

WESTERN SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON ZIMBABWE (2000-2013): HOW
EFFECTIVE ARE THESE SANCTIONS IN ZIMBABWE

BY

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Abstract

The objective of the study was to explore the effectiveness of the Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. The study did analyze the rationale behind the use of sanctions to intervene in the Zimbabwean conflict as well as explore the effect of the sanctions on the targeted individuals and entities in Zimbabwe and how the sanctions evolved since they were imposed. Using both primary and secondary sources for the study, it became apparent that the imposed sanctions caused more harm than good and therefore cannot be considered to have achieved the opposite of what they were designed to accomplish. Despite the debate generated on whether the sanctions are targeted or not the study asserts that these sanctions further endangered provision of services as leaders neglected service delivery due to the imposition of sanctions which they labeled as an anti-Land Reform Program strategy. Instead of registering improvements, sanctions soured relations between Zimbabwe and the western countries. As mentioned by the researcher in the recommendations, mediators should therefore seek to harmonize relations amongst Zimbabwean and other nations through the strategy of engagement. It is my submission that, where sanctions are imposed, it should be after a deeper scrutiny on their wider short and long term repercussions on the ordinary powerless citizens of the targeted country. One may find it fruitful and humane if great players in diplomacy search for flexible strategies of engagement rather than rely on rift widening tactics like sanctions which impact negatively on vital service providing systems for a functional service delivery.

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Dedication

This research is dedicated to the entire Payekar family and Illinois Great Rivers Conference of The United Methodist Church, USA.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

ADB	-	African Development Bank
AU	-	African Union
DAs	-	District Administers
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP	-	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
EU	-	European Union
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investment
GAO	-	General Accounting Office
GAP	-	Global Political Agreement
GDP	-	Gross Domestic products
GNP	-	Gross National Product
IDA	-	International Development Association
IMF	-	International Monetary Funds
IPLG	-	Institute of Peace Leadership and Governance
ILO	-	International Labor Organization
MDC	-	Movement for Democratic Change

MOHCW	-	Ministry of Health & Child Welfare
MPs	-	Members of Parliament
NGOs	-	Non Governmental Organizations
NPT	-	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPEC	-	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SAPs	-	Structural Adjustment Program
SADC	-	Sothorn African Development Council
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
US	-	Unites States
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programs
UNOCHA	-	United Nations Office Coordination Humanitarian Affairs
WB	-	World Bank
ZDB	-	Zimbabwe Democracy Bill
ZEDAP	-	Zimbabwe Essential Drugs Assistance Program
ZANU PF	-	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

According to the Law Dictionary (1961), in the original sense of the word, a “sanction” is a penalty or punishment provided as a means of enforcing and compelling obedience to a law. Galtung (1967) defines sanctions as "actions initiated by one or more international actors (the 'senders') against one or more others (the 'receivers') with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important." The opinion of the academic community in the late 1960s and early 1970s was that economic sanctions are largely ineffective. Galtung (1967: 409) concluded that "the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative." Doxey (1972: 547) claimed that "the deterrent and coercive force of sanctions is weak on almost every count."

Wallensteen (1968: 262) argued that the "general picture is that economic sanctions have been unsuccessful as a means of influence in the international system"; and for Adler-Karlsson (1968: 9), "the overall conclusion that the described embargo policy has been a failure" is inescapable. In addition, Baldwin (1985) quotes several official reports that reached the same conclusion. There is, however, a discrepancy between the beliefs of the academic community and policies with respect to economic sanctions. Indeed, during the same period, the number of sanction incidents rose from 5 in the 1965-70 periods, to 13 between 1970 and 1975, to 22 between 1975 and 1980, and then dropped

to 11 between 1979 and 1984 (Hufbauer and Schott, 1985: 25). This increase is not correlated with effectiveness. In fact, the success ratio before 1973 was almost 45% while after 1973 it dropped to less than one-third. The opinions of both academics and policy makers oscillate between the belief that sanctions are ineffective on the one hand, and that they can have successful policy outcomes on the other. This belief reflects real differences in the impact of sanctions (alas, with a difference of phase of 180 degrees so that these opinions are always in opposition to the facts).

The theoretical basis of sanctions is that they compel the government of the target country to change its approach in relation to certain problematic issues. When Western countries (powerful countries, ie the United States and influential European countries) consider imposing sanctions on a target country, it is believed that the pressure of sanctions would compel the government to change its conduct and attitude towards certain issues that the loss of certain privileges could persuade or force them to change their ways. An economic sanction for example is meant to force a target country to improve on its record of human rights violations, to enact specific economic reforms, or to end its support for international terrorist organization (Drury, 2010) and (Whan, 2010;2011). For the last decade, Zimbabwe has been under targeted or smart economic sanctions imposed by the West accusing the government of human rights violations. The EU and US have always maintained the sanctions as targeted restrictive measures on President Mugabe and officials who support his rule. On the other hand, ZANU (PF) views these sanctions as unjust targeting the whole nation and for that matter an anti-

Land Reform Program strategy. This research seeks to investigate the effectiveness of the sanctions and disputations which have been generated by the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and how it has evolved. Furthermore, the research will unveil the suffering caused by sanctions as education, water and the health delivery systems collapsed. The argument being that targeted or not, sanctions had far reaching consequences since for over a decade ruined service delivery to Zimbabweans (Hove 2012).

Though this aim is less evident, the effect of sanctions might cause the citizens to demand change from their government. The economic plan thought of when imposing economic sanctions is likely to be more painful for the innocent population (that is, hurting the most vulnerable segment of the society), because such external economic shocks often drive their living standard further below substance levels; such bleak economic conditions can lead aggrieved citizens to consider their economic standings after sanctions. There are different types of sanctions, for example; economic, diplomatic, travel restriction, trade sanctions and financial sanctions (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). In recent years there has been increasing use of targeted sanctions also known as “smart” sanctions whereby certain individuals or organizations within a country are specifically targeted using for example, travel bans, asset-freezing, and arm embargo as in the case of Zimbabwe.

For the United Nations, sanctions are an instrument accessible to the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Chapter VII, Article 39, UN Security Council). For other countries like the US and United Kingdom, sanction are approved by members of Congress and Parliament to compel or coerce a target country or government to effect change in policy by their vested powers (Article I, 1799 US Constitution) and (Her Majesty's Government, 2010) respectively. Sanctions were employed two times during the bi-polar system from 1945 to 1990, against Rhodesia (1968) and then South Africa (1977).

The use of sanctions amplified since the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the end of the bipolar system between East-West in international relations in 1991. It would be befitting to refer to the post Cold War era as the sanctions era (Doxey, 1987). Several sanction regimes were adopted by the Security Council from 1990 to the present. According to (Miyagawa, 1992) and (Hove, 2012), sanctions were imposed against; Iraq (1990), the former Yugoslavia (1991), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992), Libya (1992), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1993), UNITA (1993), Rwanda (1994), Liberia (1994), the Bosnian Serbs (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1998), the Taliban (1999), Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000), Zimbabwe (1998), Iran (1979), Libya (2011), Syria (2011) and Iran (2012).

1.1 Background to the use of Sanctions as a foreign policy tool

Thucydides Pericles, a Greek historian and Athenian general (460-395), is perhaps the first person to document sanctions after he took notice of his book, ‘The Peloponnesian War’ of the decree by Pericles in 432 BC banning the people of Megaria from Greek markets to travel on Athenian land (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007:9, Tsebelis 1990:3) ever since that sanctions episode this instrument of foreign policy has been used by actors to seek policy reviews by the other actors. Sanctions have been applied against Rhodesia, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Iran by institutions like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries at the multilateral level and by individual states including the US, Russia, United Kingdom at the unilateral level as an alternative to war (Tsebelis 1990:3). The imposition of sanctions by the UN, as the most prominent multilateral organization, took dramatic increase in the 1990s in what is known today as the sanction decade including the western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe.

1.1.1 Types of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe

In order to fully appreciate the true nature of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and effectiveness of these sanctions, it is worth stating that these sanctions were said to be “targeted or smart” directed at the Mr. Robert G. Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe and members of his family, over 115 senior members of the ZANU PF government such as Patrick Chinamasa, July Moyo, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi and Tshinga Dube as well as more than 120 companies and state owned institutions including Alpha International,

Breco (Asia Pacific), and Breco (UK) Ltd. Fowale (2010) presents the sanctions as follows:

- International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed unpublicized sanctions under the instigation of Britain and the US despite its earlier commitment to support Land Reform and Rehabilitation Phase 11(LRRP11) in Harare; November 1998 (Hove, 2012).
- The IMF completely suspended its support for economic adjustment and reform in Zimbabwe. The International Development Association (IDA) suspended all structural adjustment loans to Zimbabwe; September 1999 (Hove, 2012).
- March 2000, the US Senate passed the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill (ZDB) which imposed travel bans and froze the assets belonging to President Mugabe, his family and other senior members of his regime. The bill also denied Zimbabwe access to international loans and called her to withdraw forces from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and to respect existing ownership titles to property (Hove, 2012).
- In May 2000, the IDA suspended all forms of lending, leaving Zimbabwe desperate for needed funds (Hove, 2012).
- In 2001, Great Britain cancelled an aid package intended for Zimbabwe worth US 5 million dollars (Hove, 2012).

- The US froze assets of seventy-seven government officials. Zimbabwe was expelled from the Commonwealth. Australia banned one hundred and seventy seven people from doing business with her firms and together with New Zealand; they lobbied the UN Security Council to indict the President of Zimbabwe (Hove, 2012).
- In 2005 George W. Bush junior, former President of the US signed an “Executive Order” expanding the number of those affected by the US sanctions including thirty-three institutions, a list which was further widened after the 2008 elections upheavals (US Presidential Document, 2005).

1.1.2 Problem statement

The economy of Zimbabwe has experienced drying up of project finance, closure of factories and local industries that provided employment and manufactured products, increased level of poverty and limited access to finance. The economy of Zimbabwe lacks of capacity to enhance technological advancement and other far reaching effects on the majority of the population noticeable through visible economic challenges and a high level of unemployment (Ian Smillie, 2009). The Government of Zimbabwe argues that hardships being faced by the majority of the population and the poor performance of the economy are as a result of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. Sectors heavily affected in Zimbabwe over the past decades which have recorded declines in productivity both within the public and private includes the Mining and Agriculture industries, Transport and Services, inadequate supply of Electricity and safe drinking

Water, poor Health care delivery, lack of improved infrastructural development, Education and Economic decline (Chenga, 2009:6). Other critics including the West and opposition say that the government has failed to deliver the basic services to its citizens as a result of bad economic decision, untimely implementation of the land reform and redistribution policy characterized by human right abuses, harassment of opposition activist and lack of vision to move the country forward (Bratton, Chikwana & Sithole 2005). Since it became an independent country from British rule in 1980, the system of governance in Zimbabwe has been a challenge.

There has been little room for critics and a functional opposition to provide alternative views (Human Rights Watch, 2001). With these declines resulting into unemployment and poor living conditions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2013 report rates Zimbabwe as the second poorest country in the world with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of \$589.46. The Private sector in Zimbabwe also records decline in operations and service delivery. The Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe 2007 report, majority of None Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in Zimbabwe received funding from Western Governments. Accordingly, as a result of complying with the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, some have realigned their policies in consultation with their donors, other donors have either responded by withdrawing their programs or frozen further development assistance programs in the country (Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe, 2007). Therefore, this research aims to investigate the effectiveness of the sanctions the fact that government of Zimbabwe has always maintained that the sanctions are

responsible for the decline in the economy resulting to poor service delivery to the people of Zimbabwe.

1.1.3 Purpose of Study

The purpose of the study was to explore the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in order to inform policy makers and parties to the Zimbabwean situation in future decision making.

1.1.4 Significance of the study

1. The findings from this study will be used provide insight to policy makers for future use of sanctions as a means of seeking an end to a conflict.
2. Furthermore, the study was done to unveil the success or failure of the use of sanctions by the West in the Zimbabwean crisis.

1.1.5 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were:

1. The study was conducted to explore the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe.
2. The study was meant to analyze the rationale behind the use of sanctions to intervene in the Zimbabwean conflict.

3. The study was also done to explore the effect of the sanctions on the targeted individuals and entities in Zimbabwe.
4. Finally these studies were intended to identify how the sanctions evolved since they were imposed.

1.1.6 Research questions

1. How effective is the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe?
2. What was the rationale for the imposition of sanctions?
3. What were the effects of the sanctions on the targeted persons and entities?
4. How have the sanctions evolved since they were imposed?

1.1.7 Assumption or Hypothesis

This study will be based on the assumption that whether undeclared or declared, the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe has more damaging effects on the innocent and vulnerable population than the targeted persons (Rwodzi, 2009). The intended persons seem to be indirectly affected while the poor and innocent faces direct effects in a given situation.

1.1.8 Limitation

A limitation to be faced in this research will begin from the researcher's status as a non Zimbabwean student. This will be a challenge to the researcher's inability to speak or

understand the local Shona or Ndebele as well as lack of knowledge of Zimbabwe and access to key political leaders in both ruling or opposition parties and policy makers. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic and the lack of financial resources, the researcher will mainly focus on political leaders and policy makers including MPs, Ministers, DAs, Chiefs, Business community, Academicians and Councilors in Zimbabwe.

1.1.10 Delimitation of the study

This study has been designed to contribute to the global debate on the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. Findings from this study will be used by policy makers and other stakeholders interested in the Zimbabwean body politic. This Study will not be perfect and as such, will not reflect the views of stakeholders.

1.1.10 Definitions of terms

Western Countries

Powerful or influential countries out of Africa; mostly the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, Germany, Russia, Belgium etc.

Sanctions

Sanctions are punitive or restrictive measures taken, usually by several countries in concert, to pressure a country to change its certain policies. Economic sanctions ban

trading with the offending country. Diplomatic sanctions result in the withdrawal of relations and representation (Annan, 2001).

Undeclared Sanctions

Undeclared sanctions are not explicitly announced but are implied from the actions of the perpetrating nations. For example, some Non Governmental Organizations have moved their operations out of Zimbabwe, since the enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. This Act outlines the scope of targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe by the USA (US Presidential Document, 2001).

Youths

A “youth” means “every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years” (African Youth Charter, 2006).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the literature focusing on the effectiveness of the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe. This chapter also accesses the gaps, dilemmas, strengths and contradictions from scholars, politicians, Zimbabweans and policy makers about how these sanctions have evolved over time from being smart or targeted sanctions at a select few to effecting the vulnerable and innocent population. Whether these sanctions have achieved their aims and objectives for which they were imposed, there is a debate between President Mugabe and members of the Zanu PF and those opposing the legality of the sanctions and the Western Countries and members of the opposition supporting the justness of the sanctions (Chenga, 2009) and (Chogugudza, 2009:8). There are many on the other hand who believe that sanctions regimes are considered ineffective because the targeted governments use sanctions as excuses for failure to deliver basic services to a given population. However, post sanctions activities set the basis for institutional reforms and capacity building at national and community levels such as peace building and healing broken relationships.

Sanctions against Zimbabwe and indeed any other country are a declaration of war on a sovereign state, which puts the economy under siege, with debilitating downstream effects on the vulnerable groups and civilians at large (Kurebwa, 2000:3). Sanctions may

be introduced as a strategy of deterring states from wrongdoing in order to implement collective security. In support of this view Joseph Kurebwa observed that “a delinquent state threatens international security either through acts of aggression or by creating domestic conditions that are conducive for international anarchy” (Kurebwa 2000: 3). Sanctions are considered a better alternative than military compulsion or force. It can be recalled that this is not the first time Zimbabwe has experienced sanctions situation. The UN imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe then Rhodesia in the sixties (1965-1979) after she was accused of infringing human rights. Instead of alleviating the plight of the people whose rights were violated, the sanctions led to the deterioration of the situation they were meant to alleviate (Strack 1979: 44).

Nevertheless, not all countries support the imposition of sanctions on another country as a result of a number of factors including state-centric interests. A practical example was the imposition of sanctions on Rhodesia during the war against the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army forces in their struggle for Zimbabwe, at which time apartheid South Africa, Israel and Portugal did not uphold the sanctions as they continued to trade with the Rhodesian Government. Consequently, oil was pumped into Rhodesia and a Machipinda service station was built in January 1966 in an effort to aid the flow of oil into the country (Jardim 1979: 44). Another vivid example came after Mozambique closed her border with Rhodesia in 1976 in support of black majority rule; South Africa allowed the late Ian Smith led government to rapidly construct a railway line to connect to South Africa via Beit

Bridge (MS308/31/1: 1976-77). Zimbabwe is known to be endowed with many natural resources including gold, diamond, nickel, copper, coal, and iron ore among others. Zimbabwe is rich in natural resources and produces more than 40 types of metals and minerals. About 40% of the country's foreign exchange was earned from the export of these metals and minerals, accounting for 5% of total employment and 7% of GDP (Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe 1996 Report).

2.1 Theoretical framework to the study

In order to describe the theoretical basis of this study, I will use the game theory framework. Scholars like George Tsebelis and Robert D. Putnam have proposed that mostly the game theoretic models of sanctions analysis (Lace and Niou, 2004:27). Putnam first examines six different ways of conceptualizing the problem of sanctions as a game between the sender and the target country. These games make completely different assumptions about the players: They operate under complete or incomplete information, they have perfect rationality or adaptive behavior, they move simultaneously or sequentially, and they have discrete or continuous options. Regardless of the differences in the assumptions, however, all six scenarios lead to the same equilibrium outcome. Further, he examines the properties of the common equilibrium of these games. Then, the conditions under which sender countries will apply sanctions regardless of their impact, or target countries will disregard sanctions independently of their severity, are analyzed. A structural kind of uncertainty is introduced: One or both

countries do not know the "type" of their opponent (whether the opponent is "soft" or "tough"). The third part introduces domestic politics and problems of international cooperation, and compares existing empirical results concerning sanctions with the predictions of the game-theoretic model, explains the low success rate of sanctions, and gives the reasons for policy prescriptions that are poor and sometimes contradictory (Tsebelis, 1990) and (Putnam, 2008).

Rubinstein (1991:909) also argues that the game theory is an abstract inquiry into the concepts and logic of social reasoning of parties in a conflict situation. Game form is the exact and detailed description of the conflict situation including potential events and previous moves by other players (1991:910). It is wise to examine the issue of sanctions from a game theory perspective for the reason games that sender states play to elicit certain reactions by the targeted states. As stated earlier in my introduction, the general belief is that the pressure of sanctions would compel the government to change its conduct and attitude towards certain issues that the loss of certain privileges could persuade or force them to change their ways. Also mentioned was the number of types of sanctions economic, embargo, trade sanctions and diplomatic which I will be looking into as in the case of Zimbabwe. Economic sanctions have been receiving poor reputation (Smith 1996; Tsebelis 1990). Targeted sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1960s proved to be unsuccessful (Renwick 1981: 77, 87, 91). But in the more typical cases of Iraq, Haiti, Cuba and North Korea, sanctions have seemed only to

empower dictators. In recent years there has been increasing use of targeted sanctions also known as “smart” sanctions whereby certain individuals or organizations within a country are specifically targeted using for example, travel bans, and asset-freezing (Reinner, 2000). Theoretically, the idea of smart sanctions is to avoid punishing the general citizens of a country for the wrongs of a few individuals in government. As it discussed in this literature review, the distinction between smart sanctions against selected individuals and general sanctions against the country is in effect, very hard to sustain given the impact on the innocent people of Zimbabwe. Either way, it is the general citizens that suffer, while the intended targets escape the effect of the sanctions because they have the power and opportunities to access state resources (Cortright and Lopez, 2000).

The sanctions regime in Zimbabwe is characterized by smart or targeted according to its senders, sanctions against President Mugabe and senior members of his government as mentioned earlier. The sanctions involve travel bans and freezing of assets of certain specified individuals almost all of whom are connected to the government or the ruling party. The list of targeted individuals is reviewed and amended from time to time as. A matter arises as to whether these sanctions actually work as intended, that is, whether they affect only the targeted individuals or the impact extends more generally across the country. In other words, how smart are the smart sanctions working against the listed targets and institutions (Galtung, 1967).

At some point the EU issued a statement in which it argued that the sanctions were not targeted against Zimbabwe as a country but specific individuals and therefore could not be seen as detrimental to the Zimbabwean economy (Bull and Tostensen 1999:373). The government on the other hand persistently blames sanctions (and drought) for the country's economic malaise. Now, to be sure it is generally accepted that the primary causes of the crisis in Zimbabwe is a game (Government of Zimbabwe vs. Western Powers) and it is somewhat an exaggeration to blame the sanctions regime as the exclusive cause for the country's troubles. Zimbabwe's economic breakdown did not happen overnight as a result of sanctions. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the exaggeration, we cannot dismiss outright the fact that sanctions have had a negative effect on the economic conditions in Zimbabwe thereby having serious consequences on limited service delivery.

While they are not the primary cause, there is nonetheless some substance in the view that they have contributed to the demise in recent years. Why is this so, when the smart sanctions specifically target named persons? It is because the so-called smart sanctions in fact have far-reaching impact beyond the targeted persons. Zimbabwean travelers know full well that even though travel bans to certain countries were imposed against specific individuals, the experience of every other person at the border post of those countries or applying for entry visa is a nightmare. Similarly, companies may also find it extremely hard to get lines of credit where the country cannot access them. So in effect, smart sanctions can be the same as to sanctions against the country as a whole.

For all the hardships of economic sanctions in Iraq in the 1990s, Saddam remained in power Iraqi people simply adjusted. The same applies to Burma, where economic sanctions have been in place for some time, but the repressive regime has remained in power (Pape 1997). At the same time, such measures have a certain and large negative impact on the welfare of the targeted populations. Sanctions can restrict significantly the flow of trade between states (Hufbauer et al. 1997). The impact of 12 years of comprehensive trade embargo adds to the challenges of reconstructing Iraq. The cost of sanctions, together with their contested record of success, has fuelled pessimism regarding their use.

After more than two decades of debating the effectiveness of economic pressure, the state of disagreement on whether pressure works remains something of an embarrassment. Many explanations can be offered for why the controversy endures. One issue lies with the measurement of “success.” What is success and how is it measured is often contested even by the very participants in an episode. Another issue is whether success should be attributed to sanctions. Economic pressure typically takes place alongside other important events and developments, such as a weak economy or a foreign military intervention. Assigning the relative merits of economic coercion in each case can cause reasonable people to disagree (Elliott 1998).

One way debate can move forward is by verifying whether a basic ingredient for the successful use of economic pressure is, in fact, in place. Sanctions are more likely to extract concessions or induce compliance if targeted leaders have an incentive to avoid them (Hirschman 1945; Wagner1988).

2.2 Relevance of the theoretical framework to the study

The concept of this game theory is that both the sanctions sender and the target country play game with the lives and well being of the innocent and mostly vulnerable people who suffer the most. An assessment of the effectiveness of the sanctions on Zimbabwe will allow me present the effects on the extent to which the targeted sanctions have evolved from targeted person to the rest of the population (Chogugudza 2009: 8). Since the 1990s, a period which many refer to as the ‘sanctions decade’ (Cortright and Lopez, 2000), the United Nations imposed many sanctions on countries including Iraq, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Haiti and Zimbabwe. The increased use of sanctions and the resulting humanitarian crisis that followed became a concern to policymakers and academics to re-evaluate their potential negative effects.

A traditional argument in favor of the use of sanctions over military conflicts has been that even if they have a lower probability of success than military conflicts, the relatively lower cost to both the sender and the target might still make them a viable policy option. Unlike military conflicts, sanctions are not intended to kill citizens of a target country

(Drezner, 1998), so they are considered to be a more humane coercive policy. However, following the experience with sanctions in the 1990 era, scholars began to challenge this logic, arguing that sanctions are a potentially immoral foreign policy tool that indiscriminately and unjustly target poor and vulnerable innocent people of society (Gordon, 2002; Muller & Muller, 1999; Al-Samarrai, 1995; Damroseh, 1993). Additionally, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000) referred to sanctions as a blunt instrument which hurts the large number of people who are not the primary targets.

2.3 Framework for consideration of sanctions

There have been major controversies surrounding the imposition of sanction, however, the general framework for policy makers and campaigners of sanctions as a means of addressing human rights abuses and a breakdown in the governance, where the government of the day fails to provide the basic needs and make the necessary reforms and sanctions are seen as the only alternative to effect change. A careful scrutiny must be made to determine; goals of the sanctions, its legitimacy, their chances of success, measures of those chances of success and the post sanctions effect considerations (Amstutz 2005).

2.4 The Goal of a sanction

The economic sanctions must have a clear goal; by defining a clear and attainable goal that will reduce the risk of doing more harm to a population and to restore a legitimate

government. This should not be like the case in Iraq, where goals were not clearly set, moving from ending the invasion of Kuwait to military containment to getting rid of a dictator. Sometime should be merely a way for the western countries opposed to the government of Zimbabwe policies in trying to further regime change (Arya, 2008).

2.5 Legitimacy of Sanctions

Sanctions in Zimbabwe are considered by the government and its neighbor as illegitimate, given the historic and current inconsistency of the UK and other powerful countries in human rights, for example, the support to Uzbekistan in the war on terror (Gottstein, 1999). The US has been seen by many to have little moral legitimacy in pronouncing on Darfur whilst US allies in the Arab world such as Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco practice various forms of human right abuses and torture. The sanctions against Iran for its development of nuclear programs are considered inconsistent given the fact that Israel's weapons are ignored and the Permanent five members of the UN Security Council remain unwilling to act on their obligations the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to disarm. At the same time, US shift to engaging with North Korea and renewed support to Indian nuclear power by turning a blind eye to Pakistan nuclear weapon development (Sacks, 2003). A consistent principle in dealing with all countries would increase the legitimacy of sanctions and the chances of multilateral or regional support. Another criterion for the legitimacy of sanction designed to benefit the population is internal support. This occurred in Haiti and South Africa but not in the

former Yugoslavia. For the case of Iran, it seems that threats have actually hardened the resolve of the people against the US while such support may sometimes be difficult to determine, the opinions of non-governmental organizations of close neighboring countries, historical allies, co-religionist or human rights groups can sometimes give an indication of support. For sanctions to be seen as legitimate, it must be done through the process within the United Nations, where the case of justness can be considered openly (Arya, 2008).

2.6 Sanctions must have the prospects of success

Some important questions to be answered, are there methods to be considered when contemplating on imposing sanctions? What are the chances of success if military, cultural, and financial restrictions were used? Should sanctions be incremental or rapid, the former all owing for change and the latter creating pressure on a regime? The legitimacy of goals and tactics and proportionality affects the degree of support from other nations and the prospects of success (Drury, 2010).

2.7 The Success of sanctions must be measured

Considering sanctions from an economic context, success has can be defined as the difference made to an economy affecting more than two percent of the GDP in countries with high degree of trading dependency and with high compliance of their neighbor

(Gottstein, 1999). It may take over three years for sanctions to have such an impact. In Somalia and Rwanda, sanctions were only employed half-heartedly and late, with little neighborhood support. In South Africa, white society had neither the will nor the ability to suffocate the black populations because as a minority, it depended on black labor, also, South Africa had the internal resources to manage such problems (Arya, 2008). On the other hand, success may be more than just economic. It is sometimes a powerful symbol of the unacceptability of a regime, beyond the cultural and diplomatic moves to make a country a “pariah” state. Even if black-marketing occurred in Haiti or the apartheid regime in South Africa was able to weather the economic impact of sanctions, the demonstration of opposition by the international community gave heart to internal opposition and increased the questioning of the ruling party. In Yugoslavia, as it was, sanctions weakened internal opposition as people rallied around the flag. Some question whether sanctions can actually be effective in states where authoritarian regimes care little about their people as it was alleged in the case of Myanmar (Burma) and as it is in Zimbabwe, or against militarily powerful states like china over Tibet (Rajeshwar, 2000).

2.8 Monitoring Sanctions

To monitor compliance to sanctions, it is generally well done by the Security Council but this rarely chooses to monitor the effects of sanctions on the population. Whether the damage related to sanctions in Iraq was deliberate genocide or merely inadvertent willful

non-observance of the consequences and failing to monitor harm, the humanitarian consequence of these actions is unconscionable (UNICEF, 1999). Morbidity and Mortality may be measured by health professionals and epidemiologist by groups such as UNICEF, by the UN humanitarian Coordinating office, or by those providing food, shelter and access to health care. Such health data should be reported regularly always with political and economic data.

2.9 Post sanctions considerations

When considering the imposition of sanctions, careful thoughts should be given to the post sanctions future scenarios (Major and McGann, 2005). Awareness must be made of the dangers of sanctions fatigue, of specific economic interesting emerging which will highlight human suffering or timing of what is seen as an ineffective policy. Deciding when to move on from sanctions must be defined and judged in an open manner, taking into account the principles of justice; to ascertain if there has been adequate adherence to the demands and when, and what next step needs to be taken. The question to be answered is, does the failure of economic sanctions mean that the only right alternative is war? In Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia military actions eventually employed, but the outcomes were varied and devastating (Cortright and Lopez, 1997). This then confirms the view that starting a sanction may be seen like the first step to war.

2.10 How Effective is the sanctions in Zimbabwe?

The most often asked question in the literature on economic sanctions is, “Do economic sanctions work?” or, “Are economic sanctions effective?” The consensus reached by most scholars is that economic sanctions generally are ineffective, as the following statements indicate (Dajani and Daoudi, 1983). The overall assessment is that unilateral economic sanctions during the 1990s, with few exceptions, have been ineffective in achieving their foreign policy objectives while having various adverse effects on other U.S. interests (Preeg, 1999). On the other hand, there is heated debate among scholars over their view of the success of economic sanctions. John Baldwin argues that the use of economic sanctions and economic statecraft more generally involves multiple objectives and targets, and that the assessment of success or failure from the sender’s perspective could only be made convincingly by comparing the costs and benefits of economic statecraft to that of other forms of statecraft. While Baldwin does not claim that economic sanctions are likely to succeed, his conceptual framework and reconsideration of classic cases taking multiple objectives into account does suggest that the economic instrument is considerably more useful from the sender’s perspective than scholars generally acknowledge (Baldwin, 1985). As a matter of fact, Baldwin discusses the importance instead of the impact of economic sanctions. He takes the multiple goals of the sender defined by politician or policy makers, the balance sheet of the costs and effectiveness, and the comparison of the statecraft alternatives when judging the success of economic sanctions into consideration. Baldwin’s approach is quite different from that of other analyses and will confuse the essence of the power relationship inherent in

economic sanctions, which is the primary concern in this study with respect to China's leverage and Taiwan's vulnerability. Baldwin's approach will offer important implications for decision-makers of the sender in choosing alternative statecrafts, but it does not offer an answer to the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

At the same time, other additional contribution made by (Dajani and Daoudi, 1983) place great importance on the domestic perceptive functions performed by sanctions. They argue that even if sanctions fail to achieve their initial goals, they may not be totally ineffective. They do not argue that sanctions are effective instruments in achieving stated foreign policy goals, but they do suggest that sanctions are important tools of statecraft if used for other purposes, such as reaching symbolic goals or inflicting severe economic deprivation on the target (Dajani and Daoudi, 1983). Some scholars recognize that the senders often have multiple goals when imposing economic sanctions, but these experts distinguish utility of economic sanctions from effectiveness. For example, James Lindsay contends, "Trade sanctions rarely force compliance or subvert the target government and have a limited deterrent value. Yet they often succeed as international and domestic symbols" (Lindsay, 1986).

George Lopez and David Cortright argue, "If the analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions remains literal regarding primary goals [the official or publicly declared purpose of sanctions], then sanctions do indeed have limited effectiveness" (Cortright

and Lopez). In its report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes that economic sanctions are more successful in achieving the less ambitious and often unarticulated goals, such as upholding international norms and deterring future objectionable actions, but are less successful in achieving the most prominently stated goals of making the target comply with the sender's stated wishes (GAO, 1992).

According to a study by Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliot, it suggests that the success of economic sanctions in two parts: the policy result and the sanctions contribution. The policy outcome measures the degree to which the sender's policy objectives were achieved, and the sanctions contribution is the degree to which sanctions contributed to this outcome. Both parts are scaled from 1 to 4. For policy results, 1 indicates a failed outcome, 2 indicates an unclear but possibly positive outcome, 3 indicates a positive outcome with a somewhat successful result, and 4 indicates a successful outcome.

For sanctions contribution, 1 indicates a zero or negative contribution, 2 indicates a minor contribution, 3 indicates a modest contribution, and 4 indicates a significant contribution. A product of nine or higher for the policy result and sanctions contribution is counted as a sanctions success (Elliot, Hufbauer and Schott, 1990). They used a rating system to determine whether the target complied with the sender's goals and

whether sanctions were the primary cause of this change, calculate an overall success rate of 34 percent, or 40 cases for the 115 cases. Of the sanctions episodes in the pre-1973 period, 44 percent ended successfully, whereas the success rate among post-1973 cases was just less than 25 percent. Even more striking is the decline in the effectiveness of sanctions imposed in pursuit of modest goals, from 75 percent to 21 percent, most of which involved the United States. In addition, unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States in recent years have only rarely worked, with just 13 percent (or 5 of 39) unilateral U.S. sanctions achieving any success between 1970 and 1990 (Cortright and Lopez, 1997). Arguing against the findings from the above study, Robert Pape maintains that the actual success rate in the cases examined was less than five percent. In comparison, Kim Nossal argues that among the many sanctions episodes since 1945, only 14 stand out as unequivocally successful in the sense that the sanctions prompted the target state to alter its behavior. Out of the Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliot 115 total cases examined, Nossal concludes that only eight were successful (Nossal, 1999).

According to Pape's definition, economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior. He points out that this definition should exclude trade war and economic warfare, a point Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliot agreed with. Further, Pape credits economic sanctions

with success only if they meet three criteria: (1) the target state conceded to a significant part of the sender's demands; (2) economic sanctions were threatened or actually applied before the target changed its behavior; and (3) no more-credible explanation exists for the change in the target's behavior (Pape, 1997). Pape argues that an examination of the 40 sanctions cases Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliot claimed were successful reveals that, in fact, only five were clear successes. The remaining 35 are accounted for by four classes of errors: (1) eighteen are ultimately determined by force, not economic sanctions; (2) eight are failures, in which the target state never concedes to the sender's demands; (3) six are trade disputes, not instances of economic sanctions; and (4) three are indeterminate. In a counter argument to Pape's criticism, Kimberly Ann Elliot challenges Pape's interpretation of seven cases. Therefore, Elliot's response counts only 12 cases of economic sanctions successes without military determination. While Daniel Drezner agrees with Pape that seven of 40 successes in HSE data are miscoded and eleven are cases involving military force, he challenges Pape's interpretation of two cases. Furthermore, both Elliot and Drezner criticize Pape for not addressing the issue of whether economic sanctions can enhance the effectiveness of force, primarily because Pape's aim is to assess the independent usefulness of sanctions (Drezner, 2000).

2.11 Zimbabwe before Sanction

Given the situation of unemployment being one of the worst features of Zimbabwe's economic performance, statistical data to establish the trends, structure, and dynamics of the problem are unclear. Reliable time-series figures are almost non-existent. For some indication of the structure of unemployment in Zimbabwe I will use the 1986 labor-force survey data as well as the 1992 census data. But since the survey and census data collection methods were not consistent, the results were not entirely comparable. The census reported of 1982 indicates that unemployment was about 10.8%, in 1986 it was 7.2%,¹⁰ and in 1992 it was 21.8%.¹¹ It was thus not surprising when economists and policy makers estimated unemployment to be at least 30% (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996, 129). The labor market was also characterized by high levels of underemployment, especially in the informal sector. Government of Zimbabwe (1996) estimated that 300,000 people were underemployed in the rural and informal sectors.

In 1986 the proportion of the unemployed to the labor force in rural areas was 3.5% compared with 17.9% in urban areas. The corresponding figures for 1992 were 20.8% and 23.4%, respectively. (ii) In urban areas more females are unemployed than males. However, the differentiation is more difficult in rural areas. (iii) Unemployment decreases with age. The youth (aged 15-35) are more represented among the unemployed than any other group, partly because this group is composed of people who lack experience and skills. In addition, most of them were school dropouts. Between

1980 and 1990, there were about 173,315, Grade 1 to Form 6 drop outs per year (Siddiqui and Matare, 1993). Unemployment was greatest among those with secondary education or “above” (i.e. in 1986), and the secondary or diploma education (i.e. in 1992) categories. It has also been noted in other studies (Siddiqui and Matare, 1993) that unemployment was higher among secondary school leavers than any other group. The lowest reported cases of unemployment are among those with no education, a reflection of non-selectivity of this group as far as jobs were concerned.

The massive unemployment of the educated is the consequence of government policy which focused on the supply side of the labor market. Primary, secondary and tertiary level enrolments increased by 311%, 898%, and 355%, respectively between 1979 and 1984. Thus school output outstripped the jobs created. In 1980 for example, there were 26,000 new labor market entrants with primary and secondary education (not continuing) competing for 33,000 non-agricultural job openings. In 1993, there were 225,000 primary and secondary school graduates who entered the labor market. Instead in that year, non-agricultural sectors shed 20,000 jobs (Knight, 1996, 18). The problem of unemployment in Zimbabwe has also been worsened by retrenchments in the public and private sectors, a result of structural adjustment. As has been noted above the two sectors retrenched 20,000 and 26,000 workers, respectively. Private sector retrenchments came about largely as a result of poor economic performance while government retrenchments were part of the civil service rationalization program. However, the

government never envisaged private sector retrenchments at the start of ESAP. The government had assumed that reductions in civil service employment would be counteracted by major employment increases in education, manufacturing, tourism and commercial agriculture. The four sectors were projected to increase their employment between 1990 and 1995 by 12,000, 34,000, 13,000 and 20,000, respectively (Geest and Wignaraja, 1996,16). To date little employment growth has been realized in the formal sector. Many job seekers have been absorbed in the informal sector while others have left the country to seek jobs and better living conditions in neighboring countries and outside the region.

2.12 How the sanctions have evolved from targeted or smart to the rest of Zimbabweans

An explanation for the coercive mechanism at work when economic or targeted sanctions are imposed is that they will hurt (or at least cause damage) the majority of the people sufficiently that leaders are compelled to alter their behavior and policies as a result of pressure from the population (Gultang 1967). As I will look at how the sanctions have evolved from its targeted persons as they were imposed, it is apparent that the effects are being felt by the rest of Zimbabwe shifting its objectives. The Government of Zimbabwe through the Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe in its 2007 report highlighted a number sectors affected by the sanctions.

2.13 Socio-economic impact since the sanction regime

Zimbabwe has seen widespread reversal and cessation of donor funding in the areas of social development such as health, education, and infrastructure development.

2.14 Impact on health care in Zimbabwe

Health decline in quality health care delivery continued to be experienced with visible evidence of poor health delivery system and limited access to health facilities thereby leading to high cost of treatment from the few available health facilities. The withdrawals of the above donor funding program has had devastating effects on social services provision such as HIV and AIDS programs, among others. Some irrigation schemes which had sustained the lives of a substantial number of rural people have been dealt a heavy blow, which has resulted in increased levels of poverty in the rural population. Impact on Health Sector Health Services Support Programs which were suspended include the following:

- i) Supporting the provincial health service capacity building and policy issues to Ministry of Health & Child Welfare (MOHCW);
- ii) Development of a gender strategy Support to HIV/AIDS activities;
- iii) Integration of Zimbabwe Essential Drugs Action Program (ZEDAP) to national laboratories;
- iv) Establishment of the health information system; and
- v) Support to the Health Services Fund Transport Management.

The City of Harare Health Department used to derive benefits from the various Joint Research Projects with international stakeholders and these have since been stopped, as part of the sanctions, effectively constraining the health delivery system.

2.15 Impact on agricultural and rural Sector development

Some program for the Agricultural sector aimed at enhancing forestry extension services; development of agriculture policy; marketing information system; supporting irrigation schemes to small holders; provision of training to smallholder farmers; and direct support to farming households to assist them in income generating activities were also suspended, as part of the sanctions on Zimbabwe. Against this background, the Government had to reallocate its purse to forestall constriction of the rural economy.

2.16 Impact on education sector

The Education Sector Support Program which was established in January 1996, supported by donor funds was suspended after completion in 2000 and no new programs have since been funded. The project facilitated the supply of text books, special education needs, and construction of school buildings, capacity building and promotion of gender equity in education in the rural areas. All this has been put on hold following the imposition of sanctions.

2.17 Impact on investment and growth

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a key driver of economic growth in any developing economy. The purpose of FDI is to stimulate economic growth and employment creation. FDI also positively impacts on the country's balance of payments position. The negative perception that has come with sanctions has negatively impacted on foreign direct investment coming into Zimbabwe, as investors tend to shy away from economies that are perceived as risky. In 1998, FDI inflows amounted to US\$444.3 million and by 2003 the inflows had declined to a mere US\$3.8 million (Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe, 2008).

2.18 Effects of sanctions on Transport

The Transport Sector support program was funded by the DANIDA, in April 2000 it was established to support the Transport Sector with a value DKK 380 million (US\$48 million). The program was aimed at rehabilitating 116 km of roads as well as training indigenous small scale road contractors. This was meant to enhance entrepreneurial skills and capacity building for the rural population (Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe, 2007). Had this program been undertaken to completion, it could have created employment opportunity and enhance trade through efficient movement of commodities within the country and the region.

2.19 Foreign direct investment inflows

The low investment levels in the export sector have exacerbated foreign exchange shortages, leading to shortages of fuel and imported raw-materials. Yes, it is true that the transitory effects of the Land Reform Programs and inflationary pressures have contributed to a decline in output and hence underperformance of GDP but it is equally true that declared and undeclared sanctions have also resulted in the contraction in GDP. It is time that the debate focuses on the significance of sanctions on achieving their objectives, compared to the devastating effects on the livelihood of the generality of Zimbabweans.

2.20 Impact of sanctions on regional cooperation

The “smart sanctions” are also affecting the smooth running of regional groupings such as SADC and COMESA. The European Union, through the European Development Fund compensates COMESA member states for revenue losses suffered under the tariff phase down exercise under specific conditions which take into account macroeconomic policies. As part of the sanctions Zimbabwe has not benefited from the fund and this could affect, in the long term, its tariff reduction process in line with other countries in COMESA, thereby undermining the regional initiatives. Targeted sanctions have also resulted in Zimbabwe failing to be represented at regional pact meetings such as ACP-EU meetings. This means that the country is unable to present trade policy recommendations favorable to its people.

2.21 Constraints on policy

The effects of declared and undeclared sanctions has also been to narrow the policy space for the country and authorities have had to realign policies, such as fiscal and monetary interventions to unlock more self-reliant instruments, as part of the turnaround program. Ordinarily, in a case where a country's internal savings fall short of supporting ideal investment levels, the attendant internal gap is typically closed through Capital inflows, Foreign Direct Inflows, Portfolio investment and or international BOP support. But in the case of Zimbabwe, this was not the case since the external component has largely been campaigned away, leaving a very tight and limited policy space for monetary and fiscal policies. The limited policy space has, thus, become a binding constraint on such policies as exchange rate management and interest rate determination, where an eclectic strategy had to be pursued, including concessional financing of the productive sectors and measured exchange rate adjustments. Under conditions of a tight external sector position, aggravated by lack of international balance of payments support, the applicability of orthodox or free market based policy interventions becomes very limited. Vicious circle has thus evolved since the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. The resultant decline in economic activity emanating from the sanctions has given rise to rising external payment arrears, and high country risk, which in turn, has adverse effects on economic activity (Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe, 2009).

2.22 Unemployment in Zimbabwe

Unemployment is the most persistent challenges faced by youths in Zimbabwe resulting from the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe with devastating socio-economic and political collapse that characterized the past decade. The overall unemployment rate in Zimbabwe is over 95%, with youth unemployment being pegged at over 70% (ILO, 2006). Unemployment has brought all sorts of vices including participation in politically motivated violence, spread of HIV and AIDS and drug abuse among the youth. With an end to the Global Political Agreement, and the coming in of a new government there is a general consensus on the need to reduce unemployment and ensure a functional and accountable government. A study was necessary to critically analyze the causes of high youth unemployment and its effects in Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2013). Youth unemployment is a global problem faced in every country. Worldwide, youths are 43.7% of the total unemployed people (ILO, 2010).

In sub-Saharan Africa, about 60% of the unemployed are youths (ILO, 2010). The situation is no different for Zimbabwe with the Zimbabwe Poverty Assessment study (1995) revealing that the youths have the highest unemployment rate among all the age groups in the labor force in Zimbabwe. More recent figures reported indicate that out of the country's 12 million people, only 480,000 were formally employed in 2008, down from 3.6 million in 2003 (The United Nations Office of the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2008). Formal sector unemployment stood at 94 percent of which

67.7 percent constituted the youth (www.mydec.gov.zw). The rate of youth unemployment with regard to both formal and informal sectors of the Zimbabwe economy stood at 19 percent for females, 11 percent for males (Chakanya, 2008). It was during the decade of long political and economic crisis that plagued Zimbabwe since 2000 that youth unemployment peaked further compounded by the sanctions. The unstable economic environment during this period led to the proliferation of the informal sector and parallel (black) market which absorbed most young people as agents and dealers. With the signing of the Global Political Agreement, the economy stabilized and these activities came to a sudden halt, worsening the situation of the youth. Against this backdrop, the Government of National Unity took reducing unemployment to be one of the key areas of action. Article 3.1a of the GPA, “states that the parties shall be committed to working together on a full and comprehensive economic program to resuscitate the economy which will urgently address the issues of unemployment” (GPA 2008).

2.23 Cost of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe

Economic sanctions have double-edged consequence on both the sender and the target country, despite the fact that the sender usually suffers much less than the target. (Keohane and Nye, 2001) argues that a less dependent actor in a relationship has a significant political resource because changes in the relationship will be less costly to that actor than to its partners. But how much is the cost in terms of the GNP of economic

sanctions that disrupt economic relations between the sender and the target? This determines the leverage or potential power or a source of power for the sender to influence the target's behavior according to the sender's foreign policy objectives as in the case of Zimbabwe. In terms of sensitivity interdependence, for both the sender and target, trade sanctions will bring an immediate loss of economic static allocative efficiency and reliability, such as loss of undelivered regular exports/imports, loss of outstanding orders for future exports, suspended sale of services in engineering or construction projects, and loss of transportation and communication services (Lindsay, 1986:168-169). In terms of vulnerability interdependence, trade sanctions will reduce the base for future economic growth by affecting dynamic efficiency and create adjustment costs to establish new trade patterns, such as producers' loss of competitive advantage, unemployment, consumers' loss of cheaper goods, and rent-seeking.

Generally speaking, if the sender possesses a monopoly or monopsony power over some particular goods or services which are important to the target, disrupting trade between the sender and the target will cause more severe economic pain for the target. That is, it will be difficult for the target to find alternative markets and substitutes and thus suffers if these embargo or boycott goods are of significant value to its economy, a situation that has crippled the Zimbabwe over during these sanctions period (Galtung, 1967). The sender will face some specific costs of initiating economic sanctions. First, the sender will face implementation and administrative costs, including prevention of smuggling,

and bureaucratic and internal coordination costs. Second, the sender may face retaliation by the target or third parties. By contrast, economic sanctions might entail smaller costs for the target if it can obtain help, alternative markets, or substitutes for critical goods and services from other countries. In a situation of complex trade relations among countries, the real impact of a sanction on the target cannot be measured by the extent of pre-sanction trade between the sender and the target because of the possibility of alternative sources of demand or supply (Kirchner, 1997). The target could find other markets when confronted with the sender's boycott or will seek substitutes of goods embargoed by the sender. Notwithstanding, the extent of the pre-sanction trade still plays a role in determining the ease with which the target will find alternative markets and substitutes.

2.23 The problem of corruption and mismanagement during sanction regimes

Having discussed the different scholarly debates on sanctions looking at its justness, effectiveness at targeted persons and institutions and theories explaining its failure or success story, I would want to highlight the systematic and mostly planned mismanagement and corrupt practices that characterizes sanctions regime. These mismanagements and corrupt practices take various forms including fraud, embezzlement, partisanship, black market transactions, smuggling of basic commodities and the mismanagement to the state resources by a powerful but few people in authority (Chirisa and Jonga, 2009). The majority of Zimbabweans have

certainly been victimized by these practices. In addition, the sanctions on Zimbabwe have given an opportunity to the powerful but few members of government to extend and intensify grip on the citizens. Resources have become scarce, creating perfect conditions for manipulation of food as a political weapon. The scarcity of resources gives rise to increased competition as economic vultures prey on the weak. A parallel market arises which enables the few to exploit the majority because they control the available resources (Magasia, 2009). The gap between the rich and the poor is extended leading to worse economic conditions and control of the minds. Sometimes the government plays victim arguing to its citizens that it is the victim of powerful Western states that hate the country. The government presents itself as the heroic savior of the people against imperialists, with the duty to guard jealously the country's sovereignty. Those who are exposed to other sources of information and therefore able to exercise informed judgment might dismiss the effect of such expression as nonsense. But they also underestimate the effect of such messages on the general population, which is repeatedly bombarded with the same messages they end up believing it is true.

The problem here is that sanctions give credence to the expression that the problem is external that the fight is about sovereignty and an attempt by the powerful Western Countries to impose their will on small weak nations. In this process the government can impose mechanisms to increase its grip and avoid the repercussions of further economic decline. Instead of helping to reduce repressive laws, they are intensified and extended purportedly to maintain "public order and security".

As we have seen, targeted individuals scarcely feel the impact of the sanctions as intended. In this increasingly globalizing economy, vast opportunities have been opened in various parts of the world. It is therefore simple for individuals to evade sanctions. In the case of Zimbabwe, besides African countries, China, Malaysia and other Far East countries have provided alternatives to the West. After all, these days the suits, designer clothes and other luxuries are all manufactured in China anyway (Magasia, 2009). Even in the West, the use of corporate vehicles such as companies and trusts enables the targeted individuals to hide their assets from the authorities. Experience has also shown that for certain occasions the travel bans are easily circumvented. Therefore, while building a negative profile for the country, the sanctions have limited effect on the specific individuals.

The youth generation weakened by emigration fuelled by economic collapse due to the sanction and worsened by corruption and mismanagement. Zimbabwe has experienced mass emigration in the last five years. Some people have left for political reasons but arguably the majority is economic migrants, even though in order to obtain the right to stay in the chosen countries many often use the route of political asylum. Most migrants are the economically active who would have been active participants in growth and development of Zimbabwe. Unsurprisingly, it is believed that a large population of youths and adults are outside Zimbabwe but have limited influence on the economic process since they do not have the capital to establish their own small businesses or have the opportunity to get employment. Many of the Zimbabweans in the Diaspora are also

busy attending to their economic needs and coping with survival in foreign lands to have active involvement in civil society activities. In addition, the brain-drain that comes with migration increases the strain on the economy and delivery of social services. To the extent that sanctions have contributed to the economic meltdown and therefore increasing corruption and mismanagement of the resources managed by a few, they have also impacted negatively on economic development and well being of Zimbabweans (Magasia, 2009).

2.24 Conclusion

The available literature on sanctions and those imposed on the Zimbabwean government by Western Countries in pursuit of achieving human security and good governance comes with mixed reactions from people from all spectrum of the society. There are a lot of debates on the effects of the sanctions and how it has shifted from its targeted individuals and entities to the rest of the innocent population. There are concrete arguments from different sources that the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe have caused more harm than good contrary to what they were meant to accomplish. In spite of these debates and different theories about sanctions being targeted or not, the literatures reviewed for this research asserts that these sanctions further endangers a functional government services delivery as in the case of Zimbabwe resulting to low access to foreign capital and financial aids aimed at strengthening sectors such as health, agriculture, transportation, education, infrastructural development among many. As a result of the targeted sanctions, many key multilateral institutions and aid organizations

like the World Bank and IMF could not lend full direct financial donor assistance to the Zimbabwean government to fund its programs. This is because some of the heads of government institutions could not travel to seek donor funding for Zimbabwe as a result of the travel ban and visa restrictions. However, sanctions were not the only reasons why Zimbabwe experienced these declines, drought, famine, mismanagement, corruption and bad government policies also contributed to these declines. Many donors supports to Zimbabwe came in through NGOs and other community organizations. The almost collapse of a functional economy in any given country destroys the well being and development of its people with severe consequences on the innocent and vulnerable population. How effective the sanctions regime is in Zimbabwe, the near collapsed of once functional economy have brought the country to its knees evidenced by recorded decline in the economic performance thereby creating untold suffering for the majority of the population in general.

Presently some of the sanctions have been removed or relaxed as Zimbabwe returns to democratic process. However some sanctions are still in place but there are many institutions and individuals whose names have been removed from the sanctions list either because of death, or seen as not posing treat to peace and democracy in Zimbabwe. As Zimbabwe shows signs of progress and stability, the sanctions list is updated to remove names of those who have made significant progress towards peace or add new names that are seen as treat to peace and democracy in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examined the research design and methods used in this study to gather information to address the research objectives and questions as outlined in chapter one. It outlined the philosophy that underlines the research designs and instruments used during the study. The chapter also provides an outline of the data collected as well as the means used for the data analysis. It provides an overview of the research design, population, sampling procedures, data collection tools and data analysis. This chapter concludes with a section on the ethical issues that will be addressed by the research. The researcher will employ qualitative methods of research.

3.1 Qualitative Method

This approach puts emphasis on meanings, experiences and descriptions. Thus qualitative methods often obtain data through verbal channel Hodder and Stoughton, (1990:36). This means that raw data refers to what people have exactly said in interview or recorded conversation or a description of what will be observed. In this study qualitative method was used to ascertain and explore the effectiveness of the sanctions as well as investigating if the objectives of the sanctions have been met. The fact that the innocent and vulnerable people are the ones that suffer most in a sanction regime (Galtung 1967), the researcher wanted to find out what people were saying with regards

to their experiences and impacts of sanctions from its intended targeted persons to the rest of the Zimbabwean population.

3.2 Research Design

Research design refers to the process of investigation that involves how data is to be collected, presented, analyzed and interpreted so as to provide the answers to the research problem. It also involves development of a plan for enquiry so as to reduce bias and distortion. This also helps the researcher to reduce errors. Thus it helps the enquirer to obtain empirical evidence. It is also important to note that the researcher is guided by purpose and type of the study. This is aimed at tabulating the population of the study from which the sample is derived and the possible research instruments to be employed in data collection.

3.3 Population

This refers to all the existing members of the group under study. In this research, the population constitutes the MPs, current and former government officials, Chiefs, DAs, Councilors, members of opposition parties, and the general public academicians, bankers, business organizations and universities. The researcher had decided on the above the targeted respondents because they constitute an influential component of the Zimbabwean community. At the policy level Ministers, MPs, and former and current government officials play a key role in the agenda setting of Zimbabwe, while at local

and administrative level the Chiefs, DAs, and Councilors are at the implementation end of government policies. These respondents were Zimbabweans drawn from five provinces in Zimbabwe (Manicaland, Mashonaland, Matabeleland North, Harare Metropolitan and Bulawayo Metropolitan).

3.4 Sample

This refers to the people who the researcher worked with or studied from. The researcher made use of purposive sampling to identify what most people in this population understood about targeted sanctions and how effective it has been in Zimbabwe. Purposive sampling is viewed as helpful in that it seeks to ascertain why particular groups of people think and feel in particular ways and also ascertain the process by which such attitudes are constructed and the role they play in the dynamic processes within the group or community. The sample the researcher had considered consisted of 5 commercial farmers and 5 Ministers targeted on the sanctions list, 5 MPs, 5 Chiefs, 5 DAs, 5 members of opposition parties, 5 bankers, 5 students 5 business organizations and 5 Academicians. The total number of the sample planned was to be 50 respondents. However due to time, funding, and other factors beyond the researcher's control, there were 44 respondents whose responses make up this research findings.

3.4.1 Research Instruments.

John and James (1998) states that research instruments are means and procedures used in the acquisition of data with which to test the research questions. On the same note, David S (2000) indicated that research instruments are specific research techniques such as observation, interviewing, audio recording and questionnaires. In the light of this definition, the researcher has employed three instruments to collect data. These tools are the questionnaire, the interview schedule and observation.

3.4.2 Questionnaire.

Breakwell, Hammond and Schaw (1995) indicated that it is a common tool to gather data in research. This instrument has been chosen because it can be applied to many people for a given budget. Thus the use of questionnaire in research has low cost in comparison with other data collection techniques. Also the questionnaire helps provide enough quality to both answer the research questions and to make real suggestions. In this research the questionnaire was designed covering such areas as Personal details of participants, assessing the understanding of target or smart sanction, effects of sanctions on them, and evaluation of the sanction regime in Zimbabwe.

3.4.3 Interview Guide

This refers to a formal or informal questioning of a person by the researcher Seidman (2006) pointed out that interviewing makes people relate their stories in regard to the

topic under study. From a qualitative research view every word that people use in telling their stories is perceived as a microcosm of their consciousness. This is aimed at gaining access through individual consciousness to the most complex social, economical, spiritual, emotional and psychological issues. This is determined to happen because these issues are abstractions which are based on concrete experiences of life. To achieve the above mentioned aim, the researcher shall conceptualize the study, establish access and make contact with participants. The inquirer shall also try to record the interview process and engage a secretary to transcribe the recorded data. The investigator shall also work with the data to present and interpret it.

3.4.4 Observation

This refers to the giving of an outline of topics to be covered and expected questions to be observed. This is contacted by the researcher to certain target group. This has been done informally. Coolican (1990) stresses that the observer can be left to decide how to work in and phrase the questions on the various topics of the study. Therefore, in this study the investigator had designed guiding questions that cover such topics as targeted, smart or economic sanction on Zimbabwe and how effective has the sanction been, who were the sanctions targeted at, what were the rationale of the sanctions, who has suffered most, and how have the sanctions evolved over time. The researcher had set out to observe the pattern of responses given that there are arguments about the sanctions being targeted at some senior members of Zanu PF at the same time observing the views from

the opposition MDC –T respondents. The researchers had also purpose to compare outcomes from previous sanctions situations as in the case of Liberia, Iraq and many others from the sanctions decade.

3.4.5 Data Collection Procedure

The researcher sought permission from those mentioned in the sample of the population to perform the study. The researcher visited his target participants to on agreed dates, equipped with questionnaires and interview schedules for each sample respectively. Also the researcher will utilize observation as a tool to collect data. The researcher stayed in Harare, because the majority of the targeted respondents either stay or work in Harare. The researcher intended to stay in Harare for the two weeks in order to collect the intended data.

3.6 Data Analysis

The data from the respondents were used to analyze thematically without discarding unique views that will be given by the participants. The researcher decided to do so in order to comprehensively analyze the topic and respond to the research questions. The questionnaires were analyzed using the statistical software package named software package for social sciences (SPSS). The researcher chose the SPSS because the questionnaires were given to the respondents and manual analysis would not have been possible in the research time. The researcher also believes that this would help him to

determine frequencies, percentages and relationship among variables from respondents that will be used to present findings on tables, charts, and graphs.

3.6.1 Primary Data

The researcher has made use the questionnaire, Interview and observation to obtain primary data from the sampled groups. In the questionnaire, closed and open-ended questions were designed. The interview used to facilitate discussion with the participants on outlined areas of the study.

3.6.2 Secondary data

The researcher shall consult secondary sources that include written material such as library books, internet resources, articles, the newspapers, and journals. All these are going to be used in trying to find out how effective the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe have been.

3.6.3 Ethical considerations

The following research principles were adhered to in the course of this research to safeguard the rights of individuals and institutions;

- Consent; according to Drew (1985:45) consent involves respondent's choice to participate in a study. In the course of this study, consent will be obtained from

individual respondents for the basis of their participation. This is essential to ensure that the respondents participate voluntarily in the study.

- Confidentiality and Anonymity; The researcher will explain to the respondent that their response will be treated with confidentiality and used strictly for this research which is academic and that their names will not be revealed or used in writing of the research report.
- `Do no harm; the researcher will take the necessary measures to ensure that no physical, emotional or psychological harm comes to the respondents.
- Respect for Individual Autonomy; the researcher will inform the respondents that they are free to decide to continue or withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason even when consent has already been giving

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from a category of Zimbabweans from politicians, business executives, academicians, religious leaders, commercial farmers as well as students about the effectiveness of the western targeted sanctions imposed on President Mugabe and senior members of his Zanu-PF government and a number of business entities and organizations in Zimbabwe. The chapter analyzes how 44 respondents from each of the above category of Zimbabweans designed by the researcher responded to the questionnaires given them to fill in. Responses are presented in both tabular and graphic charts to show how responses were arranged and to provide additional information given by a respondent as well as frequencies, percentages. Additionally, the researcher used contents analysis to analyze the data.

4.1 Distribution by Designation

The researcher targeted 50 respondents as sample from ten categories of Zimbabweans. There were 44 possible respondents which constitute the findings of this research. The below column chart shows 44 respondents, this is 88% of the targeted 50 the researcher had hoped to sampled.




Figure 1 Distribution by Designation

4.2 Construction of concept

What is important to be understood about targeted sanctions is that, target leadership in a sanction regime will attempt to portray the sanctions as an external threat to national unity to rally the public behind its leadership (Galtung 1967). In other words, the external economic intervention will be exploited by the elites to justify the use of repressive tools against anti-regime groups under the guise of maintaining domestic cohesion. It is unlikely also, however, that the opposition will throw their support behind

the target leadership to unify against the external pressure especially when the regime remains defiant over time against the foreign demands and inconsiderate of the plight of the public. Contrary to the foregone, the innocent and vulnerable public at least the disadvantaged groups outside the government's support base appears to become more critical of the targeted leadership by attempting more protests and civil unrest (Allen 2008) and mounting a campaign to get rid of the government (Marinov 2005; Wood 2008). In support of the game theory on which this research was designed, policy makers as well as respondents are more likely trading accusation at each other. In other words, the vast majority of the populations are seen to be caught up in the politics of their own while the innocent majority is facing the effects of sanctions at the house hold level as argued by (Lace and Niou, 2004:27). This situation only further threatens and cause political instability of the target regime. Let it be known that we don't suggest that such anti-regime movements will be able to pose a major threat to the regime. While they are encouraged by the international community to mobilize aggrieved by the cost of the coercion as suggested above, the regime will likely succeed in oppressing any major threat to the status quo.

4.2.1 Participants responses to questionnaires

The total of 44 participants views were gathered to ascertain knowledge and understanding of targeted sanctions as was imposed on Zimbabwe. This question was designed to set the basis for further responses relating to the research questions. Responding to this question, 38 participants understood targeted sanctions as imposed

on Zimbabwe as the sanctions senders specific naming of President Mugabe and some senior members of his government including specific businesses and government entities meant the sanctions were direct and targeted. There were 2 responses to have no understanding of the targeted sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. At the same time, 4 participants responded of not being sure if they do understand the targeted sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe because as private citizens, they are direct victims of the impacts of the sanctions.

Table 1 Ranking of Participant's Understanding of Targeted Sanctions

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Understand targeted sanctions	38	86.3
Do not understand targeted sanctions	2	4.5
Not sure of understand targeted sanctions	4	9.2
Total	44	100

Responding to the rationale of the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe, 9 respondents rationalized that the sanctions were necessary because of bad governance practices including President Mugabe's government land policies, endemic corruption, the involvement of Zimbabwe in the DRC war, absence of the rule of law, and other ill-conceived economic policies. It is further argued that President Mugabe's political intolerance, electoral swindle and disgusting human rights abuses have contributed to

the country economic depression. At the same time, 21 responded by rationalizing the imposition of sanctions as the senders interest of seeking a regime changed agenda failure by resulting to impose smart sanctions on President Mugabe and members of his Zanu PF together with other entities. Responding to neither support nor deny both the sanctions senders and the Zimbabwean government, 14 respondents see the innocent people of Zimbabwe as victims. Therefore they could not rationalize the imposition sanctions as a way forward because it only made matters worse for all Zimbabweans regardless of the class and status.

Table 2 Participants Perceptions on Imposed Sanctions

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Rationale of sanctions: bad governance (land seizure, endemic corruption, lack of rule of law, involvement in the DRC crisis, political intolerance and ill-conceived economic policies)	9	20.5
Rationale of sanctions: (seeking regime change, land resettlement policy, easy access and control Zimbabwe resources)	21	47.7
Rationale of sanctions: (neither support sanctions nor rationalize it).	14	31.8
Total	44	100

Question three sought to find out the opinions of the 44 respondents on what they thought were the reasons for the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. Of the 44 respondents, 21 participants cited links between the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia and present day Zimbabwe as the aftermath of bad governance practices during the Smith government in the 1960s as well as that of President Mugabe. Mugabe began land redistribution in 1980 but in 2000 increased the speed of the resource distribution to quell discontent among the population. While Mugabe's hold on power was not without strife, it is understood he maintained his singular control of the regime until the implementation of a power sharing agreement with Tsvangirai in 2009 (*New York Times*, February 11, 2009). Mugabe has ruled for almost 30 years not only through coercion and at times allegations of repression but also the redistribution of resources.

It is worthy to note that there is a debate among many Zimbabweans that the Rhodesian economy was quite liberal prior to the sanctions. Thus, governments have the ability to intervene even if the economy is not centrally planned. Others were specific about the political situation in Zimbabwe.

ZANU–PF has always justified its right to rule in terms of a nationalist ideology and policies. It can be recalled in recent years, the speeches of President Robert Mugabe have increasingly laid blame for Zimbabwe's woes on a perceived coalition of external and internal enemies including the British government, white settlers, critics notably the

Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). While President Mugabe claims authority based on his credentials as an anti-imperialist freedom fighter, the challenger Morgan Tsvangirai, president of the MDC, had launched an alternative discourse. He argues that the leadership of the country should go to the political party with the most rational economic policies and the one that can win a free and fair election. Over the past five years, differences between government and opposition have widened into violence and deadlock. The government was caught off guard in February 2000 when voters rejected a draft constitution that would have strengthened the powers of the presidency (Sithole 2001).

This outburst of popular resistance inspired the labor movement and civil society to form a new political party. In the parliamentary elections of 2000, the MDC was declared winner of almost half the contested seats in the legislature. In reaction to the erosion of its control over society, the government promulgated the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). In so doing, any meeting of more than five people required the approval of the police, and debate on political issues was effectively prohibited. Ironically, POSA restored many of the provisions of the colonial Law and Order Maintenance Act. Fearing that young people were being attracted away by the opposition, the government drafted students bound for tertiary education into a National Youth Service. These 'green bombers' were deployed to enforce public discipline, for example by punishing citizens for lacking ZANU–PF party cards. Along with land invasions, these developments further established violence as a feature of Zimbabwean politics. The

presidential elections of 2002, which returned President Mugabe to office for a further six-year term, deepened the confrontation (Makumbe 2002). ZANU–PF cadres disrupted opposition meetings and prevented campaigning in rural ‘no-go’ zones. In the midst of these allegations of irregular voter rolls and a shortage of polling places in urban areas, election observers declared the elections untrue and unfair (SADC–PF 2002). As the MDC mounted a court challenge to the election results and mobilized rolling work boycotts, some of ZANU–PF supporter’s alleged aggression only intensified. The government charged Tsvangirai with treason over an alleged plot to kill President Mugabe.

In October 2003, against the backdrop of a bad harvest, international human rights monitors charged that the nation’s rulers were using food as a weapon by denying relief supplies to their critics (Human Rights Watch 2003). Several attempts were made to mediate the dispute between ZANU–PF and MDC, notably by former presidents of South Africa and Nigeria. But neither of the key players has budged from his entrenched position. President Mugabe insists on being recognized as the duly elected leader of the country; and Tsvangirai continued to call for unconditional negotiations and new elections (USIP 2003). As the state cracked down on society, citizens lost their civil liberties and political rights. Between 1998 and 2003, the country declined on the Freedom House Status of Freedom Index to a classification of squarely ‘not free’.

Since the sanction in 2000, the West sanctions have both expended and contracted in size and scope, and have ultimately showcased its senders especially the EU foreign policy at its most ineffective and increasingly unjustifiable. 23 participants hold similar views on the regime change and hatred for President Mugabe and his policies as reasons for the sanctions. The regime change agenda and dislike of President Mugabe is the main reason for which these sanctions were imposed according to some respondents. They continue that sanctions against Zimbabwe have failed completely and the senders should be ashamed. That may seem like a bold statement, but the main thing militating against it is the awkward fact that to demonstrate a policy's failure, one must first be able to articulate what that policy was intended to do. When it comes to EU (as well as US, Canadian and Australian) sanctions against Zimbabwe, that's not an easy task. As one participant explained, let's start by turning the clock back to 14 June 2004 when Tony Blair informed the UK House of Commons that: "these measures and sanction are of limited effect on the Mugabe regime.

We must be realistic about that. It is still important that we give every chance to, and make every effort to try to help, those in South Africa the southern part of Africa to put pressure for change on the Mugabe regime, because there is no salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until that regime is changed." If we use Blair's stated goal of regime change as the metric against which to judge the success or failure of 14 years of sanctions, there can be only one judgment: abject failure. British prime ministers have come and gone, and Mugabe has seen them one by one (five and counting). It is hard to

imagine Mugabe leaving office, except at a time of his own choosing or when age and infirmity finally take their toll. Furthermore, the inconsistently-enforced partial asset freeze and travel ban on President Mugabe and his wife Zanu PF and other senior members of Z is hardly any easier to defend on the grounds that it does anything to foster democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights – which is the explanation for the EU measures. Blair’s defense of sanctions suggested that they helped to support SADC-mediated change. But Mugabe has used the presence of Western sanctions to deft abstract effect at every opportunity, and SADC-mandated facilitators have repeatedly called for the removal of sanctions, seeing them as an obstacle to progress. The respondent continued, by saying for sanctions to be ‘good’ they must form part of coherent focused policies designed to achieve specific, feasible changes. But the measures against Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s worst human rights abusers and wealth-expropriators were never part of carefully-calibrated, coordinated, multilateral efforts to either change the behavior of the Mugabe government or precipitate regime change.

For sanctions to change the behavior of any state, they must also be uniformly and consistently enforced. But freezing assets in UK or US financial institutions and prohibiting London shopping trips was never going to exert influence over the elite which could effortlessly switch their shopping sprees and bank accounts to South Africa or Asia. And with a long queue of Chinese and other investors seeking access to Zimbabwe’s diamond wealth, the Mugabe government’s retention of political power and building up of personal fortunes could continue apace.

Table 3 Participants Opinions on Sanctions

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
bad governance (land seizure, endemic corruption, lack of rule of law, involvement in the DRC crisis, political intolerance and ill-conceived economic policies)	21	47.7
(seeking regime change, land resettlement policy, hatter of Mugabe, easy access and control Zimbabwe resources)	23	52.3
Total	44	100

In his 1997 report on the work of the United Nations, Secretary General Kofi Annan stressed the importance of economic sanctions: the Security Council's tool to bring pressure without recourse to force. At the same time Annan worried about the harm that sanctions inflict on vulnerable civilian groups, and their collateral damage to third states. He acknowledged that it is increasingly accepted that the design and implementation of sanctions mandated by the Security Council need to be improved, and their humanitarian costs to civilian populations reduced as far as possible (Annan 2000).

Widely shared concerns about humanitarian and third country effects can undermine the political unity required for the effective implementation of multilateral sanctions. With the erosion of support for the embargo against Iraq, it is becoming clear that the effectiveness of a sanctions regime partly depends on how it addresses humanitarian issues. Although virtually all sanctions regimes launched during the 1990s allow trade in

humanitarian goods, the "blunt weapon" of comprehensive embargo inevitably hurts those at the bottom of the economic heap. Given the poor track record of sanctions in achieving their foreign policy goals, the conventional wisdom that civilian pain leads to political gain is being questioned. Many ask whether the costs of sanctions are worth the results. In response to these concerns, practitioners and scholars alike have been seeking for ways to fine-tune sanctions to direct their force against the in power. "Targeted sanctions" or "smart sanctions", like "smart bombs", are meant to focus their impact on leaders, political elites and segments of society believed responsible for objectionable behavior, while reducing collateral damage to the general population and third countries. Growing emphasis on the individual accountability of those in power for the unlawful acts of states (highlighted by the Pinochet case and the Bosnian war crimes trials), has made the concept of targeted sanctions all the more attractive.

Before taking a closer look at certain measures, it may be useful to draw a distinction between "targeted" and "selective" sanctions. "Selective" sanctions, which are less broad than comprehensive embargoes, involve restrictions on particular products or financial flows. "Targeted" sanctions focus on certain groups or individuals in the target country and aim to directly impact these groups. Obviously the two concepts overlap. Responding to the question of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe being targeted or comprehensive, 17 responded that the sanctions were targeted. 14 responded that judging from the senders stand against the target, the sanctions in their opinions are

comprehensive because of its nature. 13 also responded that the sanctions were both targeted and comprehensive.

Table 4 Participants Opinion on targeted or Comprehensive Sanctions

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Sanctions were targeted	17	38.6
Sanctions were comprehensive because of its nature	14	31.8
Sanctions were both targeted and comprehensive	13	29.6
Total	44	100

It is believed that the concept of targeted sanctions as an alternative to comprehensive economic sanctions is relatively new. According to its history, asset freezes and travel bans were imposed in the context of broader economic sanctions. A survey on sanctions cases in the twentieth century shows that only in 20 cases were targeted sanctions (such as arms embargoes, asset freezes and travel sanctions) imposed outside the framework of comprehensive embargoes (Elliott 1999). Even in these 20 cases targeted sanctions were almost always imposed in combination with selective export restrictions or aid suspensions.

This survey record indicates that targeted sanctions have been used either as a means of preparation for broader measures or as the supposed knock-out punch by its senders. The sanctions experience against Haiti illustrates what is known as the "knock-out" approach. Initial trade sanctions by the Organization of American States were followed by more comprehensive sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. It is only after these sanctions failed to bring the desired change were targeted measures aimed directly at the Haitian military imposed. UK and UN sanctions against Rhodesia on the other hand illustrate the warm-up approach. An asset freeze, arms embargo and selective export bans did not persuade Ian Smith to allow majority rule in Rhodesia. By 1968 the UN Security Council resorted to a comprehensive embargo. In neither Haiti nor Rhodesia were the targeted measures successful (Elliott 1999).

The analysis of the success rate of targeted sanctions, in the 20 cases surveyed where they were imposed outside of comprehensive embargoes, is relatively low. Only 5 of the 20 cases can be judged somewhat successful, a rate of about 25 percent. This is slightly below than the success rate of 34 percent for economic sanctions in general during the twentieth century (Elliott 1999). In two of the success cases (Libya, Egypt) the goal was relatively limited and well-defined. An analysis of the research question of assessing if in the opinions of the respondents the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe has achieved its outcome or effects, 24 participants responded with a no. At the same time, 8 respondents responded with a yes citing the fact that Zanu-PF was forced to share power with the opposition was an example of how the sanctions achieved its goal among other reasons

while 12 respondents said partially they to some extend the outcome or effects have hit hard the intended targeted persons.

Table 5 Participants Opinion on Desired Outcome of Sanctions

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Sanctions have not achieved its desired outcome or effects	24	54.6
Sanctions have partially achieved its desired outcome or effects	12	27.2
Sanctions have achieved its desired outcomes or effects	8	18.2
Total	44	100

Sanctions need to be tailored to target the right people and organizations, while sparing the general population as much as possible. There are different opinions on the issue far from the claim that sanctions in Zimbabwe are smart and targeted, on a few individuals and entities, the true of the matter and reality on ground is that the stiff grip of the declared and undeclared sanctions is being felt throughout the entire economy and the lives of the greater number of the population. Declared sanctions are sanctions which are pronounced and normally legislated by the imposing country or organization. Targeted or smart sanctions fall under this category. Undeclared sanctions are not announced but are implied from the declared sanctions. A good example is where Non-Governmental

Organizations have moved their operations out of Zimbabwe (Reserved Bank of Zimbabwe 2009). Considering the Sanctions regime in Zimbabwe, declared or undeclared, the targeted sanctions have to a large extent affected the people of Zimbabwe in reality and claimed the lives of innocent children, the disabled and physically handicapped, through limited access to quality medication and treatment, poor infrastructures, and limited access to foreign credit. In order to analyze respondents views on how the sanctions have evolved from targeted to comprehensive, 44 participants responded in three categories of which 9 debated that the sanctions remained targeted as evidenced by the list published by the senders and has never evolved as claimed by others, in the same token, 19 see the sanctions as shifting from its initial targets to the innocent and vulnerable people as seen from the declined in the economy, health, high rate of unemployment, and agriculture. 16 other respondents consider the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe as undeclared sanctions whereby the senders did not mention the rest of the sectors that have been affected as a result of the sanctions even though it is said to be targeted.

Table 6 Evolvment of Sanctions from targeted to comprehensive

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Sanctions have not evolved from targeted to comprehensive	9	20.4
Sanctions have evolved from targeted to comprehensive based on the scope of the affected people and sectors	19	43.2
The effects of the Sanctions have evolved from declared to undeclared	16	36.4
Total	44	100

In practice, the situation about economic or targeted sanctions is hardly new in international relations, but the last 25 years is especially rich in sanction episodes. The use of sanctions by the UN and other powerful countries like the US or EU increased from two cases in the 1920s to more than 20 in the 1980s. Despite their extensive use, traditional scholarly perception is that sanctions are remarkably unsuccessful in achieving their stated policy objectives. On the other hand, the number of disputes in which they were employed during the first half of the 1990s contributes to the conclusion about the growing popularity of sanctions. It also demonstrates clear differences from previous decades. While it is noted that a significant number of the sanctions employed previously were unilateral and originated by the United States, today they are predominantly multilateral and

imposed by the United Nations. This reflects a belief that a new, inexpensive and potentially potent weapon against small and medium size troublemakers has been found (Mueller 1994, p. 363). This research question brings out the debate on sanctions as a foreign policy tool and conflict intervention strategy. To this end, what remains important is that many do not believe that sanction is the best alternative to seeking an end to conflict. This is based on the evidence of the history of sanctions failure. An assessment of sanctions as a foreign policy is largely political rather than economic in nature, in that they are imposed by one nation to change the policy of another nation, therefore the standing of the sanctioning nation, or deter political policies or actions of other nations.

Governments are often willing to accept economic losses when imposing sanctions in anticipation of achieving overriding political or policy goal goals. An assessment of the success of economic sanctions should focus on their effectiveness in achieving these overriding goals, rather than measuring the degree of economic pressure brought to bear on a target government (GAO, 1992). It was found out from the research that 29 participants responded that sanctions as a foreign policy tool and conflict intervention strategy was not the right path in seeking a solution to conflict such as the Zimbabwe crisis because its aims are for political reasons. 9 participants believed that in the short-term but in the long term comprehensive sanctions can bear result, as such; a tailored crafted sanction is a workable solution. Responding to the question of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and conflict intervention strategy, 6

respondents said sanctions should only be used or applied after all dialogue and mediation efforts have failed.

Table 7 Participants Opinions about Sanctions as Foreign Policy Tool

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Sanction senders seek to score political gains against the targeted government as such, it is not a workable and suitable conflict intervention strategy	29	65.9
Sanctions are only appropriate for the short-term as a means of conflict intervention, because in the long-term the innocent population will bear the heaviest weight.	9	20.5
The effects of the Sanctions have evolved from declared to undeclared	6	13.6
Total	44	100

Question 8 of the research sort to find out from the participants what would be their recommendation to seeking a resolution to the political challenges in Zimbabwe. Reflecting on the disposition about the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe, the respondents made several recommendations aimed at finding an end to the Zimbabwe crisis in the following manner. Zimbabwe is not owned by a particular group of people on the basis of tribe, political affiliation or class. Everything affecting Zimbabwean must required collective efforts from all sectors no matter how difficult it maybe to get every province consulted. Some believe that

Zimbabweans have the potentials to resolve their political differences, only when outsiders want to see them divided in order to exploit their rich resources. Furthermore, some respondents believe that reforms in both the private and public sectors will be a cardinal strategy in addressing the challenges faced in Zimbabwe.

Table 8 Participants Recommendations in Resolving Political Challenges

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Zimbabweans must be left alone to decide who becomes their president as a way of dealing with the political challenge, they are capable of resolving their differences, and as such the sanctions must be lifted.	5	11.4
Both Zanu-PF and other opposition parties should put Zimbabwe above all other personal or political interest for the sake of the suffering masses as way to move forward. Issues of corruption, holding of free and fair elections, inclusion of opposition in the government of Zimbabwe.	9	20.5
All parties in the Zimbabwean must embrace democracy as a means of resolving the crisis.	6	13.6
Zanu Pf and President Mugabe must allow others opposing parties and voices do so without being intimidated.	4	9.1
MDC Party and other hatters of President Mugabe must stop being influenced to effect regime change in Zimbabwe	7	15.9
There must be the restoration of rule of law with all branches of government carrying out its duty with being influenced.	9	20.5
A national reconciliation conference to include all Zimbabweans and stakeholders to dialogue the way forward.	4	9.1
Total	44	100

The subject of sanctions usage has for a very long time generated debate among scholars and policy makers. Many thoughtful, liberal people still see sanctions as being a better way of dealing with situations such as the political situation in Zimbabwe from 2000-2013 as compared to threat posed by Iraq, Libya and Syria. At the end of the last century and beginning of this twentieth century, they believe that continuing sanctions would have been far better for Iraqis and the regional and global order than the current war in Iraq. However, given the impact of sanctions described in this research, it is almost certain that the use of sanctions is not the most achievable strategy. Sanctions are often seen as cheaper than war by risk-averse nations and politicians not willing to bear the costs or to see the effects of their actions.

Many argue that ethically, economic sanctions must be considered 'a systematic and complex, internationally organized form of siege warfare, and should be seen, and judged, as such. Sanctions are a form of violence, intended to harm civilians, restricting the economy of the entire community, creating shortages of food, potable water, unemployment, and fuel, manifested in malnutrition, sickness, poverty, and exhaustion shortening life. The intent of sanctions may be to prevent violence rather than exacerbate it, but their method, generally left unarticulated, of collective punishment, is to cause damage directly, hoping to influence the leadership indirectly by triggering political pressure. This may be through civilian uprisings or by generating moral guilt over the civilian suffering among those supporting the regime. With less communication with the outside world, the victims, especially the poor and disenfranchised, remain relatively

invisible. As such, sanctions should be subject to the same rules of warfare with *jus ad bellum* (just causes of war), requiring belligerent parties to have valid grounds, such as a real and certain danger, proportionality and probability of success; whereas *jus in bello* (justice during war) requires that wars be fought in accordance with certain standards of conduct, such as protecting innocent life, preserving conditions necessary for decent human existence, and securing basic human rights. Responding to the 9th question in the researcher's questionnaires, 29 out of the 44 participants recommended that the use of sanctions in statecraft has to a large extent not achieved its intended goals and objectives, as such, the use of sanctions is not a proper intervention strategy. They further argue that targeted officials and institutions will always have the capacity to maneuver given the sanction regime leaving the untargeted population face the consequences of the suffering the effects of sanctions.

On the other hand, 9 participants recommended the use of sanctions as a way of putting pressure on the government or institutions to respect and embrace change in policies and allowing the rule of law and upholding the fundamental human rights. Recommending continuing negotiations and dialogue, 6 participants responded that by all accounts the interest of the majority populations is cardinal, therefore war and sanctions do have untold suffering on the innocent and mostly vulnerable citizens. The citizens should be given the chance to decide what will be the best possibilities with the support and inclusion of all stakeholders.

Table 9 Participants Recommendation on the use of Sanctions in Statecraft

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Recommendation: The use of sanctions in statecraft has historically not proven successful therefore is should not be instituted.	29	65.9
Recommendation: Sanctions should be imposed on government and targeted persons so that those who violate international law and instigate bad governance can be reprimanded for their actions.	9	20.5
Recommendations: Mediations, negotiations, and citizen participations	6	13.6
Total	44	100

4.3 Conclusions

From the data presented and analyzed above, there a debate from various scholars, politicians academicians, policy makers and other stakeholders on the subject of sanctions as a conflict intervention strategy. What remains most important is that the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe as not only been ineffective, but also it has not achieved it intended goals and objectives, as such, the majority of the population have been heavily affected than the targeted persons. The initial tone of the sanctions which were smart or targeted at specific individuals and institutions gradually evolved to the untargeted populations thereby eroding its resulted outcome.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the entire process of data collection and presentation with key findings before it makes recommendations. The summary of the research process takes into account the literature review and the data collection process. The recommendations in this section of the research are for the policy makers at all levels be it global, political, academic or institutional. The chapter ends with a conclusion that closes the research as a whole.

5.1 Summary of research process

The research sought to explore the effectiveness of the Western Sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and how these sanctions have evolved since 2000 -2013. Investigating further if the sanctions were the best intervention strategy into the Zimbabwean crisis among other alternatives, the research tried to find out if the intends and goals of the sanctions were met as desired by its senders. To establish a foundation for the study, the researcher examined several literatures on sanctions including articles, books, reports, and newspapers aimed at setting a basis for the inquiry. Fundamental to the researcher on the understanding of sanctions were the types sanctions and most importantly the one imposed on Zimbabwe. The nature of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe is was

economic sanctions, smart or targeted at President Robert G. Mugabe and senior members of his Zanu PF party together with listed government and business entities. The unanswered question that remains in the minds of many is whether these sanctions have achieved the desired outcome. One this for sure is the sanctions have to a large extent not achieved its purpose and can be seen as hurting the innocent and vulnerable in a given sanctions regime. After more than two decades of debating the effectiveness of economic pressure sanctions brings, the state of disagreement on whether pressure works remains something of an embarrassment.

Many explanations can be offered for why the controversy endures. One issue lies with the measurement of “success.” What is seen as successful and how is it measured is often contested even by the very participants in an episode of sanction. Another issue is whether success should be attributed to sanctions as invention strategy. Economic pressure typically takes place alongside other important events and developments, such as a weak economy or a foreign military intervention. Assigning the relative merits of economic coercion in each case can cause reasonable people to disagree (Elliott 1998).

With these misunderstanding and misconceptions about sanction, the game theory of sanctions is used by the researcher to high light a sanction regime. The game theory brings out the sanctions senders as one party to a sanction episode, followed by the targeted individuals or institutions as the second party and the party that is known as the

affected innocent citizens. This theory furthers that both the sanctions senders and the targeted persons play games with the lives of the citizens. By this, with the opportunity and access to power and resources the targeted persons have, they are more likely to escape the suffering and hardships such sanctions brings there by leaving the majority of the citizens to suffer. These games make completely different assumptions about the players: They operate under complete or incomplete information, they have perfect rationality or adaptive behavior, they move simultaneously or sequentially, and they have discrete or continuous options. A number of challenges were faced during the research and these include the thorough and security measures in placed at the Zimbabwean Parliament regarding access to meet and talk with key policy makers like Ministers, MPs, and Chiefs. In addition to having access to the Zimbabwean parliament, time was a major constrain faced by the researcher when collecting questionnaires from the respondents. This reduced the total targeted sample size from 50 to 44.

5.2 Summary of key findings

The responses from the participants in this research showed that there was a general sense understanding among them about the understanding of sanctions, economic, and targeted or smart sanctions. These understandings set the tone for their participation in the study by the kind of responses that were received. The total of 44 responses was returned to the researcher for analysis from which the findings of this research is based. The importance of these findings takes root from the Rubinstein (1991:909) interpretation of sanctions as logic and social reasoning of parties in a conflict situation

(Game theory). As respondents both supporting sanctions and those against sanctions carefully articulate their thoughts and positions, the restoration law and order, repairs of broken relationships national and community level is needed to get the once productive and peaceful people of Zimbabwe back to normal. The findings in the research come from the set of politically charged set of policy makers on the one hand Ministers, MPs Chiefs, DAs and farmers and a moderate group comprising academicians, students, pastors, and businesses even though each one has his or her personal view. The Game theory remains relevant to the study because it exerts the pressure of policy demand for change in behavior and attitude by the targeted government from the sanctions senders for the betterment of service delivery which will lead to development and peace.

More so, the debate about sanctions can lead to policy change and setting an agenda for participation and change in attitudes as was seen in the acceptance of the Zanu PF and MDC Unity Government from 2008 to 2013. The understanding of sanctions was the most popular question responded to by participants. There is a considerable level of knowledge about sanctions from the respondents in this study which were a lead factor in paving the way to further respond to the preceding questions. On the basis of the rationale of the sanction imposed on Zimbabwe, it is certain that there were mixed reactions to responses given the researcher. Irrespective of the category of the sample size, there were three major groups of response categories; there are those who believed that the rationale of the sanction stands from the point the senders objective was to seek a regime change in Zimbabwe because of the policies of the President Robert Mugabe

and his Zanu PF party. These beliefs were evidenced by the way and manner in which in their minds the West was critical of the government of Zimbabwe and their alleged support to the opposition Movement for Democratic Party (MDC) failure to removed President Mugabe and is Zanu PF from power. At the same time, other respondents also argued that the economic policies of the Mugabe government were ineffective and could not resuscitate the economy. Among others, they cited the land reform and redistribution form the minority white Zimbabweans to the majority black Zimbabweans as a bad and divisive politics. They went on to mention the involvement of Zimbabwean government in the DRC crisis, silencing of the opposition, political violence as issues that rationalize the imposition.

There are other sections of Zimbabweans who believed that in their minds they could not rationalize the sanction because as a constitutional government, Mugabe and his Zanu PF party resented the interest of the Zimbabwean people. The land seizure and redistribution situation in Zimbabwe has been a long standing one with its root dating back in the 1920s to 1970s where the disputed lands today were forcibly taken away illegally from its black owners by the white minority. They considered this matter to be totally internal and therefore form no basis for sanctioning the government. They are like many others are not in support of the implementation strategy employed by the government at the same time not in support of sanctions. On the question of the sanctions being targeted or comprehensive, the research gathered that by listing names of individual and specific entities, the tone of the sanctions meant it was targeted, but in

practical terms, the effective of the sanctions went beyond being ring fenced to affecting the general interest of the Zimbabwean by contributing to high economic declines resulting in to high unemployment rate, poor infrastructures, accumulation of unpaid domestic and foreign debts, limited access to foreign trade and capital among other including closure of local manufacturing industries and farms. This situation has led many Zimbabweans as well as foreign writers and policy makers to consider the sanctions regime as ineffectiveness and not hurting the intended targeted individuals. On the question of using sanctions as a foreign policy tool and conflict intervention strategy, it was observed that given the unsuccessful history of sanctions, as were imposed in the Iraq, Iran, and Yugoslavia, the kind of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe was just an addition to the number of unsuccessful sanctions regimes in recent history.

Both individuals whose names were mentioned on the sanctions list and other respondents to the research questions believe that western and powerful countries use sanctions as a foreign policy tool in effecting their agenda other interest as it was in the case of Zimbabwe. It further manifests how these powerful countries continue to impose their will on small countries to the extent that these small countries are arm twisted to conform to their wishes. A sanction as a conflict invention strategy is less likely to achieve any desired outcome according to the participants in the research. Alternative measures such as mediation, dialogue, institutional support and capacity building other than sanctions were strategies that could be used to intervene in conflicting situations. Some consider sanctions as a form of war, only that there are no guns and physical

carriers, but it has the tone of destruction, taking of lives and causing hardship in all forms.

5.3 Recommendations

The researcher recommends that policy makers employ the seven elements of principled negotiation as a means of conflict intervention other than the use of sanctions as propounded by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their book “ Getting to yes” as a conflict intervention strategy. These strategies include the separating the people from the problems, exploring interests of conflicting parties and not Positions, inventing options for mutual gains and insisting on objective criteria. By the separating the people from the problem or issues at hand, the researcher believes the two basic components of conflict can be addressed. These components are considered as the people and the problems. It also deals with each set of issues on its own merits, do not make substantive concessions in the hope of improving relations.

Secondly, the intervention strategy of focusing on interest and not position of parties to a conflict should be pursued. This can lead the parties to find common ground and creative ways to resolve a dispute as was in the case of GNU in Zimbabwe and other countries that have experienced sanctions. Additionally, policy makers should develop options for joints gains. In so doing, few traditional negotiations result in optimal solutions because parties rarely explore a broad range of potential options. Instead of jointly inventing

many possible solutions, the parties limit their thinking by focusing on only one or two options. Creative thinking expands the range of possible options and promotes better solutions. Exploring options also promotes a better working relationship as seen coalition governments arranged after crisis situation for example, the coalition government formed after the 2008 disputed elections in Zimbabwe. Concluding on the principled negotiation strategy is the use of objective criteria and standards. This intervention should not be seen as giving in, or bowing to the will of another party. Insisting on the use of objective standards, precedents, law, or principles is a means both to persuade the other side that an agreement is fair and to protect your side from being coerced.

Standards of legitimacy also make it easier to explain an agreement to one's constituents. Furthermore, the researcher recommends that parties involved in a conflict situation assess alternatives to a negotiated agreement. Each party should understand what it will do if no agreement is reached at the negotiating table. In any negotiation, parties face a choice between accepting a proposal or opting for a walk-away alternative. A negotiator should never agree to a proposal that is worse than his or her BATNA, or Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. By assessing and improving one's BATNA, one will gain flexibility in the negotiations. Another recommendation is that the government of Zimbabwe begins to institute measures of reforms in both the private and public sectors which will address the urgent needs for the lifting of sanctions in order to create a safe and secure environment that will encourage democratic governance development.

The Zimbabwean government should begin the process of healing and reconciliation which will include all stakeholders in the crisis by rebuilding broken relationships. The government should further take steps to address the issues that necessitated the imposition sanctions including human rights, political violence, and the much publicized land reform and redistribution policy. Additionally, the government should begin to take measures aimed at tackling the issues of corruption in the face of the persistent evidence of corruption allegations.

5.4 Conclusions

In this research, the researcher shows that economic coercion creates negative conditions that deteriorate the level of democratic governance in targeted countries. The fundamental nature of my argument is that sanctions by unintentionally providing target regimes with more incentives and opportunities to restrict democratic freedoms contribute to the decrease in respect for civil liberties and political rights. The research found evidence regarding the immediate as well as the longer-term impact of economic coercion on worsening democratic freedoms. However, the prospect of peace, development and reform is high and attainable for the good of a post sanction regime. Offering a cross-national examination of the question, my findings speak to the literature on the consequences of sanctions by calling attention to the corrosive impact of sanctions on democratic governance in Zimbabwe. This project points out that economic sanctions often disproportionately hurt the economic well-being of opposition groups that, in turn, disrupts their political viability to pressure the government for more

political reform and openness. “Smart” sanctions that directly aim at the target leadership of Zimbabwe might help decrease the corrosive impact that the sanctions with no discriminatory measures inflict on democratic freedoms (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Wallensteen et al. 2003). At minimum, such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms embargoes, financial asset freezes or international travel bans on the political elites will not worsen the economic well-being of the opposition. Instead, they might directly hurt political elites and subsequently make them less uncompromising against foreign demands for greater respect for political rights and civil liberties.

Alternative policy tools especially in the form of “carrots” or inducements such as foreign aid and/or provisions of low-interest economic loans might be more effective ways to get a target to change its policies. In some cases where the target is not particularly aggressive, engagement policies may be more effective than coercion. Instead of antagonizing the relations between the sender and target countries, foreign economic assistance and loans may create incentives for the target leaders to comply with the conditions set forth by the sender. The researcher concludes that mediation, dialogue and negotiation are cardinal in seeking a solution to a conflict situation. The seven principles of negotiations have proven to be an effective conflict intervention strategy aimed at finding an end to disputes. Certainly, inducements would be less likely to create negative impacts that weaken democratic governance and the rule of law. Future research should assess the effectiveness of engagement through mediation and

negotiation that that will serve as incentives in a context that compares these case scenarios.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Questionnaire for Respondents

My name is Melvin N. Payekar, a final year Masters in Peace and Governance student at Africa University. Africa University students in the Masters of Peace and Governance studies are expected to conduct a research and submit a dissertation as part of the graduation requirements. Therefore, I am conducting a research on the issue relating to the Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and how these sanctions have evolved over time. This questionnaire is designed to gather information on the impact of the western sanctions imposed on targeted individuals and entities in Zimbabwe. May you please assist by filling in the blanks spaces below?

This information will be used for this study only and no name of respondents is required.

Ogranization _____

Designation: Minister ☐ Member of ZanuPF ☐ Member of opposition ☐ DA ☐

Student ☐ Commercial Farmer ☐ Pastor ☐ Academician ☐ Banker ☐ Chief ☐ MP ☐

Gender: Male ☐ Female ☐ Age: _____

1. What do you understand about the targeted sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe since 2000-2013?

2. What was the rationale for imposing these sanctions on Zimbabwe?

3. In your opinion why were these sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by western countries and entities?

4. In your opinion were these sanctions really targeted or comprehensive in nature? Please explain.

5. In your opinion did these sanctions achieve the result outcome or effects? Why or why not? Explain.

6. In your opinion have these sanctions evolved from targeted to comprehensive? If the sanctions have evolved please highlight the nature of this evolution and the impact (s) thereof.

7. What is your overall assessment of the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and conflict management strategy?

8. What are your recommendations with respect to resolution of the political challenges in Zimbabwe?

9. What are your recommendations with respect to the use of sanctions in statecraft?

Appendix 2 Participant Consent Form

I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Melvin N. Payekar, a student enrolled at the Institute of Peace Leadership and Governance (IPLG) at Africa University. I understand that Africa University students in the Masters of Peace and Governance studies are expected to conduct a research and submit a dissertation as part of the graduation requirements. This research is designed to gather information on the topic, Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe (2000-2014). How effective are these sanctions in Zimbabwe. I have agreed to be one of the approximately 50 people being interviewed for this research. My participation in this research is voluntary. I understand that i will not be paid for any participation. I may withdraw or discontinue participation at any time without penalty.

I have been given a copy of this consent form.

My signature

Date

My printed name

signature of investigator