent people and hence there was the need to increase border security.

4.5.4 Conflict Resolution

The research established that leaders from SADC leaders and African Union should sit down and have dialogue over the current crisis. One respondent highlighted that the problem of the pipeline was supposed to be seen as equal to their own security. Another respondent lamented that if Zimbabwe is involved in the conflict the first thing that *Matsanga* does was to attack those who live closer to the border. Another respondent highlighted that *Matsanga* was very effective in guerrilla warfare. The last respondent in the group indicated that both Dhlakama and Guebuza were supposed to sit down and iron out their differences in pursuit of peace.

4.5.5 Deployment of soldiers in Mozambican

The research established that some respondents within the group advocated for a military strike on Renamo whilst some said it was not a noble idea for Zimbabwe to involve itself in the conflict without being provoked.

4.5.6 Memories of activities of *Matsanga*

Memories of the past conflict were still vivid in those who either witnessed or those whose relatives were indirectly or directly affected by the conflict. One respondent in the group highlighted that his nephew was taken by Renamo in the previous conflict and

spend a long time with *Matsanga* where at one point they were forced to pound sorghum until it was flour using mortars (*Maturi*).

In the focus group one respondent referred the researcher to Demeni where he knew of one member within the community who was affected by *Matsanga* in the previous conflict and the researcher was given his name. The respondents concurred that that they all knew him because he had an artificial leg.

4.5.7 Fear of *Matsanga*

The whole group showed that they were afraid of *Matsanga* and it was critical to stop him whilst he was still in his infancy. A respondent in the group lamented that it was quite sad to wait for him to first kill the people, especially the respondents who live along the border, and then respond.

4.6 In-depth interviews

(Business men Mr. X (*name supplied*))

The interview was conducted on (28/03/14) started at 08:45am and ended at 09:15am. The respondent was willing to be photographed after the researcher sought permission to do so.

4.6.1 *Matsanga* and its current activities in Mozambique

The researcher noted that the respondent was aware of the current activities of Renamo in Mozambique through the radio and their proximity to the border. The respondent indicated that he was always on news especially news at 20:00hrs.

4.6.2 Impact on livelihoods

The respondents indicated that they had nowhere to go in the event that the conflict escalated. The respondent was concerned about the goods that were in his shop and feared that once *Matsanga* came there was a possibility of losing all through looting. This is a common strategy normally used by insurgent groups all over the world to replenish supplies. The researcher noted that the shop was heavily fortified with iron bars. Some years back the shop was looted by the Renamo and nothing was left.

4.6.3 Deployment of soldiers Mozambique

There respondent highlighted that there was a need to first increase security to them because they live along the border before sending soldiers to Mozambique. The respondent lamented that there was no security on the border not even a fence or any physical barrier to avoid infiltrations. The respondents called for regular police patrols since the conflict had not spilled in the area. Mr. X highlighted that the police was too far away and in the event of a crisis they would be seriously affected. Mr. X showed reservation for the deployment of troops as these had even a negative bearing in their social lives once deployed.

'We need police at the moment no soldiers as yet because soldiers will take even our wives.

Yes if you go at Demeni Primary School there, you ask anyone to show you where Mr. X's tuck shop is. He lost his leg when Renamo left some landmines at his home, go at Demeni Primary.

At Demeni Primary School the researcher requested the authorities the direction to Mr. X's tuck shop and he was given Trevor to locate his Uncle Mr. X's tuck shop.

4.7 (Business man Mr. Y (*name supplied*))

The interview started at around 10:30am and ended around 11:30 am in the respondent's tuck shop on (28/03/2014) and in the process of the interview the researcher had some refreshments with the respondent. The respondent was willing to be photographed after the researcher sought permission to do so.

4.7.1 Matsanga and its current activities in Mozambique

The respondent indicated that he was close to the border and people talked about it especially those who traded between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Most of the tucks shops that border Zimbabwe and Mozambique sold Mozambican goods such as soap and the powerful alcohol popularly known as *ZED*.

4.7.2 Impact on livelihood

Mr. Y indicated that he was a very wealthy man and had more than 17 head of cattle 37 goats and more than 200 chickens *dzechiboyi* and at one point people would come at his homestead for a lecture on how to rear the chickens. The respondent said he had many tea bushes before the previous conflict, but was only left with only 1000 plants which were no longer enough to sustain him. When *Matsanga* came they took nearly everything from him and was left poor. He lamented that in the event that no solution was found in Mozambique he was likely to be the first victim and probably lose everything. The researcher was given the permission to even photograph some of the tea bushes at Mr. Y. Mr. Y even directed the researcher to the place where he had lost his leg and the researcher was able to visit the area.

4.7.3 Deployment of soldiers in Mozambican

The respondent indicated that it was the duty of the African Union and the SADC region to undertake such a course, Zimbabwe was not supposed to be dragged into the conflict because such an approach was likely to worsen the situation. The respondent indicated that in the previous conflict Renamo banditry activities were not quite pronounced in the area of study, but when Zimbabwe deployed troops to Mozambique the activities of Renamo escalated.

4.7.4 Fear of *Matsanga*

The respondent indicated that the experience that he went through especially the loss of his leg had some effects in his life. He indicated that even today whenever Paul Matavire's song (*Pane Chimwe Chingu Chichanditadzisa Kupinda Denga*) was played on Radio he always wept as that would bring back the flashbacks of the traumatic experience of how his nephew was abducted and how he lost his leg in the early hours of December 1 1988 two years before the signing of the Rome Peace Accord that ended the 16 year old bloody conflict in Mozambique. Why the song the respondent indicated that he had a young son and his worry was, death meant he had no one to look after him.

'Even today when I hear the song from the Radio I always cry. Charles if you hear anything about Renamo please inform me in time so that I can seek refuge on time'.

4.8. Respondent C; Minister of Defense

The researcher conducted an in-depth interview on (10/04/2014) with the Minister of Defense and was booked by the Secretary as she sought permission from the Minister. The researcher was told to expect a call the following day. In less than an hour from Defense House the researcher was phoned by the Minister's Secretary who informed the researcher that the Minister had agreed for the interview the following day at 08:40am. The interview was conducted at Defense House in the Minister's Office where the researcher was given the liberty to choose where she wanted to conduct the interview.

4.8.1 The current position of Renamo in Mozambique

The research established that the general concern of Renamo were to do with amendment to the electoral as well as constitutional provisions as agreed in the Rome Peace Accord of 1992. To tilt the balance of power Renamo had therefore engaged in military activities as a way of putting pressure on the government through the use of arms so that the Frelimo government could consider the grievances of Renamo. Most of the Renamo activities were confined in the Sofala and Tete provinces in Mozambique as well as the highway from Maputo. Those affected by the conflict included military and civilian population within Mozambique. The incursions by Renamo had deteriorated over the months due to the on-going dialogue between the Frelimo government and Renamo which has been noted as progressing in the positive direction.

4.8.2 Renamo military capability over Frelimo

The research established that Renamo at the moment had not that capability to dislodge the current government in Mozambique. This was because since its support had withered over the years it was not capable as it was during the apartheid era as well as when it was under the Rhodesian sponsorship.

4.8.3 Measures to initiate dialogue

The two parties to the conflict had at the moment been engaging in dialogue. Preparations for the Presidential elections were underway. Some countries have also put their weight in trying to find a peaceful solution to the conflict among them Cape Verde, USA, Zimbabwe, Italy, the UK, and Kenya among others.

4.8.4 Renamo and foreign mediation as credible solution to end the crisis

The presence of foreign mediators was not a guarantee to put so much trust in rebel movements, the reason being that Renamo has over the years had its own sponsors for Portugal, USA, and the UK and these can still have some great impact over the peace process in Mozambique and within the region. There was always the need for countries to safe guide themselves against possible pressures from external actors in the international political system. Not much change has been noted with regard to the relationship between Renamo and its former masters who may want it as a political party to rule Mozambique.

4.8.5 Displacement of people in Mozambique

The impact has not been quite significant and such an impression was not as massive as might be perceived.

4.8.6 SADC capability

The study established that Mozambique at the moment had the capability of dealing with Renamo and not much had been said by the government in Mozambique to seek help and as such no notification had been extended to its neighbors.

4.8.7 Availability of resources

Resources have been noted as something critical that states should consider in the event of a crisis and in the absence of the there was the need to seek such a resource in times of distress and in times of peace.

4.8.8 Deployment of Zimbabwean troops to Mozambique

The deployment of troops was not a necessary measure but only and only if the national interests of Zimbabwe were tempered with such as the disruption of the movement of goods between Mozambique and Zimbabwe through the Beira corridor and the rail way system in the Chicualacuala region in the southern districts of Zimbabwe as well as the Tete province.

The research also established that the country will be more worried in protecting both citizens of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In terms of peace and security the research established that diamonds might act as a magnet in attracting intervention in the country though a proxy armed group, but such a territorial inversion was intolerable.

4.8.9 Role of SADC and the African Union

The study revealed that Mozambique has not yet appealed for assistance from countries in the SADC region and the AU. The AU having many countries as constituency members had many challenges such as noted in for example in Somalia, the DRC, and Chad because of ethnicity and religious differences. The AU as of now was not a military fighting machine and not well integrated. The creation of the standby brigades, such as, in SADC, ECOWAS was critical. The respondent lamented that it was quite

humiliating to ask for assistance from the former colonial masters. The African force was supposed to be developed in all military structures and the capability to quickly maneuver from one conflict zone to another.

4.9 Findings from focus group interviews, in-depth interviews and questionnaires

The findings that the researcher sought were from the group focus interviews, the questionnaires and the in-depth interviews that the researcher conducted in Chimanimani East and in Harare.

(1) Are people aware of the current activities of Renamo in Mozambique and the consequences on their livelihoods?

Most of the respondents were quite aware of the activities that are currently taking place in Mozambique. The previous conflict had an effect on the lives of most of the people in Chimanimani East. From the researcher's perspectives he discovered that there was a general mistrust for strangers amongst the people and there is still a general fear and still have some very vivid memories of the past conflicts among the people. Most respondents indicated that they got much of the information from radios especially Studio 7, Radio South Africa and some on Radio Zimbabwe news at 20.00hrs and on Short Wave; a very smaller percentage indicated that they read it from newspapers some said it was through rumor since they frequently cross into Mozambique for trade purposes. The research findings from Chishiri A and B indicated that they constantly

referred the researcher to go and sought more information to the people who lived closer to the border such as those in Demeni and Mutsvangwa.

(2) What are the perceptions of the people in Chimanimani East over the activities in Mozambique?

Many of the respondents expressed reservations especially in the establishment of a border fence and the deployment of security apparatus which meant they would be separated from their marriage institutions which had existed over decades between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans as a result of the conflict who live along the border. In the focus group interviews that the researcher conducted at Chishiri A, B and at Ndima Primary most respondents were very concerned about their cultural links between them and their Mozambican counterparts. There exists an intermarriage connection that has tied the people together. Besides the marriage institutions many respondents indicated that school going children would be affected if events escalate in Mozambique they wouldn't be able to go to school. The overall responses were that dialogue or mediation was better than military intervention which they said should be left to the regional body SADC and the continental body, the African Union. Most respondents indicated that Zimbabwe was not suppose to fight in Mozambique as this was going to adversely affect people who live along the border not only in Chimanimani East but the whole border area.

(3)How has the conflict in Mozambique impacted on Zimbabwe?

The researcher noted that there was a general fear among the respondents concerning the current resurgence of Renamo. This was noted when the researcher tried to introduce his research topic. When the researcher mentioned Renamo few showed an understanding of Renamo but when the researcher said Matsanga many had mixed feelings in responding to the interview. The headman at one point in the beginning of the interview remained silent until the researcher called him to also contribute to the general discussion. After the interview one of the respondent an aid to the chief said it was very difficult to trust people especially those who normally come during the evening and it was now a norm for people whenever they are visited by strangers during the night to take them to the headman who would then take them to the Chief. The researcher noted that though the conflict has not caused physical damage to Chimanimani East the researcher noted that the impact was psychological. The Chief where the researcher resided was also very worried about his own security and at one point, went to the police to inform them that the researcher was not a student but a government agent who had been on a spying mission and the police could also not offer accommodation to the researcher as he was only given a few days to stay at the chief by both the chief and the police at Copper.

(4) What are the ongoing multiple productive strategies of resolving the conflict?

The researcher also discovered that some Ministries such as the Ministry of State Security were not forthcoming in trying to permit the researcher to conduct an

interview. The researcher also requested the Mozambican Embassy for an interview was not forth coming.

The research established that the crisis in Mozambique had calmed as the two parties to the conflict had entered into a dialogue to amend the Constitution and to reforms electoral laws which were sighted by Renamo as one of their grievances. The respondent from the Ministry of Defense also highlighted that Renamo was trying to put pressure on the Mozambican government and in the process recruitments were still possible especially those bandits who were not integrated into the national army.

The findings supported Galtung's theory of peace that societies affected by violence have negative peace imbedded in them and such forms of violence can live within the communities for ever if non-intervention strategies are initiated. Within the context of the current crisis in Mozambique various players from top leaders, middle level leaders and low level leaders should be involved in trying to solve the current problem. Once violence becomes a culture it can be easily taped and mattered on various institutions in society.

The findings also supported Sigmud Feud's trauma theory which says victims of violence whether direct or indirect are often traumatized by such events. The mind once reminded about past experiences it can trigger flashbacks. Most respondents showed some signs of trauma by the mere mentioning of the word *Matsanga*. Some were not contended at all by the research topic which they said it was too sensitive for them.

4.10 Validity and reliability

The researcher however had to interview various different respondents so as to increase the validity and reliability of the study based on the researcher's judgment that is why he had to include respondents from various institutions in society. The respondents had diverse educational and political backgrounds which the researcher thought would add value to the research in the interpretation of events. At the same time the researcher had to change his sampling techniques whereby he had to include also questionnaires in his study for triangulation purposes. The researcher had to use snowball sampling techniques whereby before commencing his research he was referred to a Chief in Ndimba (*name supplied*) by an official from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. In Ndimba the researcher met the Chief who grouped some of the respondents whom he thought had the vital knowledge about Renamo. The Chief also referred the researcher to Demeni and Mutsvangwa where he said were some of the areas he could sought the information that he wanted. The researcher then met Mr. Y who later referred him to Demeni primary school. At Demeni primary school the researcher was referred to Mr. X who was said to have been a victim of the Renamo bandits. The researcher was able to interview Mr. X who said had lost his leg as a result of the Renamo activities.

4.11 Assumptions

The research answered the assumptions which were highlighted by the researcher in chapter 1. Those who were interviewed had at one point experienced or heard or had relatives, community members who were abused by Renamo and still have the memories of such activities. The respondents also said because of their proximity to the border which according to the researcher is too porous the possibility that Renamo bandits will cross into Zimbabwe and carry out attacks if the Zimbabwean government commits troops to Mozambique was answered.

4.12 Conclusion

The chapter sought to address data presentation, data analysis and the presentation of findings. The chapter also addressed some of the central research questions which were sought through focus group interviews, in-depth interviews, questionnaires and observations that the researcher noted during the interviews. The researcher used the SPSS software to do data analysis collected from both Demeni and Mutsvangwa primary and secondary schools respectively.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

5.0 Introduction

The chapter discusses and summarizes the findings of the study and lastly makes recommendations based on the findings of the study. The purpose of the study was to find out the awareness, perceptions, the interventions strategies that have been put in place and the impact of the current resurgence of Renamo in Mozambique. The research was informed by the theory of violence and the trauma theory. The study intended to understand the significance of the data collected through in-depth interviews, questionnaires and focus group interviews from purposively selected group of respondents.

5.1 Summary

The study found out that most respondents were aware of Renamo activities and the current conflict has not affected respondents directly but psychologically as witnessed by some respondents to failing to speak over the subject highlighting that it was too sensitive. The conflict had an effect especially the establishment of a barrier between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The research found out that Zimbabwe was not suppose to

intervene in the conflict on its own but to engage other players within the continent and within SADC.

5.2 Conclusion

The chapter sought to highlight on the summary as well as the recommendation to the various stakeholders who might be affected by the current crisis in Mozambique. The chapter of the research ended with possible areas for further research in Zimbabwe and Africa in general.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 Zimbabwe

The researcher recommended that the Zimbabwean government must and only commit its troops to Mozambique that is if the conflict degenerates into an all out war. Even as an out all war Zimbabwe must deploy troops only when its national interests have been compromised by the Mozambican Renamo group because the situation in Mozambique is quite precarious, the reason being that in international political dynamics alliances are formed and some disintegrate and as a result Renamo might have new players who might try to capitalize on the crisis in Mozambique and absorb Zimbabwe into the conflict.

At the same time its involvement must be done after consulting other stakeholders within the region (SADC) and the African Union and the United Nations. The researcher is quite skeptical about the role of the former Rhodesians and Portuguese who were displaced into South Africa and Australia who might capitalize on the slightest opportunity to inflame the conflict. Due to the land reform program that the Zimbabwe government embarked on Western nations still feel the need to reverse that program.

Both Zimbabwe and Mozambique should remain vigilante and resources should be put in place in the event of a conflict. Renamo like any insurgent group can buy time for the purpose of recruitment, training, and seek sympathizers who might supply it with weapons as trafficking in small light weapons in Southern Africa is weak. Mozambique has a disadvantage of a long coastline which can be used as entry points for weapons as experienced in the 1977-1992 civil war.

5.3.2 Mozambique

The Mozambique government must as urgently as possible make reforms in the electoral laws as well as the Constitution as agreed in the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992. If an impasse remains, the only way to solve the current crisis if Renamo is not satisfied is to conduct a national referendum where all Mozambicans will participate and come with an all inclusive Constitution in which electoral laws will be drawn so as to address the grievances of Renamo and Mozambicans in general. If Renamo continues to recruit fighters then the government must suspend the October 2014 Presidential elections and go for the referendum first.

The Renamo activities must be closely monitored by Zimbabwe, Mozambique and SADC especially if attacks are renewed prior to the 2014 October elections and hence the quick deployment of the SADC brigade.

5.3.3 To the people of Chimanimani East

Though Zimbabweans leaving along the Zimbabwean border have expressed reservations on establishing or erecting a fence in Chimanimani East such structures should be put in place and traditional entry points should be spared with the establishment of gates at such points and passes should be provided to adults and school going children should be spared to allow them easy access to education in schools established on the Zimbabwean border.

There should be police presence or a camp near Demeni for crisis management purposes to deter possible infiltration in the event of a crisis. The military should only be engaged, that is, if the situation deteriorates in Mozambique to protect both Zimbabweans and Mozambicans who leave along the border so that the cultural connectivity between Zimbabwean and Mozambicans is not diluted. The presence of security personnel is crucial as the areas are so rugged, vegetated and porous which can create possible infiltration. On the other hand something should be done to the people who witnessed or were victims of Renamo in the previous conflict. There is no need for the people in the Chimanimani East to worry much as dialogue is in process in Mozambique between Renamo and the government and Renamo has reduced some of its military activities.

5.4 Possible areas of research

The researcher also identified possible areas where further researches can be conducted such as the impact of conflict on the cultural lives of people who live along colonial boundaries in Africa.

1 Porous borders and the cost of counterinsurgency in Africa. A case study of the Goma region in the DRC and the Somali-Kenyan border.

2 Cultural homogeneity along soft international boundaries and challenges to peace and security in Africa. A case study of the eastern District of Zimbabwe.

3 Trauma and post-conflict violence perpetrated by Renamo in Zimbabwe. Case studies of Rushinga, Chimanimani, Chipinge and Chiredzi (Sengwe) district.

4 Leadership crisis and demise of an African state and the emergence of insurgents groups. Case studies of Seleka rebels in Central Africa Republic and Al Shabaab in Somalia.

5 Leadership and oppositional politics intolerance and the emergence of insurgents groups. Case studies of M23 and Seleka rebels in Central African Republic.

6 National Parks as laboratories of insurgence activities and the challenges to peace and security in Africa. Case studies of Gonarezhou, Kruger National Park, and Virunga National Park.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Questionnaire to Teachers and Headmasters in Chimanimani East District.

Good morning Sir, Madam, Mr, Miss, My name is Charles Nyazungu, I am a Zimbabwean and I am a student at Africa University in Zimbabwe. I am in my final year for the Masters in Peace and Governance. For my end of studies research project, I am conducting a research on *The impact of the resurgence of an insurgent (RENAMO); A case study of Chimanimani East; Zimbabwe*. For this study to be successful I kindly ask you to respond honestly and frankly to the question as possible as you can. All your responses will remain confidential, your name will not be mentioned anywhere. The study is primarily for academic purpose, while findings will help in making recommendations that can be used to improve strategies and approaches to resolve the current conflict in Mozambique. In case there is something you are not comfortable with you can say it out before we begin the interview. At the end of every interview the researcher will thank the interviewee for voluntarily and freely responding to the questions.

Do not write your name, address or cell number on any part of the questionnaire

Personal Details of Respondents

1 What is your age range?

Age	Tick
Below 30 years	
31 to 40 years	
Above 40 years	

2 Sex of Respondents

Sex	Tick
Female	
Male	

3 Highest Academic Qualifications

Academic Qualification	Tick
Graduate	
Undergraduate	
Diploma	
Certificate	

4 Length of Service

Period	Tick
Less than 1 year	
1 to 3 years	
4 to 5 years	

6 to 10 years	
Above 10 years	

5 Have you ever head of Matsanga/ Renamo?

	Tick
Yes	
No	

6 If your answer is yes, how did you hear about it?

Medium	Tick
Radio	
Television	
Newspaper	
Through rumor	
Through discussions	
Others	

7 What was discussed in the medium you chose above? Fill in the space below

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8 Have you ever heard of anyone who was affected by Matsanga in the current or previous conflict? Write briefly in the space below

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9 What did they tell you if any. Fill in the space below

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.....

10 Do you think this conflict has and will affect you? Write briefly in the space provided below

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.....

.....

11 What do you think should be done to the current crisis in Mozambique?

Response	Tick
Through military intervention by the African Union	
Through military intervention by SADC	
Through military intervention by Zimbabwe	
Through mediation	
Through dialogue	
Others	

12 In the space provided write briefly in your opinion over the choice you have made above

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13 You are free to add on to what you think about the role of both the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe concerning Matsanga in the space below;

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Thank you for your contribution

Appendix 2 Interview Guide on focus groups in Chimanimani East

Good morning Sir, Madam, Mr, Miss, My name is Charles Nyazungu, I am a Zimbabwean and I am a student at Africa University in Zimbabwe. I am in my final year for the Masters in Peace and Governance. For my end of studies research project, I am conducting a research on *The impact of the resurgence of an insurgent (RENAMO); A case study of Chimanimani East; Zimbabwe*. For this study to be successful I kindly ask you to respond honestly and frankly to the question as possible as you can. All your responses will remain confidential, your name will not be mentioned anywhere. The study is primarily for academic purpose, while findings will help in making recommendations that can be used to improve strategies and approaches to resolve the current conflict in Mozambique. In case there is something you are not comfortable with you can say it out before we begin the interview. At the end of every interview the researcher will thank the interviewee for voluntarily and freely responding to the questions.

1 Do you know anything about Matsanga and its current activities in Mozambique?

2 Do you think the conflict will have an impact on your livelihood?

3 In your view how can this conflict be resolved?

4 Should we send soldiers to assist the Mozambican government?

5 Do you still remember some of the activities of Matsanga to the local people?

6 Are you prepared to face Matsanga?

Appendix 3 Interview Guide for the in-depth interviews with the Mozambican Embassy

Good morning Sir, Madam, Mr, Miss, My name is Charles Nyazungu, I am a Zimbabwean and I am a student at Africa University in Zimbabwe. I am in my final year for the Masters in Peace and Governance. For my end of studies research project, I am conducting a research on ***The impact of the resurgence of an insurgent (RENAMO); A case study of Chimanimani East; Zimbabwe.*** For this study to be successful I kindly ask you to respond honestly and frankly to the question as possible as you can. All your responses will remain confidential, your name will not be mentioned anywhere. The study is primarily for academic purpose, while findings will help in making recommendations that can be used to improve strategies and approaches to resolve the current conflict in Mozambique. In case there is something you are not comfortable with you can say it out before we begin the interview. At the end of every interview the researcher will thank the interviewee for voluntarily and freely responding to the questions.

1 What is the current position of Renamo in Mozambique?

2 Do you think Renamo will be able to dialogue Flerimo?

3 What measures have been put in place to initiate dialogue?

4 Renamo has been calling for foreign mediators is it credible as a solution to end the crisis?

5 Many people have been displaced in Mozambique where are they likely to find protection?

6 Is SADC capable of containing Renamo if it becomes a conventional warfare?

7 Are the resources available in the event of an out all war?

8 If Zimbabwe is to deploy troops in Mozambique is it not likely to be dragged in the war?

9 Do you think SADC and the African Union should intervene in the current conflict?

Thank you for your contribution

Appendix 4 Interview Guide for the in-depth interviews with the Minister of Defense (Zimbabwe)

Good morning Sir, Madam, Mr, Miss, My name is Charles Nyazungu, I am a Zimbabwean and I am a student at Africa University in Zimbabwe. I am in my final year for the Masters in Peace and Governance. For my end of studies research project, I am conducting a research on *The impact of the resurgence of an insurgent (RENAMO); A case study of Chimanimani East; Zimbabwe*. For this study to be successful I kindly ask you to respond honestly and frankly to the question as possible as you can. All your responses will remain confidential, your name will not be mentioned anywhere. The study is primarily for academic purpose, while findings will help in making recommendations that can be used to improve strategies and approaches to resolve the current conflict in Mozambique. In case there is something you are not comfortable with you can say it out before we begin the interview. At the end of every interview the researcher will thank the interviewee for voluntarily and freely responding to the questions.

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5 Many people have been displaced in Mozambique where are they likely to find protection?

6 Is SADC capable of containing Renamo if it becomes a conventional warfare?

7 Are the resources available in the event of an out all war?

8 If Zimbabwe is to deploy troops in Mozambique are we not likely to be dragged in the war?

9 Do you think SADC and the African Union should intervene in the current conflict?

Thank you for your contribution

Appendix 5 Interview Guide for the in-depth interviews with the Minister of State Security (Zimbabwe)

Good morning Sir, Madam, Mr, Miss, My name is Charles Nyazungu, I am a Zimbabwean and I am a student at Africa University in Zimbabwe. I am in my final year for the Masters in Peace and Governance. For my end of studies research project, I am conducting a research on ***The impact of the resurgence of an insurgent (RENAMO); A case study of Chimanimani East; Zimbabwe.*** For this study to be successful I kindly ask you to respond honestly and frankly to the question as possible as you can. All your responses will remain confidential, your name will not be mentioned anywhere. The study is primarily for academic purpose, while findings will help in making recommendations that can be used to improve strategies and approaches to resolve the current conflict in Mozambique. In case there is something you are not comfortable with you can say it out before we begin the interview. At the end of every interview the researcher will thank the interviewee for voluntarily and freely responding to the questions.

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9 Do you think SADC and the African Union should intervene in the current conflict?

Thank you for your contribution

