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**LOCATING THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS ON
ECONOMIC POLICY ARCHITECTURE IN ZIMBABWE: 2008-
2018**

BY

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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Abstract


The study elicits the need to locate the bearing of political transitions on economic policy continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe. The study notes that policy continuities and discontinuities are resultant of inter and intra party ideological contestations and shifts of power. In light of the given structural inadequacy, the study interrogates how political transitions between 2008 and 2018 have incentivised the drawbacks and divergent courses to economic policy architecture in Zimbabwe. At its centre of analysis, the study is exclusively focused on the: Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy, Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM-ASSET) and the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP). The findings of this research condemn the continued culture of policy-making which is disengaged from perennial national ideological aspirations. It is anticipated that the major contribution of this research will solicit a culture of economic policy-making which is anchored on promoting inclusive national development and transcends binaries of narrow partisan power consolidation interests. Basing on a qualitative research approach and the use of the neo-patrimonialism as a theoretical point of departure, the research posits that contestations surrounding economic policy-making are a major restraint to the inclusive and long lasting national development in Zimbabwe. As result, this paradigm-shift grounded thesis negotiates an ideological regeneration for policy architecture to be pro-national interest. As such, the research instigates the need for the preservation of ideas which give room for perpetual economically set targets for national growth. Through advocating for sustainability driven policy continuities and discontinuities, the research exposes the politically underpinning challenges to economic plans of action in encumbering national development. For that reason, study advances the promotion of a policy- creation which is aligned to collective national aspirations beyond the confines of political expedience.

Keywords: Political transitions, economic policy, architecture, continuities and discontinuities.

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my original work except where sources have been cited and acknowledged. The work has never been submitted, nor will it ever be submitted to another university for the award of a degree.

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Dedication

This contribution to the body of knowledge is dedicated to the memory of the enduring and illustrious anti-colonial exploits of the Late Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the Former President of the Republic of Zimbabwe –an ardent pan-Africanist and a global anti-imperialism giant. Mugabe the idea and not the person is a perennial symbol of reclaiming Africa's long lost dignity from the asymmetrical political-economy dispossession of the entire 'Third-World'.

May His Soul Rest In Power!

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CSOT	Community Share Ownership Trust
CSOs	Civic Society Organisations
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTLRP	Fast-Track Land Reform Programme
GNU	Government of National Unity
IFI	International Financial Institutions
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Globally, political transitions have impacted alterations in policy-making. In view of this perspective Zimbabwe went through significant power-shifts between 2008 and 2018. It is on this pretext that the need to assess the continuity and discontinuity effects of political transition on economic policy architecture in Zimbabwe and on economic (Chilunjika &Uwizeyimana, 2014). As a way of introduction, it is critical to make reference to the past in order to understand the roots of the contemporary political transitions. The inaugural political transition being the transfer of power from the Rhodesian state to the new ZANU PF government. Roussos (1998) in his book; *Zimbabwe: An Introduction to the Economics of Transformation* submits that the post-independence period was largely sustained by a successful agriculture market. Of note is that the same agriculture sector was under settler ownership as defined through the terms of the Lancaster Treaty which pronounced the decade-long transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Mukodzongi, 2013). Roussos (1998) further states that the post-independence period had a sanguine manufacturing sector which immensely contributed to the GDP of the country. The state offered export incentives to manufacturers. Consequently, this conceived mass employment, rural-urban migration heightened and consequently giving rise to urban population growth. Mining was another highly organised sector which sustained by private capital.

The analogy by Roussos (1998) to a larger extent presents the transitional decade in Zimbabwe as well-engineered with a highly functional political-economy system. However, the highly positive appraisal of the transitional decade by Roussos (1998)

on economic success was not linked to the basic needs of the majority who were structurally alienated from owning the means of production. Mandaza (1986) presents an anti-thesis of Roussos as his work articulates the tragedies of economic marginalities of the first decade of independence. It is on this account that the democracy-socialist debate emerges with a view to liberate the political-economy (Mandaza & Sachikonye, 1991). Labour movements emerged and demanded equal capital ownership. The Government was compelled to retreat to pro-poor policies to maintain its grip on power. There was mounting tension between the state and the labour movement (Raftopolous, 1997; Kanyenze, 2011)

The early independence economic liberation discourse and the labour movement insurrections substantiate that Roussos' study has partial mention of how the ownership of the economy was a preserve of a contested white oligopoly capital. This serves as a clear highlight that early post-independence economic relations perpetuated pronounced class imbalances which contradicted the full achievement of the liberation values. Roussos (1998)'s writing can be criminalised for subtle sanitising the neo-colonial sustained economic system whose transitional facet was engendered on strong marginalities of race. It is from this historical reality that this study seeks to establish comprehensive understanding of political transitions in Zimbabwe to account for how political transitions have given birth to economic policy continuities and discontinuities.

Basing on this reflection, the study seeks to examine the features of Zimbabwe's political transitions experienced between 2008 and 2018 with a view to understand how these transitions conceived economic policies. In the context of this research, the cited periods of 'transition' are Zimbabwe's elections life-cycles. Moyo (1992), uses the same approach in his ground-breaking research, *Voting for Democracy: A Study of*

Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe which focused on the dynamics, conditions and the value of the first decade elections. Zimbabwe was still coming from the armed liberation struggle, consequently, the emotions of a high national consciousness were more defining to the political-culture of the time. Democracy was one of the fundamental tenets the liberation struggle; of which elections are an ingredient to the espoused culture of democracy.

In the same manner, this research applies Moyo (1992)'s election analysis concept to define political transitions in the context of the 2008; 2013 and 2018 elections as well as the November military aided transition. Within this period, the ruling Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union Patriotic Front (*herein referred to as ZANU PF*) produced the following policies;

- The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy (2008);
- The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (2013) and;
- The Transitional Stabilization Programme 2018.

1.2 Background of the Study

The nation-state now called Zimbabwe is a product of anti-colonial war(s) whose interest was to decapitate imperial rule; chronologically, the African championed resistances which can be selectively traced from the *1893 Anglo-Ndebele War; the 1897-1897 Chimurenga and the 1965-1979 Chimurenga*. In 1980, Zimbabwe was born (Mahomva, 2014). The above mentioned protracted resistance to imperialism paved the path to decolonisation.

Robert Gabriel Mugabe is the Father of the First Republic which was born in April 1980. Mugabe is a revered nationalist. His rise to power was symbolic of the success

of the anti-colonial movement whose fight against imperialism facilitated the entire liberation of Africa. Robert Mugabe is a prominent stalwarts of pan-Africanism in the line of African liberation doyens like Nkrumah of Ghana, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenyatta of Kenya, Steve Biko of South-Africa and many other African heroes of Africa (Adedeji & Ake, 1981). His role in the liberation of Zimbabwe represented a significant era of political and economic transformation which was embodied in the values of Zimbabwe's liberation movement.

Zimbabwe's 1980 transition raised optimism for a new phase of policy continuities, discontinuities which were to eradicate the effects of the innumerable and dateless imperial economic looting and Black dismemberment. 1980 was a new start to rebuilding a fragmented economy sustained by racial inequality. The Zimbabwean economic equality question cannot be isolated from the rest of the continent's battle with inequalities of economic ownership between the indigenes and the settler minority (Chazan, 1989, Cooper, 2002).

Sadomba (2011) posits that the post-independent state's liberal position on resolving the land question in Zimbabwe was a catalyst for an inevitable inter-racial conflict which manifested itself through the fast-track land reform (Moyo 2009). The liberal approach around compensation was detached from the motivating foundations of the armed struggle which were the corner stone of the country political culture after 1980. Sadomba (2011) argues that the land question was not treated with the due revolutionary fragility it deserved. Therefore, the centrality of the war-veterans in the land-reform can be closely linked to emotions of a mass class displeasure as the majority continued to be housed as peasant farmers, yet the settler minority had a monopoly over a multi-million dollar land economy to which they were meagre wage beneficiaries. Moyo & Yeros (2005) viewed the land reform as a timely revolution

which was pro-poor people in Zimbabwe. On the contrary, Hammar, Raftopolous & Stig (2003) criticises the land reform as the genesis for gross human-rights violations and undermine of property rights.

On the other hand, Herbst (1990) submits that the state became a nerve of economic monopoly after 1980. To this end, he argues that corruption became an inherent character of the ruling party. Herbst (1990)'s study posits that mass corruption was witnessed in the mining, industry, agriculture and tourism sector. These among other economic hubs were manipulated for the ruling party's power consolidation. Moyo (1993) supports this by characterising the country's failure in the area national fiscal management. The study by Moyo (1993) indicates that the first transitional decade had poor policy planning (craft competency) and knowledgeable public administrators (craft competence). This challenge laid the foundation for the structural economic policy planning in Zimbabwe as there was an immense correlation between Government expenditure and earnings. The major consequence was poor economic policy planning. The given challenges within the purview of economic policy architecture broadly justify the neo-patrimonial lens of analysis which the study adopts (See Chapter three).

Clearly the first decade after independence was characterised transitional administrative challenges which crippled the possibilities of creating viable economic policies which had a substantial impact in developing the livelihoods of the public. The fall-back to the International Monetary Fund and World-Bank loans which led to the introduction of the unpopular Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) confirm the fragility of the post-independence state's policy-making deficiency. Resultantly, the various sectors of public service delivery namely health, education, recreation and social welfare sector declined. In this entire policy crisis

situation, elections continued to be held and the incumbent continued to win every election through ZANU PF's manipulation of its deep-seated proximity to the nationalist biography –which is still used as a commodity of the party's relevance to this day. The liberation war discourse was and is still deployed to attract the party's nationwide support (Ranger, 2003; Muzondidya, 2007). In that regard, some sectors of the populace continue to vote for ZANU PF as it has modelled its relevance as the custodian of the liberation heritage and the values of territorial integrity it serves as a custodian to since 1980.

The millennia marked a new era in the role of our political transitions; their framing of economic policies. This is because the land-reform produced new farmers who could not adequately utilise the land for high productive use which could have increased the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Mahomva & Moyo, 2015) This meant that the nation had an acute food crisis and a generally paralysed agricultural system which made elections to be essential in voting for a party that could eradicate these challenges. In the context of that decade-close economic 'shutdown' ZANU PF remained popular. While other parties also took part in the elections since the time of the land-reform, the main opponent of the ruling was the Tsvangirai-led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The opposition's existence has been strained by its inherent factional wrangles which have caused it have several contentious formations to date (Barclay, 2010, Guzura & Chigora, 2011, Raftopolous, 2013).

The study finds essential value in examining the historical and the contemporary effects of how political transitions (election outcomes) have exerted their impact on policy-making. Policies under investigation are namely the:

- Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (2008);

- Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-ASSET, 2013); and the;
- Transitional Stabilization Programme (2018).

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Zimbabwe's policy-making processes have been manipulated to secure state interests such that most economic blueprints have been crafted to secure power consolidation interests. As a result, policy-making in Zimbabwe has been problematized for falling short in terms of being all embracing of public and political elites interests. Herbst (1990) posits that this is a challenging feature of the governance question in Africa and states that, "The political arena beyond the core of the state is almost non-existent; correspondingly, the battle for absolute control of the state is the central political drama in Africa". Using a regional perspective and having Zimbabwe as the pivot of analysis, Gaidzanwa (2005) locates Zimbabwe's policy-making inadequacies to deliberate citizen exclusion and further argues that this is not unique to Zimbabwe as it applies to the entire Sub-Sahara region. Gaidzanwa (2005) uses a gender and generational binary based perspective to explain women and youth's exclusion in policy-making processes.

Nyawo-Viriri (2012) also problematizes Zimbabwe's agrarian revolution for excluding women. Nyawo (2012) condemns how women were given peripheral exceptions in the land distribution. This gendered perspective to inclusiveness in policy-making epitomises the structural deficits underpinning the character of the country's major economic policy-making frameworks. This expresses the extent to which public administration suffers compressed effectiveness in terms of providing equitable distribution of public-welfare needs and access to sources of capital. On the other hand, Makumbe (1996) argues that Zimbabwe's policy-making systems have

alienated structures local-governance in matters of national interest. Makumbe (1996)'s argument also demonstrates how policy architecture in has been partially sabotaged by neglect of the principles of democracy in Zimbabwe and how citizens have been narrowed to being consumers of policy outputs –to which they are mere beneficiaries of what is decided for them as a result of Zimbabwe's centralised system of governance in the past decades.

While there has been much emphasis on the deliberate citizen engagement weaknesses in Zimbabwe's policy-making, Moyo (1993) argues that Zimbabwe's fiscal priority sequencing is the major reason for the public-sector maladministration crisis. In extending the same debate, Moyo (1993) submits that Zimbabwe's public policy constraints have been influenced by limited political will to develop sustainable systems of public administration and enhancement of the levels of competence in public institutions. The hallmark crisis in service delivery has also been induced by poor funding dedicated to public-policy implementation.

The noted incongruent terms of ineptitude with regards to the policy-making question in Zimbabwe posit a reflective highlight of the underpinning factors to power contestations in Zimbabwe. As a result, the state has used the centrality of its influence to create policies which promote the longevity of its interests. In the process, this has offered rifts between policy equity and public interest. While confronted by equity gaps, the economic policy-making continues to stagger in terms of continuities and discontinuities which seem to service political patronage over broad-based national interest. On the other hand, the political transitions which give incentive to economic continuities and discontinuities need rigorous engagement.

Against that milieu, the study problematizes how the economic indigenisation policy tenets and Zimbabwe's anti-West policies were not entirely motivated by common national good. As such, the continuities in this policy direction are indicative of how policy-making has been perpetually manipulated to consolidate power at the same time offering a one-sided transition to power. To give an epochal explanation to the subject at hand, the problem is situated in Zimbabwe's election life-cycles between 2008 and 2013. The run-up to the 2018 election also provides an informative point of analysis to this problem particularly how the discontinuities to paradigm shift focused policy pronouncements of economic indigenisation have since been substituted by the 'Zimbabwe is Open for Business' mantra while the erstwhile anti-West rhetoric has been replaced by the ruling's propensity for 're-engagement' with the West.

This shift in the country's policy direction presents a dilemma of uncertainty on whether the Mnangagwa-led administration is curating a new environment for inclusive and national interest driven policy-making to replace the old order characterised by partisan power consolidation policy-making habits or this is a remodelled route to re-angling the interests of the ruling ZANU-PF. Could this signal a temporary or a permanent alienation of the economic indigenisation trajectory and having it replaced with an open-market economy policy turn? If the motive is power retention, how then will this be successful when the swarms of the party's support base was drawn from economic indigenisation populism? Will the party reinvent itself outside its erstwhile monopoly of the economic indigenisation ideological footprints which resonate with the longstanding liberation struggle philosophy of the African continent and Zimbabwe in particular? After aborting the economic indigenisation policy to accommodate an 'open for all' Foreign Direct Investment policy framework

will the country's struggle against unemployment, low productivity and hunger be won?

Given the political transitional effect on policy-making, this contribution facilitates a robust interrogation of Zimbabwe's policy-making processes between 2008 and 2018. This analytical position serves to develop an overview on whether continuities and discontinuities in policy-making have been instrumental in repairing the country's the fabric of governance –if not propelling variant political expedience(s) in Zimbabwe. Considering the viability of the logics of economic policy continuities and discontinuities is critical when one assigns to think how they have been incentivised shifts of political power in Zimbabwe.

1.4 Research Objectives

- Historically interrogate the impact of political transitions on policy architecture in Zimbabwe;
- Analyse the effects of political transitions in framing the logical sustainability of economic policies;
- Assess the role of election life-cycle based economic blueprint architecture and how they affect policy continuities and discontinuities.

1.5 Research Questions

- What has been the character of political transitions in proffering democratic and inclusive grounding framework for economic policy-making in Zimbabwe?
- In what ways have political transitions in Zimbabwe (200-2018) and policy-making been political expedience driven than they are national interest centred?

- To what extent have political transitional processes contributed to viable economic development?

1.6 Hypothesis

The study is premised on the view that political transitions influence policy continuities, change and elimination. As a result, this may be healthy or chronic to economic development. The study also assumes that the economic policies instituted by the state in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018 have been highly hinged on political expedience. Therefore, there is an assumption that Zimbabwe's economic policies have been short-lived and abruptly discontinued to suit political motives at the expense of public-driven interest. The following are the policies being examined:

- Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP);
- The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-ASSET) and;
- The Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP)

1.7 Significance of the Study

The research gave a historical account of how Zimbabwe's shifts in political power have impacted economic policy-making between 2008 and 2018. This enquiry was prompted by the need to investigate the cross-cutting public assertions and academic discussions which suggest how election driven transitions between 2008 and 2018) have been either pro-people or they have been populist to advance power consolidation interests of the ruling party.

The second purpose of the study was to understand Zimbabwe's policy construction since the shift of power in November 2017 from Mugabe to Mnangagwa. In 2017,

Zimbabwe experienced the ‘revolutionary’ Operation Restore Legacy (the military-aided transition which facilitated the fall of Robert Mugabe). The fall of Mugabe was followed by the 2018 election. Mugabe’s successor became President Emmerson Mnangagwa.

The study also explored the future of economic policy-making in the context of a new administration’s existence; to give the prognosis of prospects of positive public administration. This research intended to assist the current and future ruling government (s) to curate sustainable and development oriented economic policies which transcend political expedience interests. The study also sought to encourage the Mnangagwa-led administration to discontinue policies which were only aimed sustained populism of the ruling party at the expense of national interest. At the same time, the study intended to produce ideas which will promote the preservation of policies which empower the people of Zimbabwe and are radically anti-neo-colonial. It is from this dimension that the subject of policy continuities and discontinuities should present prospects of Zimbabwe’s future prosperity.

1.8 Delimitations of the Study

The study only gives a critical analysis of economic policies produced by the ruling party in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018. These policies include the:

- The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (2008);
- The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (2013) and;
- The Transitional Stabilization Programme (2018)

The researcher choose these policies because they were produced within the life-cycle of the 2008, 2013 and 2018 election-based political transitions. The study is also confined to analysing the reasons for Zimbabwe's policy continuities and discontinuities within the given period.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

The major constraint faced by the researcher was that of limited access to key political actors who responsible in the implementation of some of the policies under the study. A majority of these are former ministers who were aligned to the G40 faction. Opposition key informants were equally not easily accessible and this affected the progress of the research in terms of creating a strong argument balance. Some respondents required transport allowances to come to our meeting points for interviews. Their availability would have made some critical information for this research to be found.

1.10 Chapter Summary

This section of the dissertation has capsuled major themes the reader should expect in the study. The chapter prepares the reader for a broader understanding of the policy-making processes in Zimbabwe. The study assumes that Zimbabwe has suffered 'politicised' economic policy-making. As a result, the chapter gives the background of the transitional dynamics experienced in Zimbabwe since 1980 and how these have affected the country's economic policy architecture. The historical analogy of transitions and their effects on policy making offers a contemporary understanding on why economic policies have been part of Zimbabwe's power shifts. In such cases, some of these policies represent the short-term state interests and power consolidation

needs. It is from this perspective that the research pays attention to the key causes of policy continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter engages scholarly work on political transitions and economic policy-making. The chapter aims to pursue a linkage between the proposition of the study and what other scholars have presented. It is in this view that the issues raised in this research can be evaluated within the on-going debates on the subject under investigation.

Neo-patrimonialism by Chabal and Daloz (1999) is used as the philosophical grounding of the study to give a comparative examination of Zimbabwe's political transitional experiences with that of other African nations. The second section of the chapter defines political transitions, it explains their modalities and how they have emerged within the global context. The third section unpacks Zimbabwe's anti-colonial struggle and links it to the first decade's debate on Zimbabwe's anticipated economic development. Finally, chapter engages various perspectives on political transitions experienced between 2008 and 2018 and then discusses how this particular period informed the country's economic architecture.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Neo-patrimonialism

The study finds its philosophical lodgement in the neo-patrimonial theory advanced by Chabal and Daloz (1999). Neopatrimonialism submits that 'disorder' is an inherent facet Africa's political-culture. Chabal and Daloz attribute the concept of 'disorder' to some dysfunctional elements of policy delivery systems in Africa. Chabal and Daloz (1999) project the instrumentalisation of patronage, hegemony and power abuse as the 'disorder' forming the post-colonial political-culture, hence political transitions are

couched on incumbency abuses of power. The two scholars acknowledge that, while in their view, African politics is not favourable to meet the yardsticks of political-economy sanity prescribed by Western political science this does not absolutely exclude Africa from being modern.

Based on this it can be argued that the ‘disorder’ referred used to explain this theory is linked to pro-Western standards of ‘good governance’. Neopatrimonialism hypothesizes Africa to be in a leadership crisis. This asserted personality of the African post-colonial state follows a thinking that the Global-North serves as a template of ‘modernity’ which the Global-South must follow to create systems of democracy and economic development.

This school of thought further postulates that after the attainment of independence African states became ‘pervert’ in their function. Consequently, state power in Africa is a commodity for patronage, hegemony, opaque fiscal management and repression of political dissent. To some extent this may be used to explain the case of Zimbabwe’s ‘politicised’ policy continuities and discontinuities. The short-lived state of economic policy as highlighted in the first chapter is reflective of how policy plans for national development have been stagnated. As a result, this has raised fears that the future of economic policies will only limited to election life-cycles (power transitions).

Chabal and Daloz (1999) also submit that corrupt transfiguration of public interest by state officials like ministers, permanent secretaries, directorates and grassroots bureaucrats constrains the effective reach of policies to the public to further national development. As a result, the exit of some public officials from office implies collapse of memory on the success and failures of a policy. In some cases, public policies do not reach the grassroots as state institutions do not create innovative ways of promoting

public awareness on the existence of government economic blueprints. This paralyses the 'public agendas' embodied in policies as the public is not made aware of the economic development agendas set by the state.

On several accounts, in the context of Zimbabwe top public officials have been alleged of misrepresenting their official public duties to satisfy partisan interest. As a result, public policies have been associated with the ruling party's power consolidation interest. At the same time, this has built a negative perception on economic policy architecture in Zimbabwe. This case coincides with the neopatrimonialist view which regards public servants as systematised forces for the implementation of patronage for the ruling to consolidate the power. While this is reality is present in every state, neopatrimonialism suggests that this vice is popular with ruling parties in Africa.

Using Nigeria's military-led state dysfunction and policy failure on account of instability, (Ikpe, 2000) revisits Weberian prototype of patrimonial state. The concept of patrimonialism is a construct of Max Weber theoretical description of personal rule system in which the state distributes offices and benefits to subordinates in return for loyalty, support and services (Weber, 1978). In its present form, patrimonialism refers to a political system in which state officers appropriate their offices for personal benefits and those of their supporters.

The neo-patrimonial alternative

The Weber model of a patrimonial state can be used to explain neo-patrimonialism as universal because its existence applies in the political worlds of the Global-North and the Global-South. Weber writes from a Western Marxist perspective which represents how the supremacy of 'principle' and 'good governance' system even falls short in the Western system. This suggests that neo-patrimonialism should not only be attributed

to Africa's political/administrative 'disorder' as narrowly presented by Chabal and Daloz (1999). The political instrumentalisation of 'disorder' must be considered as a natural aspect of all political systems, hence the need to study the factors influencing policy continuities and discontinuities in a bid to eradicate the formalisation of 'disorder' in governance.

Cooper (2002) argues that neo-patrimonial systems are 'not "African" institutions, nor are they "European" impositions; they emerged out of a peculiar Euro-African History'. Cooper (2002) states that African states are thus replacements to the colonial state. The neo-patrimonial system just like the colonial state is dependent on an external, legal recognition of their sovereignty, and the resources that they can use to consolidate power. This is confirmed by Allen (1995, 304) who posits that 'to have power was to have the means to reproduce it; to lose power, however, was to risk never having the means to regain it'. This perspective represents that Western Machiavellian narrative of realism which centres on power capture to secure the interests of the leader. This shows that the African state inherited neo-patrimonialism from the repressive and monopoly anchored characteristics of the colonial state. It is in this context that the challenge in policy-making may be inherited from the Western power consolidation supremacy politics. As a result, to attribute neo-patrimonialism to weak systems of governance in Africa without considering that the political culture facets of the modern African state were inherited from the colonial state is narrow and does not give a broader space to understand the crisis of African politics. The inadequacies linked to political transitions and their effect on economic policy-architecture in Zimbabwe must also be assessed in terms of the predominant reality of political interests.

2.2.3 Political transitions: The Conceptual Grounding

The seminal doctrine of political transitions underscores that nations engage in democratic, dramatic and abrupt processes of power shifts (Huntington, 1991; Fukuyama, 1992; Fukuyama, 2012). This view is fundamentally hinged on politics as a struggle for power between those in power and those demanding power to work in favour of democracy, development and justice. Political transitions are also products of intra and inter-party power struggles. This is why constitutionalism provides organised orders of succession to prevent abrupt transitions. However, abrupt transitions have been historically manifest in many cases of conflict driven power takeovers.

Political transitions have various underlying causes and justifications. Mass-line consent for political system overhaul justifies why certain regimes in the world have been toppled. The traditional transition school of thought posits democratisation is one transitional tool (Carothers 2002).

Violence and intra-party driven transitions have been castigated through-out the governance discourse, but the shared consensus is that all power shifts must reflect policy reform. Power transitions are then critical in facilitating policy consolidation, alterations and termination. This perspective offers a consequential overview on the role of political transitions as drivers of economic policy framing. Beyond the normative incline of the role of political transitions as a source of economic policy-making, it must be known that initiators of political transitions may want to have monopoly on economic control.

However, the Latin-American democratisation decade provides an alternative conceptualisation of political transitions as grievance driven. (Meltzer & Richard

1981) emphasis that social inequalities determine the lobby for power transitions. Through their 'Theory of Size of Government' they evaluate how administrative crisis may affect fiscal running, service distributionism. In the process, this may catalyse systemic grassroots disgruntlements which may affect the need for state overthrow to usher new paths for socio-economic transformation. Ideally, governments exist to promote social-good, as such, governments must deliver on public goods and services and the perpetuation of the contrary inspires political transformation (Persson & Tebellini 1994). It is also important to note that not all inequalities are born out of repressive systems of government. Some inequalities are socially and political structural and to eradicate them takes huge financial commitments. However, in most instances, the public does not understand these inequalities as rooted in historical problems. In some instances, these are perceived as deliberate, hence the constant tensions between the governors and the governed.

To an immeasurable extent, this substantiates that power mismanagement evokes the need for abrupt transitions. On the other hand, the need to evaluate governments' effectiveness and popularity is customarily exercised through elections. Without doubt, elections serve as another transitional mechanism.

Persson and Tabellini (1994) further argue that class struggles are considered to be another major cause for the need to shift centres of power. Class inequalities translate to uneven economic relations. As such wide class differences have proved to be the major source for political transitions, the Marxism has given a historical dimension to forces of antagonism between the 'haves and the have-nots'. Usually, the uneven distribution of wealth within any given system is a cause for conflict. (Rustow, 1970) and (Prezworski, 1996) posit that nations and their citizens fight for equality in

conditions are uneven. As a result, social-economic and political marginalities incentivise structured contestations of state power.

Political transitions facilitate the systematic redress to repressive systems of power. In other words, shifts in power are class structure determined. Through patterns of history, those who are oppressed usually organise themselves to find means of challenging their point of dispossession by those in power. In this case, ontological marginalities and constructed social binaries influence the need to restructure the positionality of power and governance by those not in power (Lipset, 1959) . Consequently, this systematic overhaul of the asymmetrical economic hierarchies and maintaining tenets of economic equality and development conceives the justification for political transitions.

Huntington's argument on the 'Third-Wave of Democratisation' (1991), is further developed and revised by Fukuyama (1992). Fukuyama states that the end of communism marked the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the East leading to a linear culture of global democratisation. Fukuyama's concept of the *End of History* asserts that the world entered into a new era of democratisation, high capital growth –which in his view represented the structure of the needed modern global order. Fukuyama (1992) further starts that the Anglo-Americanisation of the world also paved the path for liberalism and promotion of systems of voting and governance management. The actualisation of world power in Fukuyama (1992)'s view broadly relates to the standardisation of politics. This explains the intensified linear dictates on human-rights, property rights and democracy at multilateral levels of power. Linear In line with this perspective, the collapse of Fascist and Communist regimes marked the end of a particular chapter of history which gave birth to the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution. To Fukuyama (1992) this is the neo-liberal democracy is the

final form of human government. Hence, political transitions must certify principles of constitutional order to strengthen state institutions instead of patrimonial rule.

2.3 The Historical and Ideological Antecedents for Economic Policy Architecture: An African Perspective.

The present-day discourse on economic policy-making is grounded on a history of economic inequalities which modelled the structure of pre-independent African state. The post-independent state's economic equality ideological premise must be the starting point of justifying our contesting economic policy continuities and discontinuities (Dudouet, 2009). Ideology and history are critical in filtering logic(s) which are disengaged from the perennial aspirations of a people as predetermined by their past and philosophies of freedom which bind them. Policy-making is an expression of cogent self-determination and preservation of political capital (Mamdani 2012). The successive highlights of power-shifts between 2008 and 2018 help in unpacking the underlying motives of economic policy-making as either partisan or national interest motivated. As such, the study appreciates that whilst policy continuities and discontinuities may be politically inspired, there is need for policy creation to be more grounded on enduring and unifying aspirations of the masses who are the mainstay of longevity for the party given the mandate to govern. The power to govern is incentivised by a set of historically grounded principles which when dissolved in favour of expedience threaten the core of national interest and the very existentiality of the interests of those in power.

Economic policy-architecture in Zimbabwe is underpinned on a broader African post-colonial 'liberation' experience. As such, the African state has been more defined in terms of economic liberation and delinking of the means of production from colonial axis of power (Adedeji & Ake 1981). On the diametrical opposite, this position has

attracted a neo-colonial counterattack as being retrogressively populist and out of touch with global market culture realities (Mills & Herbst, 2012). This does not erase the relevance of the class, regionalism and gender binary questions which challenge the given notions of equal opportunity access in the context of Zimbabwe's local economic plans of action (Moyo & Yeros 2005, 2007; Moyo, et al 2009); Scoones, et al 2010) ; Chambati 2011; Moyo 2011a, 2011b; Mkodzongi 2013a, 2013b).

In essence the exaggerated definition of African states' economic policy-making as populist ignores the post-colonial quest for equitable resource distribution and meeting the economic livelihood interests of formerly marginalised African citizenry. This corroborates the position by Mkodzongi & Lawrence (2019:1):

More importantly, the major beneficiaries of the land reform were peasants who now have access to better-quality land and natural resources that were previously enclosed and enjoyed by a few whites under the bi-modal agrarian structure inherited from colonialism, that is, white commercial farmers and agro-industrial estates on the one hand and small-scale black commercial farmers and black peasant families on the other.

A prototype milestone economic decolonisation experiments can be attributed to Julius Nyerere's principle of radical policy between 1967 and 1985. The Tanzanian model for policy-change was characterised by a deliberate position to dismantle British colonial economic monopoly and exploitation in Tanzania (Ibhawoh & Dibua, 2003). This saw the compulsory collectivisation of private farms in Tanzania and emerging African farmers on communal farms and this process became the defining mark of the Ujamaa economic blueprint (Mitchell, 2014). The Ujamaa economic trajectory was founded on indigenous, self-containment social and economic survival practices grounded on Tanzania's traditions (Ibhawoh & Dibua, 2003). There is a substantial correlation between this concept with that of Scientific-Socialism principle advocated

by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The Tanzanian (1967-1985) and Ghanaian (1960-1966) experiences are intertwined to the socialist ideological paradigm imported from East Europe with a strong grounding to rethink Western defined economic models anchored on capitalism. This pathological embodiment of the Marxist economic collectivism is also defining in the discourse of pan-Africanism as an ideological vehicle for economic decolonisation. The same genes of a Marxist and pan-Africanist predisposition can be linked to the Zimbabwean context under Robert Mugabe from the late 90s up to the time of his ouster in 2017 (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018). The wave of the Third-Chimurenga which swept through Zimbabwe after the land reform exercise had undertones of Marxist and pan-African anti-colonial leanings. This produced a defining outstanding characteristic of his radical economic indigenisation stance christened as *Mugabeism* (Ranger, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015, Mahomva, 2015). The competing discourses of Marxism and pure pan-Africanist economic trajectory characterise the complexity of the complexion of economic decolonisation in Africa (Mahomva, 2014). At the same time, this has harboured some contradictions where shifting economic policy positions are concerned. As noted in the seemingly socialist context of the ideological grounding of early independent Zimbabwe, Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was adopted by the Government and this created early criticisms for the Mugabe administration (Kanyenze, 2011). In the same vein to attract Western political sympathy after the exit of Robert Mugabe, the current administration has been problematized in some quotas for its flirting with the West in its bid to solicit access sources of foreign capital. Blunt reversals of the economic indigenisation path have become the centre of the Second-Republic's transitional embodiment.

To this end, the last decades' economic policy-making after independence can be largely defined in terms of contested attempts to either dismantle or consolidate the asymmetrical nuances of economic resource ownership in Africa. In Zimbabwe, the resolution of the land-question under Robert Mugabe was a milestone take-off to the economic indigenisation project (Scoones, et al 2007). The consequent shift from a seemingly economic radical redistribution propensity with the coming of the Mnangagwa administration is not limited to the Zimbabwean experience, but it is an approach which is in sync the reversal of racially structured economic policy-shifts which can be linked to Tanzania after Nyerere and Ghana after Nkrumah stepped down (Zvoushe, et al 2017). Across the continent, such policy position U-turns experienced during transitional episodes are perceived as means of correcting the policy pitfalls of radical and race anchored distributionism (Mamdani, 2016). Mills and Herbst (2012) support the turn to neo-liberal economics and justify it is a way of productively exploiting 60% of the world's platinum deposits which Africa is endowed with, almost 90% of the world's diamonds and 40% of the world's gold. Mills and Herbst (2012) further submit that the unproductive farm-land in Africa can be fully exploited through solicit of international capital. Consequently, 47% of the African population living in poverty are labour capital assets of the continent

The case presented by Mills and Herbst (2012) substantiates the extent to which African economic policy-making is entangled in both anti-imperialist and neo-colonial dilemmas. This is chiefly because our fight for independence was tied to economic self-reliance and yet the sources of capital to drive the post-colonial state are largely colonial. However, from the opposite end, the battle to dismantle and preserve white monopoly capital remains at the centre of economic policy-making in Africa. This explains why regional integration in Africa is based on the need to deepen cooperation

anchored on ‘an outright fight against neo-imperialism through economic development centred diplomacy in Southern-Africa in a bid to secure the continuity of the decolonisation agenda’ In light of this regional anchored perspective, Christopher Mutsvangwa (Interview 12 September, 2019), the Former Zimbabwean Presidential Advisor argues that:

There must be strengthened effort in harmonising African countries’ economic policy frameworks as an enabling mechanism to take full advantage of the newly formed African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA). This calls upon SADC states to drive the sub-region economic integration to make member-states an optimal destination for capital, to allow mobility of labour and the unimpeded cross-border trade of goods and services.

The submission by Mutsvangwa resolves the complexities and complexions of ideological fundamentals of economic policy architecture in Africa and Zimbabwe in general. The core aim of economic policy-making is linked to liberating the access to the means of production for formally marginalised African people and nation-states. In support of this assertion Mamdani (2016:79) argues:

Our understanding of decolonization has changed over time: from political, to economic to discursive (epistemological). The political understanding of decolonization has moved from one limited to political independence, independence from external domination, to a broader transformation of institutions, especially those critical to the reproduction of racial and ethnic subjectivities legally enforced under colonialism.

However, the neo-liberal tilting of the post-colonial state is perceived as a shift from the broad-based terms of linking political power with fundamental economic redistribution tenets. The face-value rationality of the establishment of the anti-colonial African state was underpinned on uneven racial terms (Andreasson, 2010). Inevitably, the restoration of socio-economic balance as part of a humanising agenda

becomes pivotal in introspecting the ideological and historical antecedents of the impact of political transitions in driving economic policy-architecture in Zimbabwe. Mamdani (2016:79) dovetails this position by stating that the conceptual framing for economic-policy making:

... has also broadened from one of local ownership over local resources to the transformation of both internal and external institutions that sustain unequal colonial-type economic relations. The epistemological dimension of decolonization has focused on the categories with which we make, unmake and remake, and thereby apprehend, the world. It is intimately tied to our notions of what is human, what is particular and what is universal

The primary facet of colonisation was economic from the outset. This validates the need to understand the role of economic policy-making as a colonial delinking expedition in African politics. In advancing a sustainable development paradigm, African politics must be defined in terms of restorative economic transformation.

2.4 Political Transitions and Economic Policy-architecture in Zimbabwe: 2008-2018

The birth of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 influenced a wide range of debates on the democracy question in Zimbabwe. The formation of the GNU between ZANU PF and MDC-T marked a significant transitional epoch which was never anticipated in Zimbabwe considering the long history of antagonism between ZANU-PF and the MDC formations. Chigora and Guzura (2011) problematize the

Zimbabwean GNU model as a source for wrong precedence in the promotion of democracy in Zimbabwe. This proposition is perceived as a negation of democracy as political elites forego elections outcomes to rectify political stalemates through power sharing arrangements. The fears raised by Chigora and Guzura (2011) on democratization ignores the centrality of the economic policy-making dynamics involved in the transitional politics such as that of the GNU. This knowledge gap becomes more pronounced when one considers that it was during that period when the Economic Indigenisation and Empowerment Policy (EIEP) was aggressively implemented to challenge the opposition conceived Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP). The EIEP derived its power from the Economic Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2007). The legislation offered a 51% mining and industrial ownership share for the black majority.

The ruling ZANU-PF repositioned its power and authority under the GNU of 2009-2013. This policy consolidated ZANU PF's power and made way for ZANU PF to win the 2013 election.

After the 2013 election, ZANU-PF introduced the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIM-ASSET). This economic policy was grounded on a cluster based Plan. The policy purported to be initiated with a view to fully exploit the internal relationships and linkages that existed between the various facets of the economy. These clusters are were as follows:

- Food Security and Nutrition;
- Social Services and Poverty Eradication;
- Infrastructure and Utilities;

- Value Addition and Beneficiation.

ZIM-ASSET also had two sub-clusters namely, Fiscal Reform Measures and Public Administration, Governance and Performance Management.

Mlambo (2010) gives an overview of elections, liberation movements and prospects for democracy in Southern Africa, paying attention to Zimbabwe. The 'Zimbabwe crises' is analysed in a way to understand how its challenges have spilled over to other countries within the region. The studies by the duo, Mlambo (2010) and Raftopolous (2013) tally with Chigora and Guzura (2011) in articulating how ZANU PF used the GNU to bolster its power and outwitted the opposition parties.

Raftopolous (2015) engages on land, Indigenisation and development in Zimbabwe under the vantage of Robert Mugabe as a key figure in making economic transfer of power a key feature of his rule. It was on this pretext that economic policies punctuated election life-cycles during the Mugabe era. While concept of radical economic power transfer is widely analysed using the prism of Mugabeism, Alois Mlambo (2010) offers a genealogical overview of economic nationalism in pre and post independent Zimbabwe casting his analysis across Africa. Mugabeism is believed to be a philosophy which championed black economic empowerment. This was resultant of the resolute land reform and indigenisation policies which were instituted by Robert Mugabe as a way of delinking Zimbabwe from the West following the strained relations between the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. This trajectory re-organised ZANU-PF to a pro-black economic political party while the opposition advanced neo-liberal 'property rights' protection politics. On this account, this study bridges the knowledge gap by analysing how economic policies have been formed within the changing epochs of Zimbabwean politics.

The 2017 November civil military sponsored transition which marked the end of the Mugabe rule and paved way for the Mnangagwa administration was characterised by a radical foreign policy change. The ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ mantra under the leadership of Emmerson Mnangagwa signaled the post-Mugabe policy shift. Claims of moving beyond Robert Mugabe’s anti-western rhetoric have been raised to open room for efforts to re-engage with the Western community namely the United Kingdom, United States of America and their allies (ZANU PF Manifesto, 2018). The change in the foreign policy position is marked by clear contrasts from the 2013 election campaign (ZANU PF Manifesto 2013). The up surging of market based relations is quite articulate of this position. The military transition of November 2017 should be treated as a precursor to foreign policy design change.

Prior to the ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ policy position, ZIM-ASSET provided a trajectory for a domestic centred economy. This meant that the door for Foreign Direct Investment was equally shut and signaling a hostile policy position towards the West. Some notions of similarities and differences can also be drawn from the GNU economic blueprint on indigenization whilst ZIM-ASSET gained traction afterwards. It must be noted that the GNU and ZIMASSET era marked pronounced radical anti-West policy positions which were overturned by the events of November 2017.

Southall (2017) critically engages the November 2017 military-transition beyond the ZANU-PF factional wrangle. Southall (2017) posits that the ‘coup’ was also meant to facilitate a new economic takeover as state power comes with resource control. This shift in power is linked to how the military grabbed power to service neo-patrimonialism in Nigeria. On that background, there is need to question if Zimbabwe will find herself in the Nigerian neo-patrimonial position discussed by Ikpe (2000).

However, the fact that Zimbabwe had an election in 2018 gives a different perspective as the results of the elections give testimony to the fact that ZANU-PF still has support. The election substantiated that the country still has principles of democracy. Therefore, at the level of political negotiation various levels of consent were met. However, the military and electoral driven terms of transition had a strong bearing on the nation's foreign policy (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018). . The continuity of the 'Second-Republic' which was born out of the November transition and the 2018 election introduced the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) to be effected between 2018 and 2020. Ideally, TSP symbolizes a policy shift aimed at the internal transformation of state institutions with an emphatic interest in reforming systems of governance (Government of Zimbabwe 2018). While the preceding policy positions were anchored on distributionism, the new policy score of the TSP is to generate a private-sector led economy. It is on this basis that the pretext for the 'Zimbabwe is Open for Business' mantra is founded. This follows the state-driven direction to attract foreign capital investment in Zimbabwe. Equally, the adoption of the TSP entailed a foreign policy turn. The TSP spells out the Government's projected aim of ushering Zimbabwe into a middle-class economy by 2030. The key objectives of the TSP are summarized as follows:

- Stabilising the macro-economy, and the financial sector;
- Introducing necessary policy, and institutional reforms, to transform to a private sector led economy and;
- Launching quick-wins to stimulate growth.

2.5 Vision 2030

The three key areas of the TSP's reform interventions are aimed driving Zimbabwe towards the realisation of a shared national vision by 2030 aimed at re-orienting the systems of governance towards the rule of law. This position is founded on re-aligning the Second-Republic to values which were deemed as irrelevant the framing of the country's erstwhile foreign policy perception management. Therefore, the newly espoused 'Vision 2030' carries with itself values which seem to be more neo-liberal in character and speak of a transitional transformation which places individual liberties and a free market culture at the centre of the institution of governance. The envisaged aim of the TSP is to lay the foundation for 'Vision 2030' to be characterised by the attainment of the following national goals:

- Improved Governance and the Rule of Law.
- Re-orientation of the country towards Democracy.
- Upholding Freedoms of Expression and Association.
- Peace and National Unity.
- Respect for Human and Property Rights.
- Attainment of Responsive Public Institutions.
- Broad based Citizenry Participation in national and socio-economic development programmes.
- Political and Economic Re-engagement with the global community.
- Creation of a Competitive and Friendly Business Environment.
- Enhanced domestic and foreign investment.
- An aggressive fight against all forms of Corruption.

2.6 The Second Republic and the Economic Policy Philosophical Change

The post-2018 election economic policy shift is in tandem with the state's position in furthering a new political image management position. This is chiefly underpinned on the need to project a political culture which is viewed as less conservative to radical position of the Mugabe era. The rise of Emmerson Mnangagwa as the President of Zimbabwe in November 2017 has been presented as a germinal step towards a progressive shift of power in Zimbabwe since 1980. This is because the Mnangagwa administration clearly demonstrated a departure from essentialist narratives which influenced the trajectory of pro-Black empowerment. Ndlovu (2018) argues that this marked a departure from rigid nationalism to fluid and liberal expressions of statecraft. Prior to this dramatic transition, several memoirs about Mugabe depict his political career as densely Machiavellian and imbedded in despotic essentialism (Holand, 2008). The despotic framing of the Mugabe rule is largely rooted on the economic policies he pursued in the advancement of a concentrated anti-colonial capital drive.

In this regard, Mugabe's fall has been perceived as an onslaught to Zimbabwe's pan-Africanist political decorum which challenged the monopoly of Western guided ideas of democracy which challenged the post-colonial economic indigenisation policies. To some extent, the current discourse of re-engagement has been criminalised for potentially subjecting Zimbabwe to Western economic exploitation and ideological degradation at the expense of previously celebrated moral standards of pan-Africanism advanced by Mugabe.

Mugabeism advanced Zimbabwe's disconnection from the West (Mugabe, 2001). Mugabe's 'anti-settler' economic reforms positioned him as more of an organic post-colonial African leader committed to economic empowerment virtues of pan-

Africanism (Mahomva, 2014; Mahomva & Moyo 2015). However, Mugabe's indigenisation policies have been labelled as concealed measures for promoting primitive accumulation, corruption and cronyism. On the other hand, Mugabe's vocal inclination to challenging the asymmetrical global order of power popularised him as a defender of Global-South decolonial aspirations. This explains why his reign was characterised by the prominence of the realignment of property rights from colonial to absolute indigenous ownership. The 'Open for Business' policy position serves as a contrast to the radicalisation of the politics of economic ownership under Mugabe.

Thus, to some extent, his exit from power has been viewed as the demise of the anti-Western capital policy position. This emanates from the paranoia towards the newly implemented position of encouraging massive privatisation of the economy. In some sections of Zimbabwe, Mugabe's fall has been perceived as an onslaught to Zimbabwe's pan-Africanist political decorum which challenged the monopoly of Western ideas to democracy and post-colonial indigenisation policy frameworks. As a result, the emphasis on the rule of law with under-currencies of framing a new diplomatic appeal to attract Western affinity in the TSP is generally regarded as a departure from the nationalist vanguard rhetoric which cemented the populist erstwhile economic policies under Mugabe.

In the conservative quotas of ZANU-PF and Government, the current discourse of re-engagement has been criminalised for potentially subjecting Zimbabwe to Western economic exploitation and ideological degradation at the expense of previously celebrated moral standards of pro-nationalist policies advanced by Mugabe. This crisis of ideological morality in the Zimbabwean political discourse suggests how political transitions convey ideological shifts. At the same time exposing the interconnection of ideology and political contradictions.

This is also evident when one considers the conflicting positions on Mugabe's legacy. This conceives the need for in-depth considerations on what his exit from Zimbabwean politics means to policy, particularly with regards to terms of diplomatic re-engagement. This is because the domestic policies initiated by the ruling Government were largely hostile to foreign capital –the West in particular.

2.7 Chapter Summary

The chapter captured various facilitating agents of political transitions in a bid to demonstrate how policy-making is influenced by the same. The chapter further exposed that economic issues raised at the centre of agitating political transitions in any given space. The historical and ideological antecedents used to map the eccentricity of political transitions located how political transitions emanate from a given socio-genesis. In this respect, it is clear that political transitions in Africa emanate and graduate from a point shared experiences and fraternal epistemic commitments to disrupt the colonial (dis)order. Key arguments around economic policy making were also presented with a few to account for the existing knowledge around the three key policies under study. The ultimate submission of this chapter is that while election life-cycles have conceived new policies there is a clear indication of a culture of discontinuities in the life-cycle of policy objectives. This represents the neo-patrimonial dilemma which has been clearly noted in the way policy-making advances partisan interests and shifts in ideology which emanate from the ruling's interest to consolidate its power in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the major discontinuity which has been observed in the study is that of the transition from the First to the Second- Republic. This has seen the proliferation of pro-liberal and market related policy politicking at the expense of the traditionally embraced pro-majority economic policy-making. As a result, the TSP symbolises a more external relations perception

management policy framework which is aimed at attracting the sympathy of 'erstwhile' Western antagonist states to Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The chapter presents the ontology and the epistemology of the study by unpacking the approaches used to corroborate the findings. Attention is given to research design, validity and reliability testing, data presentation and analysis, limitations and delimitations as well as ethical considerations. Focus is also placed outlining how research respondents were recruited for the study. Data collection and analysis is also outlined in this chapter to give the study empirical value.

3.2 The Research Design

The research design embodies of the assumed course in the operationalization of an academic investigation. The qualitative approach is applied to validate the epistemological and ontological assumptions of this study. The recruitment model for the respondents and data collection further cement the study's findings. Berg (2001) defines these key elements to the implementation of a study as the research design.

The study adopted qualitative research methodology. The Qualitative approach is critical in developing and enhancing a critical understanding of what determines dimensions the character of society, power and economics (Creswell, 2009). The qualitative method gave an expanse grounding for the researcher to interact with respondents, as well as enabling high quality analysis and interpretation of data (Creswell, 2014). The qualitative approach assisted in unravelling the underlying constructs of the driving factors to political transitions and their effects on economic architecture. The multi-sectoral structure of policy-making which involves bureaucratic systems, the public and the private sector calls for an inclusive assessment in the analysis of policy creation in Zimbabwe. The challenges encountered in

sustaining the values of objectives of policies in the pursuit of national development require grassroots engagement and interrogation of existing frameworks considered to serve public interests emanating from legal instruments, local and central government. It is from this perspective that the qualitative approach became the preferred tool for engaging the subject under investigation.

The objectives of the study and research problem justify the adoption of the qualitative approach. The qualitative research approach easily captures the emerging perspectives on the subject of policy continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe and the overall subject of policy-architecture in Zimbabwe in the context of the cited political transitions. The exploratory facet of the study is based on the illustrative case of the:

- Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy;
- Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation and the;
- Transitional Stabilisation Programme.

The above mentioned policies gave the study a reflective lens in the understanding of economic policy continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe. Some crucial issues emerging from this investigation were largely subjective and depended on a gamut of textural perspectives and individual opinions. This is why the use of a qualitative approach couches the essential themes of the study.

3.3 Research Methodology

Methodology entails the approaches used acquire, consolidate and analyse data. Burns, et al (2004: 36) define “methodology as a logical group of methods that complement one another and that can fit to deliver data and findings that will reflect the research question and suit the research purpose”. Groove (2003:488) state that “methodology

includes the design, planning, sample, methodological limitations, and the data collection and analysis techniques employed in a study”. The qualitative paradigm assumes that reality is subjective, and the researcher interacts with the researched phenomena Winsker (2001).

Content analysis was also exploited for the examine data on policy-making in Zimbabwe. Content analysis is also critical in the trace of documented history on the subject; as well as gathering the value found in other documents such as government reports, legal statutes, press and academic documents. It was through such critical documentary analysis that the researcher was able to understand how political transitions have influenced economic policy architecture continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe. The need for a historical trace of issues around policy architecture in Zimbabwe. This is because the first decade after independence was characterised by transitional inequalities and administrative constraints whose impact on policy-making may have been of disadvantage to national development. Since then, public policy has been problematized for not producing viable terms for enhancing the livelihoods security of the general populace which continues to live in poverty. This can be noted through the decline in various public service fronts such as welfare, education and health.

The second decade also presents a broader economic crisis which invites the need for an enquiry within the context of policy continuities and discontinuities. As such, a critical assessment of this case is made possible by the various variables that the research interacts with in a bid to understand the environment of policy-making in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018.

3.4 Population and Sampling

Two Parliamentary Portfolio Committees were engaged for the data gathering exercise. These were namely the:

- a) Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment and;
- b) Finance and Economic Planning.

Ten Committee Members from different political party representations were interviewed from the two Parliamentary Portfolio Committees respectively. The idea was to draw cross sectional views from Zimbabwe's political landscape since Members of Parliament represent widespread demographic attitudes on the issues around policy architecture. 10 Key informants were also identified from Government Departments and 6 political party officials from both the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC-Alliance.

This is because policies are produced by political elites cascade to the downward stream of the political hierarchy. Due to that, the comprehension of policy architecture in Zimbabwe cannot be achieved in the absence of the views of political elected political leaders and groups directly affected by a particular policy and the citizenry. The engagement of these actors in the research process helped in the gathering of useful information about the subject under study (Brenda 2015).

3.5 Recruitment of respondents

3.5.1 Purposive sampling

Recruitment of research respondents was conducted through purposive selection. Berg (2001) notes that purposive sampling involves the selection of research respondents through researcher's knowledge or expertise. The researcher used his personal

knowledge of the study site to identify the research respondents especially on the part of Government officials and strategic political party officials.

Purposive sampling enabled the researcher to select respondents based on the qualities they possess, proficiency and their knowledge on economic policy-making in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018. This is the reason why the key population sample was extracted from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. Creswell and Plano (2011 p 8) highlight that the process of purposive sampling “involves identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest.” This validates the engagement of academics with extensive knowledge on policy-making. Likewise, this includes engaging various stakeholders directly affected by the implementation of certain policies or lack thereof. As such, Marshall (1996: 523) buttresses this by noting that purposive sampling entails that “the most productive sample is selected to answer the research questions.” Through this approach, the researcher should have an informed appreciation of the circumstances surrounding a particular issue in order to gather the accurate narratives and phenomenological experiences concerning a given subject. This further compliments the view that “purposive sampling is a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the study are taken by the researcher” Mason (2002: 12). On that note, the researcher confined the purposive sampling to the following: Ministry Officials, traditional leaders, specific private sector representative organs and ordinary citizens.

3.6 Data Collection Methods

3.6.1 In-depth Interviews

The study adopted in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews facilitated eliciting subjective accounts from Government officials, Political Party Officials, Members of Parliament, and Government officials as they outlined their experiences on the impact of economic policy continuities and discontinuities. Conducting in-depth interviews with these valuable stakeholders reinforced that the provided data was reflective of the first-hand experience they share on issues in question. In-depth interviews allowed the researcher to converse with the respondents using follow-up questions particularly to open-ended questions.

Interviews created the space for objective conversation. Interviews eliminated chances of non-response as the researcher made needed appointments in advance. By their very objective character, interviews offered validity and reliability to an academic interrogation (Bricki and Green, 2007). As a result, the recommendable interview questions are those that are open-ended (Gill, 2008: 292). Open-ended interviews profit the researcher as they yield abundant information compared to closed-ended interview questions.

3.7 Key-informants Interviews

In complementing in-depth interviews, the study utilised key-informant interviews. Key informant interviews included government officials and political party officials. The key informants were chosen on the pretext of their knowledge about the national economic policies under investigation and direct involvement in some political processes under study.

3.8 Documentary Search

Data was obtained from relevant sources through documentary search. This is primarily because the research itself is an analysis on policy blueprints –which are typically documentary. The assessed policy documents include the:

- a) Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy;
- b) Zim-ASSET
- c) TSP
- d) STERP
- e) ZANU-PF 2013 and 2018 Manifesto (s)

It was critical for the research to engage political processes which gave birth to economic blueprints. As such, there was also need to scan through parliamentary reports and other public documents. It is in the context of this reality that documentary search became a critical part of this study. An expansive collage of written materials can engender qualitative information. Such documents may be key important in providing a broad understanding of the functions of institutions and their governance (Hancock, 2009). Through vigorous interaction with the written, the researcher may establish deep-rooted detail on a phenomena Winsker (2001). This is why the research indiscriminately engaged all literature on policy making in Zimbabwe in order to synergize various dimensions of the subject to the parameters of the study.

The cited documentary sources include electronic journals, policy reports, newsletters, public and conference publications, websites and other government publications. Documentary sources play a critical role in complementing the weakness of other data collection methods such as interview guides. It is on the basis of the stated merits that the study assumed a documentary inclination.

3.9 Data Collection and Instruments

3.9.1 Thematic analysis

Thematic analysis was applied to unpack and organise data. Thematic analysis is largely the common qualitative data analysis technique employed in the social and behavioral sciences (Guest, 2012). The procedure of thematic analysis comprised of reading through information gathered in interviews and categorizing themes in the data, and then interpreting the structure and content of the theme. The central reason of using thematic analysis was to identify patterns of meaning across a data that offer an answer to the issues being addressed. Through thematic analysis, patterns were identified through a conscientious technique of data familiarization, data coding, and theme development and revision (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis encompasses identification of frequently surfacing themes within data extracted from the field.

Data analysis was conducted in seven stages. The initial process of data analysis took its course in the field during in-depth interviews and key informant interviews. Notes were compiled from the interviews to establish a link between the views of the research subject and its key tenets. Upon completion of the fieldwork the compiled notes had to be converted to comprehensive transcripts. These transcripts were labelled and grouped for easy identification.

Following expansion field notes, initial codes were generated. These were three broad codes embodying the three extensive objectives of the study. Sub-codes were also produced to compliment the established broad codes. These sub-codes were informed by the theoretical underpinnings of the study and sub-topics of the literature review.

The third stage involved searching for themes. Themes were identified through recurring issues about the blueprints under study.

The fourth stage involved reviewing the themes to assess whether they were parallel to the objectives, theory, and literature review. The gathered themes were then grouped to formulate the core subject matter of the study –policy continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe.

The sixth stage was the presentation of the data which constituted the fourth chapter.

Lastly, data was analysed and discussed using the objectives of the study, theoretical underpinnings, and the literature reviewed. This constituted chapter five of the thesis which also places recommendations to the study.

3.9.2 Content Analysis

Content analysis was used to analyse written, verbal or visual communication messages (Kimberly, 2002). Content analysis allowed the researcher to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data. Through content analysis, it was possible to distil emerging issues from interviews into fewer content related categories (Guest, 2012). Content analysis is a research method for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context. The key purpose for content analysis is to: generate unexplored avenues of thought; knowledge gap bridging; and mapping the course to formulate a core subject matter on an issue (Krippendorff, 2004).

3.10 Reliability and Validity

The presented subject and evidence of the study was assembled from data cross-referenced between interviews and documentary sources in a course of triangulation. It was imperative to prove that the research was framed and conducted in such a way that it accurately identified and described the phenomenon that was investigated. To

this end, numerous sources of evidence and methods were used to project the validity of the findings and the interpretation of the data. The precise information generated from different sources was used to shape the structure of the study. However, this does not forego the constraint of establishing reliability and validity, hence the use of multiple sources.

3.11 Ethical considerations

The researcher sought permission from the prospective research respondents to interview them. Fouke & Mantzourou (2011:4) affirm the view that respondents must consent to their participation: "person knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and in a clear and manifest way, gives his consent". After being granted the permission to interview, the researcher had to brief prospective research respondents about the purpose of the research. In briefing emphasis was made in reference to the nature of the study – it is only for academic purposes. The researcher must consider that the study must maximize on the benefit of the target population and minimize harm. The research should both benefit the society and minimize any potential harm to participants and the community. Beauchamp and Childress (2001:23) give an instructive highlight of the need for "the principle of beneficence includes the professional mandate to do effective and significant research to better serve and promote the welfare of our constituents".

The researcher also notified prospective research respondents that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any given time. Prospective research respondents were assured that their information was going to be held confidential to circumvent vulnerability and victimisation.

3.12 Chapter Summary

The chapter submitted epistemological assumptions which underpin the methods utilised in the study. The chapter was divided into seven sections. The first section was the research design. Within the research design, the outline of how the research was operationalised was presented. The next section which dealt with recruitment of research respondents highlights how research respondents were recruited for the study. The following section dealt with issues surrounding data collection in the study. After the section on data collection, the following section described and justified the methods used in the study to gather data. The following sections described how data was analysed. The next section discussed how ethical issues were tackled in the study. Lastly, the closing section presented a synopsis of what was discussed in the chapter.

CHAPTER 4 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

The chapter presents findings of the study. The findings are based on twenty in-depth interviews with Members of the two key Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. Key informant interviews with Government officials and Political Party Officials also aided in coming up with the findings of the study. Data was also acquired from relevant sources through documentary search. This is primarily because the research itself is an analysis on policy blueprints –which are typically documentary. Content analysis was also exercised to locate tallies between the textual, verbal and theoretical links of the findings. The discussion is categorised into broad thematic areas which capture the key objectives of the study and the core research questions on the impact of political transitions on economic architecture in Zimbabwe.

4.2. The Political transitions and Economic Policy-making in Zimbabwe: 2008-2018

Election processes have been at the centre of Zimbabwean political transitions. The initial transfer of power which gave birth to Zimbabwe in 1980 was plebiscite facilitated. While elections serve as an urgent for democracy, it must be noted that elections legitimise processes of policy creation, consolidation and abortion (Moyo, 1992). This explains why the lifecycle of elections has been mainly defined in terms of successive economic programmes of action. Office tenures emanating from electoral mandates give the direction and lifespan of economic policies. It is in election campaign messages where the agenda for economic development is framed (Simpser, 2013). In light of this reality, this section of the study unpacks key findings on the role of elections in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018 in ushering political shifts whose

legitimacy was couched on immediate economic road-map prescriptions. The key submission here is that election campaigns market economic policy proposals. Some sections of the ZANU 2013 election manifesto are analysed to substantiate this position. The second input of this section is to explain by means of empirical findings that upon receiving election mandates political parties consolidate their power and interests through economic policy-making (Simpser, 2013). To support this, evidence on the policy products of compromise during the Inclusive Government era is highlighted. Aspects of policy continuities and discontinuities are highlighted with a view to highlight the effects of political transitions on economic policy architecture. As such, ZANU-PF's continued economic policy re-engineering between 2008 and 2018 can be situated in the recorded milestones of the land-reform policy which was a precursor to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act:

Fast track land redistribution undermined the underlying logic of settler-colonial agrarian relations founded on racial monopoly control over land that deprived peasants of land-based social reproduction and compelled cheap agrarian labour supplies. Redistribution reversed racial patterns of land ownership and broadened access to land across the ethnically diverse provinces, while replacing most private agricultural property rights with land user rights on public property. (Moyo 2011: 944a).

Further to this, there is need to question if economic policy-making has been ardently inclined on challenging white colonial monopoly power. This section also highlights the extent to which ZANU-PF has continued to be a beneficiary of electoral transitional dynamics in terms of economic policy construction. Samukele Hadebe, Former Principal Director in the Office the Former Prime Minister of Zimbabwe (Morgan Tsvangirai) backs this assertion:

Zimbabwe earnestly began engagement with the West following the Inclusive Government from 2009, it kept the trade in diamonds and the returns outside the control of both Ministers of Finance, his Trade and Industry counterpart who were not from ZANU PF. The reason being the issue of selective sanctions against ZANU PF leaders. In a way, although Zimbabwe was opening up and had pressure of socio-economic decline, it still controlled how much it opened up, especially on the lucrative diamonds. (Interview, 15 October, 2019)

This explains the popularity of the discourse of egalitarianism, and the politics of economic indigenisation and this section harnesses the underpinning logic of these two aspects which have aided the mainstreaming of economic policy creation. The role of the opposition is also assessed as an antithesis urgent for economic policies implemented by ZANU-PF.

4.2.1 The Dynamics of the GNU Inclusivity and Reality of Transitional Compromises.

As a follow-up to the contested 2008 election outcome, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed in 2009. The GNU was comprised of The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led by President Robert Mugabe and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political parties, MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC-M led by Arthur Mutambara (GoZ, 2018). A Negotiator of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which conceived the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 and ZANU-PF's Politburo Secretary for Finance, Patrick Chinamasa (Interview 10 October, 2019) submits that the political circumstances of the post-2008 election influenced power compromises which affected high-level decision-making in the Inclusive Government. It is argued that the GNU was a product of an election outcome which was:

... tilted in favour of the then opposition political party (MDC-T). The harmonized elections had no outright winner for the country's top post, leading to the holding of a run-off which failed the intended objective, as the other contestant withdrew, citing massive violence perpetrated by the ruling party ZANU-PF. The results did indicate that though ZANU-PF claimed the presidency on technical grounds, it was difficult to form a legitimate government to address the wishes of not only the majority of Zimbabweans but also of the large sections of international community. (Guzura & Chigora, 2011:1)

Chinamasa states that the initial transitional dilemma to Zimbabwe's economic policy structure was 'the banning of the printing of the Zimbabwe Dollar by the Central Bank at the behest of the GNU appointed Finance Minister, Tendai Biti'. This resulted in the formalisation of a multi-currency system which never gave an opportunity for the local currency to trade or compete with other currencies. The ZANU-PF Secretary for Finance Patrick Chinamasa (Interview 10 October, 2019) further posits that the economic policy implementation during that time was mainly hinged on 'comprises since the GNU stripped ZANU-PF of political dominance' emanating from 'the competitive and contested outcome of the 2008 election which fostered a GNU'. This indicates that the transitional compromises had a bearing on decision-making. Chinamasa further argues that 'The state came under pressure and had to make landmark policy-changes. We had to make a lot of policy shifts to attend opposition mounting pressure and the influence of foreign forces to our politics'. Chigora and Guzura (2001: 1) substantiates this position by indicating that the space for economic reform was intensely influenced by a:

a hot political contestation dating back to the year 2000 with the entry onto the scene, of a new political party formed by civil society groups, challenging the once dominant political party that had brought Zimbabwe independence through the barrel of the gun. Since the year 2000, there has been deepening

political and economic crisis which ultimately got into 2008, a year when the country held harmonized elections (these included electing leaders at the local council level, representatives to the house of assembly, the senate and the country's top post).

This given position is illustrative of the effects of the political pressure effected by the outcome of the 2008 election and how ZANU-PF had to resort to compromise in terms of its policy positions.

4.2.2 Political Compromise and the Economic Architecture Polarisation 2008 - 2013

Patrick Chinamasa's elaborate position on the currency reforms effected during Tendai Biti's tenure as the Minister of Finance are a reflection of how political transitions affect economic policy architecture. In his view, there was a discontinuity to the monetary policy which feature the Zimbabwe Dollar in the competing basket of currencies. The same abandoned position of having the Zimbabwe Dollar being restored to usher a mono-currency system substantiates that the GNU grounding for compromise was the major reason why the Zimbabwe Dollar was ejected from the basket of currencies until ZANU-PF had gained better political ground after the 2013 election.

It is on this premise that the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was launched in March 2009 and was to be effected as a transitional compromise GNU economic policy (GoZ, 2009). STERP co-existed with the ZANU-PF originated Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP). Tendai Biti, the then GNU Finance Minister lobbied less for the latter as its formation serviced the direct power consolidation interests of ZANU-PF. This view is highlighted in his 2009 Budget Statement when he emphasised that:

The Inclusive Government is founded on certain values that are at the core and epicentre of STERP. The preamble to the GPA acknowledges that ‘the values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all persons without regard to race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, place of origin or birth are the bedrock of our democracy and good governance’. In addition, the GPA itself has a vision of the new Zimbabwean society that is ‘free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality’ STERP is loyal to the above aspirations and values, which are essential and critical to get Zimbabwe moving again. In this regard, the issue of corruption and combating corruption particularly in the public service is vital to the enforcement of the above values. (GoZ 2009: 17-19)

The *prima facie* predominant strategic objective of STERP was to restore economic growth against a backdrop of a protracted economic crisis which had confronted Zimbabwe after the land-reform programme. Sampson & Hawkins (2018: 227):

The overarching strategic objective of this multi-sectoral programme was that of restoring economic growth. This was to be done by freeing up markets and prices, increasing levels of savings and investment, and which together with the exercise of strong fiscal discipline and improved revenue collection would strengthen government’s revenue base. This, in turn, would allow government to rebuild the country’s dilapidated infrastructure and restart basic service delivery.

The objectives of STERP seem to clandestinely echo the longstanding political reforms driven by the opposition since its inception in 1999. The same reform values have also been exported into the opposition’s list for electoral reforms in Zimbabwe. It can be argued that STERP as a blueprint born out of political compromise had nuances of breaking the monopoly and hegemony of the ruling ZANU-PF. This is largely because ZANU-PF was a beneficiary of ‘populist’ policies since the land-reform era (Muzondidya 2004; 2007). In contesting the race essentialist underpinning

characteristic of the economic indigenisation agenda pushed by ZANU-PF, STERP advocated for market liberalisation, enhancement Foreign Direct Investment facilitation. STERP also called for the exercise of strong fiscal discipline and improved revenue collection to strengthen Government's revenue base. The notion of fiscal discipline and consolidation could have been probed by the opposition GNU actors' fear of state-party conflation which sustained ZANU-PF's power-base. On the other hand, ZANU-PF consolidated its political capital through the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP). The indigenisation framework was an outgrowth of The 'Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act' (GoZ, 2008). The Act was passed into law by the ZANU-PF majority in Parliament prior to the 2008 elections. During the GNU a regulatory framework gazetted in 2010 to control the Act was drawn. Samukele Hadebe (15 October, 2019) indicates that this policy was rational in addressing the immediate ideological position of post-independence interests:

First it is important to acknowledge that in principle indigenisation and empowerment laws and policies were noble in intent. But also, the external players would naturally dislike it and where a country has to depend on external support for its sustenance it is only logical that it would be forced to climb down on indigenisation.

It is further argued that the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP) was strongly party driven in character and in its implementation limited consultations were made with other GNU actors. Sampson and Hawkins (2018) argue that the limited inter-Party consultative culture between ZANU-PF and other Inclusive Government parties was demonstrative of the extent to which the party had become dependent on patronage to stay in power. The ZANU-PF controlled Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment was led by Savior Kasukuwere, a

former member of the CIO. This was followed up by the establishment of a National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB). This Board was mandated to ensure compliance to ministerial directives in the implementation of the portfolio's duties. This may justify the allegations of patronage levelled against this policy.

The subject of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment became a successive conduit of the land reform not only as a means of economic empowerment, but as an avenue for power consolidation as noted by one MDC-Alliance Member-Parliament (MP):

ZANU-PF has benefited from its monopoly to swindle public resources, hence the pretence to promote youth empowerment had deliberate biases towards its party loyalists. The process was never inclusive. The whole idea of economic empowerment was also flawed because the mining revenue which was realised has been vaguely accounted for. Community Share Ownership Trust were largely monopolised by ZANU-PF for its political mileage.

Contrary to the above submission, the ZANU-PF narrative on indigenisation and economic empowerment, cast as a logical progression from the local empowerment drive of the land reform exercise as noted in the ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013: 31):

Now Zimbabweans have an historic opportunity to extend the ownership of their land to 14 key sectors of the economy whose control and ownership are in foreign hands as a direct result of colonialism and Rhodesian racist rule. In the same way we have taken back our land as Zimbabweans through the Third Chimurenga, we are now taking back our economy as its rightful owners.

Another respondent, -an MDC-Alliance MP (Interview 09 October, 2019) echoes the above response by stating that:

The economic policies instituted by ZANU-PF were bent on power gains and reducing the influence of the opposition. There has never been sincerity in terms

of attainment of real economic development since the time of the fast-track-land reform.

Basing on the two responses and the submission by Moyo (2011b) it can be valid to argue that economic policy making is linked to election lobbying by political elites. To this end, political parties have competition economic recovery programmes of action they sell through their manifestoes.

Also noting is that while ZANU-PF maintained the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy, the Government of National Unity (GNU) contributed not only to the consolidation of the conflicting political interests of the ruling ZANU-PF and its opposition counterparts of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). Chinamasa (Interview 10 October, 2019) validates this view by starting that ‘While the GNU gave an impression that the new broom would sweep better, an economic steering committee which constituted state actors namely, Emmerson Mnangagwa, General Constantine Chiwenga, George Charamba, Happton Bonyongwe’ among others. This could aptly explain why ZANU-PF managed to consolidate power ahead of the 2013 election. To this end, Raftopolous (2013: 984) concludes: ‘As a result of horrendous state-led violence, the MDCs were prevented from translating this electoral victory into state power, and the ruling party retained its incumbency, at this point through the sheer force of the state’. The competitive currencies of state-craft in the GNU era further validate the alleged reality of policy-making contestations as the inclusivity of the major GPA actors could only be sustained on negotiation and ZANU-PF’s grip to maintain its power in preparing its legitimacy locus standi for the 2013 election.

4.2.3 Hegemony Renewal and Economic Policy-Shifts

The outcome of the 2013 election had a huge bearing on the influence of the Tsvangirai-led MDC. Raftopolous (2013: 971) argues that the ‘2013 Elections in

Zimbabwe ushered in a renewed period of political domination by ZANU (PF) and its President, Robert Mugabe. This election followed five years of a SADC- facilitated Global Political Agreement (GPA), which was put into place after a contested presidential run-off election in June 2008'. In support of this view, Patrick Chinamasa argues that the MDC formations in the GNU lost their political capital as a result of being 'swallowed-up in the comforts of office during the GNU'. 'ZANU-PF was busy consolidating its power and hence its victory in 2013' adds Chinamasa.

As such, ZANU-PF's victory presented a new fate for the opposition against a backdrop of its pro-capitalist rhetoric which had been long criminalised:

the MDC's discourse on democratisation and broadly neo-liberal economic programmes, backed by western countries, was always found wanting, against the redistributive logic of ZANU(PF)'s land reform process, the ideological legacies of the liberation movement, and the discourse of state sovereignty. (Raftopolous 2013: 984).

The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP) reinforced ZANU-PF's predominant populist culture. It was in this period that ZANU-PF consolidated its political support through the Youth Economic Empowerment Fund which was a partnership between the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenization and Empowerment and various financial institutions. The approach assisted in the support mobilisation of the ruling Party as argued by an MDC-Alliance Legislator (Interview 10 October, 2019) who argues that:

Most beneficiaries of the Youth Development Fund were people aligned to ZANU-PF. The people who benefited from those funds were from ZANU-PF structure and close allies of the former minister, Saviour Kasukuwere.

In response to this position, a ZANU-PF elected legislator (Interview 09 October, 2019) argued that 'the funds allocated to the youth were meant to promote

entrepreneurial skills among our youth as a way of dealing with the problem of unemployment'. The two respondents share a contradiction on the underlying objective of the Youth Development Fund which augmented the longstanding indigenisation policy, but one can safely from their submissions that the programme capsuled the interests of the ruling ZANU-PF.

It must be noted that it was during this tenure of ZANU-PF power retention that the ruling Government introduced the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transform (ZIM-ASSET). The policy was premised on four strategic clusters namely: Food security and nutrition, social services and poverty eradication, infrastructure and utilities and value addition and beneficiation (GoZ, 2013).

ZIM-ASSET was a product of the 2013 ZANU-PF Manifesto, the reconfiguration of the policy document from being a party manifesto to being a national blueprint reaffirms the correlation between political transitions and economic policy-formulation in Zimbabwe. The enormous election outcome in favour of ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections conferred ZANU-PF a new mandate to deliver on its 2013 election manifesto which had a strong economic underlying ground of delivering ultimate sovereignty as guided through indigenisation policy. In October 2013, ZANU-PF had a major decision-making stake in terms of law formulation:

ZANU-PF went from being a minority party to enjoying a clear majority in the House of Assembly, increasing the number of its MPs to 160, and thus enjoying a large two-thirds majority (in fact, closer to a three quarters majority) in the lower chamber of 210 representatives. The size of its majority meant that it could ensure the passage of any amendments to the new constitution its leadership saw fit to introduce. (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018:335)

This explains greatly why ZIM-ASSET was crafted by ZANU PF senior leaders and enshrined into the party's campaign manifesto which promised among other things

empowerment of the youths, rehabilitation of roads, schools, provision of health services to all the citizens, shelter and creation of employment especially for the youths. ZIM-ASSET further advanced the continuity of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP). In the President's preamble in the ZIM-ASSET, the Late Robert Mugabe highlighted that: 'Zim Asset was crafted to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenization, empowerment and employment creation which will be largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the country's abundant human and natural resources' (GOZ 2013: 6). This position signals a policy continuity as far as the intravenous relationship of ZIM-ASSET and the IEEP was concerned. However, Hadebe (15 October, 2019) argues that ZIM-ASSET was reduced to a mere propaganda instrument by ZANU-PF: 'Part of the weaknesses was that the ruling party reduced the blueprint to a party propaganda tool but it never effectively publicised it'.

It can be argued that the need to consolidate power by ZANU-PF affected the continuity of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP); at the same time creating the abrupt suspension of the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP). This indicates the extent to which there has been a deliberate reverting to populist economic propensities aimed at entrenching the power of the ruling, but at the same time safeguarding enduring national interests. To this end, Chanamasa (Interview, 10 October, 2019) argues that the notion of policy discontinuities undermines the perpetual essence of policies like ZIM-ASSET:

There is no way any political transition can ignore issues of food security, beneficiation and value-addition, infrastructural development and poverty eradication. The cluster provisions of the ZIM-ASSET blueprint contained an in-depth list of far-reaching Government programmatic interventions.

Through ardent focus on policy quick-wins the policy was illustrative of a broad set of thematic areas to be addressed through various arms of Government (GoZ 2013). It must be noted that in unambiguous contrast to earlier documents, ZIM-ASSET emphasised the importance of results management, an implementation structure. This heightened the urgency for multi-sectoral implementation of thematic monitoring and evaluation of progress. In other words, the common features between ZIM-ASSET and the current Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) relate more deeply to the policy pillars of the preceding economic blueprint. This may suggest continued shift in the culture of policy monitoring.

4.2.4 The ‘New-Dispensation’ and Currencies of Economic Policy Reform?

The demise of Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s political tenure following the civil-military aided transition dubbed the ‘November Coup’ and the subsequent rise of Emmerson Mnangagwa as the President of Zimbabwe in November 2017 marked a landmark political transition in Zimbabwe (Rogers, 2018; Simpson & Hawkins, 2018). The promise for reform which underpinned the Mnangagwa episode has been perceived as a germinal step towards a progressive shift of power in Zimbabwe since 1980. It can be submitted that this unique transitional phase marked a departure from inflexible and hard-core nationalism ushering in a more accommodating political landscape for a friendly business environment. Prior to this dramatic transition, several memoirs about Mugabe depict his political career as densely Machiavellian and imbedded in despotic essentialism (Holland, 2008). However, it must be noted that the abundant criticism of Mugabe’s political life-cycle is largely centred on his shift from reconciliatory economic inclined politics. Muzondidya (2007: 325) argues that the “notions about race and nativism, nationhood and citizenship, rights and entitlements” defined Mugabe’s economic indigenisation policy. As highlighted in the previous section, the

victory score of ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections was incentivised through the radical turn to the indigenisation policy.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) uses the term *Mugabeism* to account for Mugabe's lethal approach to crushing opposition in Zimbabwean politics. This further indicates that economic policy architecture under Mugabe was defined in terms of a radical penchant and hence the land-reform programme has been characterised as a grotesque framing of economic decolonisation under Mugabe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) maintains that apart from its grotesque character, Mugabeism is celebrated for its unambiguous anti-imperial posture and unflinching determination to resisting neo-colonialism. In support of this perspective, Obert Mpofu (11 September, 2019) –one of the longest serving Cabinet Ministers under Robert Mugabe and a post-Mugabe Politburo Member reflects:

In his lifetime, Cde Mugabe became an ideological mantle of our centuries of resistance to colonial hegemony, plunder and exploitation. After independence, he gave a nod to Africa's inaugural land reform programme. This substantiates the magnitude of loyalty he submitted to the liberation creed of this region and Africa at large. Thus, the doyen pan-Africanist Mugabe here is not the person, but he is now an idea representing perennial aspirations to remodel Africa's decolonisation project.

Mpofu further describes Mugabe: 'as the bedrock of Pan-African memory; as a champion and think-tank of reframing the ontological density of Blackness'.

It is undisputable that Mugabe advanced Zimbabwe's disconnection from the West. Mugabe's 'anti-settler' economic reforms positioned him as more of an organic post-colonial African leader committed to economic empowerment virtues of pan-Africanism (Mahomva 2014; Mahomva & Moyo, 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). However, his indigenisation policies have been labelled as concealed measures for promoting primitive accumulation, corruption and cronyism:

While violent state clampdowns on *makorokoza* are not peculiar to the Marange diamond fields, the scale of the violence and the decisiveness of the military intervention stand out. In the Marange, the state eliminated a popular survival economy that continues to exist in the gold sector. This is perhaps because the stakes in diamonds were higher and the interest stronger. Yet the political economy of both gold and diamonds are similar in other ways, and arguably represent a similar anatomy of criminalisation, patronage and accumulation (Mawowa, 2013: 923)

Despite the characterisation the Mugabe era as an epitome of the Zimbabwe's crisis political economy, Mugabe's vocal inclination to challenging the asymmetrical global order of power popularised him as a defender of Global-South decolonial aspirations. Thus, to some extent, his exit from power has been viewed as the demise of the prominence of racially inclined economic policy lobbying. At the same time, the ZANU-PF election rhetoric premised on the ZANU-PF 2018 Manifesto dictum 'Zimbabwe is Open for Business' affirms the reality of an economic policy change. (ZANU-PF Manifesto 2018). In Zimbabwe, Mugabe's fall has been perceived as an onslaught to Zimbabwe's pan-Africanist political decorum which challenged the monopoly of Western ideas to democracy and post-colonial indigenisation policy frameworks. To some extent, the current discourse of re-engagement has been criminalised for potentially subjecting Zimbabwe to Western economic exploitation and ideological manipulations aimed at elevating pro-Western capital interests. This presents the need to locate the logic of economic policy continuities and discontinuities under Emmerson Mnangagwa –Mugabe's successor. Despite these fears, Samukele Hadebe (Interview, 15 October, 2019) argues that Mugabe was a conveniently anti-Western economic proponent. The blatant turn to neo-liberalism by his successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa is reflective of ZANU-PF's penchant for proximity neo-colonial capital: 'ZANU-PF always talked radical left but economically it was always

friendly to capital. Otherwise, how do we explain ESAP? ZANU-PF was very strong on Africanisation of the civil service but not on nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy’.

4.2.5 The Second-Republic’s Transitional Stabilisation Programme: A Return to Neo-liberal Orthodox?

After assuming office following the 2018 election, Emmerson Mnangagwa pursued the ‘Engagement and Re-engagement’ policy under the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP). The bedrock of this policy was linked to promoting macro-economic stability which would increase economic growth to help restore international confidence in Zimbabwe. The second core motive of the TSP was to mobilise funding for clearing the country’s external debt. This saw the new Minister of Finance adopting austerity measures through a policy high fiscal discipline. These measures were part of a broader scheme of restoring Zimbabwe’s capacity to access international credit lines (GoZ, 2019). In summary, the TSP is premised on the following pillars:

- Stabilising the macro-economy, and the financial sector;
- Introducing necessary policy, and institutional reforms, to transform to a private sector led economy and;
- Launching quick-wins to stimulate growth.

In principle, the TSP’s thematic construction is premised on rational budget planning and public expenditure meant to arrest excess public sector spending and weak accountability systems. The second aspect on reform can be linked to the intentions of the policy in fostering behaviour change from the state. Simpson and Hawkins (2018:xi) critic the posturing in this respect of the Command Agriculture:

The extension and expansion of the ‘command agriculture’ programme referenced in this book, a pet project of the new President, carried out with the extensive involvement of the military when he was Mugabe’s deputy, and now backed up by the former Major-General in charge of the portfolio, is a clear sign of the strong elements of continuity at work.

The genetic traits of the state reflect a high degree of continuity in some respects. However, it must be noted that features of discontinuity continue to feature particularly through the re-engagement foreign policy. The normative construct of ‘re-engagement’ from a Zimbabwean perspective is inherently linked to the 2017 November civil-military aided democratic transition. The notion of re-engagement is relatively inclined to the key characteristics of the ‘new-dispensation’; which served as precursor of the Second-Republic born out of the 30 July election of 2018. A respondent who spoke on condition of anonymity problematizes the political shift from a pro-indigenisation to seemingly neo-liberal economic culture:

‘The idea of re-engagement exposes Zimbabwe to neo-colonial subjection. The whole fascination around attracting foreign investment is unrealistic. We cannot fully dependent on unknown investment potential for our national development’ (Interview October, 2019).

A ZANU-PF M.P (Interview 16 October, 2019) who spoke on condition of anonymity also posits that, ‘the whole issue of political reform which my party is bending towards may be a recipe for exiting power. We must not reform to please countries which have imposed sanctions on us. The instruction for reform which we are trying to follow is aimed at helping the opposition to get power’.

In this regard, the TSP as a power-shift blueprint aimed at impacting economic reform depicts transitional driven re-engineering of the country’s policy architecture. The core

motive of this policy change is desired to attract Foreign Direct Investment. Another respondent who is a MDC-A Member of Parliament argues that the reform by ZANU-PF is not sincere and it won't assist the Mnangagwa administration in anyway:

The shooting of citizens to stop the 1 August demo is the highest evidence of ZANU-PF's hypocrisy in showing that the party has moved away from its use of force. So, the international community is watching and Zimbabwe will not be assisted because of the growing human rights abuses under Mnangagwa (Interview 16 October, 2019).

Contrary to the above submission, in essence the TSP heralds a departure from the longstanding political norms which defined the Mugabe era. The ethos of re-engagement pursued by the Mnangagwa administration have been cascaded further to other sectors of the country's economy such as the tourism sector. Through the National Tourism Recovery and Growth Strategy – Vision 2025, Government projects the need to recoup lost market share in the traditional markets of Europe, America, Australia and Japan. The broader aim is to also penetrate new markets in Eastern Europe, China and India in Asia as well as growing the domestic market so as to enhance the contribution of tourism to the national economy. The tourism turnaround strategy aims to increase tourist arrivals from the anticipated 2.7 million in 2018 to over 5.5 million by 2023; as well as growing tourism receipts from US\$1 billion in 2017 to US\$3.5 billion by 2023 (GoZ, 2017). The key aim of this policy commitment is to unlock the much needed contribution to elevating Zimbabwe be a middle-class economy by 2030 as prescribed in our country's main economic blueprint, the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP). The lost market share referred to in the Zimbabwe's 2018 tourism blueprint is linked to the post-land reform period which injured Zimbabwe's image on the international map. Tourism as a single sector

substantiates the Mnangagwa administration's penchant towards a new foreign investment attraction route through an open-market strategy.

Therefore, it may be valid to argue that the re-engagement policy has been relatively framed in terms of Zimbabwe's commitment to re-establish its lost cordial interaction with the West, particularly Britain and America. The call for the removal of sanctions by the Western countries also gives substantial meaning to the motives of the re-engagement policy. Also worth-noting negotiating Zimbabwe's readmission into the Common-Wealth.

Mkodzongi and Lawrence (2019:4-5) castigate the position of re-engagement as it characterises how:

the new political administration, already committed to allowing capital a free rein in key sectors of the economy, will intensify these developments. Since the ousting of Mugabe, there have been reports in the international and national media of many white farmers returning to 'reclaim their land', taking advantage of the reconciliatory tone of the new government, and signalling a dramatic shift from a 'radicalised state'.

Further to that, (Mkodzongi and Lawrence 2019:7) posit that:

The post-Mugabe era is thus likely to witness an intra-elite realignment of political forces to accommodate global capital as a goodwill gesture to imperialism and neo-colonialism. Imperialist sponsored forces are believed to have used underhand tactics in influencing the trajectory of a political transition within ZANU–PF. For example, the British diplomatic mission in Zimbabwe is believed to have played a covert role in ZANU–PF succession struggles that culminated in the dramatic removal of Mugabe by a military coup.

The above incredulity –also shared by ZANU-PF interview respondents is reflective of the insecurity surrounding the state's ideological shift. There is broad consensus

that the TSP as two year foundation (2018-2020) for Vision 2030 is preparing Zimbabwe for a neo-liberal paradigm shift.

The policy's attempts to uproot the longstanding ethos of economic indigenisation as it lobbies transformative manoeuvres for a neo-liberal market economy. In some quarters this position is seen to be ideologically provocative to the broad-based economic indigenisation aspirations which have been long focused on promoting local industrial ingenuity. Samukele Hadebe, castigates this thinking as elusive because history bears testimony to how the politics of indigenisation were:

The only rupture and even a surprise element that even capital was not expecting was the Fast Track Land Reform. It was far-reaching and researchers are still seized with the matter as to why that move was taken and at a precarious time in as far as the economic situation was concerned. You do not initiate ESAP and a decade later expropriate land without compensation, it is a contradiction that capital was not prepared for and history is yet to reveal what actually was happening (15 October, 2019).

At the centre of Vision 2030 is the idea to elevate Zimbabwe to a Middle-Class Economy by 2030 (GoZ 2018). The dilemma of manufacturing a middle-class economy only programmes the economy to produce labour for foreign capital. The desire to condition the Zimbabwean economy for external capital investment is similar to Mills and Herbst (2012)'s recommendation of advancing Africa's economic reform through global market penetration is premised on strong neo-liberal reform dictates which are similar to Zimbabwe's political re-wiring by 2030 through:

- Improved Governance and the Rule of Law.
- Re-orientation of the country towards Democracy.
- Upholding Freedoms of Expression and Association.
- Peace and National Unity.

- Respect for Human and Property Rights.

While the above tenets prescribed in the TSP (2018) are justified in creating a beneficial grounding for political-economic growth, it must be noted that they are deliberately used to entrench Zimbabwe into the pro-West democracy values for attracting capital. In as much as these values have a strong correlation with our enduring national interests, it stands to be noted that their place in the neo-liberal matrices of the TSP may be a posture for legitimacy for Zimbabwe to qualify for Western-aid. For that reason, might this imply that the discontinuation of the indigenisation trajectory and its subsequent replacement by a neo-liberal turn is the ‘end of history?’

This shift in economic policy-making is a political transitional effect which one respondent (Interview 10 October, 2019) defines as: ‘The major reason for our suffering. Those in power are concerned about boosting the country’s political image to Western countries at the expense of the povo. The West is not even recognising the efforts we are making’. This view is further complimented by another academic who spoke out on condition of anonymity (Interview 10 October, 2019):

I am struggling to make sense of the policy shifts. A mass party must have policies that resonate with the majority. I am not sure if the experiment of ‘opening up’ will work. We could be experiencing our own ‘glasnost’ and ‘perrstroika’ moments which precipitated the demise of the USSR. Maybe there is a concealed wisdom in the party’s policies, but for now I cannot discern it.

The resonance of reason between the two respondents suggests the relevance of an anti-West emotions with regards to the grounding for economic policy-making. This position is informed by the inequalities inherited from colonialism and the centrality of the nationalist movement (in this case, ZANU-PF) as a cog for unity against

economic neo-imperialism. As a result, the seeming departure from the nationalist values under the TSP is regarded as an ideological value collapse on the side of the ruling.

4.3 Economic Policy-making: A Struggle for National or Partisan Interest?

Policy-making is a series of planning, adoption and implementation of a plan of action aimed at servicing matters public interest. Policy-making serves as a structured mapping and evaluation of problem-solving mechanisms over a given period of time. Beland and Cox (2013) define policy-making as a set of ideas which define common interests and are implemented to satisfy public interests. Given the notion of public interest involved in policy-making, it is important to argue that policy-making may either be political serving or be guided national interest. The underpinning ideological premise for a policy can indicate if its core motive is either partisan or national. As highlighted, the introduction of the IEEP was based on collective aspirations to democratise the ownership of the means of production. The major justification being that of breaking the monopoly of historical inequalities. This also saw the same policy being used to secure power consolidation interests of the ruling ZANU-PF. Given this background, it can be argued that economic policy-making is founded on the twin biases of partisan and national interests. This explains why the indigenisation agenda is has been castigated as a pro-establishment policy which was used political mobilisation for the ruling ZANU-PF. The reference made to indigenisation as a core national project in the 2013 ZANU-PF Manifesto emphasises the reality of how policies are manipulated set political agendas. At the same time, this could indicate how certain policies resonate with certain traditional ideological patterns. Since its establishment the indigenisation policy has been synonymously juxtaposed with the nationalist economic decolonisation stance.

The introduction of the STERP was an extension of the Inclusive Government's cohabitation terms. After the GNU ended STERP was aborted. The short-lived character of STERP is illustrative of how policy-making may be an expression of transitional effects. Further to this, policy-making is grounded on short term political interests. However, it must also be noted that while some policies tend to be short-lived as a result changing dynamics of power their core objectives are subject to inclusion in the continuity of policy-change. This is because public interests continue to be perennial and changing less for the good.

In the case of ZIM-ASSET, the adaptation of issues pronounced in the ZANU-PF 2013 election Manifesto as policy reflects how political actors set the political agenda in any case of transition.

The TSP and its thematic remodelling of political economy issues in Zimbabwe substantiates how political transitions facilitate a transformation in the norming of political parties. This has been noted through ZANU-PF's premise of re-engagement discourse which is seemingly turning neo-liberal as highlighted in the TSP. Samukele Hadebe (15 October, 2019) warns the ruling for taking a route which seeks to satisfy standards which secure foreign capital at the expense of popular opinion and rationale to economic policy making:

The Mnangagwa administration, a beneficiary of the change and people's goodwill ...What was needed were bald steps towards opening up Zimbabwe politically before 'Opening it for business' as business gets cue from citizens. My fear is that, if nothing gives in, Zimbabwe's transition shall abort and the consequences to dire to contemplate.

It is the view of the researcher that the opening up of Zimbabwe political as recommended by Hadebe broadly speaks to a deliberate position to return to politically

sensible terms of promoting economic indigenisation under clearly defined terms which address the historical marginalities of the majority of the country's populace. Anything else, is policy-making which is disengaged from the perennial aspirations of the country as far as locating the majority at the centre of owning the means of production. This is chiefly because sustainable social contracts are imbedded on ideas which resonate with the interests of the majority and any signs of policy architecture which is disengaged from a people's past and their philosophy of freedom is detrimental to political interests of those bestowed with the power to govern. There is need to reinforce political interests with national interests. A departure from what is perceived as national interest is a threat to political interest. Political interest is sustained by national interest, so for politicians to stay in power, their policies must be in sync with national goals and aspirations. On this premise; 'The economy dictates the politics. Political parties might claim to differ in policies and even ideological inclinations, but when economic conditions dictate certain trajectories the politics follows suit' Samukele Hadebe (2019).

4.4 Chapter Summary

The chapter highlighted the post-colonial state's entanglement in competing nativist and neo-liberal philosophies in its enduring struggle for resource management and the harnessing of capital. In light of this broad perspective, a detailed zoom-in to the electorally incentivised transitions in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018 stirs the discussion in substantiating the reality of political transitions in impacting economic policy architecture. To this effect, the chapter discussed: *The Dynamics of the GNU Inclusivity and Reality of Transitional Compromises*. The third section of the data presentation and analysis focused on: *The Second-Republic's Transitional Stabilisation Programme: A Return to Neo-liberal Orthodox?* The final section

discussed the intravenous relationship between the role of national and political interest in influencing policy formulation. Given the context of political transitions pinned down to economic policy creation, the chapter concludes economic policy architecture cannot be disengaged from interchanging power shifts. The political transitions experienced in Zimbabwe between have served as a source for policy continuities and discontinuities. Far beyond the given, policy architecture must be informed by rational political interests which house the aspirations and values of the national questions of the day.

CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter discusses the findings of the study following a deep exploration of the effects of political transitions in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018. Based on the theoretical underpinnings of the study, reviewed literature and applied research methods, the study substantiates the extent to which political transitions affect economic policy making in Zimbabwe. To this end, policy continuities and discontinuities serve as a key defining mark to the challenge of policy making which has been strongly rooted on politicisation of decision-making in Zimbabwe. To give an empirical grounding to this position, the core grounding to arriving at this position was derived from a critical appreciation of the following economic blueprints:

- The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy (2008);
- The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-ASSET, 2013); and the;
- The Transitional Stabilization Programme (2018).

5.2 Summary

The noted pitfalls to policy-making question in Zimbabwe which have led to continuities and discontinuities offers a reflective highlight of the underpinning factors to power contestations in Zimbabwe. The study substantiates this through a critical analysis of the power assertion wrangles in the GNU arrangement and how at the same time the key characteristics of compromise facilitated convergences with regards to policy creation.

After regaining its political traction in 2013, the ruling Party exploited its influence in Government to secure immediate self-serving interests. This is noted with regards to how ZIM-ASSET was launched to consolidate power at the same time entrenching the longevity of ZANU-PF. It also stands to be noted that with the same policy pro-people distribution characteristics of policy-making were central in the promotion of entrepreneurship. The continued embrace of pro-establishment power consolidation aiding policies suggests the hidden justification of policies such as STERP. The STERP blueprint was perceived to be feeding into the direct interests of the opposition in arresting the monopoly of the ruling ZANU-PF during the GNU.

As such, the continuities in this policy direction are indicative of how policy-making has been perpetually manipulated to consolidate power at the same time offering a one-sided transition to power. To give an epochal explanation to the subject at hand, the problem is situated in Zimbabwe's election life-cycles between 2008 and 2013. The run-up to the 2018 election also provides an informative point of analysis to this problem particularly how the discontinuities to radical policy pronouncements of economic indigenisation have since been substituted by the "Zimbabwe is Open for Business" mantra while the erstwhile anti-West rhetoric has been replaced by the ruling's propensity for re-integration with the West.

This shift in the country's policy direction presents a problem of uncertainty on whether the Mnangagwa-led administration is curating a new environment for inclusive and national interest driven policy-making to replace the old order characterised by partisan power consolidation policy-making habits. At the same time, this also probed the need to locate how the departure from the economic indigenization trajectory serves as an entry-point for a neo-liberal economic aimed at political image management and perception on the part of the new administration.

The study historically located the effects of political power shift on economic policy construction in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018. This enquiry was prompted by the need to investigate the cross-cutting public assertions and academic discussions which suggest how election driven transitions between 2008 and 2018 have been either pro-people or they have been populist to advance power consolidation interests of the ruling party.

5.3 Conclusions

The ultimate submission of this chapter is that while election life-cycles have conceived new policies there is a clear indication of a culture of discontinuities in the life-cycle of policy objectives. This represents the neo-patrimonial dilemma which has been clearly noted in the way policy-making advances partisan interests and shifts in ideology which emanate from the ruling's interest to consolidate its power in Zimbabwe. The major discontinuity which has been observed in the study is that of the transition from the First to the Second- Republic. This has seen the proliferation of pro-liberal and market related policy politicking at the expense of the traditionally embraced pro-majority economic policy-making. As a result, the TSP symbolises a more external relations perception management policy framework which is aimed at attracting the sympathy of 'erstwhile' Western antagonist states to Zimbabwe.

5.4 Implications

The study indicates that the premise to policy-making in Africa is fixated on a historical and ideological position to facilitate equitable economic growth. This explains why the subject of economic indigenization has been at the centre of the policy continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwean politics. To this end, the empowerment drive has been continued to serve a dual purpose of power consolidation

and addressing economic imbalances. The role of economic policy-making as a colonial delinking project in African is critical in understanding the perpetual essence of Indigenisation politics. This explains why the same policy was largely affected in the GNU period. The state directed reversal of this policy after the 2018 election may have a bearing in foreign investment attraction, but it's worth noting that the departure from Indigenisation may be reflective of lack of ideological sincerity to the initial inception of the policy by the ruling ZANU-PF.

The study further suggests the state runs the risk of disengaging economic policy making from the enduring national values if it adopts fully the neo-liberal turn prescribed through the TSP of 2018.

5.5 Recommendations

- Policy-creation must be directed towards servicing enduring national values beyond competing and narrow political interests.
- Continuity of economic policy overdrives must be largely enshrined in permanent national interests beyond political expediency.
- Economic policy making must transcend the rationality of distribution agendas which have no bearing on economic development.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Interview guide



My name is Richard Runyararo Mahomva and I am doing a Master of Science in Public Policy and Governance at Africa University in Zimbabwe. In partial fulfilment of the Degree Programme, I am conducting a research on Political transitions and economic policy architecture in Zimbabwe: Continuities and Discontinuities, 2008 To 2018. I kindly request that you be a participant in this research by responding to the questions below. My email address rasmkhonto@gmail.com. You have the right not to answer questions you are not comfortable with or to discontinue the interview.

This study has been approved by Africa University, and received ethics clearance through the Africa University Research Ethics Committee (AUREC).

Name

.....

Age.....

Sex

☐ M

☐ F

Highest level of education

Semi-structured interview questions

1. Between 2008 and 2018 what would you consider to be the key features of political transitions in Zimbabwe?
2. What is the relationship between political transitions and economic policy-making?
3. Is economic policy-making tied down to power consolidation interests or enduring national interests?

a. Please briefly explain

4. Where do you locate the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act in the context of political transitional dynamics?
5. Was ZIMASSET a justifiable economic blueprint after the 2013 Election?
6. Is the Transitional Stabilisation Programme a reflection of the politically anchored continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe's economic policy architecture?

a. Please briefly explain

7. What lessons can be drawn from the nexus between political transitional processes and economic development?
8. To what extent were the economic policies enacted between 2008 and 2018 reflective of ideological shifts and political interest consolidation of the ruling ZANU-PF?
9. What are the prospects and the challenges of the set policy environment with regards to promoting sustainable and pro-people economic policy-making?
10. Any other comment or contribution?

END

Thank you for your time